Is withdrawing consent the same as disobedience? Is consent identical to designation, so that withdraw of consent is the removal of authority? Even if one is a good ruler does that by itself give him the right to rule?
In disobeying one may not necessarily be designating one's self as the ruler, though in effect that is what he is doing. Can there be disobedience without recognition that obedience is owed?
One is not guilty of disobedience if a sin is enjoined.
There is a difference between designating another ruler as opposed to designating one's self, in effect, through disobedience. One should follow the law in the changing of rulers but I can imagine that if there is a grave threat to the common good, this law may be ignored. What if the process for selecting the ruler is itself unjust? For example, hereditary succession seems to violate distributive justice, even if it has a long history and is found in many cultures.
Law is ordered to the common good, but following the law is not always identical with the common good? Obeying the law is a component of the common good, as can be submission to an unjust ruler. But in replacing an unjust ruler with a just ruler, even if one is not following the established custom in doing so, might it not be that one is obeying a "higher" law?
Is a ruler, once he becomes a ruler, above judgment? Who can judge whether he is acting in accordance with his office or if he has exceeded it? If all powers related to the common good reside in the community as a whole before they are delegated to one or some, can those powers be recovered by the community? Does it matter whether they are virtuous or not?
Has someone resisting an unjust ruler not already made a judgment about the ruler? It may not be binding on the public; is private judgment sufficient to ground a claim of legitimate self-defense? Or must he be acting in some public capacity, even if he is acting as lone individual? (Acting as a lone individual is not the same as acting as a private individual.)
(The origin of government.)
Should it be presumed that one is unqualified to rule until he qualifies himself (military service + property + family)? Or should one be reckoned qualified until it is established that he is vicious? The former qualifications are rather low, since the appearance of virtue, such that it garners the trust and respect of others, is sufficient, and may be compatible with the latter stance.
There is also the pragmatic question of effectiveness -- even if a ruler is virtuous and right, if the people do not agree to his being the ruler, how can he rule except with the use of force? What if he does not have sufficient force?
No comments:
Post a Comment