The Book of Nature

It was astounding to learn how central the idea of Nature as a Book as been in the Christian tradition, from Basil to Bonaventure to Benedict.

Here's a fantastic article by Fr. Giuseppe Tanzella-Nitti that I drew on: https://t.co/XQ4cbZmjLJ

— Peter Mommsen (@PeterMommsen) May 25, 2021

Cur Deus Verba

"Ignorance of the Scriptures is ignorance of Christ." @TheJeremyHolmes recently joined the "After Dinner Scholar" podcast to discuss his new book, "Cur Deus Verba" (https://t.co/KFqctxkEo6), which explores what God sought to accomplish by making the Bible.https://t.co/UFDG4TNQIO

— Ignatius Press (@IgnatiusPress) May 21, 2021

Hebraic Exceptionalism

Hebraic Exceptionalism and Western Exceptionalism (essay by Paul Krause) https://t.co/TQlJbUYjFJ

— ImaginativeConservat (@imaginativecons) November 8, 2020

Imaginative Conservative

"Apocalyptic"

Whole Counsel Blog

Given that our Lord and His Apostles and Evangelists transmitted very little about political life and political arrangements (beyond the importance of obedience), would it be erroneous to conclude that political life is not important? Yes. It would also be erroneous to think that Catholic Social Teaching is not subject to change or correction, as its moral theology is only as good as the one doing it.

More on Divine Patterns

Divine Patterns in Story and Image, pt. 1

Source of the Anecdote?

From Things That Can't Change by George Weigel:

When the Second Vatican Council was putting the finishing touches on one of its key documents, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium), Pope Paul VI proposed that it include a statement that the pope is “accountable to the Lord alone.”

The suggestion was referred to the Council’s Theological Commission, which, perhaps to Pope Paul’s surprise, flatly rejected it: the Roman Pontiff, the Theological Commission noted, “is . . . bound to revelation itself, to the fundamental structure of the Church, to the sacraments, to the definitions of earlier Councils, and other obligations too numerous to mention.” The pope cannot, in other words, change the deposit of faith, of which he is the custodian, not the master. The pope can’t decide that the Church can do without bishops, or that there really are eleven sacraments, or that Arius had it right in denying the divinity of Christ.

"The Jewish Roots of Catholic Charity"

Gary Anderson

Thomistica.net: Hypothetical Disqualification of Dogma? by Christopher J. Malloy

Idealism, subjectivity, and Divine Revelation

Kyle R. Cupp: Patriarchy, Theology and Doctrine, More on Power, Patriarchy and Truth, and Am I a Dissenter?

In combating controversy, the Church has refrained from declaring certain philosophical systems or statements or positions as erroneous, except when they manifestly contradict her teachings. Is there a new form of Modernism afoot, which is an attack not on supernatural knowledge directly, but indirectly through questioning of natural human knowledge (and communication, which is dependent upon language). How can a false understanding of human knowledge not lead to some form of neo-Modernism? The Church may need to declare certain propositions concerning human knowledge to be errors in order to safeguard Revelation, the authority of the Church, and Apostolic Succession, if such errors ever gain prominence, instead of being the speculation of academics lacking a solid preparation in philosophy. If the object of the intellect is not the thing but an idea or concept, then how is the idea connected to the thing? How can one possibly know that the idea represents reality?

Epistemology, knowledge, truth: what is the relationship between what one believes about human knowledge and Divine revelation here? Communication or teaching is meditated through human language, which is grounded upon human knowledge. But language is also grounded upon custom; hence part of education lies in untangling the two. Belief or faith doesn't require that the proposition is evident for one to assent to it; in fact, belief or faith is only possible when the proposition is not evident. Nonetheless, that the mind can have opinions is an indication that the mind transcends the material (and sensation)? So how does the modern distinguish between nous, episteme and doxa?

Not all are careful enough to define their terms in their arguments, and so "interpretation" comes into play, especially if there is no acceptable tradition providing definitions for those terms. But with respect to human knowledge (philosophy or science), one does not learn from words alone, but by checking those propositions against reality and what one already knows.


Regardig "realism" -- Aristotelian-Thomism is sometimes said to be "moderate" realism, while Platonism is "radical" or "extreme" realism. Plato does not deny that we have true knowledge, but the things that are the object of our knowledge are the Forms, not the material world. But the realism to which I refer is not with regards to universals, but to our knowledge; the contrast between realism and idealism. Can there be such a melding of realism and idealism so that it is still realism, a la "phenomenological realism"? If we have knowledge of ideas and things, then what makes the connection, and how do we know that such relation is true?

Are some mistaking the way we transition from confusion to knowledge through refining of definitions for something else? Our understanding of things can grow, but our starting point must be the thing, and not an idea of that thing. A "philosophy of hermeneutics" might be plausible if one was dealing with just opinions, and not reality. No wonder scientists scorn philosophers.

SEP: hermeneutics, phenomenology, epistemology
Modernism