Thursday, September 21, 2006

Michael Behe

Evidently Kenneth Miller was at BC to give a talk about 5 months ago; I vaguely remember that, but I decided not to go... maybe because I could tell what direction he was going to go in, even though I don't think I knew that much about his position. Then again, maybe I had read something by him but just forgot.

I got a chance to take a pic with Dr. Behe; I'll post it over at The New Beginning.

The Lady Downstairs was shocked by some of the rather ignorant questions the undergraduates posed. Some were rather combatative, but what else would one expect on a hot-button issue like this? Attendance was good; mostly undergraduates, plus one or two grad students in philosophy, some grad students in theology, Dr. Kreeft, maybe one other faculty member? But no one introducing himself as a member of the biology faculty at B.C. No interest? Or more important things to do?

In his presentation he didn't address the two articles Dr. Miller has over at his website. (But he did publish a response to one of them last year.)

Afterwards, I asked him about his views on the structuralists and he responded that he was not very familiar with them. I tried to characterized structuralism as the search for laws that govern development (and by extension, evolution), and Dr. Behe did not think that it would be ultimately successful, since he believed that the initial conditions already had design "implanted" in them. (I think I got his response down.) He also thought that an algorithm would not be able to capture the information necessary for the system. (Which presupposes that information can be quantifiable, and a certain understanding of information theory. Does he share the same information theory as William Dembski?)

Dr. Behe said that he has another book coming out this year--I'm looking foward to it. In the meantime, I'll e-mail him for an essay he wrote in response to Dr. Miller last year, as well as for some references to flagellum synthesis.

Some reflections
neo-Darwinists (and scientists in general) must avoid the fallacy of affirming the consequent
evolution --> genetic (or structural) similarities
genetic (or structural) similarities
therefore, evolution

At best, one can argue that it is "probable" that evolution took place. But, in order to make this claim (or even the stronger claim that evolution has taken place), one needs to show that possible explanations have been definitively ruled out.

For example, using a variation of Ockham's razor, one could argue that God as creator keeps things as simple as possible, and hence there are genetic (or structural) similarities.

[Now, this may not be falsifiable (a la Popper).]

If it is the case that a-->b, but x-->b or y-->b, then one needs to show ~x and ~y.
For example, if x-->c or y-->c, then if it can be shown ~c, one might conclude from modus tollens that ~x or ~y. But, is it modus tollens necessary the case for physical causality? Is physical causality necessary, or contingent? (Something else could intervene to prevent the effect from coming to be.) Does modus tollens only apply then to logical necessity or something of the sort?

Is it wise to compare a living thing to a machine? After all, a machine is not a substantial unity, while a living thing is. A machine comes to be purely from an external cause--construction is "received" by the parts. On the other hand, when a living thing reproduces or develops, it itself is a causes of this taking place. (Though how this is so needs to be explained well.) Living things, after all, move themselves, and reproduction of single-celled organisms or development of more complex organisms is a form of self-motion.

Kant apparently compares living things to machines; I recall that W. Carroll and S. Baldner criticized Behe precisely on this point.

If development is a natural motion, and is also natural in the sense that it is not conscious or intelligent, is it not the case that there must be intelligence guiding development? Similarly, for the synthesis or generation of parts like the flagellum? Does the substantial form of a thing provide the plan? It seems not, though development proceeds in accordance with the form or with the nature of a thing and is not counter to it (except "incidentally"(?) if there is a defect in the matter?).

A complex part like a flagellum is not generated simply through a single sequence of DNA being transcribed. (Dr. Behe confirmed this for me.) Hence, my interest in the literature. Rather, different genes are involved, and other proteins come into play as well. I will have to look at the details once I get some articles, but it seems like a good example to use to illustrate my point, so I'll wait until then.

In development, what are the initial conditions? (As determined by the constituents that are first present, or specifically by their virtual powers, or "natures" as it were?) While the First Mover is always "at work," what operations of the organism are first, and which are caused by those? What parts act on other parts to get the ball rolling, as it were? (And I'm not thinking of a domino effect, but at any point in time, if there is some motion taking place, the First Mover is present. The First Mover does not simply push the first domino, with each subsequent domino taking care of the rest of the domino effect by itself...)

No comments: