1. Voting is a mechanism for securing justice, and the common good. As such, it should be evaluated as any other mechanism would be. It is not in itself an object of justice. It could only be thought so, if law were the expression of will -- for then, to deny to a people the ability to vote would be to deny them the expression of their wills. But if law is a function of right reason, the vote as such is neither here nor there. There may be all kinds of ways in which a community may deliberate effectively, and come to a decision regarding what course of action to take.
2. The justice of a law depends upon its promotion of the common good. Now the common good, if it is an order embracing all the individuals within it, is not the same thing as a good parceled out. Consider the analogy of a family. The little baby in that family does not diminish the amount of love the other children receive from the parents. Rather, the baby adds a new way in which the parents will love the other children: as the brothers and sisters of this unique child. The order of the family is made greater and more complex. The common good is like that; it transcends the compromises made necessary by a fixed amount of goods to be shared (and envied). The greater the number of souls embraced by the common good, the greater the good. For we enjoy not only our share in the good, but also the good itself as shared by everyone else. Your enjoyment of the common good increases my enjoyment.
3. There is a sense in which, for the common good, genuine diversity, which results from genuine inequalities in talent, luck, wisdom, and so on, is better than flat sameness. Again, the analogy of a family is apropos. If we were actuated by charity and not envy, would we expect the impossible (and even the undesirable) from our parents, that they should love each of us children the same? John was the beloved disciple of Jesus -- was that an offense to Peter? Or does a sense of the common good welcome that difference?
"Your enjoyment of the common good increases my enjoyment."
Hrm. How would Dr. Esolen define the common good? For the virtuous, this proposition may be true, but what of those who differ in virtue, or someone who is vicious? Perhaps the problem is with the subjective attaining of the common good, rather than the objective common good? But is there an objective common good apart from the subjective attainment of it by the citizenry? Living well with others in society--if I act virtously I am contributing to the common good, but if I act viciously I do not, and I may even be harming the common good. If I am vicious will I benefit from others acting virtuously? Not in the sense that I may be able to take advantage of their honesty or some other virtue. Rather... I will certainly not be harmed by them, unless they punish for some crime I commit. They may treat me in a friendly manner and so on. At least there will be some degree of peace (until the vicious decide to violate it). So it does seem that even the vicious benefit from the virtuous pursuing the common good.
