Subsidiarity and Family Policy

Subsidiarity and Family Policy@smarick in @NationalAffairs https://t.co/8lutDWz6pD

— Josh Hochschild (@JoshHochschild) June 22, 2022

David Clayton on Byzantine Liturgical Reform, Part 2

NLM

Adrian Vermeule on the Constitution

(via MoJ)

The Atlantic: Beyond Originalism by Adrian Vermeule
The dominant conservative philosophy for interpreting the Constitution has served its purpose, and scholars ought to develop a more moral framework.

But originalism has now outlived its utility, and has become an obstacle to the development of a robust, substantively conservative approach to constitutional law and interpretation. Such an approach—one might call it “common-good constitutionalism”—should be based on the principles that government helps direct persons, associations, and society generally toward the common good, and that strong rule in the interest of attaining the common good is entirely legitimate. In this time of global pandemic, the need for such an approach is all the greater, as it has become clear that a just governing order must have ample power to cope with large-scale crises of public health and well-being—reading “health” in many senses, not only literal and physical but also metaphorical and social.

Vermeule is a professor of constitutional law at Harvard? And he doesn't know that the Constitution is for the Federal Government and its powers are limited for a reason? Nor does he realize that the common good that is proper to the political community is not the same as the good of a federation because of the scale involved. In addition to being an integralist, Vermeule's a statist and a nationalist with respect to the Constitution. Those who disagree with him (I've included some reactions below), do so not because they disagree with the scope of power he is advocating for the Federal Government, but because of his favoring a confessional state or some other moral or religious principle. They would have a strong centralized government, so long as it promotes their ideology, and they too could talk about ruling for the common good as well, it's just that they have a different (and erroneous, though in their minds they think it correct and humane) opinion about how that common good is achieved and preserved.

Assured of this, conservatives ought to turn their attention to developing new and more robust alternatives to both originalism and left-liberal constitutionalism. It is now possible to imagine a substantive moral constitutionalism that, although not enslaved to the original meaning of the Constitution, is also liberated from the left-liberals’ overarching sacramental narrative, the relentless expansion of individualistic autonomy. Alternatively, in a formulation I prefer, one can imagine an illiberal legalism that is not “conservative” at all, insofar as standard conservatism is content to play defensively within the procedural rules of the liberal order.

This approach should take as its starting point substantive moral principles that conduce to the common good, principles that officials (including, but by no means limited to, judges) should read into the majestic generalities and ambiguities of the written Constitution. These principles include respect for the authority of rule and of rulers; respect for the hierarchies needed for society to function; solidarity within and among families, social groups, and workers’ unions, trade associations, and professions; appropriate subsidiarity, or respect for the legitimate roles of public bodies and associations at all levels of government and society; and a candid willingness to “legislate morality”—indeed, a recognition that all legislation is necessarily founded on some substantive conception of morality, and that the promotion of morality is a core and legitimate function of authority. Such principles promote the common good and make for a just and well-ordered society.

Let us do away with the pretense that the Constitution is even legally relevant with respect to preserving the order the Founders originally envisaged. That order disappeared a long time ago. What are we to do now? Do we do what we can to preserve observance of the moral law under the cover of the Constitution, interpreting it just so that for the sake of appearances, everything that is legislated is constitutional? Perhaps we would not disagree with this pragmatic approach so much, even if it involves a sort of "noble lie" or legal fiction that our observance of the Constitution is traditional. At least Vermeule admits that it is not. Our biggest disagreement remains - Vermeule looks to the central government as a solution; we look to decentralization and all that requires as the solution.

Common-good constitutionalism is not legal positivism, meaning that it is not tethered to particular written instruments of civil law or the will of the legislators who created them. Instead it draws upon an immemorial tradition that includes, in addition to positive law, sources such as the ius gentium—the law of nations or the “general law” common to all civilized legal systems—and principles of objective natural morality, including legal morality in the sense used by the American legal theorist Lon Fuller: the inner logic that the activity of law should follow in order to function well as law.

Doess the Anglo-American tradition recognize the Natural Law? It may depend upon its adherents, but I would think that the tradition would acknowledge that the Natural Law is embodied in the Common Law tradition; otherwise individual laws that are unjust are also invalid, and would or should have been nullified. Nonetheless, so long as we live in the shell of a federation of (sovereign) states we are tied to the Constitution, until that is replaced or some other agreement between the states is reached. Vermeule needs to stop imaging what power is able to achieve and consider instead what the limits of power are, after he has spent some time living in a true political community. Until that happens, his opinion (and that of integralists in general) is irrelevant as it has no basis in a true experience of community. It is just another version of received dogma with respect to political life.

How, if at all, are these principles to be grounded in the constitutional text and in conventional legal sources? The sweeping generalities and famous ambiguities of our Constitution, an old and in places obscure document, afford ample space for substantive moral readings that promote peace, justice, abundance, health, and safety, by means of just authority, hierarchy, solidarity, and subsidiarity. The general-welfare clause, which gives Congress “power to … provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” is an obvious place to ground principles of common-good constitutionalism (despite a liberal tradition of reading the clause in a cramped fashion), as is the Constitution’s preamble, with its references to general welfare and domestic tranquility, to the perfection of the union, and to justice. Constitutional words such as freedom and liberty need not be given libertarian readings; instead they can be read in light of a better conception of liberty as the natural human capacity to act in accordance with reasoned morality.

A "liberal tradition"? Perhaps some liberals wanted to restrict it. Maybe some oligarchs wanted to restrict it as well. But some originalists and paleoconservatives also wanted to restrict the reading of the general-welfare clause as well, because the Constitution enumerates the powers of the Federal Government, to which it is limited. Again, what sort of professor of constitutional law is this? One whose family background (his family name is Dutch) is tied to New England WASPs (Yankees), and a product of Harvard for both undergrad and law school. (A legacy admission? His mother was a member of the faculty for Radcliffe.) It's no wonder he is a Yankee Nationalist with respect to his understanding of the Constitution. He was also a clerk for Antonin Scalia -- was Scalia ignorant of the purpose and meaning of the Constitution as well, or were these lessons never given to his clerk, or never requested by his clerk? He converted to Roman Catholicism in 2016, and that grace is not going to remedy any defects in his opinions about the Constitution.

"Originalism has now outlived its utility, and has become an obstacle to the development of a robust, substantively conservative approach to constitutional law and interpretation," Adrian Vermeule writes: https://t.co/kqEQ4HD8Ql

— The Atlantic (@TheAtlantic) March 31, 2020

Some reactions:

“Common-good constitutionalism is not legal positivism, meaning that it is not tethered to particular written instruments of civil law or the will of the legislators who created them.”

That’s certainly one way of putting it. https://t.co/4JNkZrEXwP

— Charles C. W. Cooke (@charlescwcooke) March 31, 2020

Originalism had a good run. Time for common-good constitutionalism, reason of state, illiberal legalism and direct, authoritative rule for the common good, says Adrian Vermeule at the Atlantic https://t.co/sLHB9HNMS9

— Gladden Pappin (@gjpappin) March 31, 2020

To add even more context, Adrian Vermeule has stated he believes liberal democracy is demonically inspired. That’s the meaning of the Biblical quotes discussing “liberalism’s true identity” in the piece below. Did the editors at The Atlantic miss that? https://t.co/CLGHDeY3S2

— Mark R. Yzaguirre (@markyzaguirre) March 31, 2020

The New Republic: The Emerging Right-Wing Vision of Constitutional Authoritarianism

No surprise here, Vermeule is receiving support from other Latin integralists: Adrian Vermeule’s Brilliant Essay on Common Good Constitutionalism

Even some "conservatives" are sympathetic to his argument:

Leave it to Adrian Vermeule to make everyone in the broader legal academy, commentariat, and profession alike lose their collective minds even while he’s off Twitter for Lent.

Good for @TheAtlantic for publishing such a bold argument. https://t.co/1QrIXZ99K2

— Josh Hammer (@josh_hammer) March 31, 2020

A critique: Rejecting Vermeule’s Right-Wing Dworkinian Vision by Lee Strang
NRO: Adrian Vermeule's 'Common -Good Constitutionalism': No Alternative to Originalism

The Problem with Catholic Integralism in One Tweet By Andrew T. Walker

"Pacem in Terris: After 50 Years," Session Three: Sovereignty and Subsidiarity, Jean Bethke Elshtain

Patrick Brennan Responds to Jordan Ballor

The catholicity of subsidiarity

Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine by Patrick Brennan (via MoJ)

TAC as an Example of Subsidiarity?

Fr. Joseph Illo, Subsidiarity

CST and the United States

Catholic intellectuals and their quest to show how CST transcends the platform of both major political parties in the United States:
The Idol of Liberty
The Role of Government and the Battle over Catholic Social Teaching
The Unity of the Catholic Moral Vision

Let's get beyond the lecturing and start building some real community. Appeals to solidarity and the common good are rather useless if there is very little community to begin with; rather it is a mass aggregate of individuals who are strangers to one another. If they really got to know one another, you might be surprised how many divisions might appear, and while this may not be "ideal," it would be a necessary corrective, much to the dismay of those who live on sentimentalism.

Clarifications on the Political Common Good

Solidarity, subsidiarity, and principled sanity by Carl E. Olson (via Insight Scoop)

A lot of people have made use of a picture of Inigo Montoya from Princess Bride and the quotation, "You Keep Using That Word, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means," with reference to some disputed term or other. I think it would be humorous to make one of these photos with "common good."



Is the definition of the common good (along with subsidiarity), as put forth by contemporary CST and used by Mr. Olson, helpful? Yes, but primarily with reference to the modern nation-state. He cites the Compendium: "The common good of society is not an end in itself; it has value only in reference to attaining the ultimate ends of the person and the universal common good of the whole of creation. " The political common good, as "traditionally" understood by Thomists and Aristotelians, is not the same as the instrumental good defined by John XXIII and adopted into contemporary CST. The common good, the good of the community, is an end in itself - desirable for its own sake and not merely as a means to an end desired for itself. This does not mean that it is not subordinate to a "higher" end or good, like the supernatural common good (and man's ultimate end), God Himself. The common good, as defined within contemporary CST, may be an instrumental good to the political common good, but it is not identical to the political common good:

The principle of the common good, to which every aspect of social life must be related if it is to attain its fullest meaning, stems from the dignity, unity and equality of all people. According to its primary and broadly accepted sense, the common good indicates “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily”.

This instrumental good is explained as such by proponents of the New Natural Law Theory, for example. And yet there is use of language usually associated with the traditional [definition of the] common good:

The common good does not consist in the simple sum of the particular goods of each subject of a social entity. Belonging to everyone and to each person, it is and remains “common”, because it is indivisible and because only together is it possible to attain it, increase it and safeguard its effectiveness, with regard also to the future. Just as the moral actions of an individual are accomplished in doing what is good, so too the actions of a society attain their full stature when they bring about the common good. The common good, in fact, can be understood as the social and community dimension of the moral good.

An explanation of how the common good is common, though it may have been better to explain how it is common or shared - not as belonging to them, like property (in which case common would be said in praedicando), but as a shared end. And in the next paragraph:

A society that wishes and intends to remain at the service of the human being at every level is a society that has the common good — the good of all people and of the whole person [347] — as its primary goal. The human person cannot find fulfilment in himself, that is, apart from the fact that he exists “with” others and “for” others. This truth does not simply require that he live with others at various levels of social life, but that he seek unceasingly — in actual practice and not merely at the level of ideas — the good, that is, the meaning and truth, found in existing forms of social life. No expression of social life — from the family to intermediate social groups, associations, enterprises of an economic nature, cities, regions, States, up to the community of peoples and nations — can escape the issue of its own common good, in that this is a constitutive element of its significance and the authentic reason for its very existence[348]

Can the second part of this section be harmonized with the first? If the common good is the "social and community [communal] dimension of the moral good [the life of virtue]" then is it the same as "the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily"?

As for Fr. Barron's essay -- "Now in Catholic social theory, subsidiarity is balanced by solidarity, which is to say, a keen sense of the common good, of the natural and supernatural connections that bind us to one another, of our responsibility for each other." Solidarity may be identified with the virtue of social justice (or legal justice), or with civic friendship, or both, depending on, of course, its definition. The Compendium:

Solidarity is also an authentic moral virtue, not a “feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good. That is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all”[418]. Solidarity rises to the rank of fundamental social virtue since it places itself in the sphere of justice. It is a virtue directed par excellence to the common good, and is found in “a commitment to the good of one's neighbour with the readiness, in the Gospel sense, to ‘lose oneself' for the sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to ‘serve him' instead of oppressing him for one's own advantage (cf. Mt 10:40-42, 20:25; Mk 10:42-45; Lk 22:25-27)”[419].

I've already written about subsidiarity (as well as the contemporary notion of common good) and how these terms probably are better understood as reactions to the growth of the modern nation-state and polities that are too big for their own good, and the concomitant political and economic centralization. This may have been a conscious formulation for the first theorists, but those currently presenting CST as a basis for seeking political solutions may be unaware of the original contextual background of the terms.

Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts when we consider the [political] community and its members? Is legal justice distinct from civic friendship? I will have to address these questions at some other time. At some point I will also have to rewrite the discussion of how one cannot talk about common good if a community is mostly absent and the potential for community must be developed first, addressing the need for a common culture and a single identity, one people. Taking the United States as one nation, or polity, is a problem, because the scale is too big and the relationship between all of its members to one another too tenuous for the most part. Talking about the common good (and subsidiarity and solidarity) when the current political order (taken broadly as to referring not only to the federal government but also the culture and social order), or constitution in the Aristotelian sense, mitigates against it.

MOJ: "Much Ado About Subsidiarity" (which links to this post at VN, which notably does not offer a definition of the common good, but one assumes that the one current in CST is implied). Garnett cites Russell Hittinger for an explanation of subsidiarity, and Hittinger adequately presents contemporary teaching on the concept. What is missing, to circumscribe the definition of subsidiarity and the state? A notion of the common good (life in community) that is tied to an understanding of the proper human scale.

If the common goods that exist at different "levels" do not have the same definition, then how can there be an ordered hierarchy of authorities serving them? If common good1 is not a part of common good 2, then how can authority1 be subordinate to authority2? An authority that serves to preserve the peace of many communities cannot have any sort of authority over the communities themselves - this would go beyond its competence.

Thomas International Center's Wolfe explains the value of subsidiarity


Does that sound like a traditional exposition of subsidiarity and politics?

The American Thing

Some additional thoughts to this post, but on the American polity, or rather, polities.

I wonder, those American Catholics (especially those who adhere to the Nationalist understanding of the Constitution) who talk about subsidiarity, how many of them live in a real community?

I would argue there can be real authority only when there is a real community, and there is shared commitment to the community and the common good. I would question whether those who are prepared to leave, for the sake of better economic opportunity or advancement, can really be considered members of a local community. Without community, can there be real self-rule or real authority at the "lower levels," rather than rule by a "fortunate" few. Even if one is attached to a romantic notion of democracy (i.e. the capacity of most people for self-rule), do they recognize that in such a situation, when true community is absent, that the regime is usually a bad one, with those who rule doing so for the sake of a few and not for the good of the whole? (What whole?)

It may be the case that most states no longer have a real basis for sovereignty (as they lack autarky and true citizenship), but it seems better for us to recover constitutional order for the sake of reform, rather than attempting to start from scratch. There is something to turning to the Constitution and our own legal and constitutional history for the devolution of power. It may be the case that true subsidiarity can only be brought about when the assumption that states are the locus of sovereignty is addressed, but this would be a better way to decentralize, rather than waiting for things to fall apart. As it is, many Catholics seem to ignore the traditional role of the states when discussing subsidiarity, holding to a nationalist conception of the Union and seeing the states as nothing more than administrative units, one more "level" of authority.

Another CMT contributor -- Subsidiarity and the Case of the Missing Lunch
By: Jana Bennett

Meanwhile, we non-politicians tend to see only the distinctions between federal and state levels, but much less so at local levels. But if we’re taking the principle of subsidiarity seriously, the feds and the state should be supporting local schools in all the ways it can, but stay out of decisions that schools themselves ought to be making – including whether it is appropriate to “teach to the test,” and how to measure their student populations’ successes. Someone teaching special education on a reservation, which has undoubtedly unique aspects compared to, say, the wealthy school district in my area that everyone wants part in. Or, the impoverished “Teach to the test”, even in statewide measures, make no sense, but because education is big bucks, the state and the feds are involved far more than I think is warranted. We ought to trust each other more – especially the people on the ground.

Just as we ought to trust a principal to know her school and make a determination about lunches. She’s not being unfair or unjust; she’s giving students with very particular needs an out, but she’s also making a fairly-considered decision for her school.

I won't address the question of American federal system and the locus of sovereignty. The problem is that not all authority is the same, just set in hierarchical order. The sphere of authority will differ in accordance with the nature of the good of the group. When it becomes possible that attendance at schools is 100% voluntary for all children then we can talk about what powers a principal may have under contract. Asserting that a principal has authority (even if conceded in law) does not mean that it is true -- tyrants claim the protection of the law.

One should be wary of limiting the authority of parents, even if it is under the guise of protecting children's health or promoting a good learning environment -- the school is not the state, and even the state should be restrained in what it can and cannot legislate for the sake of legitimate liberty.

Perhaps one should not expect much from a blog, including a careful analysis of all of the terms that are involved (though this would be necessary for rigorous argumentation), but professional academics should be careful of writing a blog, less their competence be judged by it.

Federalism and Subsidiarity

The Prudent Case for Robust Federalism and Limited Subsidiarity
By Peter Haworth

Federalism and subsidiarity are, indeed, different concepts, even though they often dictate similar applications. Federalism is a rigid notion; it now frequently connotes the making of strong demarcations of power between the multiple local associations and the single central government within a political union. Subsidiarity, however, enjoins leaving a function with the lowest level of association (i.e., not allowing a higher-level association to assume power over the function) to the extent that the lower-level association can perform it efficiently.*

The difference between the two principles can be further illustrated through considering the different ways that each might dictate handling the scenario of a rogue state or polity within a larger political union that possesses a federal government to help manage the common affairs of this union.

Let us assume, for example, that a state gravely mistreated a minority portion of its residents. What would each of the above principles direct as being the correct action? If the political union were organized such that the states had full police powers and this was not a power assigned to the federal government, then federalism would demand maintaining such demarcation of powers regardless of the fact that the rogue state is failing to protect and is even willfully mistreating its residents. In fact, other than during the initial stage of deciding how power is to be demarcated between lower and higher (or more centralized) levels, the effective performance of a function is not even considered in determining applications of the principle of federalism.

Subsidiarity, on the other hand, is more flexible, in that it is theoretically open to transferring a function (i.e., power over the function) to higher levels if it becomes clear that a lower-level association cannot perform the function efficiently. Thus, if it were found that a state or polity within our hypothetical union could not efficiently perform the function of protecting a certain minority of people within its borders, then subsidiarity would direct us to transfer this function and the corresponding power over such function to a higher level, by whose agency performance of that function could be performed more efficiently.

For many, the pursuit of such applications of the subsidiarity principle (and not federalism) just seems like utter common sense. Subsidiarity is a principle that allows for continual re-evaluation about which levels of government can most efficiently perform various functions and, hence, should have the relevant powers over such functions. Federalism, on the other hand, does not entail this evaluation within its concept; it refers merely to the maintenance of an already determined division of functions and the powers to implement them.

Here is a short post I wrote on subsidiarity, speculating on its role in contemporary CST. A longer post.

We have to remember that what may be ideal or in accordance with reason is different from what obtains in reality. While the civitas is the perfect community and should be of a certain size, because of the loss of autarky what used to be a perfect community may no longer be such, and what originated as a union of civitates may now have the character proper to a perfect community, instead of being some sort of alliance or confederation.

How does the authority of the father differ from that of the head of a guild? How does the authority of the government of the civitas compare?

FPR has a precis of Lew Daly's God's Economy.

Mr. Daly writes, concerning subsidiarity:

I needn’t explain here the tendency among American conservatives to interpret subsidiarity as a Catholic version of the Republican Party’s libertarian agenda of dismantling government agencies and privatizing entitlements and services. Of course it means nothing of the kind: subsidiarity is not a theory of local control or minimal government; it is a theory delineating precisely the critical role of central government in assisting natural social structures, beginning with the family, when they are weakened in the order of society. The properly subsidiary role of the state is to support, for example, the family, without distorting or usurping its place in the order of creation or its purposes as given by God. Unlike the liberal welfare state, a subsidiary state recognizes the prior ground of family and other natural spheres and does not encroach on the legal and moral autonomy they derive from God; but unlike liberal anti-statism, the subsidiary state is responsible for protecting and supporting the natural spheres when they are violated within society or otherwise falter. For example, when wages fail to support workers and their families in their proper dignity, the sanctity of the family is violated and the state must intervene, either by strengthening the power of workers to extract higher wages from employers, or by compensating families directly out of the public purse. Against the moral anarchy created by “market laws” that push working families beneath their dignity, a properly subsidiary state delineates “justice” by strengthening the weaker spheres against the stronger, those given by God against those ordered by men. In upholding and protecting such “sphere sovereignty,” as the Kuyperians termed it, the state “brings stability to the land,” and this, Kuyper insists, is called “justice.”

In the background to modern subsidiarity teaching, the opponents of revolutionary liberalism at the dawn of the modern era understood the dialectical relationship between individualism and statism. The latter does not arise without the former’s destruction of all other forms of authority and protection within society. As Nisbet put it, “the state is a refuge for the moral consequences of individualism,” adding, further, that the new “laissez faire individualism” of the nineteenth century was not “the simple heritage of nature,” but rather a calculated, collaborative product of economic interests and centralized power:

It was brought into existence by the planned destruction of old customs, associations, villages, and other securities; by the force of the State throwing the weight of its fast-developing administrative system in favor of new economic elements of the population. And it was brought into existence, hardly less, by reigning systems of economic, political, and psychological thought, systems which neglected altogether the social and cultural unities and settled single-mindedly on the abstract individual as the proper unit of speculation and planning.

The more I think about it, the more I think that subsidiarity is emphasized within Catholic Social Teaching not only because it is a sound political principle, but as a reminder to the secular rulers that they should be prudent and not over-extend themselves in their legislation. It is a more pragmatic approach to over-sized polities, to the world as it is, rather than focusing on claims of justice and rights, which may be true but will nonetheless be ineffectual, given who has power and the inertia of political culture.

Is it true that the Church would sympathize with those who aspire to a more humane political arrangement, appealing to rights or self-determination or secession? Where is the balance between obedience to a legitimate authority (poorly exercised) and political reform (or even dissolution) to be found? In the impact upon the common good.

Insight Scoop: Governmental expansion and the principle of subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity

How is the principle of subsidiarity formulated in the CCC and the Compendium of Catholic Social Doctrine?

From the Compendium of Catholic Social Teaching:

185. Subsidiarity is among the most constant and characteristic directives of the Church's social doctrine and has been present since the first great social encyclical. It is impossible to promote the dignity of the person without showing concern for the family, groups, associations, local territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social, cultural, sports-oriented, recreational, professional and political expressions to which people spontaneously give life and which make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth. This is the realm of civil society, understood as the sum of the relationships between individuals and intermediate social groupings, which are the first relationships to arise and which come about thanks to "the creative subjectivity of the citizen." This network of relationships strengthens the social fabric and constitutes the basis of a true community of persons, making possible the recognition of higher forms of social activity.

186. The necessity of defending and promoting the original expressions of social life is emphasized by the Church in the Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, in which the principle of subsidiarity is indicated as a most important principle of "social philosophy." "Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them."

On the basis of this principle, all societies of a superior order must adopt attitudes of help ("subsidium") -- therefore, of support, promotion, development -- with respect to lower-order societies. In this way, intermediate social entities can properly perform the functions that fall to them without being required to hand them over unjustly to other social entities of a higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and other social entities of a higher level, by which they would end up being absorbed and substituted, in the end seeing themselves denied their dignity and essential place.

Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, institutional or juridical assistance offered to lesser social entities, entails a corresponding series of negative implications that require the State to refrain from anything that would de facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells of society. Their initiative, freedom, and responsibility must not be supplanted.

I believe that it would be a mistake to read this as a libertarian manifesto. The good of a nation state is not different in kind from that of a polis. It is however, more difficult to obtain, because of the size involved. One needs to remember the distinction between incomplete/imperfect communities and complete/perfect communities. The political community is a perfect community, while the family and other intermediate societies or associations are not.

A polis is complete because it can provide all that is needed for the good life. The principle of subsidiarity protects the lesser societies and even the individual from micromanagement by the government.

Still, I do not think the principle of subsidiarity as it is presented within recent Church teaching should be understood as a positive endorsement or promotion of the modern nation-state. It may be an acceptance and affirmation that such political organizations exist, without an endorsement of their existence as being an ideal. Aristotle's criticism of communities that are too big are still valid today, especially for those nation-states that claim to be democracies. The principle of subsidiarity rather is a prudential response to them and their overreaching. The Church's teaching on subsidiarity can be seen as an attempt to limit the problems associated with nation-states that are too big for their own good and centralization, and is another example of the Church's realism.

Even in a properly sized polis the principle of subsidiarity would apply--there is a place for individuals to exercise some prudence in determining what to do for themselves, their families, and for the polis. In fact, the principle of subsidiarity is more a normative feature of the polis than of large nation-states. Why?

Because even in such a community there are multiple levels of organization; while the lower are wholly subordinate to the higher as to the end, nonetheless the lower have ends/goods proper to them.

The case can be made that for some smaller political "sub-units" (the province, state, etc.), that they are actually perfect communities. I would argue that it is not intrinsically unjust for such subunits to secede; only considerations of prudence, such as interdependency for essentials (food, etc.) should prevent such a unit from seceding. (Such communities which are contemplating secession should do what they can to mitigate such interdependency and to build up self-sufficiency before declaring political independence.)

(What work is proper to a certain level of organization?
An extreme interpretation--affirm that there is autonomy? Potential basis for independence?)


Note: the compendium makes a distinction between the political community and civil society:

417 The political community is established to be of service to civil society, from which it originates. The Church has contributed to the distinction between the political community and civil society above all by her vision of man, understood as an autonomous, relational being who is open to the Transcendent. This vision is challenged by political ideologies of an individualistic nature and those of a totalitarian character, which tend to absorb civil society into the sphere of the State. The Church's commitment on behalf of social pluralism aims at bringing about a more fitting attainment of the common good and democracy itself, according to the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity and justice.

Civil society is the sum of relationships and resources, cultural and associative, that are relatively independent from the political sphere and the economic sector. "The purpose of civil society is universal, since it concerns the common good, to which each and eveyr citizen has a right in due proportion." This is marked by a planning capacity that aims at fostering a freer and more just social life, in which the various groups of citizens can form associations, working to develop and express their preferences, in order to meet their fundamental needs and defend their legitimate interests.

418. The political community and civil society, although mutually connected and interdependent, are not equal in the hierarchy of ends...

What is the distinction being made here? I do not think "political community" is referring here to the state (or to the government). Rather, it is between men understood as being gathered together for the sake of a political end, and men understood as being gathered together for an end that is even higher than that. If I am correct here, then perhaps the language is a bit sloppy and needs to be clarified. (It may be similar to the distinction that is attributed to Augustine, between temporal society and a supernatural society, the City of Man and the City of God--this distinction is not the distinction that Augustine himself makes, though.)

The political community is not reducible to the government and institutions associated with governing, even if the government has the role of guiding the whole community to its proper end. (see Maritain and Simon on what they have to say about the "state").

Economic interdependence is not a sufficient reason to create an even bigger political community with a centralized government, destroying sovereignty -- rather it should give impetus for relocalization and a move towards self-sufficiency. If we know that we are dependent upon other communities for the necessities of bodily life, we should take that as a warning sign, rather than an indication that we have attained some sort of lofty humane ideal.

Defensive alliances too can take care of the need for a common defense. There is no reason that a single government is necessary for a collection of states, even though by themselves, they are lacking in the means to defend themselves from a larger state.

(Is the Federal Government a necessary instrument for determining interstate commerce, movement of peoples between states? That is, the authority it has to make decisions on such matters is originally derived from the states themselves? Or does it actually have a higher authority by its very nature than that of the states?)

Historically, the trend towards consolidation is a result of sin more than "reason." (Thanks to Dr. Clyde Wilson for describing this trend as "consolidationist.") Those who attempt to justify an international community, with "one world government" point to the ills that such a government can solve, but at what price? (Advocates include certain prominent Catholic intellectuals, unfortunately.)

The size of the modern nation-states thus presents an obstacle to the good life in at least two ways (and is therefore fundamentally disordered).

1. When it has been coupled to an almost unlimited right to acquire and dispose of property, the self-sufficiency of smaller political units becomes threatened and eventually destroyed as corporations are able to expand their reach and even most food is produced by corporations. With their long chains of supply, the production of food is eliminated, for the most part, from most political units and the burden for feeding their citizens is transferred onto other political units (to the detriment of local ecologies).

2. Even in a properly ordered nation-state which is able to maintain some sort of check on the corporations and the rich, one must ask the question of how much power the new central government can have, without destroying the political life of the smaller units, or violating their authority?

Wwhat sort of justice is involved here, in these considerations about size and sovereignty and subsidiarity?

Are powers delegated to the government by the people by agreement or consent? Is transference of authority possible, and to what extent?

The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church on
The Organization of the International Community

441. Concern for an ordered and peaceful coexistence within the human family prompts the Magisterium to insist on the need to establish 'some universal public authority acknowledged as such by all and endowed with effective power to safeguard, on the behalf of all, security, regard for justice, and respect for rights.' In the course of history, despite the changing viewpoints of the different eras, there has been a constant awareness of the need for a similar authority to respond to worldwide problems arising from the quest for the common good: it is essential that such an authority arise from mutual agreement and that it not be imposed, nor must it be understood as a kind of 'global super-State'.

Political authority exercised at the level of the international community must be regulated by law, ordered to the common good and respectful of the principle of subsidiarity. 'The public authority of the world community is not intended to limit the sphere of action of the public authority of the individual political community, much less to take its place. On the contrary, its purpose is to create, on a world basis, an environment in which the public authorities of each political community, their citizens and intermediate associations can carry out their tasks, fulfil their duties and exercise their rights with greater security'.

442. Because of the globalization of problems, it has become more urgent than ever to stimulate international political action that pursues the goals of peace and development through the adoption of coordinated measures. The Magisterium recognizes that the interdependence among men and nations takes on a moral dimension and is the determining factor for relations in the modern world in the economic, cultural, political and religious sense. In this context it is hoped that there will be a revision of international organizations, a process that 'presupposes the overcoming of political rivalries and the renouncing of all desire to manipulate these organizations, which exist solely for the common good', for the purpose of achieving 'a greater degree of international ordering'.

In particular, intergovernmental structures must effectively perform their functions of control and guidance in the economic field because the attainment of the common good has become a goal that is beyond the reach of individual States, even if they are dominant in terms of power, wealth, and political strength. International agencies must moreover guarantee the attainment of that equality which is the basis of the right of all to participate in the process of full development, duly respecting legitimate differences.

Is the solution worse than the problem? How can the public authority of the world community be effective if it does not in some way override the authority of sovereign nation-states? The Compendium and the Magisterium do not appear to be talking about the continued use of diplomacy and binding treaties, but of something else entirely. Catholic liberals also endorse the nation of a supranational authority as being necessary for the common good of all mankind. I find it rather dubious--how can be subsidiarity be preserved, when the size and organization of current nation-states themselves are already opposed to reason?

Review:
Mirror of Justice: Mirror of Justice: Subsidiarity Within the Church, The Ambiguities of Subsidiarity
What is the link between practical reason and a theory of authority; what is reasonable versus what is legally binding?

Clyde Wilson on Ft. Sumter