The Use of Analogy

CWR: Fatima to Vatican II: Mary, ‘Mother of the Church’ and Our Loving Mother by Matthew Tsakanikas, STD
Called to be the God-bearer, Mother to the Head of the Church, Mary was commissioned and called implicitly to be mother of every member born of the virginal womb of the Church in baptism.

Who among the Fathers of the Church called the Theotokos the "Mother of the Church," other than St. Ambrose? If Mary is the Mother of the Church, who is the Father? God the Father, presumably.

Is it better to understand this title primarily as referring to her spiritual maternity of all Christians, rather than anything ontological? The essay and others have attempted to link the two, but would a confusion of the meanings of the word "mother" result? Mother is not used univocally, as it is used of a human mother with reference to her children. And was it prudent or right for Paul VI to declare this title without consulting the separated apostolic churches?

Theology of Presbyterate/Episcopate

MASCULINITY AND THE LITURGY by Fr. Thomas Loya

If the priest acts in persona Christi, how does he strengthen the "mystical understanding of his husbandhood and fatherhood"? Do presbyters participate in Christ's role as Bridegroom/Husband for the Church as the Mystical Bride? Not directly but as intermediaries or representatives of Christ who teach and lead, subordinate to Christ and the Holy Spirit. But in what way is Christ analogous to the human husband? Who would claim that Christ and the Church share some sort of egalitarian or even a complementarian relationship?

Published This Month

Analogy after Aquinas: Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers By Domenic D'Ettore

Going too far with an analogy?

First Things: GOD AS A GENTLEMAN
THE 2018 ERASMUS LECTURE
by Rémi Brague

video

And the Two Become One Flesh by Veronica A. Arntz

A questionable interpretation of the parable of the wedding feast.

Lastly, through this improper reception of the Eucharist, we come to the wedding feast without the proper garment. In one of Christ’s parables, a king is hosting a marriage feast for his son, and after many of those invited rejected the invitation, the king brought in any from the streets who would come. Among these, however, “He {the king} saw there a man who had no wedding garment; and he said to him, ‘Friend, how did you get in here without a wedding garment?’ And he was speechless” (Matthew 22:11-12). This man was thrown “into the outer darkness” because he did not come properly dressed (Matthew 22:13). Thus, when we approach the Lord without having gone to the sacrament of Confession, and receive him unworthily, we are likewise approaching the wedding feast of the Lamb without the proper garment. Here, we see the eschatological purpose of the Church: if we do not participate in the Church with the right end of Heaven in mind, then we are doing a disservice to the Body of Christ. How will we be able to respond to the invitation to come to the “Spirit and the Bride” at the end of time, if during our whole lives as Christians we were not properly prepared to receive him? (Revelations 22:17). For the ultimate end of the Body of Christ is to enter the Mystical Body in Heaven, and to do that, we ought to be properly prepared to be part of the Body, and to receive the Eucharistic Body.

Is HPR so hard up for submissions that it is publishing essays by college seniors? (Even if that college is WCC.)

Our understanding of Christian marriage or natural marriage is dependent upon our understanding of the Church and its relation to Christ? Aristotle and Cicero, cited at the beginning of the essay, had no knowledge of the Mystery of Christ. One can just as easily say that the marriage crisis is due to the loss of faith, but what Christian trying to live in Christ doesn't realize that already?

How Useful for Natural Theology?

James Chastek: From feminine to divine perfections

While Aquinas does make the claim that the mother's love for her child is one ideal, is it disputed which sex has the better capacity for love that is tempered by justice? Some perfections pertain to the intellect and the will, some pertain to the operation of the intellect and the will in so far as the soul is the form of the body and thus we have to consider the influence of the emotions. It is not so controversial among Catholics to claim that there are sex differences. But to claim that such differences ground a hierarchy within the family and society at large?

Tonight Fr. David briefly touched upon involuntary sin, the concept of which was baffling to the Roman Catholics in the room - a sin which we do involuntarily? What could that mean? Fr. David emphasized that sin was not the same as culpability or guilt - which would seem to mean that with respect to involuntary sin, "sin" is being used analogically. If that is the case, and involuntary sin is a part of the Greek tradition, can we not say that the use of "sin" analogically is not foreign to the tradition? And that there is room for harmonizing the Latin teaching on original sin with the Greek tradition, on its own terms?

James Chastek, The order among analogues and An order among analogues, II

James Chatsek, The analogous names of God developed by philosophies of dialogue

Domenic D’Ettore Earns Doctorate in Philosophy
5/2/2012
Domenic D’Ettore, a doctoral candidate in the University of St. Thomas Center for Thomistic Studies program, publicly defended his dissertation on April 23 before the University community and his dissertation board.

D’Ettore’s dissertation was accepted by the Center for Thomistic Studies and in May he will be the 21st recipient of a doctorate in philosophy from the University of St. Thomas.

The purpose of D’Ettore’s dissertation, titled “Early Thomists on Demonstration with Analogous Terms,” is to defend the demonstration through analogical terms given by early Thomists, such as Thomas of Sutton (1250-1315/20) and John Capreolus (1380-1444), in the face of objections that such demonstration is fallacious from John Duns Scotus (c.1265-1308) and those influenced by Scotus, such as Henry of Harclay (ca. 1270-1317) and Peter of Auriol (ca. 1280-1322).

The virtue of the Scotist position is its preservation of the apparent integrity of arguments from perfections in creatures to those same perfections in God. The weakness of this position is that it blurs the distinction between God and creatures. The strength of the Thomist position is the preservation of the distinction of God from creatures.

D’Ettore’s dissertation considers whether or not the early Thomist tradition provides the contemporary Thomist with an adequate answer as to how Thomas’s doctrine of analogy avoids the problems Scotus and his early successors find in it and what aspects these Thomists left for future Thomists to develop.

D’Ettore’s dissertation committee included Dr. Jeremy Wilkins, associate professor in the School of Theology; Dr. Thomas Osborne, Jr., associate professor of philosophy; Dr. John F.X. Knasas, professor and Bishop Nold Chair in graduate philosophy; Dr. Mirela Oliva, assistant professor of philosophy; Dr. Mary Catherine Sommers, professor of philosophy and director of the Center for Thomistic Studies; and external reader Dr. Joshua Hochschild, dean of the College of Liberal Arts at Mount St. Mary’s University.

Hochschild stated in the summary of his examination of the dissertation that he felt “confident that Mr. D’Ettore’s dissertation represents a genuine contribution to the field.”

via Thomistica.net

Klubertanz and Ramirez by Tom Osborne

I used to have a bookmark at BAC? for books by Fr. Ramirez, but his books appear out of print now? The bookmark is on another hard drive, so I can't look it up now. Maybe someone over at the Thomism YG or Ite Ad Thomam would have more info.

Questions on analogy

Steven Long, Thoughts on "A Long Way to Go," a response to Christopher Malloy's "A Long Way to Go."

His book: Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith

Authority in the Education of a Human Being by Anthony Esolen (MoJ and Mere Comments)

Professor Esolen is correct to criticize radical egalitarianism. But do teachers have an authority, and does authority have the same meaning as auctoritas? They are superior to students in virtue of the knowledge that they have (or should have). But the do not have the authority of a law-giver, the author of the laws. They may have the authority proper to someone who is reckoned wise or knowledgeable or proficient, someone who has the trust of the students or others. But is not authority then being used in a different sense?

Insight Scoop: The U.S Bishops' Committee responds again to Elizabeth Johnson...

Brian Davies

Over at Thomistica.net, a post on a new book by Brian Davies: Is God a Moral Agent?
One argument given by Davies that God is not a moral agent is that moral agents are under obligation to a moral law; he attributes this understanding to Aquinas. Is this a proper representation of Aquinas's definition of a moral agent? Could Davies's argument be restated, with Kantian terms thus: is God not a moral agent because he is autonomous while angels and humans are heteronomous, and only heteronomous beings are moral agents? Is this a case of equivocation causing misunderstandings? (It wouldn't be the first time with analytic philosophers.)

How does St. Thomas (or a traditional Thomist) define moral agency? We would look at the different sorts of agency present in creatures, starting with the distinction between voluntary and involuntary/natural. The question is whether by moral agency Aquinas adds anything to his notion of "perfect voluntary" agency. What texts does Davies cite to develop a definition of moral agency?

It is clear that human beings and angels are not God. Is good used analogically of God and creatures? Or equivocally? But if God is not a moral agent, can we say that He is morally good at all? It would seem from the short blurb given at Thomistica.net that Davies does take his reasoning in this direction in order to establish a different Christian theodicy. It seems erroneous to me. If God cannot be said to be good, or is not essentially good, then what reason would He have to save us, rather than desiring our destruction or misery? Why should we not imitate His example, rather than submitting to a moral law?

I get the impression that Davies has missed the order of learning and is relying too much on premises taken from his reading of the text (foundationalism?), and then formulating arguments without being confirmed that his understanding of reality is correct.

A review by E. Jennifer Ashworth of Joshua Hochschild's The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia.

The review ends thusly:

To sum up, this book should certainly be read by Thomists, and by anyone who wants a readable account of what Cajetan actually said. On the other hand, it will be disappointing for those who want to set Cajetan in a wider context, whether of the development of post-medieval scholasticism or of the history of logic in the later Middle Ages. Nor does it have anything to offer those working in contemporary philosophy of language who are not ready to accept a medieval Aristotelian framework for their discussion. It will be interesting to see whether Hochschild can use this book, which grew out of his doctoral dissertation, as a basis for further exploration of the issues it raises.

To put Cajetan in a wider historical context would probably require at least a lifetime of scholarship. As Hochschild is rather young, this might be expecting too much from a book that was originally his dissertation (the fact of which the reviewer is aware). How difficult would it be to find Cajetan's sources and to determine who his opponents are?

The reviewer notes:

It should be noted here that although Hochschild frequently speaks as if signification is the same as meaning, this is not the case: the two notions cannot be precisely mapped onto each other, although there are obvious relations between them.

If this is an actual error on the part of Hochschild, it would raise concerns about the quality of Hochschild's presentation of Cajetan's doctrine of analogy and its place in logic.

New titles from UND Press

Forthcoming from University of Notre Dame Press:
1. Joshua P. Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia

2. Thomas F. O’Meara, O.P., Erich Przywara, S.J.: His Theology and His World

Does everyday use of analogy debase a language?

Common expressions that you'll hear in the United States include, "My bad," and "You're good." It's rather easy to decipher the meaning of these expressions and it is usually clear that the speaker is not speaking of a moral quality or attribute, but something else. Certainly these expressions show that the use of analogy is quite common in our language, even if we do not know that we are doing it unless we are prompted to reflection. Still, is this a sign that our language is in decline? Instead of saying, "My bad," or, "You're good," should we not retain more traditional expressions like, "My mistake, " and "You are fine."

James Chastek, Maurice Dionne on a critical text concerning analogy

Since Cajetan, the central text in considering St. Thomas’s doctrine of anally has been the Scriptum super Sententiis I d 19 q.5 a. 2. Interpretations of this abound, along with refutations of all of them. Dionne’s explanation of the text is so simple I found myself wondering how there was ever a dispute over it. All one has to do is distinguish the order of names of the order of being.

I cut out two sentences that seemed clunky, and cleaned up some of the syntax to make it more English like. So if you are reading this in the post-apocalyptic world where this is the only version of the text, put me in a footnote somewhere.


3. Super I Sententiarum d. 19 q. 5 a. 2.

Before examining this text, we note that St. Thomas here responds to a difficulty. The difficulty involves the passage from the level of the intentional to the real.

It [the objection] involves asking whether there is only one truth, the uncreated truth. It seems there is. One has said in the previous article, in effect, that that truth is an analogous term. But there is only one health numerically, from which the animal is called healthy since it is the subject, from which medicine is called healthy, since it is the cause, and urine is called healthy, since it is the sign. In the same way, it seems, one needs to say that there is one truth from which all things are called true. We note that in the minor of this argument one treats of predication: true is an analogue. In the major, one treats of reality: the analogue only exists in one. Only the first analogue is possesses the form intrinsically, from which it is denominated. Of all that is called healthy, for example, only the animal possesses health intrinsically. From these two premises, one infers the unity of truth one says that there is only one real truth, just as there is only one real health.

In order to deal with this difficulty, St. Thomas needs to treat of analogy not only in intention, but also analogy secundum esse. He will gather the term analogy in all its possible senses.

St. Thomas distinguishes three ways in which something is said analogously. The first is secundum esse and not secundum intentionem. Since one here excludes the analogy according to being, one could here speak of extrinsic denomination. This happens when the intention relates to many inferiors according to a certain order, but which has being only in one. This is the case of health, which relates to the animal, the medicine and the urine in a certain order, but exists only in the animal.

The second kind of analogy is secundum esse and not secundum intentionem. This happens when many inferiors relate to some common intention. The being is nevertheless not common in all. For example, we can consider body as it is said of corruptible and incorruptible things, according to the understanding of the ancients. Logically, it is a univocal name. But with respect to the natures, there is not question of considering them wholly univocal.

Last, the third way of speaking about analogy is secundum esse and secundum intentionem. There one has equality neither in the intention of the name, nor in being. This is the case with the word being, which is said of substance and accident. One has a common nature that has some existence in any of its inferiors, but is different relative to whether there is more or less perfection. We nevertheless note that for the logician the fact that the analogy secundum esse is imposed on the analogy secundum intentionem does not make the word analogous. The moment one has a non-equality in a common intention, one has an analogous term; this inequality on the level of representation suffices for the doctrine of analogy as such. In the case of health and of being, the word “analogy” is said indifferently. But if one is forced to consider conditions on the side of things, he needs to use the example of health being an analogy secundum intentionem only and being being secundum esse and secundum intentionem.

See the original at Just Thomism for all of the italicizations.

James Chastek, Is analogy a lot simpler than the controverises over it?

I’m starting to wonder whether the reason St. Thomas never wrote a separate question on analogy is because he saw it as much more simple and unobjectionable than we do, and that our confusions are based on a convoluted and over-dramatic notion of what analogy is. Why not say that analogy is a second imposition, and that’s it? As second, it is known only in relation to a first. So taken, when we say “being is said analogously of God and creatures” what we mean is “The meaning of the word ‘being’, when it includes God, can only be a secondary imposition of the word, and the first imposition of the word is not said of him” or “when we consider what the word being first means, it cannot include God, though a second meaning can”. St. Thomas gives various reasons why this is so (God is a cause while we first know effects, etc, see ScG I 32-34) We might even, for all I know, have a meaning of the word being that can be said of God and creatures- but all St. Thomas insists on is that the first meaning can’t include God.

Why this order in impositions or meanings? Because there is an order in our knowing. That is all. Contemporary English speakers figure that a word can mean whatever we want it to, whenever we want it to, and so we find it odd when St. Thomas insists there must be an order in meanings. In fact, our tone-deafness about order in meaning is probably founded on our general tone-deafness about any order of knowing- or maybe even of hierarchies altogether.

The first meaning cannot include God, but somewhere down the line it might be possible to have meaning that can be univocally applied to both God and creatures? What do the Scotists say to that? See the comments to the post for more clarification.