Paolo Carozza Comments on Pontiff's MessageSOUTH BEND, Indiana, JAN. 9, 2007 (Zenit.org).- On the World Day of Peace, Benedict XVI warned that the path to peace will be uncertain and wayward if it is not paved with a "true integral humanism."
According to Paolo Carozza, the words of Benedict XVI reaffirm what Pope John Paul II had said about peace being the fruit of relationships of justice and solidarity.
Carozza, a law professor at the University of Notre Dame and a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, shared with ZENIT how Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace highlighted the role of principles such as the dignity of life, religious freedom and equality among all persons in working toward peace.
Part 2 of this interview will appear Wednesday.
Q: The title of Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace, "The Human Person, the Heart of Peace," addresses the rights and dignity of the human person as the path to peace. In what ways does this confront the conventional wisdom of the international diplomatic community?
Carozza: There certainly is a sharp difference between this vision and an approach to peace based merely on the diplomatic, economic, and military relations between sovereign states that some approaches to international peace and security would emphasize. Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which Benedict XVI's point is not new, but in fact picks up and strengthens an understanding of the path to peace that has been present to a significant degree in global affairs at least since World War II.
The architects of the post-1945 international order were highly conscious of the relationship between outrages to the dignity of the human person and the tragedy of war, and that link can already be seen clearly in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the Pope himself recognizes in the message.
In fact, I would say that in much of the world the strong connection between peace and the rights and dignity of the person is now accepted as self-evident. One can see it in the way that the language and politics of human rights has permeated everything from international trade to post-conflict institution building to environmental protection.
Where Benedict XVI goes much further than the prevailing mentality is in his insistence that it is not enough to simply assert -- however correctly -- the link between peace and human dignity. To make that connection real and concrete, not just an abstract ideal or intuition of the truth, one needs to cultivate an adequate and objective understanding of what the human person is, and what human dignity requires.
Benedict XVI thus takes us back to what Mary Ann Glendon has referred to as the "unfinished business" of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the question of its foundations. For 60 years the international community has largely proceeded to try to develop and realize human rights though positive law while prescinding from any sustained effort to reach common understandings of their underlying source and scope.
In short, the difference between the vision in Benedict XVI's message and the conventional wisdom of international affairs is not so much in the affirmation that the dignity and rights of the human person are the path to peace, but rather in the Pope's warning that that path will be uncertain, unstable and wayward without a "true integral humanism" that embraces the whole human person as a concrete, given reality -- without reduction, without manipulation, and without ideology.
Q: Natural law is a central theme in the Pope's message, and he sees it as a point of convergence among the various cultures and civilizations, rather than a peculiarly Western idea. Why is natural law an important component for peace?
Carozza: Perhaps the most eloquent answer to this question is not in the words of the Pope's message or in any explanation of it that we could give, but in the witness of his presence in Turkey and the way that in great simplicity he was able to bridge what seems to many an unfathomable chasm in human understanding. He did so by a profound appreciation for and firm focus on what is common to every human heart.
In that recognition of our common humanity lies the only path to a peace that is more than merely the absence of violent conflict. As John Paul II often emphasized and Benedict XVI reaffirms in this message, peace is the fruit of relationships of justice and solidarity, a mutual and genuine commitment to the good of one another. And that commitment only arises out of the mutual recognition of what we share -- the original needs and desires of every human heart.
Thus Benedict XVI stresses that the personal commitment that is required of us to renew the world in peace and justice can only be realized on the basis of "respect for the 'grammar' written on human hearts by the Creator."
Recognition of the natural law is essential not in the first instance as a set of moral rules or restraints, but simply as an acknowledgment of certain truths about every human being and of what is conducive to human flourishing because of the way that we have all been created.
Or to see it from the contrary perspective, one cannot build peace -- in the thick sense of relationships of justice and solidarity -- on the basis of false or weak and uncertain notions of what constitutes the fulfillment of the human heart. On the contrary, as the Pope points out, such relativism invites the victory of power over truth and freedom.
Q: It seems implicit that Benedict XVI's exhortations to reconsider and take seriously the role of reason require a major engagement with the natural law. Because the dialogue of cultures hinges on the acceptance of reason, how can the Church help other cultures, religions and societies engage the natural law tradition of inquiry?
Carozza: The Pope has written in his first encyclical, "Deus Caritas Est," that it is not the role of the Church to bring about justice in the world, but rather to help purify reason by fostering an openness of mind and will, and to liberate reason from its blind spots and self-limitation so that in seeking justice we are able to act more fully in accord with the nature of every human being.
This means first that the task of the Church is to present with clarity and reasonableness the wealth of her teaching, and to propose to the world the insights she has gained from her experience of humanity.
Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace is itself a lucid example of this: It does not pretend to provide solutions -- let alone detailed blueprints -- about how to achieve peace and justice, but educates us by reminding us of the central importance of such principles as the gift of life, freedom of religion, the natural equality of all persons, the destiny of the created world, and so on.
It is up to us to be the bearers of these truths in our work and to generate thereby a culture of "authentic integral humanism" that is capable of transcending cultural divides.
The most important locus for engaging the natural law tradition and fostering a radical openness of reason, therefore, is above all in ourselves. Only if we are attentive first to the education of our own hearts and the purification of our own reason, can we act in the world with the clarity and certainty necessary to engage every person and every culture in a genuine dialogue about what is good for human persons.
Without that affection for the truth of one's own life, even the natural law can easily be reduced from the ground of cross-cultural understanding to a meaningless formalism or an imposition.
Q: The Pope stated: "Peace requires the establishment of a clear boundary between what is at man's disposal and what is not." Can you explain in more detail what he means by this? How can that boundary be established?
Carozza: In several places in this text Benedict XVI shows an acute concern that has consistently marked his thought and teaching more generally, both as Cardinal Ratzinger and since becoming Pope: If nothing is beyond the bounds of human possession and instrumentalization, then there is ultimately no possibility of safeguarding human dignity and freedom.
The phrase quoted in the question raises this preoccupation in the particular context of a discussion of "gift" and "life." Recognizing that our life is given, and not created by us to use as we will, is the first indispensable step toward protecting all human rights with consistency.
The boundary between what is ours to use and what is not, and thus the boundary between inviolable human rights and merely conventional norms, begins with the protection of human life in all the contexts where it is most vulnerable to being reduced to the measure of its material usefulness and disposed of at the will of the more powerful.
The Holy Father mentions, in particular, victims of armed conflict, terrorism and other forms of violence, as well as the "silent deaths" caused by hunger, abortion, euthanasia and experimentation on human embryos.
It is worth highlighting, too, that Benedict XVI explains the fundamental importance of religious freedom along the same lines. By existing beyond the boundaries of what is ours to possess and use, the relationship between the human person and a transcendent "other" is a keystone holding up the edifice of all other human rights.
[Wednesday: Building an Integral Humanism]
Paolo Carozza on Building an Integral HumanismSOUTH BEND, Indiana, JAN. 10, 2007 (Zenit.org).- Benedict XVI's exhortation on the World Day of Peace to strengthen and clarify our reason, and not settle for weak or diluted anthropological visions, is essential to the challenge of building an integral humanism.
So says Paolo Carozza, a law professor at the University of Notre Dame and a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
He shared with ZENIT how Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace stresses the dignity of the human person, the common good, true advocacy of human rights and the use of transcendent principles in developing international law.
Part 1 of this interview appeared Tuesday.
Q: The heart of the Pope's message seems to be that the path to peace is grounded in a proper anthropology of the human person, in which man is understood as having inherent dignity by virtue of being created in the "imago Dei," as well as a transcendent end. But are there forums in the international community where this "integral humanism" is taken seriously?
Carozza: By its own nature the ideal of integral humanism is one that always demands renewed personal commitment and deeper understanding about the good of human persons in new and different historical and cultural circumstances -- so in a certain sense it is never fully realized but always only in progress.
At the same time, all international fora and institutions were in some way created in response to real, tangible human needs -- for example, as responses to crises or out of a growing awareness of human interdependence and the necessity of coordinating activity for the common good.
Thus, at some level, they all contain within them an important degree of inherent concern for authentic human goods, even if it is always only imperfectly realized. It is important, therefore, always to seek and strengthen those good and constructive elements, while clearly working to resist or "prune" whatever is contrary to them.
This is often a difficult judgment to make because it requires us to steer a course that avoids both an uncritical acceptance of internationalism for its own sake and also an unreflective rejection of international institutions and processes in response to the fact that some of them are very unhealthy.
This is exactly why Benedict XVI's exhortation to strengthen and clarify our reason and not settle for weak or diluted anthropological visions is so essential to the challenge.
Ultimately, a consistent concern for integral humanism in international fora will only be present to the extent that there are individuals there who give it voice and take action consistently with it.
I am happy to say that in my experience of working in international law and institutions there are such persons, and it is always an encouragement and inspiration to encounter them, sometimes in most unexpected ways and places. But there is no doubt that the need is even greater, by far.
First, the world of global affairs desperately needs more people, especially young professionals whose reason and hearts are educated to appreciate the breadth and depth of the dignity of human persons, to dedicate themselves to constructing peace and justice in the world. Secondly, there is a great need for strengthened unity among the disparate individuals already present in these institutions, a unity of conscience and judgment.
In building up that integral humanism, we should not forget that it is not only intergovernmental institutions that are the relevant actors. There is enormous potential today for civil society organizations to contribute, or to undermine, the ideal.
For example, two of the international nongovernmental associations that I am most familiar with that do tremendous good in promoting true humanism today are the World Youth Alliance and the Association of Volunteers in International Service.
Q: In what ways does the vision of human rights advocated by Benedict XVI diverge from the conception of human rights espoused by many international organizations that the Pope says actually divests them of their authority as advocates for the rights of persons?
Carozza: The Pope's use of the word "authority" here is very interesting. Obviously he does not mean authority merely in the sense of the fact of being able to exercise power, or even in the technical juridical sense of having the legal warrant to make decisions and take action.
He refers to the moral authority that ultimately grounds and justifies those actions and exercises of power. And that kind of authority is founded in the common good, which is the total set of conditions allowing for individual persons and groups to reach their fulfillment more easily.
Where international institutions are in fact undermining the common good, they do not have the authority, in the fullest sense, to act or to expect our cooperation even though they might have the factual power and positive legal license to do so. This happens in the world today any time that organizations fail to respect and safeguard the basic rights of persons, to promote social well-being and development, or to foster the stability and security of a just order.
Although Benedict XVI does not say so directly, he knows well that there is one specific issue in particular that threatens to compromise the authority of a wide array of international organizations, and that is abortion.
It is no secret that there has been for some time a very intense and sustained effort on the part of powerful interests to advance access to abortion globally through the influence of international institutions, and that must be one of the prime examples of what Benedict XVI is implicitly referring to, especially in light of his prior, beautiful reminder that "life is a gift which is not completely at the disposal of the subject."
Q: The Pope's message included an exhortation to apply the principles of international law to new forms of conflict and violence, including terrorism. How might this be done? What contributions can the Church make to such a conversation?
Carozza: When existing international law no longer is completely adequate to address new realities and global concerns -- whether it is forms of conflict and violence, new technologies affecting human dignity, new ecological threats, or other problems -- the most reasonable response is not to discard international law, which is an essential tool for the realization of the universal common good generally, but to provoke its development and adaptation to those new circumstances.
One of the critical ways to do so is to recall and insist on the underlying fundamental principles that gave the law its direction and meaning, so that any new rules and practices still adhere to and respect the basic human goods that animated the prior legal order. That consistent insistence on transcendent principles is a tremendously important contribution that the Church makes to global debate.
With regard to the problems posed by contemporary forms of violence, for instance, Benedict XVI rightly points out certain requirements that must be maintained in any evolution of the rules of armed conflict and humanitarian law: that noncombatants be protected and not targeted; and that there must be clear ethical limits on methods of guaranteeing internal security -- such as, presumably, the prohibition on torture.
When these principles and similar ones are maintained with sufficient conviction and resolve, the freedom of international law to change in response to the demands of the common good is enhanced, not diminished.
Q: Significantly, the Pope makes reference to the growing competition for energy sources and its potential for international conflict and war. In what ways can an anthropology of integral humanism and Catholic social doctrine address this problem?
Carozza: The problem, of course, is generated by the multiplicity of interests in possessing and controlling scarce resources. While it is played out through highly complex dynamics in diplomatic, economic and military arenas, it is most fundamentally a problem of the human heart and its relationship to the goods of creation.
Without the growth of the virtue of solidarity, without an increased consciousness of the common destiny of all human persons, and without an education to the meaning and purpose of the things we possess and use, any resolution in the struggle to acquire energy resources or other scarce goods will be no more than a temporary truce, or the partial victory of one power or interest over another.
To generate a lasting solution, therefore, we must start with an adequate appreciation of the person, and of the common stewardship of mankind over the goods of creation, for the benefit of all. Catholic social doctrine is nothing other than this -- a distillation of "what is in accord with the nature of every human being" (as the Pope wrote in "Deus Caritas Est"), and thus an aid to the attainment of justice and peace.
Friday, January 12, 2007
Thursday, January 11, 2007
Edited: a review of the book
I probably won't buy the book ($60+!), but I may have to check it out for the sake of being thorough.
V. Bradley Lewis
Can a Christian be a Democrat? or The Common Good and the Modern State
The Common Good in Classical Political Philosophy
Michael Waldstein: The Common Good in St. Thomas and John Paul II
SEP Natural Law Tradition in Ethics
righteousness is certainly linked to rectus (straight); and justice is the straightness of the will, with respect to others
How is righteousness understood within a scriptural context, or within Christian theology or the Tradition itself? What is its definition? And is Aquinas' conception of justice, particularly general or legal justice, really that alien to "righteousness"? (How are religion and general justice the same, and how are they different?)
What is the etymology of ius? Is the Greek dike closer to righteousness than iustitia, and if so, why? What is the etymology of justice or iustitia?
What about holiness and righteousness? Holiness and sacred? Is a contrast between sacred and profane necessary? Does the definition of sacred necessarily involve the notion of the profane? It would seem so. Something is sacred it if is set apart for God; it is used only for functions related to the divine.
But this is not the same contrast as between holy and sinfulness? If there is only one end, then one is either holy or one isn't. One is either holy or one is in the state of sin. (What is the actual opposite of holiness? Sinfulness? Or something else?) One who is holy is set upon God as the ultimate end, and orders everything towards Him; but is holiness therefore a synonym of righteousness?
Tuesday, January 09, 2007
Debating the Role of Self-InterestBy Father John Flynn
ROME, JAN. 8, 2006 (Zenit.org).- Economic issues figured prominently among the end-of-year summaries offered by the media and commentators. The Christmas frenzy always brings with it concerns over excessive consumerism, added to which were reflections about inequality and the need for greater opportunities for developing nations.
Among the many analyses of these issues a couple of recent books are of interest. The first is "The Moral Ecology of Markets: Assessing Claims about Markets and Justice," by economist and theologian Daniel Finn.
The market economy is criticized for many shortcomings, but amid this debate most economists prefer to concentrate on empirical analysis, leaving aside questions of moral judgments. Nevertheless, Finn observes, morality forms an ineluctable part of our daily lives.
One problem when it comes to debating the morality of economic issues is the great variety of positions. The starting points and assumptions vary widely, according to what part of the political spectrum people occupy. Finn hopes to achieve in his book a common framework in which to examine key issues related to the market economy.
He starts by arguing that an adequate analysis of markets, whether it be from a supportive or critical perspective, must include a consideration of the moral underpinnings. The most obvious starting point for this is to look at the concept of self-interest.
Defenders of markets, Finn explained, follow in the footsteps of Adam Smith, and claim that good results can arise from complex systems of human interaction even when the individuals are not intending to generate those good outcomes. Egoism and greed no doubt exist, but through the mediation of markets, self-interest can work for the good.
Saints or sinners?
The concept of self-interest is not without its critics, continues Finn. For example, a theory that makes no distinction between a Mother Teresa and a thief -- positing that both are acting to further their respective self-interests -- is deficient. A description of the world that cannot distinguish between vice and virtue, saint or sinner, martyr or murderer, is seriously lacking in the ability to describe life's realities.
Other critics of self-interest point to problems such as large inequalities in wealth, and insufficient protection for the weak as evidence of the limitations of a system based on the pursuit of self-interest. Critics respond, Finn observes, by arguing that it is wrong to blame the market for all the evils in our society, which can stem from a variety of causes and cultural factors.
But defenders of the market face greater difficulties in responding to the accusation that a system based on self-interest foments greed. Defenders of the market point to its role in promoting virtues such as hard work, initiative and creativity, but critics point out that the utilitarian habit of basing actions on self-interest tends to spread into all areas of life, eventually undermining the moral standards on which the market itself depends.
When it comes to economic tasks such as the allocation and distribution of resources the free market does indeed have many advantages, concludes Finn. But economic production is just part of our lives and the application of behavior based on self-interest in other areas can create problems.
Even within the economic realm, acting solely on self-interest can sometimes not be enough. Finn cites the case of a consumer faced with the option of choosing between two products, one cheaper than the other because it is produced in a sweatshop. Self-interest would lead the consumer to opt for the cheaper product, but if the producer has success in selling these goods, it could reinforce the existence of exploitative work conditions.
This leads Finn to conclude that it is wrong to automatically suppose that it is either always morally wrong or right to act out of self-interest. The moral evaluation of any action in the market depends on a series of factors related to the context and the results.
Similarly, when it comes to a judgment of the market itself, Finn points out that it is not a simple choice between a free market or a centralized planning system. In practice, markets exist within a complex system of boundaries, or "fences" as he terms them, regarding their operation. The decision as to where these fences should be placed varies widely from situation to situation. In addition, markets exist within a social, political and cultural context that cannot be ignored.
Another recently published book on the subject of markets is "Adam's Fallacy: A Guide to Economic Theology," by Duncan Foley, economics professor at the New School for Social Research.
Like Finn, this author examines in detail the concept of self-interest in relation to markets, albeit in a more historical and less rigorously analytical way. The Adam referred to by Foley is Adam Smith, author of the classic economic text, "The Wealth of Nations."
The fallacy, according to Foley, "lies in the idea that it is possible to separate an economic sphere of life, in which the pursuit of self-interest is guided by objective laws to a socially beneficent outcome, from the rest of social life, in which the pursuit of self-interest is morally problematic and has to be weighed against other ends."
In his analysis of how markets work, Foley admits that the concept of pursuing self-interest proposed by Smith has a lot of sense and realism, but to describe it as a positive good is another question, he argues. The bulk of the book is then devoted to a synthesis of economic ideas put forward by a number of economic thinkers in the last couple of centuries.
In concluding, Foley comments that Smith himself realized better than many subsequent economic thinkers the limits of self-interest and the market. In addition to defending the advantages of a market system, Smith also recognized the need for political institutions to channel and control the operations of capital.
Contemporary capitalism is a successful system for the creation of wealth, but, Foley maintains, it is not some sort of automatic process inherent in human nature. Economic institutions are fragile and contingent and need to be shaped and guided. In addition, understanding how an economy works does not mean we should subsume our moral judgment to the logic of the market. Economic development brings with it many changes for society and culture, but the mistake would be to accept all these changes as something inevitable.
In the spirit of looking to complement and shape the operation of a market system, the Catholic Church proposes the virtue of charity. Benedict XVI, in his encyclical "Deus Caritas Est," explained that: "Building a just social and civil order, wherein each person receives what is his or her due, is an essential task which every generation must take up anew" (No. 28).
This is essentially a political task, in which the Church does not play a direct role, the Pope said. Yet the Church can contribute to this effort. "She has to play her part through rational argument and she has to reawaken the spiritual energy without which justice, which always demands sacrifice, cannot prevail and prosper."
One of arguments put forward by the Church concerns the role of love. "There is no ordering of the state so just that it can eliminate the need for a service of love," stated the Pontiff. "Whoever wants to eliminate love is preparing to eliminate man as such." This is worth keeping in mind when looking at how markets work.
In music, order is imposed onto matter (progression of notes or sounds). This is not a form of naturalism--one is not replicating within the musical composition some order within nature. Still, can one chord be said to be better than another? Or is a tonal system better than an atonal system? Can there be order within an atonal system? Or is atonality an arbitrary restriction imposed by the mind, which goes against something else that is more proper to beauty?
How do notes amplify one another? Work with or harmonize?
What about rhythm? Do some combinations sound more pleasant than others? For a reason? What of harmony and dissonance? Tones and pitches? Can quantity be used to discover "natural" relationships between tones and values?
Monday, January 08, 2007
Robert Audi coming to SCU... I don't think SCU will switch away from analytic philosophy back towards the Catholic intellectual tradition any time soon...
Professor Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, will be giving a series entitled, "Emotion and Motivation, Obligation and Virtue," on Tuesdays, Jan. 9th, 16th, 23rd, and 30th, 4-5 pm, Bannan Engineering, Room 325. Co-sponsored by the Dept. of Philosophy & the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics. Supported in part by the Fagothey Fund. Questions: Contact Janis Davis, firstname.lastname@example.org, or David DeCosse, ddecosse @scu.edu.
Paul Hurley, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Claremont McKenna College, will be the Austin J. Fagothey Professor in Spring quarter 2007. Professor Hurley was in the Dept. of Philosophy at Pomona College from 1988 until 2006. He is a three-time teaching award recipient. His specialties are Ethics, Political Philosophy, and Philosophy of Law.