The Atheistic Delusion

The Atheistic Delusion

Religion's Critics Taken to Task

By Father John Flynn

ROME, MARCH 26, 2007 (Zenit.org).- The spate of recent attacks on God and religion has not gone unanswered. Among the replies to last year's book "The God Delusion," by Oxford professor Richard Dawkins, is the just-published book by Alister McGrath, "The Dawkins Delusion?" (SPCK). McGrath is a professor of historical theology at Oxford.

In the introduction to the book he co-authored, McGrath admits that in the 1960s he was, as Dawkins is now, an atheist. Dawkins is an expert in evolutionary biology; similarly, McGrath started out in science, earning a doctorate in molecular biophysics.

But he then switched to theology and, as he explains: "I subsequently found myself persuaded that Christianity was a much more interesting and intellectually exciting world view than atheism."

McGrath declares himself disappointed with the level of argument in Dawkins' book, which he describes as "the atheist equivalent of slick hellfire preaching, substituting turbo-charged rhetoric and highly selective manipulation of facts for careful, evidence-based thinking." He adds: "Dawkins preaches to his god-hating choirs," relying on pseudoscientific speculation and aggregating convenient factoids.

A delusion?

McGrath devotes a chapter to explaining why God is not a delusion, as Dawkins maintained. He observes that the definitions used by Dawkins to describe faith, such as a "process of non-thinking," are foreign to a Christian definition of faith.

Dawkins is correct in arguing that we need to examine our beliefs, McGrath acknowledges. To that end children need to receive a true and accurate instruction in Christianity. It would be far more damaging, he contends, for them to have their heads filled with the superficial and erroneous arguments that Dawkins uses.

Most of us, McGrath points out, hold many beliefs we cannot prove to be true, but they are, nevertheless, reasonable to entertain. Thus, these beliefs are justifiable, without being absolutely proven in an empirical sense. This situation occurs not only in the area of religion, but also in science, where there are many theories that have not reached the status of being conclusively proved.

McGrath also cites what some prominent scientists, such as Stephen Jay Gould, a biologist in the United States, and Sir Martin Rees, president of the British Royal Society, had said about religion. Both of them admitted the limits of science and accepted that science and religion are not by their nature mutually exclusive.

Moreover, many of the great questions about life, McGrath points out, can be explained by a number of theories and there is no absolute scientific proof available. In addition, there are questions that lie beyond the scope of the scientific method, such as deciding whether there is purpose within nature.

Another prominent scientist, Sir Peter Medawar, who was awarded the 1960 Nobel Prize in medicine for his work in immunology, dealt with this subject in his book "The Limits of Science." McGrath explains that Medawar distinguished between transcendent questions, which are better left to religion and metaphysics, and inquiries into the organization and structure of the material universe.

A further demonstration that Dawkins is not representative of scientific thought is the fact that in 2006, the year "The God Delusion" appeared, three leading research scientists published books that admitted the validity of a space for the divine in the universe. They were: Owen Gingerich, "God's Universe"; Francis Collins, "The Language of God"; and Paul Davies, "The Goldilocks Enigma."

"Dawkins is forced," McGrath concludes, "to contend with the highly awkward fact that his view that the natural sciences are an intellectual superhighway to atheism is rejected by most scientists, irrespective of their religious views."

Being evil

Another argument used by Dawkins is that God and religion are evil, being responsible for all sorts of violence and abuses in mankind's history. McGrath readily admits that violence which draws its inspiration from religion is clearly something to be rejected.

McGrath, who grew up in Northern Ireland, had plenty of experience with religious violence. Nevertheless, he points out that it is an entirely different proposition to argue that violence is an inherent element of religion. Dawkins also errs in making out atheism to be a universally benign influence. A look at 20th-century history readily provides abundant examples of politically motivated violence, not least of which was that committed by the atheistic regime of the Soviet Union.

Clearly, people are capable of both violence and moral excellence, McGrath points out, and both of these qualities may be provoked by worldviews, religious or otherwise. It is true that religion can turn human conflicts into battles of good and evil. At the same time, a society that rejects God then tends to hold up as an absolute other realities or concepts. Thus, the French Revolution in its effort to replace Christianity with secular ideals carried out violent repression as it sought to impose its principles.

Another book, from 2006, also dealt with the question of violence and replied to criticisms made against religion. Keith Ward, professor of divinity at Gresham College, London, in "Is Religion Dangerous?" (Lion Hudson), argues that the world would be a lot worse off without religion.

Ward admits that there are examples of religiously inspired violence, but that a lack of faith can also lead to destructive impulses and evil. It is true that religious texts such as the Bible can be misused for unjust purposes. But this is achieved only when vital precepts, such as love of God and neighbor are ignored, and when the texts are taken out of context.

Seeking good

All human beings, Ward argues, are susceptible to the temptation of evil, whether they be religious or not. How to guard against this? One of the best ways, he suggests, is a set of beliefs that teaches principles of right and wrong and motivates us to repentance and to seek goodness.

Instead of making generic charges about "religion being dangerous," we should be asking whether a particular religion in its specific context might be dangerous, Ward contends. The answer to this question will vary according to the circumstances. In general, he continues, most of the time religion is one of the forces making both for social stability and for morally serious debate and reform.

Certainly, the threat of Islamic terrorism has led to concerns over religiously inspired violence. But, this is just one way in which Islam has been interpreted. A number of other social and political factors, not religious in nature, have also played a role in promoting this violence. And while the media give much attention to religious violence, a lot of the strife in today's world has little to do with religion. Moreover, when religion does promote violence it is often in a situation where religion has become blended with political institutions, and it is then used in an instrumental way to justify the use of force.

We should also recall all the positive contributions made by religion, Ward explains in one chapter. The example of charity left to us by Jesus has inspired people over the centuries to follow a life of loving others. Christianity also has inspired countless hospitals, schools and universities, as well as great works of art, literature and music.

Christian faith also encouraged rational enquiry into the material world and gave rise to modern science. The Christian belief in the dignity of human life played a crucial role in developing ideals of human rights. Religion, Ward concludes, can be one of the most positive forces for good in human life.

The Fragility of the Human Body

What is the explanation from evolution why human beings are not like other apes? Not having fur, and so on?

To complete the argument, I would have to look at the necessity of shoes for protection. There are various peoples who still do not wear shoes and can manage without footware--but can they handle the same wear and tear that other apes can handle? Or are humans more vulnerable to injury in comparison to them? Perhaps the human body is not as fragile as we who live in rather pampered societies might think. Still, one wonders if it is easier to injure the human foot than it is to injure, say, the foot of a gorilla?

Nature equips us with a fragile body? Very little protection against the elements? Why not keep a more ape-like body, with more hair and fur, tougher skin and feet, etc.?

On the other hand, humans would not need protection if it came from another source? (From God, in the form of a preternatural gift.) If in comparison to the other apes we are weak and vulnerable, these facts, coupled with a proper argument for the wisdom and goodness of Divine Providence, might signal to the non-believer to some event like original sin.

Might it also be an argument against evolution? After all, if having a hairy body is still a benefit, what is the advantage of losing fur? It is not clear to me that hair would significantly impede the application of reason to various tasks, or confer a reproductive advantage. (Unless one wants to argue that humans who are less hairy are somewhat more sexually attractive, but if this is solely due to perception and does not involve a chemical signal, what is the mechanism? Those who have less hair would be at a disadvantage in colder climates, but in warmer climates... one can survive despite having a lot of body hair? How is hairiness selected for or against? And what causes thickness of hair? And the density of hair follicles?)

An argument against this might be that humans have intellects which enable them to fashion tools with which they can compensate for what they lack by nature (see Aristotle). But why should they lack the protective features other animals/apes have in the first place? Does it spur intellectual development? Create an incentive for the acquisition of some compensating benefit?

In science fiction one often sees a manifestation of the gnostic tendency coupled to evolutionary theory -- as humans become more "intellectual," or more evolutionary advanced, the weaker the body the becomes-- the mind becomes everything, the body nothing. (For example, the first sequel to the original Planet of the Apes.)

Is Scholastic sacramental theology responsible?

For the loss of a proper understanding of the liturgy? Or could we not point fingers at the fact that the liturgy was in a dead language instead?

Cardinal Ratzinger, How Should We Worship,
(print-friendly)

It is important, in this connection, to interpret the "substantial continuity" correctly. The author expressly warns us against the wrong path up which we might be led by a Neoscholastic sacramental theology that is disconnected from the living form of the Liturgy. On that basis, people might reduce the "substance" to the matter and form of the sacrament and say: Bread and wine are the matter of the sacrament; the words of institution are its form. Only these two things are really necessary; everything else is changeable. At this point modernists and traditionalists are in agreement: As long as the material gifts are there, and the words of institution are spoken, then everything else is freely disposable. Many priests today, unfortunately, act in accordance with this motto; and the theories of many liturgists are unfortunately moving in the same direction. They want to overcome the limits of the rite, as being something fixed and immovable, and construct the products of their fantasy, which are supposedly "pastoral", around this remnant, this core that has been spared and that is thus either relegated to the realm of magic or loses any meaning whatever. The Liturgical Movement had in fact been attempting to overcome this reductionism, the product of an abstract sacramental theology, and to teach us to understand the Liturgy as a living network of Tradition that had taken concrete form, that cannot be torn apart into little pieces but that has to be seen and experienced as a living whole. Anyone who, like me, was moved by this perception at the time of the Liturgical Movement on the eve of the Second Vatican Council can only stand, deeply sorrowing, before the ruins of the very things they were concerned for.

This is potentially an example of the problem of using facile historical explanations that seek a root in some simple "intellectual" cause to explain some practice or development. Fortunately, it takes the form of a waning--do not adopt a simplistic understanding of the liturgy and disregard its organic development over time. Still, it would not surprise me if there are polemicists who seek to put the blame of everything that is wrong in the Church on scholasticism and neo-scholasticism, including the Church's liturgical problems.

The problem is not the analysis, but rather the deficiencies in catechesis of the one studying scholastic theology.

Similarly, some have criticized the causal analysis of the sacraments offered by scholastic theologians as being too narrow or inadequate.

The Anaphora of Addai and Mari
Guidelines on Eucharist Between Chaldean and Assyrian Churches (Vatican.va)
The East Syrian Liturgical Tradition
Mar Thoma: The Apostolic Foundation of the Assyrian Church and the ...
SYRIAC SOURCES AND RESOURCES FOR BYZANTINISTS Sebastian Brock ...

Fr. Taft, S.J. comments on the decision regarding the Anaphora of Addai and Mari:
Mass Without the Consecration?
A reaction from the SSPX

doc

John Allen reports:

Taft calls the agreement “the most remarkable Catholic magisterial document since Vatican II.” He believes that by treating consecration as something accomplished by the entire liturgical prayer, and not by an isolated set of “magic words,” the Vatican has repudiated a quasi-mechanistic understanding that “seriously warped popular Catholic understanding of the Eucharist.”

Rome Diary #48
Fr. McBrien
On Studying the Liturgy
By Father Allyne Smith, Th.D.

Anaphoren ohne „direkte“ Wandlungsworte bereits unter Pius XI. (1922-1939)
Ein Beitrag zu einer aktuellen Diskussion
von P. Martin Lugmayr FSSP

Potpourri pdf

Still, I wonder if the ruling on the anaphora is the last word from Rome on the matter, or whether the case put forward by certain scholars that the words of consecration were originally present in the liturgy but were gradually removed from the texts has any water. Is it not a legitimate question to ask when Christ becomes sacramentally present? Either He is present or He is not--there is no middle ground (otherwise one violates the principle of non-contradiction.) And if He is present, what is the formal cause of the sacrament? (As I think about it, perhaps formal cause is not the right way to explain it--after all, is not the formal cause of Christ being present in the Sacred Species something else? I guess I'll have to study more Thomistic sacramental theology.)