Is the concept of dignity convertible with the "good"? Is it an adequate foundation for understanding the virtue of caritas? Mr. Miller notes that the New Natural Law theorists make use of "human dignity" in their argumentation, and I agree with him. I also agree with the substance of his argument, especially on this point:
In particular, the concept of human dignity lacks definite content: It implies that we must treat others with respect, but it does not tell us which kinds of treatment are respectful and which not.26 The formula that we must treat human beings always as ends and never merely as means is similarly empty. It does not justify any particular set of moral norms because it tells us nothing about what kind of treatment is consistent with treating a person as an end and not a mere means.27 For that matter, it does not provide a clear account of what it means to say that we are treating a person as an end or a means. If I hire a prostitute to give me sexual pleasure, these moralists will say that I have treated her as a means, but if I hire a masseuse to give me non-sexual physical pleasure, they say that I have treated her as an end, for this latter transaction is morally licit. Whence the difference, since in both cases I have participated in a voluntary transaction in order that I have a pleasant sense experience? As far as I can see, the theologians who rely on the concept of human dignity have no basis to distinguish these cases.
NNL theorists have difficulties explaining the virtue of justice and its associated acts based on human dignity alone. But an extended development of this claim will have to wait until I finish my project.
