Thursday, February 26, 2009
On the "Right of Association"
A continuation of this post. (The examination proceeds with an exclusive focus on justice, rather than charity, because no political state can enforce the precepts of charity. Only God can.)
Can a member of a political community be forced to remain a part of that community, simply because he no longer wishes to live with them? Or if they do not share the same conception of the good life?
It seems to me that one can choose to dissociate or separate from others because they are a bad influence or do not share the same goals. For example, the virtuous man may have to separate himself from bad friends. What then if the political community becomes so degenerate that one cannot live in it, because it is not pursuing the right end? It seems that the virtuous man should leave, and take his family with him. (It might be easier for a man living "on his own" to cope with a degenerate society, but I don't think it would be healthy for him to stay too long. Certainly that community would continue to be a source of temptation.)
This does not mean that society is not natural or that one's happiness does not consist in living with others. What it does mean is that as a result of Adam's fall and men's sins, one may not only separate from others, but it is prudent and even right to do so when his fellow-men do not seek to live virtuously, and are sources of scandal to him. One could even say that in such a case, a minority of the righteous has been rejected by the others; by rejecting the righteous they give up their claims to their aid and support in justice. (The example of the righteous man, Lot.)
Nonetheless, can the government compel a person to remain in the community? We may instantly reject such coercion as being wrong and unjust, but let me put forth an argument in defense of it.
Because of economic interdependence and the division of labor, the virtuous man may be needed for the community to survive. To take an extreme case, what if he is the only farmer, supplying all of the food for the rest of the community? Also, what is to be done about one's obligations in justice--making a return for the past benefits received from that community? While one should fulfill these obligations, it could be that love of self (in charity) may override any of these obligations. But so long as the community is not directly preventing him from worshipping God but only endangering his salvation through vicious living, the farmer may have a duty to remain and continue contributing to the community.
Would it not be better to get the rest of the community self-sufficient with respect to food, and allow him to go his way, instead of forcing him to stay indefinitely so that he provides a needed service for the community? Some might see continued coercion as nothing more than a form of slavery which cannot be justified as punishment, since he has not done anything wrong. How can he be forced by law or the threat of punishment to produce for others? Because the community has a legitimate interest in ensuring he carries out his obligations to the community. Still, if the community is actually vicious, it will probably have no compunction over forcing the farmer to stay and continue supplying food, even though he dislikes the company of the other members.
What then of the racist farmer? Can he be allowed to go his own way because he does not want to live with people of another race? As I stated in that previous post, while the farmer may not be bound by commutative justice to sell his produce to people he does not like, he may be bound out of legal justice to exchange goods with others, so long as they are living in a community together.
But does this mean that there is no "right of association"? Only that if there is such a right, it does not apply to commercial transactions for necessities. (And arguably, if all work is necessary for the sake of the members of the community, then even transactions for non-necessities.) Nor does it apply to the gathering of citizens, as citizens--anything touching upon "public" life. One can still choose one's intimate friends though.
Community is voluntary in so far as one must consent to living with others. (Happiness is voluntary in this way since it, too, must be willed.) In fact, one must do more than this for there to be a true community. On the other hand, the number of intentional communities that can come into existence without a violation of some virtue of justice are few -- most of them are religious, since one's duty to God supercedes one's duties to parents or community of birth patria. Just as one cannot choose the family one is born into, one usually cannot choose the political community one is born into, and once one starts living there, one picks up obligations to other members of that community.
A community is always in danger of decay, and ultimately falling apart or being destroyed because of sin and human weakness.
Can a member of a political community be forced to remain a part of that community, simply because he no longer wishes to live with them? Or if they do not share the same conception of the good life?
It seems to me that one can choose to dissociate or separate from others because they are a bad influence or do not share the same goals. For example, the virtuous man may have to separate himself from bad friends. What then if the political community becomes so degenerate that one cannot live in it, because it is not pursuing the right end? It seems that the virtuous man should leave, and take his family with him. (It might be easier for a man living "on his own" to cope with a degenerate society, but I don't think it would be healthy for him to stay too long. Certainly that community would continue to be a source of temptation.)
This does not mean that society is not natural or that one's happiness does not consist in living with others. What it does mean is that as a result of Adam's fall and men's sins, one may not only separate from others, but it is prudent and even right to do so when his fellow-men do not seek to live virtuously, and are sources of scandal to him. One could even say that in such a case, a minority of the righteous has been rejected by the others; by rejecting the righteous they give up their claims to their aid and support in justice. (The example of the righteous man, Lot.)
Nonetheless, can the government compel a person to remain in the community? We may instantly reject such coercion as being wrong and unjust, but let me put forth an argument in defense of it.
Because of economic interdependence and the division of labor, the virtuous man may be needed for the community to survive. To take an extreme case, what if he is the only farmer, supplying all of the food for the rest of the community? Also, what is to be done about one's obligations in justice--making a return for the past benefits received from that community? While one should fulfill these obligations, it could be that love of self (in charity) may override any of these obligations. But so long as the community is not directly preventing him from worshipping God but only endangering his salvation through vicious living, the farmer may have a duty to remain and continue contributing to the community.
Would it not be better to get the rest of the community self-sufficient with respect to food, and allow him to go his way, instead of forcing him to stay indefinitely so that he provides a needed service for the community? Some might see continued coercion as nothing more than a form of slavery which cannot be justified as punishment, since he has not done anything wrong. How can he be forced by law or the threat of punishment to produce for others? Because the community has a legitimate interest in ensuring he carries out his obligations to the community. Still, if the community is actually vicious, it will probably have no compunction over forcing the farmer to stay and continue supplying food, even though he dislikes the company of the other members.
What then of the racist farmer? Can he be allowed to go his own way because he does not want to live with people of another race? As I stated in that previous post, while the farmer may not be bound by commutative justice to sell his produce to people he does not like, he may be bound out of legal justice to exchange goods with others, so long as they are living in a community together.
But does this mean that there is no "right of association"? Only that if there is such a right, it does not apply to commercial transactions for necessities. (And arguably, if all work is necessary for the sake of the members of the community, then even transactions for non-necessities.) Nor does it apply to the gathering of citizens, as citizens--anything touching upon "public" life. One can still choose one's intimate friends though.
Community is voluntary in so far as one must consent to living with others. (Happiness is voluntary in this way since it, too, must be willed.) In fact, one must do more than this for there to be a true community. On the other hand, the number of intentional communities that can come into existence without a violation of some virtue of justice are few -- most of them are religious, since one's duty to God supercedes one's duties to parents or community of birth patria. Just as one cannot choose the family one is born into, one usually cannot choose the political community one is born into, and once one starts living there, one picks up obligations to other members of that community.
A community is always in danger of decay, and ultimately falling apart or being destroyed because of sin and human weakness.
In the concrete, civic friendship cannot be identified with virtuous friendship, because not everyone is virtuous. But this does not mean that this is not the ideal. Aristotle's definition of friendship is applicable to those who live in a good regime, even if the citizens do not all share the same intimate friendship with one another.
The question of whether egoism or altruism is true of human motivation may be raised by some -- do individuals gather together merely for the sake of self-interest? Should people gather together merely to exchange the necessities of life? If what is meant by self-interest is survival (and reproduction), then no. But what if self-interest is extended to higher goods, such as having the company of others?
We would think it strange to call a group of self-sufficient (with respect to basic necessities) individuals who do not communicate with one another in any way a community.
Because of the associations of the words egoism and altruism, and how they are understood by certain philosophers, it would be better to employ Aristotle's distinction between the various kinds of self-love. It is part of our perfection to live well with others, communing not only in the necessities for the sustaining of life, but also in higher goods.
Related:
Robert Weissberg, Stuff White People Like
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