The virtue of justice: Ad alterum by Michael A. Hayes

It looks good, on first reading, but does it lack in precision? Acts of particular justice are towards the other, and they are ordered to the common good, through legal justice, and charity. But is the virtue of justice necessary for Christian morality? How is it different from the love of neighbor or of the common good?

The archives for Pastoral Review have been taken down? There was an interesting article from 2006 about the diaconate and its relation to "service."

John Paul II on the Right to Citizenship

A reader left a link to Javier Hervada's The Principles of the Social Doctrine of the Church in the combox. It's been a while since I've looked at the essay. Professor Hervada is probably a good man (indeed I owe him for an act of generosity), and I may have even recommended his introduction on this blog at some point, but I wanted to call attention to one part which is probably problematic:

6. THE NATURAL RIGHTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON. One characteristic of the human person is self-mastery. This dominion has two aspects. First, control by reason and will over the other faculties makes a person's acts free and responsible; second, his being and the natural ends proper to it entitle the person to rights and liberties, as well as to duties, in his relations with others. These rights (and duties) a-e called natural rights (or fundamental rights--an expression much used by John XXIII) or inalienable rights of the human person (as John Paul II often calls them).

Usually these rights are stated in general terms; it then belongs to the interpreter to explain them more precisely. The main fundamental rights are as follows (MM 11-27; UN--Address of John Paul II to the 36th General Assembly of the United Nations, Oct. 2. 1979):


...

18) the right to citizenship.

So Professor Hervada is not offering his own opinion or giving his own synthesis of liberalism with CST - rather, he is citing a speech given by Pope John Paul II. Does Pope John Paul II endorse universal democracy as the most just form of government as well? I would argue that this opinion goes against an Aristotelian-Thomistic political theology, and probably against the dominant Catholic theological opinion before the 20th century.

Given Professor Hervada's institutional affiliation one would expect that he not be critical of the opinion of a Roman pontiff. But there is something to be said about ultramontanism being an obstacle to the reforming of the Church.

(Is there a basis for the charges given by certain groups and personages against John Paul II?)

I was reminded how weak our current conception of citizenship is because a friend mentioned that he had passed the citizenship test not too long ago - a test based merely on "knowledge" rather than on demonstrated virtue.

The concept of dominion is used as a theoretical foundation for rights. Something I'll have to remember when reviewing his book on rights.

The Precepts of Natural Law

There is a very good article in the January 2011 issue of The Thomist by Randall Smith, "What the Old Law Reveals about the Natural Law." I think St. Thomas's discussion of the moral precepts of the Old Law does illuminate his teachings about Natural Law and the first principles of practical reason. However, it is curious that Smith reduces the Natural Law to the two great commandments:

The natural law is grounded in two general, invariable precepts, which are invariable with respect to both rectitude and knowledge: to love God and to love neighbor as oneself. The natural law also contains a series of more specific precepts  derived from these first-level, general, invariable precepts (135).

Did he not remember I II 100, 5 ad 1?

Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.

According to Aquinas, there is a precept to love one's self, but it was not necessary for it to be promulgated as a separate commandment from God.

A reminder about St. Thomas on the fppr:

Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. 

I think this post at Siris, On Grisez on the First Principle of Practical Reasoning, goes too far to make a distinction between the first principle of practical reason and the first principle of law, as it says the first principle of practical reason is "one founded," not that it is. 

(The Latin: "Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.")

Related:
SEP: Medieval Theories of Practical Reason
IEP: Medieval Theories of Practical Reason

Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2"

Kelsen and Aquinas on “the Natural-Law Doctrine” by Robert P. George

An Overview of Practical Reason on Aquinas

THE LOGIC OF NATURAL LAW IN AQUINAS'S "TREATISE ON LAW" James Fieser

Here it is

That dissertation I thought might be interesting: Thomas John Bushlack, Justice in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas: Rediscovering Civic Virtue (pdf).

Benedict Ashley, O.P. on Natural Law

Mark Latkovic has this essay (pdf) comparing Fr. Ashley and the NNL theorists on natural law.


Reminder: Fr. Ashley's essay, "What is the End of the Human Person? The Vision of God and Integral Human Fulfillment," Moral Truth and Moral Tradition, ed. Luke Gormally. (A response)

Fr. Benedict Ashley on Science and the Fall

CV
"The Biblical Basis of Grisez's Revision of Moral Theology," in Robert P, George, ed., Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998).

"The Loss of Theological Unity: Pluralism, Thomism, and Catholic Morality," in Mary Jo Weaver and R. Scott Appleby , Being Right: Conservative Catholics in America (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 63-87.

Related:
Fr. Koterski's review of some books by Robert George.

Grisez on the Good of Religion

My Finnis books are not handy, so I will use Germain Grisez's treatment of religion* as a reference for the New Natural Law Theory:

[1] "We experience sin and alienation from God; the goods are the peace and friendship with God which are the concern of all true religion."

[2] "Religion is a great blessing, for nothing in life is more important than liberation from sin and friendship with God. However, harmony with God should not be confused with God himself nor with the divine life in which Christians share by adoption. The human good of religion—that harmony with God which perfects human persons as human—is only one human good alongside others (see GS 11). St. Thomas Aquinas makes this point by distinguishing the virtue of religion from the theological virtues. The former, concerned with specifically religious acts, such as prayer and sacrifice, does not bear upon God himself as the latter do (cf. S.t., 2–2, q. 81, a. 5)."

[3] Finally, in his summary of the seven basic categories of human goods Grisez writes:
"(4) religion or holiness, which is harmony with God, found in the agreement of human individual and communal free choices with God’s will."

Friendship with God is charity, and should not be confused with the virtue of religion. It is not clear to me that Grisez does not muddle the two in [1], as he says that peace and friendshipw ith God are the concern of all true religion. In [2] the differentiation is clearer.

In his discussion of religion and its act, devotion, Aquinas seems to be saying that there cannot be the virtue of religion without charity, since religion is concerned with the means to the end which is the object of charity, God Himself. In the response to the first objection, he says:

The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.

Can one will something to God as an end without first loving Him? Can there be the act of religion without the virtue of charity? It seems not: charity is the proximate cause of devotion [religion]. How can someone will something as a means to an end without his will first being referred to the end? Without willing the end, how can the means be a means?

Is religion, then an infused virtue, and not an acquired one? It is apparent that there must be an infused virtue of religion that corresponds to the theological virtue of charity.** But is there a natural, acquired virtue of religion matching the natural love of God? Here we enter into the thicket of controversy: the relationship between the natural order and the supernatural order and the consequences of the Fall and effects of original sin.

I tend to think that there is not an acquired virtue of religion after people attain the use of reason. Either they accept God's grace or they do not.

Germain is clearly doing moral theology in his books. But if he follows Aquinas (or this understanding of Aquinas) and implicitly admits in his account of natural law that religion is thus tied to charity, then its usefulness ends. What is needed for non-believers beyond this point, as I said earlier, is not more discourse about the precepts of the natural law, but grace and Christ.

I should compare this with what Finnis writes about the good of religion...

I note that a special issue of the American Journal of Jurisprudence was devoted to Grisez on the question of human fulfillment, and iirc, some of the contributions examined his treatment of religion.


On religion as "belief system" or "worldview":
In a comment to a previous post from today JBS gives a definition of religion:

Religion - that set of rules by which I know I'm ok...and you're not.

This definition allows for many belief-systems not normally thought-of as 'religious' to function, allowing for everyone to have a religion, apart from a real relationship with God.

It seems that here religion is synonymous with belief system or world view. Everyone has a belief system or worldview, which is a mixture of knowledge and set of beliefs about reality. But it is not the same as religion as it is defined by Grisez or Aquinas. People act in accordance with certain first principles, but these first principles may not include God.

What about the pagans and their beliefs and attitudes? Is God or are the gods superior to us? Hence we must give them the proper respect and may even need to placate their anger. Or are they merely used by us? That is, they are servants of our happiness. Whom must we please? Ourselves or the gods?

If the virtue of religion is tied to the love of God, then what motivates those who do not love God but are "imperfect" to perform certain acts of religion? The fear of punishment or the promise of reward (or a certain good of reason), which can be harmonized with the love of self. One does not need the love of God to fear punishment, etc. Similarly, non-Christians do not need charity in order to perform the rituals that they have learned from their elders. Just because certain acts associated with a virtue are being done does not imply that this virtue is present in the agent.

We can use Aquinas's treatment of the Old Law as a model for understanding non-Christian religions*** before the coming of Christ and relate their proximity to the truth through the supposition of a Primitive Revelation. See Journet's The Meaning of Grace for his account of grace before the Incarnation and "God in Search of Man" by Patrick Beeman for more about Wilhelm Schmidt.

A good complement to The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State? On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State by Joseph R. Strayer (GB)

Note: How do the virtues modify the powers? And is this the key to understanding the relationship between the infused virtues and the acquired virtues?

(See St. Thomas on courage? Example of fasting? Almsgiving/beneficence vs. magnanimity.)

This comment over at WWWTW forced me to return to the diss. to check my notes. (I confess that I was motivated by the desire to give someone a written smackdown.) It was at the very least a good exercise in thinking about ius, and as a result of my new notes I may revise the first chapter or even start from scratch. I was thinking about committing myself to its writing during Mass - maybe a bad distraction. Whether it will happen, we'll see. It is time to check the last revision of the outline.

An old article in the Marquette Law Review, written by Anton Hermann Chroust: The Problem of Private Property According to St. Thomas Aquinas

Is Aquinas a liberal?

In this one respect -- how he defines injustice.

Lydia McGrew: Contract killing

As Wesley J. Smith points out, when he was in law school he was taught that X's agreeing to be murdered does not make killing X legally something other than murder. And a good thing, too. Well, as usual, the UK is leading us into a new world. In Brave New Britain, that isn't true anymore, evidently.


Michael Bateman put a bag over the head of his wife Margaret and pumped in gas to kill her. She was in a lot of pain that wasn't getting properly treated because the moronic medical establishment didn't diagnose her broken pelvis. (It was discovered after her death.) She was also depressed about not being able to do normal things like taking showers. That's it. She wasn't dying, if you think that's a relevant consideration. (I don't.) So she and Michael planned her death, and he killed her, because she apparently couldn't do it herself. The prosecutor has declared that it "isn't in the public interest" to prosecute Michael, presumably because Margaret agreed to be murdered.


In the current context of recent posts, I'm almost afraid to ask whether mere libertarianism would mean that agreeing to have yourself killed with plastic bags and gas means that everything is A-okay and no prosecution should be carried out against your killer. I'm pretty sure I know the answer. And that, folks, is just one reason that, while I'll defend small government all over the place, I don't carry a libertarian card.

Aquinas asks, "Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?" Is it no longer injustice if we suffer the action willingly? In the body, Aquinas argues that no one can suffer an injustice except involuntarily. But he adds in the response to the third objection:

Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above (Article 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above (Article 2). Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.

And so the agent may nonetheless be guilty of committing an injustice, even if the victim consents to it. How is this so? Because the action in itself is unequal. That is to say, injustice is not defined by consent, but by the lack of what is due.

The Object of the External Act

A source of confusion for some trying to understand Catholic moral theology. St. Thomas teaches that the object is the term of the act--what it brings about. We often have an implicit understanding of this, as is shown by our use of a name for both a thing and the action that leads to the making of that thing. For example, section and partition. What are some other examples of this analogical naming?

Temporal Happiness

Returning to an old post, I ask once again: What is temporal happiness? Is it identical to what might be called imperfect participation in happiness by Aquinas? Or is it the imperfect happiness that we can attain by our natural powers alone?* I suppose "temporal happiness" could be used to refer to either, depending on the speaker.

However, some authors, such as Henri Grenier (see the comments to that post), use "temporal happiness" to name the end of civil society. Was the use of temporal happiness in this way begun by neo-Thomists? Or can it be found in earlier Thomistic commentators? I need a Dominican Thomist to be my personal reference librarian.

For the neo-Thomists, does one's temporal good consist of the necessities of life, as well as health/life? Or are these understood as instruments for the sake of activity? I would suspect the latter --these instruments would then be necessary conditions for virtuous activity, but not sufficient conditions, obviously. I think the listing of  habits  (e.g. knowledge) and quasi-habits (e.g. family) as a good constitutive of happiness is a recent "development" (perhaps most prominent among New Natural Law theorists?) and involves a certain confusion about the meanings of the word "good" and how the analogous use of good is related to desire and practical reason. Are the NNL theorists just following the example of Aquinas? If happiness is convertible with both ends and goods, and it is defined as an activity by those who follow Aristotle, then can a habit or quasi-habit said to be an end or good in the same way an activity can? Is what Aquinas writes about how the precepts of the Natural Law are derived incorrect or in need of clarification? More on that later.

If temporal happiness is identified in this way, it can then be distinguished from the supernatural end or good (spiritual good?) of man. I suppose calling the supernatural good a "spiritual" good is misleading, as virtue and the temporal good are primarily goods of the soul. A related question then: Why shouldn't the Church have care of the temporal good as well as the "supernatural good"?


*I cannot say that this imperfect happiness is identical to the natural end/good of the neo-thomists. I don't understand the controversy over nature/supernature, the natural desire of man to see God, etc. well enough to say anything at this point. I do plan on getting a copy of Feingold's The Natural Desire to see God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters. (Sapientia Press has also published that collection of essays, Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of the Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought.)

I still have to finish reading Dennis Bradley's Aquinas on the Two-Fold Human Good (a review; Google Books).

Related:

Richard Kraut's article on Aristotle's Ethics

entelechy, energeia, eudaimonia

Begun on July 15, 2010 at 12:41 AM.

Solidarity vs. Identity

Solidarity, if it is identical to social justice or perhaps benevolence, pertains to the will, while identity pertains to the intellect. The exercise of solidarity is dependent upon how one's identity, which is admittedly "subjective," in that people can identify themselves in various ways and think that each way of determining their identity is correct relative to the moral agent. But in answer to the question of "Who am I?" in relation to moral reasoning, we should look not at what is relatively insignificant (what are our pastimes or "interests" are), but firstly the role we play in creation [our function, narrowly conceived]. This role is tied to our understanding of our family (including lineage), relations with friends and associates, community, and people.

I remember someone else in the PhD program writing her dissertation on role-centered morality, but from more of an "analytic" perspective--I don't know if she is trying to turn her dissertation into a book (or if she's still in academics). If roles are so important, why didn't the medievals talk about them? Because their moral theology  already presupposes an understanding of roles and related precepts (see Aquinas's discussion of the virtues related to justice and the order of charity)--there wasn't a need to write an explicit account of roles and duties. (As Fr. Cessario once said in class, "The medievals didn't have to talk about community; they lived it.")  This understanding of roles is covered, implicity if not explicitly (at least not as far as I remember) in Dr. Fleming's The Morality of Everyday Life (a review here).

For us Americans, the acquisition of a "role-centered" morality is necessary for a deepening of our understanding of the lay vocation.

Some posts at American Creation remind me that I have to re-examine Brian Tierney... Charles J. Reid on Brian Tierney and Charles J. Reid on Brian Tierney II.

FPJ coverage of the rule of law

Natural Law, the Rule of Law, and Liberty by Edward B. McLean 

Rule of Law: The Great Foundation of Our Constitution by Matthew Spalding 

The Common Law between England and America by Roger Scruton

Christopher Tollefsen on the New Natural Law Theory

In a previous post I mentioned that Christopher Tollefsen can be considered to be a disciple of Germain Grisez. From this I concluded that he is probably an advocate of the New Natural Law Theory. It turns out that I surmised correctly. I also noted in another post that the Philosophy Department at St. Anselm College has a blog. Today I discovered that there is a journal of philosophy associated with the college as well--Lyceum. There is also a blog dedicated to the discussion of articles from the journal. Browsing through the archive, I find that Dr. Tollefsen has written an article discussing the New Natural Law Theory (pdf). This article is recent, so it should provide a good overview of the state of the controversies raging between adherents of the NNLT and traditional Thomists (or neo-Thomists, as some NNLT proponents label some of them--let's set aside the question of whether neo-Thomism is rightly used as a pejorative or not). It also seems to me that the introduction by Tollefsen could serve as a basis for an "informal" (i.e. not published in an academic journal) response (or a formal, published response) by traditional Thomists to the assertions of New Natural Law theorists.

I wish to concentrate solely on what Dr. Tollefsen says about the common good and to make some notes.

4. Political Authority and the Political Common Good
In 1979, Grisez and Boyle published Life and Death with Liberty and Justice; in 1980, Finnis published Natural Law and Natural Rights. Together the two books marked the beginnings of a “discussion of political theory” carried on between the three thinkers.[30] Grisez and Boyle describe their early part in this discussion as conceding “somewhat too much to political theories that are prevalent in the United States.”[31] By this, they refer to an indebtedness to John Rawls’s antiperfectionism. In Life and Liberty Boyle and Grisez allowed that it would be wrong for the state to incorporate substantive moral values, such as the good of life, into its governing principles, and hence into its conception of the common good of the state. In part this was motivated by a need to find a principled limit on the state’s sovereignty over the lives, including the moral and religious lives, of its subjects.

Finnis’ work in Natural Law and Natural Rights, by contrast, argued for a perfectionist account of the state: the basic goods of human persons were not to be ruled out of the practical considerations at the heart of political rule, as in Rawls’s work. Yet Finnis too, like Grisez and Boyle, has been sensitive to the need for liberty in the state, and the limits of state sovereignty over individuals; all three oppose the view, encouraged by what Finnis calls a “quick” reading of Aquinas, according to which “government should command whatever leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people from evil-doing and induce them to morally decent conduct.”[32]

Accordingly, Grisez, Finnis and Boyle have converged on an account of political authority and the common good that, while rooted in the basic goods, nevertheless sees the state as a “community co-operating in the service of a common good which is instrumental, not itself basic.”[33] Political authority is necessary because individuals, families, and groups, while sufficient in one sense for the pursuit of all the basic goods, including the goods of marriage and religion, are nevertheless thwarted in their pursuit of these goods by (a) lack of social coordination; (b) the hostility of outsiders; (c) the predatory behavior of some insiders; and (d) circumstances beyond the control of individuals that leave them in conditions of more than usual dependence but without the usual personal and social aids, as, for example, widows, orphans, the sick, and the disabled.

Political authority, and optimally, a political authority itself subject to law, is necessary to efficiently and fairly pursue these goals; but together, these goals comprise a set of conditions instrumentally necessary for individuals and groups to directly pursue the basic goods, individually and cooperatively. The political common good is thus described by Finnis as “the whole ensemble of material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration, that tend to favor, facilitate, and foster the realization by each individual [in that community] of his or her personal development.”[34]

In putting forth this account of political authority and the common good, Finnis has criticized the idea, mentioned above, that the common good includes the complete well-being, including the moral well-being, of the state’s citizens. In contrasting this Aristotelian idea with what he takes to be the true Thomistic view, Finnis has drawn criticism from some Thomists, who read St. Thomas as more similar to Aristotle than does Finnis. He has also generated some debate internal to the New Natural Law theory concerning the proper limits of political authority.[35]

Finnis holds that recognition of the instrumental nature of the state means that, as George summarizes his position, “law and the state exceed their just authority – thus violating a principle of justice – when they go beyond the protection of the public moral environment and criminalize 'even secret and truly consensual adult acts of vice.’”[36] But, says George in response, “it does not follow, or so it seems to me, from the instrumental nature of the political common good that moral paternalism, where it can be effective, is beyond the scope of that good.”[37] And so George, unlike Finnis, holds that the legitimate limits on legislation where morality is concerned are prudential, not principled.

Please refer to the on-line article for the footnote references.

1. Why is political authority necessary? It is not made necessary by the good involved (being common as opposed to private or singular), but for the reasons listed above, which cover interpersonal conflict. The presence of social coordination would facilitate individuals and families attaining the basic goods. But otherwise, individuals and families are sufficient to attain the basic goods. In contrast, Aquinas maintains that political authority is necessary because the good to which it is ordered is not the same as the private good of the individual. This is the holistic good, the good of the community as a whole.

(Something must adjudicate between competing desires and plans?)

2. "Yet Finnis too, like Grisez and Boyle, has been sensitive to the need for liberty in the state, and the limits of state sovereignty over individuals; all three oppose the view, encouraged by what Finnis calls a “quick” reading of Aquinas, according to which “government should command whatever leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people from evil-doing and induce them to morally decent conduct.”[32] "

Aquinas recognizes that there are limits to human law. And yet if we take him seriously as an intellectual, we would gather that he thinks this is compatible with the common good being the good of the community as a whole.

"Finnis has criticized the idea, mentioned above, that the common good includes the complete well-being, including the moral well-being, of the state’s citizens. In contrasting this Aristotelian idea with what he takes to be the true Thomistic view, Finnis has drawn criticism from some Thomists, who read St. Thomas as more similar to Aristotle than does Finnis. He has also generated some debate internal to the New Natural Law theory concerning the proper limits of political authority.[35]"

What is the "complete" well-being? Can government bring about complete virtue? Probably not. But can it prohibit those actions which harm others or lead to bad moral states? Aquinas would agree that enforcement of the "no-harm principle" is important for the well-being of any community. But should law should be limited to this or not?

While Aquinas argues that law should not prohibit all vices, he does not give as a reason the question of enforceability. He focuses more on the question of observance. Would the lack of enforceability be a reason acceptable to Aquinas? Or would he reject this reason on other grounds?

Even if it is the case that law should be mostly limited to enforcing the no-harm principle, that does not mean that there is not a communal good distinct from the basic goods listed under the New Natural Law Theory. Is the complete well-being of the state's citizens the same as citizens living well with one another? I do not think so. And this is the problem, if Tollefsen is correct in his summary. (I'll have to double-check Finnis's Aquinas eventually.) The common good of the political community is not the complete well-being of its citizens. Rather, it is their life in common. It is not surprising that we who live as atomists or liberals fail to recognize this good, since for the most part we do not aim to achieve it in our own lives.

The dissertation by M. Therrien on the pedagogical nature of law should help one understand how law trains people in virtue.

*No-harm principle: No one can harm or injure (commit an act of injustice, not just physically hurt) another.

Brian Tierney, "The Idea of Natural Rights - Origins and Persistence"

I believe the issue in which this article appears may have another article or two about rights, but I'm too lazy to check at the moment.

Some titles of interest

From Transaction:
Sketching Theoretical Biology, Toward a Theoretical Biology, Volume 2; C. H. Waddington, editor (Google Books)

Vol. 1 The Origin of Life
KLI Theory Lab

Urbanization in a Federalist Context, Roscoe C. Martin (Google Books)

Power, Authority, Justice and Rights, Anthony de Crespigny and Alan Wertheimer, editors (Google Books)

This might be useful for the diss, something from Rowman & Littlefield:
Rethinking Justice by Richard H. Bell (Google Books)

Hmm... a quick look at the foreward... maybe it isn't as useful as the recommendation led me to believe. "Bell argues quite persuasively that a rights-based conception of justice is intrinsically deficient because it decouples the rights of self-regarding individuals from any prior moral obligations they owe each other." -- Choice

Also from R&L: The Problem of Natural Law by Douglas Kries and Excellence Unleashed by Paul J. Rasmussen

Temporal Happiness

Returning to an old post, I ask once again: What is temporal happiness? Is it identical to what might be called imperfect participation in happiness by Aquinas? Or is it the imperfect happiness that we can attain by our natural powers alone?* I suppose "temporal happiness" could be used to refer to either, depending on the speaker.

However, some authors, such as Henri Grenier (see the comments to that post), use "temporal happiness" to name the end of civil society. Was the use of temporal happiness in this way begun by neo-Thomists? Or can it be found in earlier Thomistic commentators? I need a Dominican Thomist to be my personal reference librarian.

For the neo-Thomists, does one's temporal good consist of the necessities of life, as well as health/life? Or are these understood as instruments for the sake of activity? I would suspect the latter --these instruments would then be necessary conditions for virtuous activity, but not sufficient conditions, obviously. I think the listing of  habits  (e.g. knowledge) and quasi-habits (e.g. family) as a good constitutive of happiness is a recent "development" (perhaps most prominent among New Natural Law theorists?) and involves a certain confusion about the meanings of the word "good" and how the analogous use of good is related to desire and practical reason. Are the NNL theorists just following the example of Aquinas? If happiness is convertible with both ends and goods, and it is defined as an activity by those who follow Aristotle, then can a habit or quasi-habit said to be an end or good in the same way an activity can? Is what Aquinas writes about how the precepts of the Natural Law are derived incorrect or in need of clarification? More on that later.

If temporal happiness is identified in this way, it can then be distinguished from the supernatural end or good (spiritual good?) of man. I suppose calling the supernatural good a "spiritual" good is misleading, as virtue and the temporal good are primarily goods of the soul. A related question then: Why shouldn't the Church have care of the temporal good as well as the "supernatural good"?


*I cannot say that this imperfect happiness is identical to the natural end/good of the neo-thomists. I don't understand the controversy over nature/supernature, the natural desire of man to see God, etc. well enough to say anything at this point. I do plan on getting a copy of Feingold's The Natural Desire to see God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters. (Sapientia Press has also published that collection of essays, Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of the Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought.)

I still have to finish reading Dennis Bradley's Aquinas on the Two-Fold Human Good (a review; Google Books).

Related:

Richard Kraut's article on Aristotle's Ethics

entelechy, energeia, eudaimonia