Curtis Martin - Two Battlefields, One Choice

Galileo’s great bluff and part of the reason why Kuhn is wrong. (via Ed Feser's blog)

Dr. Henry Rosemont

Manyul Im's blog, and the group blog he joined: Warp, Weft and Way.

Consequential Ideas by Harvey mansfield
Exploring the subtle dangers of 'soft despotism' in democracies.

Rahe's work can be said to be an extended critique of the work of Skinner and Pocock, which has never resulted in a debate among the principals because Skinner and Pocock have never deigned to answer him. The issue between him and them is whether and how ideas influence history. Rahe believes that "ideas have consequences," that they have the power to guide and even make events, and therefore that they are not mainly caused by the conditions of their time or context but are, on the contrary, mainly the cause of these conditions.

More from James Chastek on De Koninck

What insight could Dekoninck give into being as opposed to the most indefinite concept?

Modern Epicureanism?

TED Blog: The importance of deep pleasure: Q&A with Paul Bloom

Galactic scale energy Part 2: Can economic growth last? by Tom Murphy (EB)

James Chastek offers a tentative critique of De Koninck regarding metaphysics.

The Consent of the Governed

Zippy Catholic at WWWTW: The Consent Idol

More Geoffrey West

“Why Cities Keep on Growing, Corporations Always Die, and Life Gets Faster”

See also: yesterday's post.

Sandro Magister, China. On the Powers of the Bishops, the Council Saw Far Ahead

It established that without the papal mandate, they cannot govern the dioceses. The young Ratzinger was against it at the time, but soon changed his mind. It is thanks to that norm that today, as pope, he is disarming the illegitimate bishops. And defusing the schism

The ordination of these "mandarin" bishops is sacramentally valid. Also sacramentally valid are the Masses celebrated by them. What they lack is hierarchical communion with the see of Peter. And it is this that renders them devoid of authority over their respective dioceses, over the clergy and the faithful.

They are in fact bishops, but devoid of that power of governance which only the pope can give. The declarations and instructions that the Holy See released following the latest illicit episcopal ordinations in China insist on this.

This is a point that saw a highly charged clash of positions at Vatican Council II.

There were in fact some who held the position according to which sacramental ordination is sufficient to confer on the new bishop the fullness of his powers, including that of governance, without the need for a further mandate from the pope: that is, precisely the position that is so agreeable to the Chinese authorities today.

An active part in that conciliar clash was also played by a young theologian named Joseph Ratzinger.

On which side of the fence did he stand?

*

To answer this question, one must go back to the middle of November 1964, to what has been called the "black week" of Vatican Council II.

That week began, on Monday, November 16, with the unexpected reading in the basilica of Saint Peter, on the part of the secretary general of the Council, Archbishop Pericle Felici, of a "Nota explicativa praevia" desired by the "highest authority," meaning Pope Paul VI.

At the behest of the pope, the note was to be received as "explanation and interpretation" of chapter three of the constitution on the Church "Lumen Gentium": the chapter dedicated to the role of the bishops, submitted for voting in those same days.

In point number 2, the note affirmed that one becomes a bishop by virtue of episcopal consecration. But in order that a bishop may exercise the "power" that has been conferred on him with sacred orders, he must receive the "iuridica determinatio" from the supreme authority of the Church.

The note raised protests from the progressives. Even the theologian who had drafted it, the Belgian Gérard Philips, was complaining two years later about its excessive "legalism," which ended up "suffocating and extinguishing the communion of charity."

Among the conciliar periti, one of the most determined in criticizing the note was the young Ratzinger, who was the trusted theologian of German cardinal Joseph Frings.

In an essay that will soon be published by Libreria Editrice Vaticana and has recently been previewed in issue number 61 of the Notiziario of the Paul VI Institute, the author, Belgian canon Leo Declerck, reconstructs Ratzinger's position at that juncture, on the basis of the diaries of other protagonists of the Council.

In order to clear the way for the note and its interpretation of the powers of the bishops, Ratzinger met with Professor Giuseppe Alberigo, a representative of Fr. Giuseppe Dossetti, who was the leader of the progressives. Together they wrote the draft of a speech by which Cardinal Frings would downgrade the note to a simple commission text and would ask that it be submitted for discussion in the assembly. At the same time, groups of bishops, including about a hundred Africans, would sign petitions to the pope. The objective was the removal of the entire third chapter of "Lumen Gentium."

But that's not what happened. The third chapter was approved by a large majority, and the note entered among the conciliar documents as a supplement to "Lumen Gentium."

Ratzinger recognized afterward that the note had had the merit of defeating the "maximalism" of the progressives and appeasing the Council's traditionalist minority, getting "Lumen Gentium" approved almost unanimously.

But he was careful to point out that the note did not bear the signature of the pope or of the Council fathers, but only that of Archbishop Felici.

And he wrote, shortly after the Council had ended, that in any case the note left "a bitter taste," both for the way in which it had been imposed and for its content, expressive "of a legal-systematic mindset that has as its standard the present-day juridical figure of the Church," in contrast with "an historical approach that would be based on the full extent of Christian revelation."

Today, a few decades later, having become pope, Joseph Ratzinger takes a more critical view of the conviction that "the Church should not be a Church of law, but a Church of love," free from juridical restraints.

Thomistica.net: A new and welcome edition of Aquinas' "De Unione Verbi Incarnati" is now available

James Chastek, On a cause of corruption in popular governments.

NLM: Dr. Manfred Hauke on the “Basic Structure“ (Grundgestalt) of the Eucharistic Celebration According to Joseph Ratzinger

Face Development in the Womb - Inside the Human Body: Creation - BBC One

Natural resources, again

And ownership...

How are natural resources common? (1) Intended for the benefit of all? (And therefore to be shared by all or apportioned to all.) Or (2) common in so far as they are not claimed by anyone? In which case they (a) belong in potency to everyone or anyone, or (b) belong in actuality to everyone until they are apportioned to someone through property claims/rights?

I'm thinking of not just fossil fuels, oil and coal, but other, more basic natural resources -- fresh water, [arable] land, plants and trees -- these do not appear to be uniformly distributed across the planet. Is it the case that how they are to be distributed should be left to the market, and to contracts between individuals or groups, and thus governed only by commutative justice, with property rights being given to those who have first possession? Or should distributive justice also play a role in determining property rights, with only labor for extraction and processing covered by commutative justice?

Or do fossil fuels differ from other natural resources because they are such immense stores of energy and more important/valuable in that respect?

How are claims of ownership to be adjudicated if not "first come, first have," or "finders, keepers"?

I could imagine these considerations being used to defend the need for a world government, in order for there to be an 'equitable' distribution of resources.

Something to reflect upon again: the right to refuse service and the right of association

More math...

The sameness of organisms, cities, and corporations: Q&A with Geoffrey West

Evidence of natural law and natural limits? I am doubting it.

Geoffrey West: The surprising math of cities and corporations

Professor Cua passed away earlier this year. I didn't know that. I wish I had had the opportunity to meet him while I was in the DC area.

Contemplans Aliis Tradere: An Article From the Summa on Liturgical Unity

Tony M. over at WWWTW has a post on authority: Political Authority and its Legitimacy.

Who is doing the designating? How so (and on what basis and rationale)? And how is this decision made known? How is authority transferred or conferred?

So, I am going to suggest that even within the context of assuming that all authority comes from God, it is a natural, essential feature of political authority in exercise that there be a public act or condition under which it is recognized, before the ruler can rightly and appropriately demand obedience.

Other than the sheerest direct intervention by miraculous sign, this public event or condition is at the hands of men: it is men, for example, who design and regulate the law of succession from one king to the next. In many cases, it is the oldest son, but in some cultures a group of elders select which son it is. Men can change the rule of succession without a revolution against the existing order. So, it seems to me correct to say that whatever we say about whether God puts the authority into the hands of the body politic as a whole for them to pass on, or not, it must be the case that God normally permits the designation of who shall hold authority as a matter for men to determine. (And this does not imply democracy.)

I have fixed the html for the problematic post.

It appears that it may have been the posts with the TED videos causing the problem. I will have to look at the html for those posts and see if I can learn what the problem is.

Still haven't figured what the problem is yet. This was a reason why I upgraded from the classic template to the new template, so I wouldn't have to figure out what was causing the page elements to be fouled up. Bah!

I don't know why the layout is not working properly, with the gadgets appearing at the bottom of the blog. Will try to figure it out, or I may be forced to scrap the template.

Thomas Tallis, Spem in alium


Taverner consort & choir/Andrew Parrott.

Les oeuvres de Saint Bernard de Clairvaux

The Oil Drum: Galactic-scale energy: Part 1 by Euan Mearns

Thomas Tallis (1505-1585) - Honor, virtus et potestas

Taverner Consort, Taverner Choir
Andrew Parrett
(via the Chant Cafe)

OpStJoseph: The Worshiping,  Sacramental Body
A lecture by Fr. Walter Wagner, O.P.

The Worshiping,  Sacramental Body from Province of Saint Joseph on Vimeo.

Kevin Slavin: How algorithms shape our world

Imagining the world too mathematically?

Church of God to be released in October

Ignatius Press is printing a new edition of Louis Bouyer's Church of God (via Insight Scoop).

A good complement to The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State? On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State by Joseph R. Strayer (GB)

TED: Mikko Hypponen: Fighting viruses, defending the net

Edward Feser, Does morality depend on God?

Now that doesn’t mean that God is irrelevant to ethics; far from it. For one thing, only part of the natural law can be known without reference to God. For example, that murder, lying, adultery, dishonoring parents, etc. are contrary to the good for us can be known from an examination of human nature alone. But the fact that God exists naturally has moral implications of its own, and since for A-T the existence of God can also be known through natural reason, there are certain very general religious obligations (such as the obligation to love God) that can be known through reason alone, and thus form part of the natural law. (Indeed, these are our highest obligations under natural law.) Then there is the fact that the natures of things, including human nature, derive ultimately from those ideas in the divine intellect which form the archetypes by reference to which God creates. (In this way morality is for A-T neither independent of God nor grounded in arbitrary divine commands, as I explained in a post on the Euthyphro objection.) Furthermore, for A-T, a complete account of moral obligation requires reference to God as legislator (even if moral obligation can proximately be explained by reference to the natural end of the will). Finally, divine revelation is also needed for a complete account of everyday moral life. For one thing, divine revelation discloses certain details about morality that the human intellect is too feeble reliably to discover on its own. For another, some aspects of the natural law are so demanding that many people are capable realistically of living up to them only given the hope of a reward in the hereafter, of the sort divine revelation promises. (Again, all of these issues are discussed in Aquinas. See chapter 8 of the first volume of Michael Cronin’s The Science of Ethics for a useful treatment of the proximate and ultimate grounds of moral obligation.)

All the same, since to a large extent the grounds and content of morality can be known from a study of human nature alone, it follows that to a large extent morality would be what it is even if human beings existed and God did not. For, again, morality is not based in arbitrary divine commands any more than scientific laws are expressions of some arbitrary divine whim. From the A-T point of view, “divine command theory” (or at least the crude version of divine command theory that takes the grounds and content of morality to rest on sheer divine fiat) is, I would say, comparable to occasionalism, and similarly objectionable. (Cf. my recent post on Ockham.)

Per impossibile... after all we cannot come into existence on our own. The goods of human nature would stay the same, though something would be missing, our ultimate end.

No, It Was Just Plain Old Equivocal by David Werling

A Response to Fr. Cavalcoli’s letter in the on-going debate over the Second Vatican Council and the traditionalist critique

I was reading the comments for Edward Feser's latest. Who has the time and money to be a FT apologist? Because that is what is needed for a proper response to be given to those who are objecting to the proofs for the existence of God, claiming that they understand Aquinas's metaphysics.

But have they been convinced by the argument from motion? Is there a problem with jumping to the metaphysical proofs when the physical proof has been neglected or is not understood? After all, Aquinas believes that it is not possible to prove Creation ex nihilo, and that one cannot argue against an eternal Creation. And yet, the proof from motion would nonetheless be sound. Is this true of the third way (possibility/necessity) as well? I would think so... An eternal Creation does not exist necessarily? But can we know this from reason alone? If we can't, we must show that even if it exists necessarily, it is nonetheless caused by another. Or, one has to show that the ultimate necessary being is not material.

So does this show, once again, that there is a need to study physics before metaphysics?

A return to the Divine authority?

Aquinas' moral theology is not a version of divine command theory in so far as that involves [Divine] voluntarism. But while the intelligibility of moral precepts is tied to "eudaimonism," the intelligibility of the precepts does not mitigate their obligatory character. Do discussions of Thomistic virtue ethics ignore this aspect of the moral precepts, and how their observance is tied to the virtues of obedience and religion (and not just charity, even if that is the highest virtue)? (Similarly, even if we rightly call God "Abba" should we not temper out understanding of Him with an acknowledgment of His Sovereignty and His Superiority?)

In an earlier post I talked about Aristotle's discussion of education for the young and how it should be common, or "public." What happens when the society is corrupt and the mores it seeks to impart contradict the natural law? Liberal tolerance may seem nice and neutral, but it involves a rejection of traditional morality and usually directs its adherents to suppressing those who would uphold it. What are families to do when their community has become hostile to tradition and to God? Does this mitigate the obligation to have one's children participate in the common paideia (and I am not equating this with our public school system, even if proponents of public mass education believe they are identical)? I would think so, precisely the authority of God is greater than that of the polis, and what the polis is doing is wrong in the sight of God.

Quare?

Theologian Jean Porter Honored for Book on Natural Law (which has plenty of links, including one for her faculty page)

Nature as reason: a Thomistic theory of the natural law wasn't that good, according to the reviews written by trusted people that I've read. She is being honored for a different book, Ministers of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal Authority by the Catholic Press Association. I should take that organization's opinion into consideration because?

Edward Feser, So you think you understand the cosmological argument?

Les oeuvres de Saint Alphonse-Marie de Liguori

Sandro Magister, The Theologian and the Cardinal. An American Story

The censure of a book about God provokes not rupture, but dialogue. The progressive magazine "America" holds out the olive branch. A lesson by Pope Benedict on what "true" theology is

What gives?

Oh really?

NYT: Internet Use Affects Memory, Study Finds

"The subjects were significantly more likely to remember information if they thought they would not be able to find it later. “Participants did not make the effort to remember when they thought they could later look up the trivia statement they had read,” the authors write."

How much money was spent on exploring what should be obvious? After all, memory does involve some volition, it's not "automatic."

Note: How do the virtues modify the powers? And is this the key to understanding the relationship between the infused virtues and the acquired virtues?

(See St. Thomas on courage? Example of fasting? Almsgiving/beneficence vs. magnanimity.)

James Chastek: "The physical sciences are based not just on measurement, but measurement of a rationalized continuum, which means that there is no possible measurement without a definite numerical value."

His discussion of facts.

The latest issue of Nova et Vetera has an article by Angela McKay Knobel on Aquinas's treatment of the infused and acquired virtues. It does pose a good puzzle about the exact relationship between the two.

There's a name I haven't seen in a while

Thomistica.net: Dr. Jeremy Wilkins Appointed Director of the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College, University of Toronto

OpStJoseph: A Biographical Essay on Fr. Benedict Ashley, O.P.

Radical Orthodoxy: An Interview with John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock

More finger-pointing at Duns Scotus for what ails Western culture.

mp3

Rome Reports: Who is Saint Benedict, according Pope Benedict XVI

The theology of creation and the theology of the Resurrection (which includes and ratifies Incarnation) demand that prayer should be expressed in a bodily form, involving all the dimensions of bodily expression. The spiritualization of the body calls for the embodiment of the Spirit, and vice versa. Only in this way can man and the world be 'humanized', which means that matter is brought to its spiritual capacity the Spirit is expressed in the wealth of creation. (The Feast of Faith, 71)

St. Thomas doesn't explicitly discuss the use of bodily gestures in prayer? But his teachings could be accommodated to it.

Tomas Luis de Victoria - O Vos Omnes

Another from ARIAS:

Sandro Magister, Six Years on the Throne of Peter. An Interpretation

Oxford: Modern polar bears descended from extinct bears from Ireland

First Things: The Married Lifestyle by Gabriel Torretta

OP Vocations: "The Intellectual Life and the Dominican Vocation" with Fr. Gilles Emery OP (which links to OpStJoseph)

“A Carnal Love of Concepts or a Work of Mercy? The Intellectual Life and the Dominican Vocation” from The Lumen Christi Institute on Vimeo.

I can understand why some might think the center of the soul is in the head or brain, given the position of the eyes and the importance of sight in our encounter with reality. Even the blind who rely on the developed senses might think of the head as being the important part. What are the reasons for believing that the soul is centered elsewhere, like the gut or the heart?

Daniel McInerny has a blog. He has introduced a Virtual Summer Circle of Thomistic Studies.

A reminder that we should thank God for good health.

Simon Lewis: Don't take consciousness for granted

Pope's Prayer for 60th Anniversary

Zenit

Beautiful in its use of biblical metaphors.

Papal Address to Ratzinger Prize Winners

Zenit

Papal Address to Ratzinger Prize Winners

"The Real Question": "Is What We Believe True or Not?"

VATICAN CITY, JULY 1, 2011 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Beneedict XVI gave Thursday when he conferred the Ratzinger Prize on its first three winners. The prize recognizes work in theology.

NCR: East-West Catholic Dialogue in D.C.
Orientale Lumen conference tussles over the role of the papacy. Greek Orthodox bishop suggests a Ratzingerian solution.

Dominican History: Aquinas on the Decalogue (a clip of a lecture by Matthew Levering)

Christianity Today: Q & A: Bishop Kallistos Ware on the Fullness and the Center

Mirror of Justice: Punishment Theory and the Method of System: Stephen's Thought
Jaffa on Aristotle and Aquinas

OpStJoseph: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Philosophy
A Report by Br. Ambrose Little, O.P.

MB posts a link to this: Nut and gristle, a response to a lecture by Dr. Christos Yannaras.

Related:
Dr. Yannaras Receives Honorary Doctor of Divinity
Citation: Bestowal of Honorary Doctorate upon Dr. Christos Yannaras
Address: Dr. Christos Yannaras 14 September 2010
Towards a New Ecumenism
ΠΑΝΤΕΙΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ

Thaddeus J. Kozinski, The Relative Absoluteness of Truth

In reference to Jude Doughtery's synthesis of Aquinas with modern rights theories:

As much as I respect Dr. Dougherty as a senior, I think he is incorrect in his attempt to harmonize a modern rights theory with Aquinas. I don't think he's modified his views since he wrote that piece (which was in the 80s), but then again, I haven't read through his entire corpus. The tendency of modern Thomists to talk about "metaphysical" bases can be rather confusing, though I can see what he is trying to do, to exact a metaphysical argument from Aquinas's theology, just as someone might try to extract an account of ethics or natural law from it. But nonetheless, I think equality of nature is mostly irrelevant to Aquinas's treatment of justice -- it is important in his explanation of charity, the love of neighbor, and that part of the Great Commandment, so it's foundational in that sense to his moral theology. But it doesn't explain what the virtue of justice is, except in so far justice is directed towards other human beings.


My interlocutor writes:
But I did read below the Aquinas citation, and was roughly familiar with Aquinas terms for justice and what they mean before. I'm well aware of what you say about not being able to ground modern conceptions of rights and justice in Aquinas. I agree. But it isn't clear to me it does any good to say he "doesn't talk about justice being founded upon the fact that people are equal because they have the same nature," because it seems to me this just begs the question of what relevant thing it is that people share, in part because the statement "people are equal" is pretty vacuous. I'm not interested in defending modern conceptions of rights and justice. Aquinas is famously inexplicit about moral first principles, still what reasons does he give for his supreme one, neighbor-love? What is the rational basis for the golden rule, or is there one?

The New Natural Law theorists have complained that Aquinas doesn't clearly derive the precepts of the Natural Law from human goods and the like. His discussion of the precepts of the Natural Law in I II 94, 2 is admittedly brief. But Aquinas just doesn't have the same project as the NNL theorists, who wish to focus on the precepts in their model of practical reason. Rather, the precepts are associated with the virtues, and subordinate to them. So when he writes,

Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. (I II 94, 2)


We need to know what is good for man but we also have to understand this in the context of his discussion of the virtues. He doesn't reason out the precepts for the reader, but perhaps it should be fairly obvious.
As for charity, charity extends to neighbor on account of God, who desires to share Himself with rational creatures. So those who have the same nature and end, other human beings, are loved with charity. But so are those that do not have the same nature but are higher, the angels.

Yes! Magazine: Sarah Van Gelder, Rehabilitation, Not Punishment: A Better Solution to Crime

This is not exactly voluntary, prisoners aren't free to come and go as they please -- there is still a penal aspect to it.

This comment over at WWWTW forced me to return to the diss. to check my notes. (I confess that I was motivated by the desire to give someone a written smackdown.) It was at the very least a good exercise in thinking about ius, and as a result of my new notes I may revise the first chapter or even start from scratch. I was thinking about committing myself to its writing during Mass - maybe a bad distraction. Whether it will happen, we'll see. It is time to check the last revision of the outline.

Rome Reports: Pope celebrates 60 years as a priest and the feasts of Saints Peter and Paul

An essay dealing with the Filioque by a friend (who is Orthodox) and his secondary bibliography

LY Faber criticizes remarks made by Francis Cardinal George regarding Duns Scotus.* These days I cringe whenever a bishop or theologian does intellectual history -- the narrative they provide usually seems facile and poorly informed? Who has the time to do history and become an expert on more than one thinker? Very few specialists. A bishop should study good theology instead and not worry about who said what, but too many Catholic intellectuals seek to explain "modernity" and its problems through intellectual currents of the past. Too much of an academic exercise, and not sufficiently "pastoral" -- what do the Christian faithful really need, an egghead or a pastor who will teach them about God?

Unfortunately the tendency to do bad intellectual history seems to be a fault of Joseph Ratzinger as well.

*They are in an unpublished manuscript, “Catholic Christianity and the Millennium: Frontiers of the Mind in the 21st Century.”

A critique of a recent essay by R. R. Reno giving suggestions as to how we would best help the poor: R. R. Reno's "Preferential Option for the Poor"  (from a link posted at FPR)

I can understand why those with families would wish to avoid living in poor areas. A universal precept that aone should move to such areas seems inappropriate. But we should do what we can to build up community and to live in solidarity with the poor, giving up luxuries that are not necessary (and may even interfere with progress in charity) and working for a more just political economy.

What can be done to improve the moral condition of poor areas, if they are beset by moral problems in addition to material poverty? The lack of fathers has had an impact, and government intervention and welfare has not done much.

Priesterweihen am Dreifaltigkeitssonntag 2011 - The Monastic Channel - 19.06.2011

Rome Reports: Spanish youth tackling controversial issues in Church for WYD 2011 in Madrid


WYD 2011 Madrid (FB)
Pilgrimage Office?