Holy See on UN Reform

"Rights Always Exist Inseparably From Responsibilities and Duties"

NEW YORK, SEPT. 29, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is the address given today by Archbishop Celestino Migliore, permanent observer of the Holy See at the United Nations, to the general debate of the 64th session of the U.N. general assembly.

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Mr. President,

As you assume the presidency of this 64th session of the General Assembly, my delegation wishes you all the best in your endeavors and looks forward to working with you in order to address the many challenges facing the global community.

Every year anticipation surrounds the General Assembly in the hope that governments will be able to find points of agreement on the persisting problems that afflict humanity and adopt common direction for resolving them in a peaceful manner for the well-being of all.

Understandably, the deliberations of the preceding session of the General Assembly were dominated by preoccupation with the world financial and economic crisis. It is only fitting that this year delegations have been asked to focus on effective responses to global crises: strengthening multilateralism and dialogue among civilizations for international peace, security and development.

In view of a political and cultural dialogue oriented toward the harmonious evolving of the world economy and international relations we would do well to revisit the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations where it affirms: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined...to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small...."

The various world crises that intertwined in the last months bring to the discussion presuppositions of thought and principles of individual, social and international behavior, which extend well beyond the financial or economic field. The idea of producing resources and assets, i.e., the economy, and strategically managing them, i.e., politics, without wanting together with the same actions, to carry out also the good, i.e., ethics, has been proven to be a naïve or cynical and fatal delusion. A more solid and profound contribution that the General Assembly must give to the solution of the international problems lies in promoting the principles contained in the preamble and in article 1 of the Charter of this Organization, in a manner that such high human and spiritual values serve to renovate the international order from within, where the real crisis lies.

A first element of truth is found exactly in the "We the peoples of the United Nations." The theme of peace and development, in fact, coincides with that of the relational inclusion of all peoples in the unique community of the human family that is constructed in solidarity.

Evident in the diverse G8, G20, regional and international meetings, held in parallel with the work of the preceding General Assembly, was the necessity to give legitimacy to the political commitments assumed, confronting them with the thought and needs of the entire international Community, so that the devised solutions would be able to reflect the points of view and the expectations of the populations of all the continents. That is why efficacious modes must be found to connect the decisions of the various groupings of Countries to those of the UN, where every nation, with its political and economic weight, can legitimately explain itself in a situation of equality with others. [Some elaboration of what was proposed in Caritas in Veritate?]

Mr. President,

It is in this context of truth and sincerity that the recent appeal of Pope Benedict XVI is put in perspective. As he notes in his Encyclical, Charity in Truth, "in the face of the unrelenting growth of global interdependence, there is a strongly felt need, even in the midst of a global recession," for an urgent "reform of the United Nations Organization, and likewise of economic institutions and international finance, so that the concept of the family of nations can acquire real teeth." Such reform is urgent "to find innovative ways of implementing the principle of the responsibility to protect and of giving poorer nations an effective voice in shared decision-making" (n. 67).

Admittedly, the duty to build the United Nations as a true center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends is an extremely difficult task. The more the interdependence of peoples increases, the more the necessity of the United Nations becomes evident. The need to have an organization capable of responding to the obstacles and increasing complexity of the relations between peoples and nations thus becomes paramount. [Can the march towards interdependence be turned back? And should it?]

The United Nations will advance toward the formation of a true family of nations to the extent that it assumes the truth of the inevitable interdependence among peoples, and to the extent that it takes up the truth about the human person, in accordance with its Charter.

Mr. President,

As we consider the nature of development and the role of donor and recipient countries, we must always remember that true development necessarily involves an integral respect for human life which cannot be disconnected from the development of peoples. Unfortunately in some parts of the world today, development aid seems to be tied rather to the recipient countries' willingness to adopt programs which discourage demographic growth of certain populations by methods and practices disrespectful of human dignity and rights. In this regard, it is both cynical and unfortunate that frequent attempts continue to be made to export such a mentality to developing countries as if it were a form of cultural progress or advancement. Yet such a practice is by its nature not one of reciprocity but imposition, and to predicate the decision to give development aid on the acceptance of such policies constitutes an abuse of power.

Every human being has the right to good governance, that is, all social actions, at the national and international level, contribute directly or indirectly, to guarantee for all persons a free and dignified life. [Fortunately the Church does not teach that there is a right to democratic government.] At the same time, it is an essential part of that dignity that everyone takes responsibility for his actions and actively respects the dignity of others. Rights always exist inseparably from responsibilities and duties. This applies to individual men and women and analogically to States, whose true progress and affirmation depends on their capacity to establish and maintain responsible relations with other States and to express a shared responsibility for world problems.

At the origin of many of the current global crises is the pretense of States and of individual persons that only they have rights and their reluctance to take responsibility for their own and other people's integral development. Often in the activity of international organisms is reflected an inconsistency already widespread in the more developed societies: on the one hand, appeals are made to alleged rights, arbitrary and non-essential in nature, accompanied by the demand that they be recognized and promoted by public entities, while, on the other hand, fundamental and basic rights, already explicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, remain unacknowledged and are violated in much of the world. The rights and duties of Nations do not only depend upon agreements, treaties and resolutions of the international organisms, but find their ultimate foundation in the equal dignity of every individual man and woman, be they citizens or aliens. [But do aliens and citizens have equal rights across the board?] Ultimately, true multilateralism and dialogue among cultures must be based on assuming the duty of commitment for the development of all human beings. We must not forget that the sharing of reciprocal duties is a more powerful incentive to action than the mere assertion of rights.

In this light, the equity of the international commercial system and world financial architecture will be measured by the creation of permanent sources of jobs, stability of work, the just retribution of local production and the availability of public and private credit for production and work, especially in the poorest countries and regions. Thus, the effects of the inevitable economic cycles will be buffered, preventing them from becoming new and more serious global crises. [Inevitable? How so?]

The implementation of the principle of the "responsibility to protect," as formulated at the 2005 World Summit and approved by unanimous consensus of all UN Member States, becomes a touchstone of the two enunciated principles of truth in international relations and of global governance. The recognition of the core objective and indispensability of the dignity of every man and woman, ensures that the governments always undertake with every means at their disposal to prevent and combat crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and any other crimes against humanity. Thus, recognizing their interconnected responsibility to protect, States will realize the importance of accepting the collaboration of the international community as a means of fulfilling their role of providing responsible sovereignty.

The mechanisms of the United Nations for addressing common security and the prevention of conflicts were developed in response to the threat of total war and nuclear destruction in the second half of the last century and for this reason alone they deserve perennial historical remembrance. Moreover, the works of peacekeepers have ended and stabilized innumerable local conflicts and have made reconstruction possible. Nevertheless, it is well known that the number of conflicts that the United Nations has not been able to resolve remains high and that many of these conflicts have become occasions of serious crimes against humanity. That is why the acceptance of the principle of the responsibility to protect and of the underlying truths which guide responsible sovereignty can be the catalyst for the reform of the mechanisms, procedures and representativeness of the Security Council.

In this context, Mr. President, my delegation would like to remember here the Honduran people who continue to undergo suffering, frustration and hardships from the already too long political upheaval. Once more, the Holy See urges the concerned parties to make every effort to find a prompt solution in view of the good of the people of Honduras. [No Vatican recognition of the legitimacy of the current Honduran government?]

Mr. President, this session of the General Assembly began with a special Summit on climate change and will soon hold the Copenhagen Climate Conference (8-16 December 2009). The protection of the environment continues to be at the forefront of multilateral activities, because it involves in cohesive form the destiny of all the Nations and the future of every individual man and woman. Recognition of the double truth of interdependence and personal dignity also requires that environmental issues are taken as a moral imperative and translated into legal rules, capable of protecting our planet and ensuring to future generations a healthy and safe environment.

In closing, Mr. President, in these changing times the international community - "we the peoples" - has the unique chance and responsibility to ensure full implementation of the UN Charter and thus greater peace and understanding among the Nations.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Pope's Discourse to Academic World

Pope's Discourse to Academic World

"The Idea of an Integrated Education ... Must Be Regained"

PRAGUE, Czech Republic, SEPT. 27, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is the address Benedict XVI gave today at a meeting in Prague with representatives of the world of academia and culture.



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Mr President,
Distinguished Rectors and Professors,
Dear Students and Friends,

Our meeting this evening gives me a welcome opportunity to express my esteem for the indispensable role in society of universities and institutions of higher learning. I thank the student who has kindly greeted me in your name, the members of the university choir for their fine performance, and the distinguished Rector of Charles University, Professor Václav Hampl, for his thoughtful presentation. The service of academia, upholding and contributing to the cultural and spiritual values of society, enriches the nation's intellectual patrimony and strengthens the foundations of its future development. The great changes which swept Czech society twenty years ago were precipitated not least by movements of reform which originated in university and student circles. That quest for freedom has continued to guide the work of scholars whose diakonia of truth is indispensable to any nation's well-being.

I address you as one who has been a professor, solicitous of the right to academic freedom and the responsibility for the authentic use of reason, and is now the Pope who, in his role as Shepherd, is recognized as a voice for the ethical reasoning of humanity. While some argue that the questions raised by religion, faith and ethics have no place within the purview of collective reason, that view is by no means axiomatic. The freedom that underlies the exercise of reason - be it in a university or in the Church - has a purpose: it is directed to the pursuit of truth, and as such gives expression to a tenet of Christianity which in fact gave rise to the university. Indeed, man's thirst for knowledge prompts every generation to broaden the concept of reason and to drink at the wellsprings of faith. It was precisely the rich heritage of classical wisdom, assimilated and placed at the service of the Gospel, which the first Christian missionaries brought to these lands and established as the basis of a spiritual and cultural unity which endures to this day. The same spirit led my predecessor Pope Clement VI to establish the famed Charles University in 1347, which continues to make an important contribution to wider European academic, religious and cultural circles.

The proper autonomy of a university, or indeed any educational institution, finds meaning in its accountability to the authority of truth. Nevertheless, that autonomy can be thwarted in a variety of ways. The great formative tradition, open to the transcendent, which stands at the base of universities across Europe, was in this land, and others, systematically subverted by the reductive ideology of materialism, the repression of religion and the suppression of the human spirit. In 1989, however, the world witnessed in dramatic ways the overthrow of a failed totalitarian ideology and the triumph of the human spirit. The yearning for freedom and truth is inalienably part of our common humanity. It can never be eliminated; and, as history has shown, it is denied at humanity's own peril. It is to this yearning that religious faith, the various arts, philosophy, theology and other scientific disciplines, each with its own method, seek to respond, both on the level of disciplined reflection and on the level of a sound praxis.

Distinguished Rectors and Professors, together with your research there is a further essential aspect of the mission of the university in which you are engaged, namely the responsibility for enlightening the minds and hearts of the young men and women of today. This grave duty is of course not new. From the time of Plato, education has been not merely the accumulation of knowledge or skills, butpaideia, human formation in the treasures of an intellectual tradition directed to a virtuous life. While the great universities springing up throughout Europe during the middle ages aimed with confidence at the ideal of a synthesis of all knowledge, it was always in the service of an authentic humanitas, the perfection of the individual within the unity of a well-ordered society. And likewise today: once young people's understanding of the fullness and unity of truth has been awakened, they relish the discovery that the question of what they can know opens up the vast adventure of how they ought to be and what they ought to do.

The idea of an integrated education, based on the unity of knowledge grounded in truth, must be regained. It serves to counteract the tendency, so evident in contemporary society, towards a fragmentation of knowledge. With the massive growth in information and technology there comes the temptation to detach reason from the pursuit of truth. Sundered from the fundamental human orientation towards truth, however, reason begins to lose direction: it withers, either under the guise of modesty, resting content with the merely partial or provisional, or under the guise of certainty, insisting on capitulation to the demands of those who indiscriminately give equal value to practically everything. The relativism that ensues provides a dense camouflage behind which new threats to the autonomy of academic institutions can lurk. While the period of interference from political totalitarianism has passed, is it not the case that frequently, across the globe, the exercise of reason and academic research are - subtly and not so subtly - constrained to bow to the pressures of ideological interest groups and the lure of short-term utilitarian or pragmatic goals? What will happen if our culture builds itself only on fashionable arguments, with little reference to a genuine historical intellectual tradition, or on the viewpoints that are most vociferously promoted and most heavily funded? What will happen if in its anxiety to preserve a radical secularism, it detaches itself from its life-giving roots? Our societies will not become more reasonable or tolerant or adaptable but rather more brittle and less inclusive, and they will increasingly struggle to recognize what is true, noble and good.

Dear friends, I wish to encourage you in all that you do to meet the idealism and generosity of young people today not only with programmes of study which assist them to excel, but also by an experience of shared ideals and mutual support in the great enterprise of learning. The skills of analysis and those required to generate a hypothesis, combined with the prudent art of discernment, offer an effective antidote to the attitudes of self-absorption, disengagement and even alienation which are sometimes found in our prosperous societies, and which can particularly affect the young. In this context of an eminently humanistic vision of the mission of the university, I would like briefly to mention the mending of the breach between science and religion which was a central concern of my predecessor, Pope John Paul II. He, as you know, promoted a fuller understanding of the relationship between faith and reason as the two wings by which the human spirit is lifted to the contemplation of truth (cf. Fides et Ratio, Proemium). Each supports the other and each has its own scope of action (cf.ibid., 17), yet still there are those who would detach one from the other. Not only do the proponents of this positivistic exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason negate what is one of the most profound convictions of religious believers, they also thwart the very dialogue of cultures which they themselves propose. An understanding of reason that is deaf to the divine and which relegates religions into the realm of subcultures, is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures that our world so urgently needs. In the end, "fidelity to man requires fidelity to the truth, which alone is the guarantee of freedom" (Caritas in Veritate, 9). This confidence in the human ability to seek truth, to find truth and to live by the truth led to the foundation of the great European universities. Surely we must reaffirm this today in order to bring courage to the intellectual forces necessary for the development of a future of authentic human flourishing, a future truly worthy of man.

With these reflections, dear friends, I offer you my prayerful good wishes for your demanding work. I pray that it will always be inspired and directed by a human wisdom which genuinely seeks the truth which sets us free (cf. Jn 8:28). Upon you and your families I invoke God's blessings of joy and peace.

© Copyright 2009 - Libreria Editrice Vaticana

An Interview with Fr. Hugh Barbour

I need to find his short article on probabilism. Edit. Looks like that article is no longer available.

From his review of Morality of Everyday Life:

Another error that is more to the point regards the characterization of Saint Alphonsus’ moral teaching as “probabilism.” Quite precisely, his theory is called “aequiprobabilism.” This school of casuistry holds that the opinion favoring liberty over law may be followed if it is intrinsically probable, all things being equal. This last condition means that, in cases where there is question of the cessation of a law that has already been in force, the opinion favors the law even if the other opinion has probability, but, when there is question of the law having yet come into force, the opinion favors liberty. The simple probabilist holds that any truly probable opinion may be followed, even if an opposing opinion may be more probable. An aequiprobabilist holds the same view but gives greater weight to laws already presumably in force. In casuistic practice, however, these views are merely useful for persuading the penitent, because the confessor may not impose his theory’s resolution of the moral case in question on the penitent, if there exists another view not condemned by authority. In reality, the only two systems of moral evaluation condemned have been rigorism (as in the case of the Jansenists) and laxism (as in the case of some Jesuits), so all the others are practically probable and certainly licit. The Q.E.D. is that the probabilist view wins out, if the penitent wants it to and the confessor keeps within the bounds of his authority. The Thomist Dominic Pruemmer explains in his classic Vademecum:

If one prescinds from rigorism and laxism, each of the systems described is tolerated by the Church, and so the confessor has no right to impose his system on the penitent, or strictly require anything of the penitent which he is not bound to do according to the approach of another legitimate system. Thus the confessor may prudently counsel safer or more probable opinions, but he cannot strictly impose them (that is, in preference to merely probable ones). In practice let him choose those opinions which, considering all the circumstances, he foresees will produce the best fruit for the spiritual health of the penitent.

Thus, Dr. Fleming’s intuition is fundamentally sound: Probabilism, which favors liberty because of a respect for circumstances, is the default system of classical Roman Catholic casuistry. Even so, it is not Roman Catholic casuistry he is promoting but rather a return to any casuistic system at all (including Talmudic or Caroline) within the traditions that have made up our society, for such systems by their very nature harmonize with life as it is actually lived and use morality to preserve and strengthen rather than to break down and overturn ties of blood and soil and common endeavor. Apart from those few things one may never do under any circumstances—such as blaspheme, murder the innocent, commit unnatural acts, or steal from a man poorer than oneself—it is almost impossible to indicate specific acts that must always be done regardless of circumstances. For this reason, then, there must be casuistry, since the possibilities for doing good are literally infinite.

For every manual of casuistry, there needs to be a speculative presentation of general principles. Otherwise, the ethics inculcated may be merely a kind of positivistic integralism, a “this is the way its always been, so don’t ask questions” attitude, unable to defend itself from the critical and revolutionary spirit. This companion volume to The Morality of Everyday Life has yet to be written, but here the reviewer dares to present a suggestion as to what its overarching, unifying insight should be. The exposition of nominalism in the sixth chapter points in the direction of the deepest level of moral reasoning. Whereas Dr. Fleming’s interpretation and application of the genesis of the notion of individualism is not one to which I would subscribe, this is the one place in the book where he brushes up against the larger philosophical issue underlying any account of the morality of human acts and transcending any given instance of moral reasoning.

But is the speculative presentation of general principles by St. Alphonsus the same as that of St. Thomas Aquinas? Apparently not, according to Fr. Pinckaers...

Fr. Pinckaers on St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus Liguori

"Dominican Moral Theology in the 20th Century," The Pinckaers Reader, 77-8.

Father Deman, who succeeded Father Ramirez from 1945 to 1954, is of special interest to us because of his lengthy and excellent article on probabilism, which appeared in 1936.(1) There he makes a penetrating critical and systematic study of moral casuistry. He describes the controversy which had centered on probabilism since the seventeenth century in response to the problem of a doubtful conscience in the application of the law, and which ended in the recommendation of the teachings of St. Alphonsus Liguori. The latter became the patron saint of moral theologians because of his balance, which avoids the laxity of the casuists and the rigor of the Jansenists. However, Father Deman concludes his study on St. Alphonsus and on the concept of moral theology, of which he is the eminent representative, in these words:

Between St. Alphonsus and St. Thomas there remains the lack of harmony of two irreconcilable systems. Every attempt at reconciliation is doomed to concordism, that is to say, to artifice, that is to say, to failure. The historical reality of their misunderstanding cannot be denied.(2)

This judgement seems to me entirely justified. Between St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus and the authors of the manuals, even when they follow the Thomistic school, it is certainly possible to find some partial agreements, but there is always a fundamental lack of harmony at the level of systematization, all the more difficult to resolve when it is not perceived. In St. Thomas we are dealing with a morality of beatitude and the virtues, centering around charity and prudence, and with our modern moralists, with commandments and legal obligations, focusing on conscience and sins.

1. "Probabilisme," Dictionnaire de la theologie catholique, vol. 13 (1936), col. 417-619.
2. Ibid., col. 590.

Can the two systems of moral theology be harmonized? Not fully, according to Fr. Pinckaers. The precepts of the modern moralists, the casuistry and development of conscience, might be able to be integrated into a more "classical" system of moral theology, but its foundations or presuppositions about the Christian moral life cannot be.

Conscience, as it is understood by moderns, is not the same as prudence, and it cannot replace prudence, but is it a "part" of prudence? Does the development of conscience in accordance with the modern manuals truncate the development of prudence, and by extension, the Christian spiritual life? It seems to me that Fr. Pinckaers would agree with this conclusion, though I have to read what he writes about "modern" conscience.

Fr. Corapi on femininity

Fr. Corapi, in one of his EWTN episodes (I don't know which one -- I was listening to the audio version on a Catholic radio station) claimed that he was a true Catholic feminist, in that he affirmed the value of femininity and its difference from masculinity, and recognized that men and women have differences which impact their lives (and vocations). I don't know if he was using the Von Hildebrands as a source, but he went on to explain that women are by their nature "receptive." (I mention the Von Hildebrands, especially Alice Von Hildebrand, because the first time I heard someone talk about receptivity it was from Alice Von Hildebrand, who was contradistinguishing it from passivity.) As a result, they are more receptive to the divine -- hence, there were more women to be seen in Church.

It seems to me that the complete definition of female must refer to the male, even if only implicitly, since male and female are complementary with respect to the sex act, first of all. It also seems to me that all other roles and differences are founded upon this fundamental difference in function.

Women are receptive with respect to the activity of men (specifically their husbands, but also with respect to their fathers) -- being led and reassured, and so on. Women also reach out to others, including their husbands, but not quite in the same way. Women have both active potentialities and passive potentialities in their relationships with men, but in a healthy relationship they are not the same or identical to the potentialities that men have. (When men and women have the same set of potentialities, or if they are reversed, with women having what is proper to men and vice versa, problems arise.)

I think it is problematic to say that women are "receptive" by their very nature, as if other creatures are not receptive -- after all, all creatures have some potentiality, and all intellectual creatures have the obediential potency to the Beatific Vision. Angels are receptive just as human beings are, in this respect. Men are just as receptive as women to grace and the infused gifts. Men can be as "spritual" as women, since all are dependent upon God.

Is yin-yang "theory" wrong, abstracting what belongs to male and female, essentializing these characteristics, turn then into cosmic principles? While there may be opposition in the universe, even opposition that is reducible to a fundamental pair of forces or elements, it seems to me that yin-yang theory is too univocal in ascribing to everything shares in a "masculine" and a "feminine" principle. Is it possible that even asexual things can be called "masculine" or "feminine" by analogy?

Now with respect to the spiritual life and Christian education, are girls more docile than boys? Are they able to benefit more from guidance by others, the frail human instruments of God's Providence? Is it the case that boys cannot be taught as well, or that men do not benefit as much from religious education when they are young and undisciplined and have not learned how to master their energy? Are there other obstacles to the spiritual formation of men that are not present for women generally? (For example, bad liturgical music and a lot of emphasis on feelings in spirituality and worship?)

Begun on September 15, 2009.

Pinckaers revisited

Fr. Pinckaers on the origin of the two competing notions of freedom:

In seeking the source of these profound differences in the concept, organization, and teaching of moral theology I was led, by a study at once systematic and historical, to the idea of freedom undergirding the two systems. On the one hand was the freedom of indifference, whihc brought Ockham into opposition with St. Thomas, while its concept went back to two compatriots, Gauthier of Bruges and Henry of Ghent, contemporaries of St. Thomas but outliving him. On the other hand, in Aquinas we find a freedom rooted in the intellect and will according to their natural inclinatiosn to the true and the good, and this is what we call a freedom of ecellence or of perfection.

From "Dominican Moral Theology in the 20th Century," collected in The Pinckaers Redaer: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, pp. 80-1.

So there were antecedents to Ockham. Was Ockham really that influential on his contemporaries and successors? That remains my question, as I am not convinced of the causal relationship, even if there are resonances between his account of freedom, and how moral theology was later conceived. And should we attribute this account of freedom to "nominalism" as such? Or is it an inheritance of certain schools of thought? Who is the earliest theologian to understand freedom as the freedom of indifference?

* note that one of the translators or editors decided to turn all instances of the pronoun he to she in a blatant manifestation of academic PCness. Unbelievable--even at CUA press they feel compelled to do this.

Zenit: Pope Notes Anselm's 3 Stages of Theology. The actual address: On St. Anselm: Theologian, Teacher, Pastor.

Sandro Magister, A Newly Published Work by Ratzinger the Theologian. From 54 Years Ago, But Always Relevant

It is his doctoral thesis on Saint Bonaventure and the theology of history. With the backdrop of the Joachim of Fiore''s vision of a new and completely "spiritual" Church. The complete text of the preface written recently by the pope

John Mueller

Over at Front Porch Republic, AML writes:

John Mueller at the EPPC has been working on resurrecting what he calls Augustinian or neo-scholastic economics. The main feature of his work is its focus on “gift,” that essential element that you place so much emphasis on. Some of his articles are posted here: http://www.eppc.org/scholars/scholarID.73,type.1/pub_list.asp.

Is this an accurate characterization of Mueller's work? What is central to economics, the notion of gift (and the corresponding virtue of gratitude), or some other virtue, such as charity or justice? Is gift to be understood with reference to natural resources and such, or does it include other people as well?

Articles I should read:
Elements of Economic Theory and American Political Economy
Lehrman American Studies Center, Princeton University, 17 June 2008

A Return to Augustinian Economics

Restoring Economic Orthodoxy
Outline of (Neo-) Scholastic Economics

The Return of Natural-Law Economics By John D. Mueller

Other links:
The Claremont Institute - John D. Mueller

James Chastek on the difference between affirming a proposition and affirming a predicate of a subject.

From Nederlands Thomas-Genootschap: Interview with Dr. Matthew Levering

Thomistica.net: Streamed discussion on Aquinas on BBC Radio (which links to In Our Time)

Edward Feser's latest: Now available: AQUINAS

Does the Catholic Church Favor World Government? (with apologies to Aquinas)
By Kevin M. Doak

Zenit: Benedict XVI to Former Students
"The Law, as Word of Love, Is Not a Contradiction to Freedom"

The History of American Secularism - Charles Taylor

Does he get it right?

2009 Alasdair MacIntyre Newman Lecture PT1.


For part 2 and the rest, click here.

Photo: Butterfly Nebula

The Butterfly Nebula from Upgraded Hubble

Related Links:
STScI/HST Pictures
Hubble Heritage Gallery of Images
NASA - Hubble Space Telescope
Main Hubble Page
SEDS: Best of HST
The European Homepage For The NASA/ESA Hubble Space Telescope
Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI)

Huffington Post

Standmickey: The “innocence” argument and the Consistent Life Ethic

It is important to remember that Catholic teaching on the dignity of man is not contingent on the degree of innocence or guilt with which a soul is burdened. In a literal sense, none of us is “innocent”; even the unborn carry the stain of original sin that must be washed away by the waters of Baptism, and obviously the rest of us have to answer for a multitude of personal sins. Every human being, the unborn child as much as the mass murderer as much as you or I, is in need of redemption.

Literal sense? Yes, someone has thus reinforced the belief of some American Orthodox that the Romans subscribe to some belief of "inherited guilt," which they correctly find repulsive. Innocent/and guilt, used with respect to original sin, cannot be used but equivocally.

My point in saying this is not that abortion, torture, capital punishment, and the like are justifiable by virtue of the guilt that we all share (nor is it my intention, obviously, to pass any kind of judgment on the fate of the souls of unbaptized aborted children, a question that is best left to God in His mercy). My point is exactly the opposite: the Church teaches, based on the example of the life of Christ, that human dignity is not earned, either by good deeds that we have committed or evil deeds that we have not committed (i.e. crimes that have been committed by prisoners but not by unborn children). Nor does an individual forfeit his or her human dignity by the commission of evil acts. Rather, such dignity is intrinsic to every human being and shared equally by all individuals, because every individual is created by the Father, redeemed (or has the potential to be redeemed) by the Son, and sanctified (or has the potential to be sanctified) by the Holy Spirit.

Of course human dignity is unearned -- any gift from God that is given without our cooperation is unearned. Here we see how problematic "dignity" can be, when it is used not only to affirm that those who are guilty of a crime should not be punished beyond what they deserve, but that certain punishments which were formerly deemed to be proportional to their defense are no longer so, all in the name of protecting human "dignity".

And when we look at this larger principle, it becomes clear that it is not licit for a anyone, particularly a Catholic, to call himself pro-life while supporting (either explicitly or by a failure to condemn) torture, capital punishment, and unjust war. For in the end, the belief in which this hypocrisy is rooted– the belief that victims of such atrocities are “less innocent” than victims of the atrocity that is abortion–is simply not valid.

Once again, "innocence" is used but equivocally. Does anyone "deserve" God's mercy, strictly speaking? No. Should we be merciful to those who have injured us, in certain situations? Probably. But that does not mean that God's mercy overrides the demands of justice, or redefines the notion of justice.

Poor reasoning once again at work at that blog.

Vox Nova: Tillard on the role of the local church of Rome

[T]he catholic Church of God is the koinonia of local churches mutually recognizing themselves as churches of God. This mutual recognition we think is essential. The Latin West concealed this in its desire to make everythng depend upon the relationship with the Church of Rome and its bishop. The catholic communion was seen as a totality of local churches all in communion with the sedes of Rome, without it being made clear that this necessary relationship with Rome is in the service of the mutual koinonia of local churches throughout time and space. In the gospel of God, which expresses the divine plan to reconcile all the human blocs shredded by sin, this mutual relationship is what counts more than anything else. What good would it be for them all to be in communion with Rome if the local churches remained water-tight compartments, shut up in their differences, as portrayed in a book for children which shows the Church as a great sun radiating around Rome, with the rays only converging. In the Holy Spirit and by the power of the Eucharist, it is mutual recognition that forms the concrete fabric of koinonia.

[...]

The function of the local church of Rome and of its bishop must be understood in this perspective. It seems to us above all to be a ministry of recognition. Its principal task is that of ensuring the mutual recognition of the churches and basically the maintenance in each of them of the traits of the Church of Pentecost. Thus it is the guardian of communion, a communion which is realized in and by the local churches themselves, not imposed by some authority that transcends them. For communion is not realized around Rome, but thanks to Rome.

J. M. R. Tillard, “The Local Church Within Catholicity.” The Jurist 52 (1992): 448–54.

Zenit: Vatican Letter on Catholic Education
"Religious Education in Schools Fits Into the Evangelizing Mission of the Church"

Papal Address at Bonaventure's Birthplace

Papal Address at Bonaventure's Birthplace

"The Universe Itself Can Again Be the Voice That Speaks of God"

BAGNOREGGIO, Italy, SEPT. 7, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of Benedict XVI's address Sunday at Bagnoreggio, the birthplace of St. Bonaventure.

* * *

Dear brothers and sisters:

This morning's solemn Eucharistic celebration in Viterbo opened my pastoral visit to your diocesan community, and this meeting here in Bagnoreggio practically closes it. I greet you all with affection: religious, civil and military authorities, priests, men and women religious, pastoral agents, young people and families, and I thank you for your cordial welcome. I renew my gratitude first of all to your bishop for his affectionate words, which referred to my link with St. Bonaventure. And I respectfully greet the mayor of Bagnoreggio, grateful for the courteous welcome he gave me in the name of the whole city.

Giovanni Fidanza, who later became Friar Bonaventure, joins his name to that of Bagnoreggio in the well-known presentation that he makes of himself in the Divine Comedy. On saying: "I am the soul of Bonaventure of Bagnoreggio, who in exalted tasks put to one side erroneous endeavors" (Dante, Paradise XII, 127-129), which underscores how, in the important tasks that he had to undertake in the Church, he always postponed attention to temporal realities -- "erroneous endeavors" -- in favor of the spiritual good of souls. Here, in Bagnoreggio, he spent his childhood and adolescence; then he followed St. Francis, for whom he manifested special gratitude because, as he wrote, when he was a child he "snatched him from the jaws of death" (Legenda Maior, Prologus, 3,3) and predicted "bona venture," as your mayor recalled recently. He was able to establish a profound and lasting bond with the poor man of Assisi, drawing from him ascetic inspiration and ecclesial genius. You jealously guard the famous relic of the "holy arm" of this illustrious fellow-citizen, keep alive his memory and reflect deeply on his doctrine, especially through the Center of Bonaventure Studies, founded by Bonaventure Tecchi, which every year promotes special study conferences dedicated to him.

It is not easy to summarize the extensive philosophical, theological and mystical doctrine that St. Bonaventure left us. In this Year for Priests, I would like to invite priests especially to listen to this great doctor of the Church and to reflect more profoundly on his teaching of wisdom rooted in Christ. He directs every step of his speculation and mystical tension to wisdom that flowers in holiness, passing through the degrees that range from what he calls "uniform wisdom," which concerns the essential principles of knowledge, to "multiform wisdom," which consists of the mysterious language of the Bible, and then to "omni-form wisdom," which recognizes in the whole of created reality the reflection of the Creator, to "informed wisdom," that is, the experience of profound mystical contact with God, wherewith man's intellect knows the infinite Mystery in silence (cf. J. Ratzinger, St. Bonaventure and the Theology of History, Porziuncola publishers, 2006, pp. 92ff). On remembering this profound researcher and lover of wisdom, I would also like to express my encouragement and appreciation for the service that theologians are called to give, in the ecclesial community, of that faith that seeks understanding, that faith which is a "friend of intelligence" and which becomes a new life according to God's plan.

From St. Bonaventure's rich cultural and mystical patrimony I limit myself, this afternoon, to consider a "path" of reflection that might be useful for your diocesan community's pastoral journey. He was, in the first place, a tireless seeker of God, from the time of his studies in Paris until his death. He indicates in his writings the path to be followed. "Given that God is on High," he wrote, "the mind must ascend to him with all its strength" (De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam, No. 25).

In this way, he traces a committed path of faith, in which it is not enough "to read without unction, to speculate without devotion, to do research without admiration, to be circumspect without joy, to be expert without piety, to know without charity, to be intelligent without humility, to study without divine grace, to speak without wisdom inspired by God" (Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, Prologue 4). This journey of purification involves the whole person striving, through Christ, to the transforming love of the Trinity. And, given that Christ, forever God and man forever, effects in the faithful a new creation with his grace, the exploration of the divine presence becomes contemplation of him in the soul "where he dwells with the gifts of his uncontainable love" (ibid. IV, 4), to be finally transported in him. Hence, faith is the perfection of our cognitive capacities and participation in the knowledge that God has of himself and of the world; we experience hope as preparation for our encounter with the Lord, who will constitute the fulfillment of that friendship that already unites us to him. And charity introduces us to divine life, making us see all people as brothers, according to the will of our common heavenly Father.

In addition to being a seeker of God, St. Bonaventure was a seraphic singer of creation who, following St. Francis, learned to "praise God in all and through all creatures," in which "shines the omnipotence, wisdom and goodness of the Creator" (ibid. I, 10). St. Bonaventure presents a positive vision of the world, gift of God's love to men: He recognizes in it the reflection of the highest Goodness and Beauty that, following St. Augustine and St. Francis, assures us that it is God himself. God has given it all to us. From him, as original source, flow truth, goodness and beauty. To God, as on the steps of a stairway, one ascends until arriving and almost attaining the highest Good and in him we find our joy and peace. How useful it would be if also today we rediscovered the beauty and value of creation in the light of divine goodness and beauty! In Christ, observed St. Bonaventure, the universe itself can again be the voice that speaks of God and leads us to explore his presence; exhorts us to honor and glorify him in everything (Cf. Ibid. I, 15). Herein we perceive the spirit of St. Francis, with whom our saint shared love for all creatures.

St. Bonaventure was a messenger of hope. We find a beautiful image of hope in one of his Advent homilies, where he compares the movement of hope to the flight of a bird, which spreads its wings as far as possible, and employs all its energies to move them. In a certain sense, it make its whole being a movement to rise and fly. To hope is to fly, says St. Bonaventure. But hope exacts movement from all our members and our projection to the authentic stature of our being, to God's promises. He who hopes, he affirms, "must lift his head, directing his thoughts on high, to the height of our existence, that is, to God" (Sermo XVI, Dominica I Adv., Opera Omnia, IX, 40a).

In his address, the Lord Mayor posed a question: "What will Bagnoreggio be tomorrow?" In truth, we all wonder about our future and that of the world, and this question has much to do with hope, for which every human heart is thirsty. In the encyclical "Spe Salvi," I wrote that not just any hope is sufficient to address and overcome the difficulties of the present: a "certain hope" is indispensable which, giving us the certainty of attaining a "great" goal," justifies the effort of the journey" (cf. No. 1). Only this "great hope-certainty" assures us that, despite the failures of our personal life and the contradictions of history as a whole, we are always protected by the "indestructible power of Love."

When we are sustained by such hope we never run the risk of losing the courage to contribute, as the saints did, to the salvation of humanity, and "we can open ourselves and open the world so that God will enter, God, who is truth, love and goodness" (cf. No. 35). May St. Bonaventure help us to "spread the wings" of hope, which drives us to be, as he was, incessant seekers of God, singers of the beauties of creation and witnesses of that Love and Beauty that "moves everything."

Thank you, dear friends, once again, for your hospitality. While I assure you of my remembrance in prayer, I impart to you, through the intercession of St. Bonaventure and especially of Mary, faithful Virgin and Star of Hope, a special apostolic blessing, which I extend with pleasure to all the inhabitants of this beautiful land, rich in saints.

[Translation by ZENIT]

Society of Scholastics blog. I'm not sure if they are going to create a new website, or update the old one.

James Chastek, The equivocation of analogous terms, pt. I

On Practical Reason

The advocates of the New Natural Law Theory and the so-called "neo-Thomists" (like Ralph McInerny) are divided on the question of whether practical reason is "pre-moral" and therefore must be further specified in order to be moral reasoning.

Without reviewing the literature, I'd like to first write down some thoughts.

Practical reasoning deals with both doing and making. Is making therefore a morally neutral activity? Taken in the abstract, it might be. But does anyone proceed to make anything without considering whether it is good or not? Perhaps those who are unflective or those who have not attained the full use of reason. But in the concrete, all individual acts are either morally good or morally evil, even if one does not sufficiently reflect upon whether they should be doing it or not.

Would it be accurate to say that moral reasoning is a form of practical reasoning according to the proponents of the NNLT? That is to say, moral reasoning is practical reasoning plus certain foundational moral principles to guide that reasoning?

h/t to a friend in RI/Boston: Audio lectures by T. F. Torrance

Pope's Message to Inter-Christian Symposium

Pope's Message to Inter-Christian Symposium

"Build Together the City of God"

CASTEL GANDOLFO, Italy, SEPT. 3, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the message Benedict XVI sent to Cardinal Walter Kasper, president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, on the occasion of the 11th Inter-Christian Symposium, which began today in Rome.

* * *

Through you, venerable brother, in your capacity as president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, I have the pleasure and joy of sending a warm and auspicious greeting to the organizers and participants of the 11th Inter-Christian Symposium, promoted by the Franciscan Institute of Spirituality of the Pontifical University Antonianum and by the Aristotle Orthodox Theological Faculty of Thessalonica, planned in Rome from Sept. 3-5.

I am happy first of all for this initiative of fraternal encounter and exchange on the common aspects of spirituality, which is beneficial for a closer relationship between Catholics and Orthodox. In fact, these Symposiums, which began in 1992, address important and constructive topics for reciprocal understanding and unity of intention. The fact that it takes place alternatively in a territory of Catholic or Orthodox majority also allows for real contact with the concrete, historical, cultural and religious life of our Churches.

In particular, this year you wished to organize the Symposium in Rome, city that offers all Christians indelible testimonies of history, archaeology, iconography, hagiography and spirituality, strong stimulus to advance toward full communion and above all, the memory of the Apostles Peter and Paul, Protothroni, and of so many martyrs, ancient witnesses of the faith. Of them, St. Clement of Rome wrote that "suffering ... many insults and torments, they became a most beautiful example for us" (Cf. Letter to the Corinthians, VI,1).

The topic chosen for the next meeting: "St. Augustine in the Western and Eastern Tradition" -- argument intended to be developed in collaboration with the Patristic Institute Augustinanum -- is most interesting to reflect further on Christian theology and spirituality in the West and in the East, and its development. The Saint of Hippo, a great Father of the Latin Church, is, in fact, of fundamental importance for theology and for the West's very culture, whereas the reception of his thought in Orthodox theology has revealed itself to be rather problematic.

Hence, to know with historical objectivity and fraternal cordiality the doctrinal and spiritual riches that make up the patrimony of the Christian East and West, is indispensable not only to appreciate them, but also to promote better reciprocal appreciation among all Christians.

Therefore, I express cordial wishes that your Symposium is fruitful in that it discovers doctrinal and spiritual convergences that are useful to build together the City of God, where his children can live in peace and in fraternal charity, based on the truth of the common faith. I assure you of my prayer for this end, asking the Lord to bless the organizers and the institutions they represent, the Catholic and Orthodox speakers and all the participants.

May the Grace and peace of the Lord be in your collaborators and in your minds!

In Castel Gandolfo, August 28, 2009

BENEDICTUS PP. XVI

[Translation by ZENIT]

God's Answer to the World

This post was begun on June 15, 2009, but it is only now that I have found some links to go with it.
Gabriela Manuela Scherer, who used to write comments at Peter Hitchens's blog, has written a book, God's Answer to the World. "Um, yeah." I'm puzzled as to why the book was able to get published. Publishers are generally aware that people are looking for spiritual writings. They just can't separate the good from the bad. Her comments at PH's blog left me with a bad impression--she could express her thoughts, but the content and the reasoning were lacking.

It turns out that Grosvenor House Publishing Ltd allows authors to "self-publish." That might explain things...

Gareth Southwell of the Philosophy Online Forum will be reviewing the book...

Last week, in a post at another blog I asked the question of why it was necessary for the head of a religious order to be ordained, or receive the sacrament of holy orders. (I believe this is true of abbots as well? I really need to learn the terminology for different associations of religious.)

It is true that bishops, as the successors to the Apostles, have been given the care of our souls; that is to say they have authority with respect to that supernatural good to which we have been called.

There are some distinctions that need to be remembered: Our objective beatitude is God Himself. Our subjective beatitude is our attainment of that God, our (supernatural) union with Him. Similarly, the extrinsic common good of the universe is God, while the intrinsic common good is the order of the universe which reflects His goodness and wisdom.

The bishops have the authority to teach us God's laws, and provide additional laws for our spiritual welfare. Laws are a means to attaining some common good; in this case the common good is God Himself. If the good of an religious order or monastery is not different from the supernatural good of Christians, taken individually or as a whole people, but is a participation in that good (or a certain manifestation of it), then it makes sense that the superior of an order should have some sort of participation in holy orders and Apostolic succession. It is not necessary for the superior of an order to be a bishop, but he must have holy orders.

(Who is the superior in a third order?)

But: How is this rationale reconciled with the lack of a direct, ordained superior for women's orders and congregations?

Code of Canon Law

Started on 8/25.

The International Society of Scholastics is commencing an online course of studies. (h/t to Rorate Caeli and Mr. Jeff Culbreath)

Its proposed order of learning.

Relationes societatum perfectarum in statu conflictus

source

The future of offensive war

Card. Alfredo Ottaviani

When two societies which are only materially distinct from each other come into collision neither is to be sacrificed to placate the other, but the interests of each are to be catered for in a rigidly fair manner.

This principle is based on the fact that these two societies are of equal standing, enjoy therefore identical rights and have neither of them any legal advantage over the other; neither in fact is obliged to waive any of its rights in favour of the other. On this account a balance in no way derogatory to either must be struck as accurately as is possible between the conflicting rights; for example, by dividing up the disputed matter (granted it is divisible) or by making compensation. At times indeed the right claimed on one side may be a putative one only, and that on the other side clearly unimpeachable (objective); or at least one rather than the other side clearly unimpeachable (objective); or at least one rather than the other may have a greater interest at stake or stronger grounds on which to quarrel. But even in situations such as these, peaceful methods of settling the issue must take precedence over all others.

First of all, therefore, every effort should be made to establish the existence of whatever right is being claimed; then an attempt should be made to compose differences amicably; finally, should this fail, war must not be declared without first trying out certain coercive measures which, though of less consequence than war, may be equally effective in the circumstances. These last, indeed, are the only measures to be taken whenever it is clear that they of themselves can effect a settlement, and avoid the disasters of war.

But what of mediation, arbitration or an investigation by an international tribunal? Are not these also possible means? To me, indeed, they seem of so obligatory a nature that they alone are the only justifiable and lawful means of vindicating rights in present times; war is out of the question. It is important, however, to note with regard to this view that this is not the opinion of past centuries: in those days mediation, etc., were not considered the exclusive means of settling disputes between perfect or fully autonomous societies; they were at the most highly commendable from a humanitarian viewpoint. For, granting the concept of the sovereignty of every state, then each state, because of its very independence and perfection, was also possessed of the juridical power of safeguarding its rights even by force of arms. The state, it was held, had ample resources at its disposal with which to uphold its rights in face of an adversary struggling against or simply ignoring the obligations these rights imposed upon him.

Warfare, however, was not to be indulged in merely because one had a just and proportionate cause with which to justify the action; it also had to be necessary to the preservation of the social well-being, and withal reasonably assured of success.

The justification of war did not rest, therefore, on the presumption that war was as satisfactory as a duel between two private reasons: neither course proves on which side right and reason lie. No, the sole justification of recourse to warfare was on an occasion when there was little hope of appealing to, or - if a disputed right were in question - of getting a decision from an authority higher than the state. War could be used then to compel an adversary to make good some infringement of rights - but with the understanding that it was a physical instrument the only concern of which was to keep intact the moral implication of the right infringed.

All the foregoing reasoning is cogent enough if we confine ourselves to a purely theoretical treatment of warfare. But in practice and in relation to present conditions the principles enunciated do not seem to hold. They were meant, we should remember, to cover warfare of a special kind, that between mercenary armies, and not our mammoth warfare which sometimes entails the total downfall of the nations at grips with each other; the principles, in fact, cannot be applied in the life of modern nations without doing serious damage to the particular peoples involved, and (leaving aside a question of a defensive war begun, under certain conditions, for the protection of the state from actual and unjust aggression) no state is justified any longer in resorting to warfare when some right has not been given its full due. Not that we for a moment wish to despise or belittle the theories of the great exponents of Christian international law! That would be unpardonable! The war of their treatises is not the war of our experience. The difference indeed is not even of the purely numerical or mathematical order; it goes much deeper. It affects the very principles governing war. Principles indeed drive from and vary with the nature of things; the difference between war as it was and war as we know it is precisely one of nature.

At the Vatican Council the Fathers intimated to the Pope their desire that some definite statement be drawn up which might induce men to abandon warfare altogether or at least induce them to conduct their wars according to humanitarian principles. The salvation of certain Christian peoples was the chief cause of their concern; not simply because these peoples were then in the throes of war but "rather because of the horrible disaster" with which they were afflicted as a result of war. War, they were gravely troubled to note, was the occasion of disasters not the least of which, a lowering of moral standards, accompanied and persisted after war, and made shipwreck of the faith of so many souls. We in this century have even further cause for concern:

1. On account of the great development of communication in modern times and the desire on the part of nations to extend their interests to all parts of the world, excuses for war are now all too frequent.
2. The disasters which worried the Fathers at the Vatican Council now affect not only soldiers and armies at war but also entire peoples.
3. The extent of the damage done to national assets by aerial warfare, and the dreadful weapons that have been introduced of late, is so great that it leaves both vanquished and victor the poorer for years after.
4. Innocent people, too, are liable to great injury from the weapons in current use: hatred is on that account excited above measure; extremely harsh reprisals are provoked; wars result which flaunt every provision of the jus gentium, and are marked by a savagery greater than ever. And what of the period immediately after a war? Does not it also provide an obvious pointer to the enormous and irreparable damage which war, the breeding place of hate and hurt, must do to the morals and manners of nations?
5. In these days, when the world itself has become seemingly shrunken and straitened, the bonds between the nations of the world are so close and exigent that almost the whole world becomes involved once war is declared.
6. A regime may be under the impression that it can engage in a just war with hope of success; but in fact secret weapons can be prepared to such effect nowadays that they, being unforeseen, can upset and utterly thwart all calculations.

These considerations, and many others which might be adduced besides, show that modern wars can never fulfil those conditions which (as we stated earlier on in this essay) govern - theoretically - a just and lawful war. Moreover, no conceivable cause could ever be sufficient justification for the evils, the slaughter, the destruction, the moral and religious upheavals which war today entails.

In practice, then, a declaration of war will never be justifiable. A defensive war even should never be undertaken unless a legitimate authority, with whom the decision rests, shall have both certainty of success and very solid proofs that the good accruing to the nation from the war will more than outweigh the untold evils which it will bring on the nation itself, and on the world in general.

Otherwise the government of peoples would be no better than the reign of universal disaster, which, as the recent war has shown, will claim its victims more from the civilian population than from the combatant troops. In what way then shall international crises be dealt with on future occasions? "Discussion and force", says Cicero, "are the main ways of settling quarrels, the former of which is peculiar to man, the latter to brute beasts". The former therefore is ever to be preferred; the interests of peace must be our chief concern ever - and it is not the forming of armies but the formation of minds which will best secure this.

In this formation the weapons of charity, justice and truth shall be:

1. A civil and religious education of nations which so disposes peoples (and hence the rulers chosen from them) to co-operation and to an honourable recognition and interchange of rights and obligations, that class bitterness, race enmity and imperial competition - than which there is no better kindling for wars - are entirely eliminated.
2. The setting up of an international body whose pronouncements all nations and rules should respect.
3. The inculcation among peoples of a spirit of brotherliness in accord with gospel principles; as a result each nation will be prepared to place the good of the whole human brotherhood before its own interests, in the manner in which individuals in any republic worthy of the name ought always to contribute to the common good from whatever they themselves possess.
4. To render impossible totalitarian regimes, for they above all else are the turbulent sources from which wars break out. Moreover, should the representatives of any people (or the people themselves) ever have conclusive indications that their rulers are on the point of undertaking a war in which nothing but blood and ruin will be the lot of the nation, they should and ought to take just measures to overthrow that regime.

Card. Alfredo Ottaviani, Institutiones Juris Publici Ecclesiastici, Vol. 1 (Jus Publicum Internum) Pars I, Titulus iii, art. 3 (Relationes societatum perfectarum in statu conflictus) Principium 2 - Vatican, Polyglot. 3rd Edition (1947) pp. 149-55

English translation: Blackfriars - a monthly review. Edited by the English Dominicans. Published at Blackfriars, St Giles, Oxford, Vol. XXX September 1949 No. 354

An obituary for the cardinal in Time Magazine.