Have I changed my mind about torture? Originally I thought it was unjust. But now it seems that there are arguments for inflicting pain to punish disobedience and to force compliance. So I haven't changed my mind about acts that inflict pain or directly attack the health of his body and are not meant as punishment--these are always unjust and therefore intrinsically evil. But acts that are intended as punishment? These seem to be morally good, at least with respect to the object. Other considerations, like the circumstances of the act, may make them imprudent or even evil.
The formal object can be tricky to understand...
Some things for me to work out:
If I hold a lit match up to the fuse of a stick of dynamite in order to light the fuse, lighting the fuse is part of the formality of my action, even though I do not bring this about except by means of the lit match. I cannot say that it is the match which is responsible for the lighting of the fuse.
Similarly, if I torture someone in order to get information, I do it precisely to induce them to act in a certain way, even though they are free to refuse, unlike the fuse of the stick of dynamite, which will always light, provided that nothing interferes with the action of the fire. Getting them to talk seems to be part of the formal object, since it is an intended result or consequence of my action.
One may ask how it is possible to separate consequences in one's intent -- for example, how does the principle of double-effect work? How is it possible that I can use deadly force, even lethal means, to defend myself, without intending the death of the assailant? Can I intend to stop the assailant with something that could possibly kill him, without wanting him to die?
2 comments:
What we knowingly do we intend?
Like the example: driving a train, I see that the track splits ahead. On one side of the track there is one person tied up, on the other side, ten people. I cannot stop the train; I must direct it one way or another.
The choice presented is whether to save one life or ten. Materially, the choice is to kill. But it is not formally, murder, since I do not intend to take innocent life--although I do intend--in the sense of knowingly perform--to kill one, and therefore save ten. Formally is the act only, saving ten lives? In the sense that, to kill or not to kill, formally, is not a act within my purview--i.e. it is going to happen no matter what. And then the only choice is whether to save more or less, which is an easy choice as far as it goes.
After having read Anscombe on double (side) effect, I find it difficult to see how one can avoid "directing intention" in the way she accuses, rather than allowing for side effects being something outside of one's choice at all and therefore outside of the voluntary.
Thoughts?
Have you read Stephen Brock's Action and Conduct? I think chapter 5, "Praeter Intentionem," is especially relevant. I don't know if I can offer any of my own thoughts, though I have these thoughts about your example, which is not meant as a response. It's just notes of my initial thoughts.
With respect to the material object, it seems to me that it is to flip the switch and to divert the train onto one track. Flipping the switch changes the circuit, and this causes the track to move, and with the movement of the track, the train is caused to go down one, etc.)
It is known that the train going down this track will kill the one person tied to it. But is this consquence intended? It seems not. Then is it a case of double-effect reasoning at work?
After having read Anscombe on double (side) effect, I find it difficult to see how one can avoid "directing intention" in the way she accuses, rather than allowing for side effects being something outside of one's choice at all and therefore outside of the voluntary.Perhaps you could explain this further?
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