Does the act of judgment have a habit or virtue? It is apparent that there is a difference between judging and judging well. Is judging well solely due to the accumulation of experience? For example, judging how fast the cars in front of us are going--some seem to never learn to make the judgment before making a lane change. The act of judgment is dependent upon our moral state -- those who are patient enough to accumulate sufficient sense data before judging are better able to do so than those who are not.
How is the habit of nous or intellectus related to simple apprehension and judgment? I used to think that intellectus was related to simple apprehension only, but now I am wavering on this point. But I do not see how our judging well is due to anything but experience and having the requisite moral habits.
Logic and Mental Philosophy
Principles of Logic
The Mansions of Thomistic Philosophy
Classical man and the Traditional Ethic
Joseph Sikora, S.J. article
Where has Joseph Magee gone? Elementary Aristotelian-Thomistic Logic is still incomplete.
(This post reminds me of the account of human knowledge given by virtue epistemologists like Linda Zagzebski.)
OUP (Google Books)
Ernest Sosa's A Virtue Epistemology
Heather Battal, What is Virtue Epistemology
Misc: The Lonergan Institute
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