Syllogistic reasoning with intermediate quantifiers (pdf)
Intermediate Quantities: Logic, Linguistics, and Aristotelian Semantics
A bunch of sellers are dumping this book for $9.00. I wonder if that says something about its quality.
"On the Logic of 'Few,' 'Many,' and 'Most'"
He has another book, Fact Proposition Event
Info about the book.
Bases his work on Zeno Vendler? ucalgary
Linguistic analysis + ? (any influences from Noam Chomsky?)
Steve Bayne, "Nominalization and agent causation:Vendler/Chisholm"
The Nominalization Template
"Nominalization in Kavalan"
"Creative Discovery in the Lexical 'Validation Gap'"
"Generating Expressions Referring to Eventualities"
"Knowledge, Belief, and Category Mistakes: A Solution" (alt)
"Category Mistakes in M&E"
"Ontology in Formal Semantics and Lexical Semantics"
On the typology of state/change of state alternations
Max Kistler, Causes as events and facts
A finite-state approach to even semantics
Gerundive nominals and the role of aspect
The language of propositions and events (download the thesis)
HIST-Analytic
Monday, September 04, 2006
Richard John Tierney
He wrote this thesis: Essence and explanation in Aristotle's philosophy of science and philosophy of nature
info here
info here
Abstract
This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between essence and explanation in Aristotle's philosophy of science and philosophy of nature. My central theme is that Aristotle's concept of the nature of a substance ties these two areas of his philosophy together. In his philosophy of science it manifests itself in the notion of the essential nature of a kind, in his philosophy of nature it finds its expression in the essential potentialities of a substance. I argue that the explanatory dimension of Aristotle's philosophy of science lies not in his concept of scientific demonstration but in its implicit recourse to a substance's essential potentialities.
A scientific demonstration, I maintain, does not constitute an explanation, nor does it involve explanation in performing its demonstrative function. Rather, demonstration gives rise to understanding; the apprehension that something belongs in the essential nature of a kind. I call this scientific exposition, rather than scientific explanation.
In order to 'recover' the explanatory dimension of Aristotle's philosophy of science I consider, first, the structure of his essentialism, and second, his metaphysics of change in which the notions of potentiality and actuality play a central role. It is in these two aspects of his philosophy that the substantial content of Aristotle's definition of 'nature' (phusis) is located. A nature, according to Aristotle, is a principle of change belonging to a thing in itself; but what is essential to a kind consists of what belongs to the members of the kind in itself, and a potentiality is defined as a principle of change.
It is through this link that Aristotle's philosophy of science finds its underlying explanatory dimension. For when, through scientific demonstrations, we 'unpack' the essential nature of a kind, what we lay bare are the essential potentialities of each of the members of the kind, the actualizations of which constitute the various changes that those substances may undergo. That is, we lay bare what it is in the nature of things that accounts for their behavior in various diverse circumstances.
Andrea Falcon's webpage
here
Hrm, snazzy website. Haven't read her books...
From an abstract:
The study of the soul is not a part of the science of nature? I don't know if Aristotle makes this claim. What did I read recently that was making this point? Oh never mind, I think it was Fr. Brock's paper for the Thomistic Institute. He was arguing that the soul is studied both in natural philosophy and in the metaphysics, and he was citing certain texts within Aristotle's De Anima. I'll have to reread the third book.
As for the celestial world having an influence on the soul--perhaps Aristotle does not include the soul as being under the influence of the celestial world because he believes it to be spiritual (and hence free, etc.).
I'll have to see if BC has this book and see what texts she cites to make her claims.
It turns out she wrote the SEP entry on causality. (The housemate reminded me that the aitia are enumerated by Plato; he must have been talking about the Phaedo.)
From the entry:
Hrm, snazzy website. Haven't read her books...
From an abstract:
COLLOQUIA & CONFERENCES ARISTOTLE AND THE SCIENCE OF NATURE
Andrea Falcon
Department of Philosophy
Virginia Tech
February 3, 2005
Thursday, 4:00pm-6:00pm
BA (Close/Hipp) 008
In the opening lines of the Meteorology Aristotle outlines a program for the investigation of the natural world. I will focus on this program and show that Aristotle's science of nature is structured in a certain way and this structure is crucially dependent upon a particular conception of the natural world. Aristotle conceives of the natural world as a causal system in which the only direction of explanation is from the celestial to the sublunary world. A full appreciation of this conception will help the reader to understand the precise sense in which Aristotle's science of nature is a distinctly organized science. I will also argue that the opening lines of the Meteorology presuppose a strong grasp of the boundaries of the science of nature. Tellingly, the study of the soul is not mentioned in the opening lines of the Meteorology. Elsewhere Aristotle makes it abundantly clear that the study of the soul is preliminary to the study of life, but it is not a part of the science of nature. I will focus on the problematic relation between science of nature and study of the soul and the unique status of the De anima in the Aristotelian corpus.
The study of the soul is not a part of the science of nature? I don't know if Aristotle makes this claim. What did I read recently that was making this point? Oh never mind, I think it was Fr. Brock's paper for the Thomistic Institute. He was arguing that the soul is studied both in natural philosophy and in the metaphysics, and he was citing certain texts within Aristotle's De Anima. I'll have to reread the third book.
As for the celestial world having an influence on the soul--perhaps Aristotle does not include the soul as being under the influence of the celestial world because he believes it to be spiritual (and hence free, etc.).
I'll have to see if BC has this book and see what texts she cites to make her claims.
It turns out she wrote the SEP entry on causality. (The housemate reminded me that the aitia are enumerated by Plato; he must have been talking about the Phaedo.)
From the entry:
Aristotle was not the first person to engage in a causal investigation of the world around us. From the very beginning, and independently of Aristotle, the investigation of the natural world consisted in the search for the relevant causes of a variety of natural phenomena. From the Phaedo, for example, we learn that the so-called “inquiry into nature” consisted in a search for “the causes of each thing; why each thing comes into existence, why it goes out of existence, why it exists” (96 a 6-10). In this tradition of investigation, the search for causes was a search for answers to the question “why?”. Both in the Physics and in the Metaphysics Aristotle places himself in direct continuity with this tradition.
Konrad Lorenz notes
Recommended by C. Blum. I haven't had a chance to read Konrad Lorenz's books yet, but they may be prove to be useful; what are his views on evolution? Lorenz is considered to be the founder of ethology, that part of zoology which studies behavior. iirc, Dr. Blum's main reason for his endorsement was Lorenz's acceptance of teleology as a form of scientific explanation--animal behavior is purposive and his method as a naturalist -- trying to observe animals without interference or contrived experiments.
King Solomon's Ring (Routledge Classic edition)
Nobel Prize bio
autobiography
wiki entry on Lorenz, ethology, imprinting
Konrad Lorenz and imprinting
Konrad Lorenz, Classical Ethology, and Imprinting (pdf)
animalbehavioronline.com
Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen
Other links:
Konrad Lorenz Institute
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Ethology
Sympsium: "Origins of Ethology"
Look up: Max Planck Institutes
King Solomon's Ring (Routledge Classic edition)
Nobel Prize bio
autobiography
wiki entry on Lorenz, ethology, imprinting
Konrad Lorenz and imprinting
Konrad Lorenz, Classical Ethology, and Imprinting (pdf)
animalbehavioronline.com
Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen
Other links:
Konrad Lorenz Institute
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Ethology
Sympsium: "Origins of Ethology"
Look up: Max Planck Institutes
Suggestions from the Philosopher
Not Aristotle, but my housemate.
The keynote lecture at the 27th annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign this year piqued my interest. The keynote lecture was "Ethics and the Collapse of Civilization" by Jonathan Lear (John U. Nef Distinguished Service Professor, Committee on Social Thought, Department of Philosophy, the University of Chicago). (I think he is also married to Gabriel Richardson Lear.) I asked my housemate what he thought of him, but he couldn't offer anything substantive that I can recall.
The theme for this year's philosophy graduate student conference at Fordham this year was
"The Future of Philosophy." I was going to write something on the impact of peak oil on universities in general, and philosophy in particular, and the vocation of a Catholic philosopher.
Now that it is passed, looking at the conference program as a Catholic, my reaction is "Who really cares?" I don't really see anything that would be of interest to the general public, just to a small group of people with certain specialties.
Another version of "geekdom"? Perhaps.
I asked the Philosopher what would be some good classical texts discussing the nature and purpose of philosophy.
Plato's dialogues: Philebus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedrus
(To look at the arguments for the superiority of the philosophical life to all others.)
To these I would have added the practical bent of classical Confucianism.
Then I would proceed with a historical examination of the decline of the Greek schools and see if any comparisons could be drawn between their situation and the current state of universities in the United States.
Then some judgments:
(1) It would become increasingly difficult for departments of philosophy to justify their existence in universities that were oriented towards job training and other practical ends. (Unless philosophy departments made bioethics and business ethics courses a big component of their programs.)
(2) A lot of discredit that has fallen upon philosophy as an "academic discipline" is due to academic philosophers themselves.
(3) Universities themselves may be put out of business by peak oil, since the economy would not be able to sustain the existence of so many, and the job-training and skills they offered would become mostly irrelevant to economies that would have to shift towards becoming localized and less oil- and technology-dependent.
Followed perhaps by a recommendation that philosophers, if they sincerely loved truth and pursued it, should ready themselves for the upcoming economic downturn by finding a job they could handle, and offer their teaching for free, for those who were interested.
My housemate also recommended Roger Scruton's Thinkers of the New Left (plus, of course, The Meaning of Conservatism)--I don't think I would find much in Scruton that would be of interest to me, though I should note that last I heard, he will be giving lectures (on aesthetics) for the Institute for the Psychological Sciences.
I was also thinking of writing something for the American Maritain Association conference this year, but decided that it wouldn't be worth the time and expense, since I wasn't sure where I would be this semester and if I would have funds. My topic? Biological structuralism and Aristotelianism. I still hope I can finish up the paper, and submit it to a journal.
Whoopee... there's a blog for people to post info about upcoming philosophy conferences.
social decline (Jonathan Lear)
The keynote lecture at the 27th annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign this year piqued my interest. The keynote lecture was "Ethics and the Collapse of Civilization" by Jonathan Lear (John U. Nef Distinguished Service Professor, Committee on Social Thought, Department of Philosophy, the University of Chicago). (I think he is also married to Gabriel Richardson Lear.) I asked my housemate what he thought of him, but he couldn't offer anything substantive that I can recall.
The theme for this year's philosophy graduate student conference at Fordham this year was
"The Future of Philosophy." I was going to write something on the impact of peak oil on universities in general, and philosophy in particular, and the vocation of a Catholic philosopher.
Now that it is passed, looking at the conference program as a Catholic, my reaction is "Who really cares?" I don't really see anything that would be of interest to the general public, just to a small group of people with certain specialties.
Another version of "geekdom"? Perhaps.
I asked the Philosopher what would be some good classical texts discussing the nature and purpose of philosophy.
Plato's dialogues: Philebus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedrus
(To look at the arguments for the superiority of the philosophical life to all others.)
To these I would have added the practical bent of classical Confucianism.
Then I would proceed with a historical examination of the decline of the Greek schools and see if any comparisons could be drawn between their situation and the current state of universities in the United States.
Then some judgments:
(1) It would become increasingly difficult for departments of philosophy to justify their existence in universities that were oriented towards job training and other practical ends. (Unless philosophy departments made bioethics and business ethics courses a big component of their programs.)
(2) A lot of discredit that has fallen upon philosophy as an "academic discipline" is due to academic philosophers themselves.
(3) Universities themselves may be put out of business by peak oil, since the economy would not be able to sustain the existence of so many, and the job-training and skills they offered would become mostly irrelevant to economies that would have to shift towards becoming localized and less oil- and technology-dependent.
Followed perhaps by a recommendation that philosophers, if they sincerely loved truth and pursued it, should ready themselves for the upcoming economic downturn by finding a job they could handle, and offer their teaching for free, for those who were interested.
My housemate also recommended Roger Scruton's Thinkers of the New Left (plus, of course, The Meaning of Conservatism)--I don't think I would find much in Scruton that would be of interest to me, though I should note that last I heard, he will be giving lectures (on aesthetics) for the Institute for the Psychological Sciences.
I was also thinking of writing something for the American Maritain Association conference this year, but decided that it wouldn't be worth the time and expense, since I wasn't sure where I would be this semester and if I would have funds. My topic? Biological structuralism and Aristotelianism. I still hope I can finish up the paper, and submit it to a journal.
Whoopee... there's a blog for people to post info about upcoming philosophy conferences.
social decline (Jonathan Lear)
Some questions about corporations and property
Corporations -- were guilds defined as a corporation under civil law? What of any social body?
How is legal personhood defined? In terms of rights and powers that belong to the person. It seems then it is possible that there is no necessary connection between legal personhood and a Lockean right to property. Are the property rights of a private association different from that of a political community? Must a corporation have the same rights as its members?
Can property be defined apart from the rights? Does use (or consumption) always entail [transfer of] ownership? (Is the reception of a gift equivalent to taking ownership of it?)
Are there any problems with legal personhood that are intrinsic to the notion itself? Is it necessary that we conceive of a community as a substantial whole in order to consider it as a "person"? (I think the answer is no.)
What happens to legal justice when applied to relations between corporations? Does everything reduce to commutative justice? (Does commutative justice exist between communities?)
How is legal personhood defined? In terms of rights and powers that belong to the person. It seems then it is possible that there is no necessary connection between legal personhood and a Lockean right to property. Are the property rights of a private association different from that of a political community? Must a corporation have the same rights as its members?
Can property be defined apart from the rights? Does use (or consumption) always entail [transfer of] ownership? (Is the reception of a gift equivalent to taking ownership of it?)
Are there any problems with legal personhood that are intrinsic to the notion itself? Is it necessary that we conceive of a community as a substantial whole in order to consider it as a "person"? (I think the answer is no.)
What happens to legal justice when applied to relations between corporations? Does everything reduce to commutative justice? (Does commutative justice exist between communities?)
Subsistit vs. est
Pontificator has two posts on the use of subsistit in Lumen Gentium.
The first post summarizes an article by Karl Josef Becker, S.J. The second is from "The Ecclesiology of the Constitution of the Church, Vatican II, Lumen Gentium," by Cardinal Ratzinger and the CDF.
The first post summarizes an article by Karl Josef Becker, S.J. The second is from "The Ecclesiology of the Constitution of the Church, Vatican II, Lumen Gentium," by Cardinal Ratzinger and the CDF.
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