Hugh Walters on Vincent McNabb, O.P.

The Thomist Inheritance and the Household Economy of Father Vincent McNabb

When St Thomas analyses property in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles, his lectures on Aristotle and the Summa Theologiae, he is not talking of the early communal apostolic life of the early church which could still be found in religious life. He is talking of ordinary ownership, and borrows his main line of thought from Aristotle’s Politics. The key texts in the Summa Theologiae are contained in 11-11 q.66, where he is discussing theft and robbery. Property is essentially about things (res), not, as later for Locke, ourselves, our life and our liberty as well as our possessions. Property involves ownership or control (dominium). This can be divided up into managing or taking care of them and distributing them (potestas procurandi et dispensandi) on the one hand, but also the use of things. Thomas does not in fact discuss quite how property is acquired—a lacuna leading to much diversion in later thought. The basic reason why this ownership is appropriate is argued from Genesis 1: the dominion given over the creation.

The main problem, though, is that of private property (propriam possidere): with what justification can someone come to appropriate for themselves what is common to all, or at least open to be appropriated by all? Thomas argues that private property is both permitted and necessary. The reasons for this are common sense ones, given human nature as it is: that everyone is more concerned to acquire their own things rather than what is common; common tasks will belong to everyone and no one; that it is simply more efficient and better organised to run one’s own affairs, and finally that there is less to quarrel about. He claims that it is what is jointly owned that is the basis of the most frequent disputes. Here he was running up against the radical tradition of the Church Fathers, who by and large saw private property as the basis of disputes. To incorporate this tradition, Thomas in his next paragraph seems to take back what he said, in discussing the use of things as opposed to their management.’ In this regard things are not held as private property but ut communes—as common, for the common good, the whole community. In need each should readily share with others. He quotes I Timothy, that the rich should give easily and communicate their wealth to others. Private property for Thomas is an extension of the natural law, part of human law, made by agreement, a device of human reason. It has been claimed, not without some justification, that the history of natural law (particularly that to do with property) is ‘an attempt to rearrange the elements of the puzzle left by Aquinas.’ The reason for this is the difficulty of reconciling the very idea of private property (with its concomitant idea of developing the resources of the earth) with the ability of those in need to have prior claim to it. What in fact does private property amount to?

The limits of property rights clarify the rhetorical flourishes of those who wanted to abolish the distinction of mine and thine. Here Thomas relies on the discussion of almsgiving or charity eleemosyna) to declare what became traditional teaching: some resources are essential for the survival of oneself and one’s household; some are necessary to one’s state of life and business affairs, or paying debts. These can be called absolute and relative necessity. Finally there are superflua, or luxuries. What should be done in justice with each of these elements of one’s own belongings?

In times of extreme need, ‘for anyone in that condition, all resources become common resources’. There is no theft morally: people in this condition are simply taking from the common stock. They are entitled to do so. Likewise those who have what is necessary for one’s state in life or superflua under a duty in strict justice to help those whose need they are aware of where there is dire need all around, the individual must judge what is best under the guidance of good sense. When there is no famine the rich ought by natural right to sustain the poor who do not have enough for a decent life out of their superflua: these are also held in common. Quite what is relatively necessary and what is superfluous is left up to individual judgement, a true judgement unswayed by consumerism, as we would say today. Yet, as Finnis says, for the distribution of superflua legislation is appropriate.

Two very important points arise out of this discussion of property. Distributive justice, what is owed to the poor in strict justice, is a matter for every owner, every householder. It is not primarily a matter for the state, contrary to our modern assumptions. Ownership is a good thing, limiting the power of the state and giving the rich the opportunity to give of their abundance both in justice and in charity. The second point is that Thomas says quite clearly that a man cannot have more than enough without another having less than enough (II-II 118 a.1 and 2). Finnis emphasises that even though economics is not a zero sum game, Thomas is still right to say this: ‘For if we set aside the possible world in which everyone everywhere has enough to meet all their needs, superflua truly belong to others; anyone who keeps them is depriving, and indeed stealing from those to whom they should by one means or another have been made available.’ The thoughts of St Thomas are taken up with clarity by McNabb who wrote ‘Study not merely to give God his due by worship but to give man his due by justice. What is superfluous to your poor estate distribute. This is distributive charity; a virtue so sacred that crimes against it are the forerunners of inevitable doom’.

Hrm... Distributive justice is to be executed by the owner, rather than the ruler? Who has charge over common goods has charge over their distribution -- so how is that which is owned by an individual "common"? If it is common, then how is it owned or property? But the point St. Thomas is making is that that which is superfluous reverts to being "common" in times of urgent need. But who should be handling the distribution -- those who have ownership of common goods, or those who had original ownership?


If it is the community as a whole that has ownership over what is common to all, then either it is the community as a whole, or those who are appointed to rule, who have the responsibility for distributing those goods, rather than the original owner?

Hence, an additional solution might be to argue that owners have some share in ruling and therefore this is part of their discharge of their duty as a ruler, but I do not think this is what the author is claiming. This solution may not be sustainable, even if it may be in accord with certain republican sympathies.

Is it more an act of charity than of distributive justice? (And should not one's effort in producing those goods play some role not only in determining ownership/property claims, but also merit?)