Idealism, subjectivity, and Divine Revelation

Kyle R. Cupp: Patriarchy, Theology and Doctrine, More on Power, Patriarchy and Truth, and Am I a Dissenter?

In combating controversy, the Church has refrained from declaring certain philosophical systems or statements or positions as erroneous, except when they manifestly contradict her teachings. Is there a new form of Modernism afoot, which is an attack not on supernatural knowledge directly, but indirectly through questioning of natural human knowledge (and communication, which is dependent upon language). How can a false understanding of human knowledge not lead to some form of neo-Modernism? The Church may need to declare certain propositions concerning human knowledge to be errors in order to safeguard Revelation, the authority of the Church, and Apostolic Succession, if such errors ever gain prominence, instead of being the speculation of academics lacking a solid preparation in philosophy. If the object of the intellect is not the thing but an idea or concept, then how is the idea connected to the thing? How can one possibly know that the idea represents reality?

Epistemology, knowledge, truth: what is the relationship between what one believes about human knowledge and Divine revelation here? Communication or teaching is meditated through human language, which is grounded upon human knowledge. But language is also grounded upon custom; hence part of education lies in untangling the two. Belief or faith doesn't require that the proposition is evident for one to assent to it; in fact, belief or faith is only possible when the proposition is not evident. Nonetheless, that the mind can have opinions is an indication that the mind transcends the material (and sensation)? So how does the modern distinguish between nous, episteme and doxa?

Not all are careful enough to define their terms in their arguments, and so "interpretation" comes into play, especially if there is no acceptable tradition providing definitions for those terms. But with respect to human knowledge (philosophy or science), one does not learn from words alone, but by checking those propositions against reality and what one already knows.


Regardig "realism" -- Aristotelian-Thomism is sometimes said to be "moderate" realism, while Platonism is "radical" or "extreme" realism. Plato does not deny that we have true knowledge, but the things that are the object of our knowledge are the Forms, not the material world. But the realism to which I refer is not with regards to universals, but to our knowledge; the contrast between realism and idealism. Can there be such a melding of realism and idealism so that it is still realism, a la "phenomenological realism"? If we have knowledge of ideas and things, then what makes the connection, and how do we know that such relation is true?

Are some mistaking the way we transition from confusion to knowledge through refining of definitions for something else? Our understanding of things can grow, but our starting point must be the thing, and not an idea of that thing. A "philosophy of hermeneutics" might be plausible if one was dealing with just opinions, and not reality. No wonder scientists scorn philosophers.

SEP: hermeneutics, phenomenology, epistemology
Modernism