This is a fascinating list. Many philosophers (and others) would think these are obvious or at least reasonable.
— Josh Hochschild (@JoshHochschild) December 2, 2020
At one time all these would have been seen as clearly false, or even unthinkable — not even in need of criticism. https://t.co/wQy37TkFu0
Showing posts with label analytic philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label analytic philosophy. Show all posts
Thursday, December 03, 2020
20 Theses of Analytic Philosophy
Tuesday, July 10, 2018
First Things: Aristotle Returns by Tim Crane
Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science edited by william m. r. simpson, robert c. koons, and nicholas j. teh routledge, 352 pages, $140 Raphael’s School of Athens depicts Aristotle and Plato at the center of a group of ancient Greek philosophers modeled on . . . . Continue Reading »
Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science edited by william m. r. simpson, robert c. koons, and nicholas j. teh routledge, 352 pages, $140 Raphael’s School of Athens depicts Aristotle and Plato at the center of a group of ancient Greek philosophers modeled on . . . . Continue Reading »
Thursday, April 14, 2016
Tuesday, March 31, 2015
Feser on Denys Turner's Thomas Aquinas: A Portrait
Was Aquinas a Materialist?
I was thinking of buying the book but now I've lowered its priority on the wish list.
I was thinking of buying the book but now I've lowered its priority on the wish list.
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
Sunday, October 23, 2011
Brian Davies
Over at Thomistica.net, a post on a new book by Brian Davies: Is God a Moral Agent?
One argument given by Davies that God is not a moral agent is that moral agents are under obligation to a moral law; he attributes this understanding to Aquinas. Is this a proper representation of Aquinas's definition of a moral agent? Could Davies's argument be restated, with Kantian terms thus: is God not a moral agent because he is autonomous while angels and humans are heteronomous, and only heteronomous beings are moral agents? Is this a case of equivocation causing misunderstandings? (It wouldn't be the first time with analytic philosophers.)
How does St. Thomas (or a traditional Thomist) define moral agency? We would look at the different sorts of agency present in creatures, starting with the distinction between voluntary and involuntary/natural. The question is whether by moral agency Aquinas adds anything to his notion of "perfect voluntary" agency. What texts does Davies cite to develop a definition of moral agency?
It is clear that human beings and angels are not God. Is good used analogically of God and creatures? Or equivocally? But if God is not a moral agent, can we say that He is morally good at all? It would seem from the short blurb given at Thomistica.net that Davies does take his reasoning in this direction in order to establish a different Christian theodicy. It seems erroneous to me. If God cannot be said to be good, or is not essentially good, then what reason would He have to save us, rather than desiring our destruction or misery? Why should we not imitate His example, rather than submitting to a moral law?
I get the impression that Davies has missed the order of learning and is relying too much on premises taken from his reading of the text (foundationalism?), and then formulating arguments without being confirmed that his understanding of reality is correct.
One argument given by Davies that God is not a moral agent is that moral agents are under obligation to a moral law; he attributes this understanding to Aquinas. Is this a proper representation of Aquinas's definition of a moral agent? Could Davies's argument be restated, with Kantian terms thus: is God not a moral agent because he is autonomous while angels and humans are heteronomous, and only heteronomous beings are moral agents? Is this a case of equivocation causing misunderstandings? (It wouldn't be the first time with analytic philosophers.)
How does St. Thomas (or a traditional Thomist) define moral agency? We would look at the different sorts of agency present in creatures, starting with the distinction between voluntary and involuntary/natural. The question is whether by moral agency Aquinas adds anything to his notion of "perfect voluntary" agency. What texts does Davies cite to develop a definition of moral agency?
It is clear that human beings and angels are not God. Is good used analogically of God and creatures? Or equivocally? But if God is not a moral agent, can we say that He is morally good at all? It would seem from the short blurb given at Thomistica.net that Davies does take his reasoning in this direction in order to establish a different Christian theodicy. It seems erroneous to me. If God cannot be said to be good, or is not essentially good, then what reason would He have to save us, rather than desiring our destruction or misery? Why should we not imitate His example, rather than submitting to a moral law?
I get the impression that Davies has missed the order of learning and is relying too much on premises taken from his reading of the text (foundationalism?), and then formulating arguments without being confirmed that his understanding of reality is correct.
Sunday, September 25, 2011
Friday, September 23, 2011
CathBlog - Metaphysics well regarded outside the Catholic 'ghetto' by Simon Rowney (via Insight Scoop)
Wednesday, June 01, 2011
The Vocation of the Catholic Philosopher: From Maritain to John Paul II
John P. Hittinger , ed.
Will Catholic philosophers in the United States lead the charge for a change in Catholic higher education and how it is being handled? Who will speak the truth to power about the higher education scam? Hiding behind the defense that a Catholic liberal education is not meant to be practical will seem self-serving.
The American Maritain Association
John P. Hittinger , ed.
Will Catholic philosophers in the United States lead the charge for a change in Catholic higher education and how it is being handled? Who will speak the truth to power about the higher education scam? Hiding behind the defense that a Catholic liberal education is not meant to be practical will seem self-serving.
The American Maritain Association
Sunday, September 26, 2010
Judging well
Does the act of judgment have a habit or virtue? It is apparent that there is a difference between judging and judging well. Is judging well solely due to the accumulation of experience? For example, judging how fast the cars in front of us are going--some seem to never learn to make the judgment before making a lane change. The act of judgment is dependent upon our moral state -- those who are patient enough to accumulate sufficient sense data before judging are better able to do so than those who are not.
How is the habit of nous or intellectus related to simple apprehension and judgment? I used to think that intellectus was related to simple apprehension only, but now I am wavering on this point. But I do not see how our judging well is due to anything but experience and having the requisite moral habits.
Logic and Mental Philosophy
Principles of Logic
The Mansions of Thomistic Philosophy
Classical man and the Traditional Ethic
Joseph Sikora, S.J. article
Where has Joseph Magee gone? Elementary Aristotelian-Thomistic Logic is still incomplete.
(This post reminds me of the account of human knowledge given by virtue epistemologists like Linda Zagzebski.)
OUP (Google Books)
Ernest Sosa's A Virtue Epistemology
Heather Battal, What is Virtue Epistemology
Misc: The Lonergan Institute
How is the habit of nous or intellectus related to simple apprehension and judgment? I used to think that intellectus was related to simple apprehension only, but now I am wavering on this point. But I do not see how our judging well is due to anything but experience and having the requisite moral habits.
Logic and Mental Philosophy
Principles of Logic
The Mansions of Thomistic Philosophy
Classical man and the Traditional Ethic
Joseph Sikora, S.J. article
Where has Joseph Magee gone? Elementary Aristotelian-Thomistic Logic is still incomplete.
(This post reminds me of the account of human knowledge given by virtue epistemologists like Linda Zagzebski.)
OUP (Google Books)
Ernest Sosa's A Virtue Epistemology
Heather Battal, What is Virtue Epistemology
Misc: The Lonergan Institute
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