Zenit: Cardinal Cordes on "Caritas in Veritate"
"The Heart of Social Doctrine Remains the Human Person"
Friday, July 17, 2009
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Regarding the act of religion
After thinking about this topic for the past few days, I've reached some tentative conclusions:
Looking through ST II II question 81 again, I see that when Aquinas speaks of the subjection of our mind to God with respect to the virtue of religion, he is referring to religion’s direction of our actions to God as our last end. So in this case, subjection is just giving what is due to God as First Principle and Lord of all things; it is subjection in a rather limited sense. Hence it is possible to be subject to God in this way, by rendering to Him what is due (honor and worship), and yet be in rebellion against him (i.e. being in the state of sin).
So at this point I am inclined to think that acts of religion are possible for those who are in the state of sin, but the possibility of acquiring the virtue to some degree is even less than that of the other moral virtues, given the proximity of religion to God. With that being the case, one could still argue that the state should not compel acts of religion.
I'll have to look at the earlier paper I wrote about acts of religion; I think I argued that acts of religion should not be commanded by the state, but the justification for this was that the state did not have the competency to compel one to do what required grace. While an act of religion may not require grace, to expect someone in the state of sin to develop that virtue, while persisting in sin, seems to be unreasonable.
Looking through ST II II question 81 again, I see that when Aquinas speaks of the subjection of our mind to God with respect to the virtue of religion, he is referring to religion’s direction of our actions to God as our last end. So in this case, subjection is just giving what is due to God as First Principle and Lord of all things; it is subjection in a rather limited sense. Hence it is possible to be subject to God in this way, by rendering to Him what is due (honor and worship), and yet be in rebellion against him (i.e. being in the state of sin).
So at this point I am inclined to think that acts of religion are possible for those who are in the state of sin, but the possibility of acquiring the virtue to some degree is even less than that of the other moral virtues, given the proximity of religion to God. With that being the case, one could still argue that the state should not compel acts of religion.
I'll have to look at the earlier paper I wrote about acts of religion; I think I argued that acts of religion should not be commanded by the state, but the justification for this was that the state did not have the competency to compel one to do what required grace. While an act of religion may not require grace, to expect someone in the state of sin to develop that virtue, while persisting in sin, seems to be unreasonable.
Alasdair MacIntyre has a new book out: God, philosophy, universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition. Can intellectual history be well-written? Only if one takes advantage of the latest scholarship, and even that may not be sufficient as one tries to recreate the intellectual milieu of an age.
How difficult is it to determine a theologian's influence at a university or within a religious order? Tracing a school of thought to its founder(s) may be simple enough; but to show that this school had an impact on those who were not members? Can this be done, especially if they are not contemporaneous?
How difficult is it to determine a theologian's influence at a university or within a religious order? Tracing a school of thought to its founder(s) may be simple enough; but to show that this school had an impact on those who were not members? Can this be done, especially if they are not contemporaneous?
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Some discussion of the primary end of marriage here. Compare with the United States Catechism for Adults.
From an article by Robert T. Miller criticizing Msgr. Alberto Bonandi:
From an article by Robert T. Miller criticizing Msgr. Alberto Bonandi:
More specifically, Bonandi argues that there are two ends of marriage—the unitive and the procreative—and if the Church permits the divorced and remarried to pursue one of these ends (the unitive), "consistency would require" that the Church also permit such persons to pursue the other (the procreative), and so to have sexual intercourse. But these "ends" are not the ends of "marriage," no matter what theologians or popes may have carelessly said; they are the ends, rather, of marriage acts, that is, of sexual acts. In contemporary Catholic moral doctrine, a sexual act is licit if, among other things, it is appropriately ordered to these two ends; that is, it is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of the moral liceity of a sexual act that it be of a kind that is (a) fit to produce a certain kind of emotional intimacy between the spouses, and (b) fit to be procreative. Thus sexual acts incompatible with either the unitive end (some people mention in vitro fertilization) or the procreative end (e.g., masturbation) are morally wrong. The reason, incidentally, that adulterous sexual acts are wrong is that, while they may be ordered to the unitive end, they are incompatible with the procreative end because an adulterous relationship is not a reasonable one in which to rear the children that the act may produce.
Bonandi takes these ends, which govern the moral quality of sexual acts, and converts them into norms governing human relationships generally: For Bonandi, if a relationship is fostering the unitive end, then that relationship may (perhaps ought to) foster the procreative end as well. The implications of this are rather shocking. For if, as Bonandi says, a man and a woman sharing a life together and rearing children are pursuing the unitive end and so may pursue the procreative end as well, then a widower who invites his own mother into his home to assist in the rearing of his children will be pursuing the unitive end with her and so may have sexual intercourse with her as well, which is worse than absurd. In truth, we pursue the unitive end with different people in different ways all the time. This does not license us to pursue the procreative end as well.
Saturday, July 11, 2009
Google Books: Dominican Gallery, by Aidan Nichols, O.P.
In this book Fr. Nichols discusses the lives and influence of seven English Dominicans of the 20th century.
In this book Fr. Nichols discusses the lives and influence of seven English Dominicans of the 20th century.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Apparently Matthew Levering is now at the University of Dayton, according to this post at Ordo Praedicatorum. Does this have to do with the current situation at Ave Maria? (Dr. Levering still has a faculty page at the university.) What's going to happen to the Aquinas Center for Theological Renewal?
According to his CV(?), he will be starting at UD this Fall.
(source)
According to his CV(?), he will be starting at UD this Fall.
(source)
A personalist notion of the common good in Caritas in Veritate?
From the encyclical:
What is marked in red seems to be in accord with the traditional understanding of the common good--one which is found in the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example. But what follows right after seems to be a more personalistic understanding of the common good, in which the common good is subordinate to the good of each individual. I don't think the Latin translation is available yet, but I do not think it will say anything really different from what is being expressed here in English. This understanding of the common good can be found in John XXIII, the documents of Vatican II, and subsequent documents concerning Catholic social teaching. But is that enough of a pedigree to grant it validity? The two notions of the common good can be reconciled, if it is admitted that the supposed good of the individual, to which the "common good" is subordinate, is itself a common good, and not a private good.
Did Pope Pius XII write much on the common good?
I am surprised that more Catholic philosophers and theologians have not picked up on this. But if my understanding of this current notion of the common good is wrong, please explain to me how so.
7. Another important consideration is the common good. To love someone is to desire that person's good and to take effective steps to secure it. Besides the good of the individual, there is a good that is linked to living in society: the common good. It is the good of "all of us", made up of individuals, families and intermediate groups who together constitute society[4]. It is a good that is sought not for its own sake, but for the people who belong to the social community and who can only really and effectively pursue their good within it. To desire the common good and strive towards it is a requirement of justice and charity. To take a stand for the common good is on the one hand to be solicitous for, and on the other hand to avail oneself of, that complex of institutions that give structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically and culturally, making it the pólis, or "city". The more we strive to secure a common good corresponding to the real needs of our neighbours, the more effectively we love them.
What is marked in red seems to be in accord with the traditional understanding of the common good--one which is found in the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example. But what follows right after seems to be a more personalistic understanding of the common good, in which the common good is subordinate to the good of each individual. I don't think the Latin translation is available yet, but I do not think it will say anything really different from what is being expressed here in English. This understanding of the common good can be found in John XXIII, the documents of Vatican II, and subsequent documents concerning Catholic social teaching. But is that enough of a pedigree to grant it validity? The two notions of the common good can be reconciled, if it is admitted that the supposed good of the individual, to which the "common good" is subordinate, is itself a common good, and not a private good.
Did Pope Pius XII write much on the common good?
I am surprised that more Catholic philosophers and theologians have not picked up on this. But if my understanding of this current notion of the common good is wrong, please explain to me how so.
Thursday, July 09, 2009
Living with others
Living with others is a "basic" good; and yet is there a precept of Natural Law that commands us to do so? We may speak of a natural inclination to do so, or a natural imperative, but a precept? We may have an inclination to procreate, but this is not a precept for everyone -- the precepts of Natural Law tell us how to choose this reasonably, if we choose it. Some may renounce it for the sake of the Kingdom. But some may be called to renounce human company for the sake of God's company -- to become a hermit. They are not cut off from the supernatural communion that is the Church, but they are removed from participating in human relationships "in this world." (Physically? I think you see what I am getting at.)
It would seem from his treatment of the lawfulness of virginity that St. Thomas would affirm that there is, indeed, a precept to live with others. If someone is not needed for the earthly civitas for its perfection, but set aside by God for something greater, are they dispensed from the precept? I don't see how the duty to live with others can be anything but a duty of the individual. The duty of the multitude, as described by St. Thomas, does not seem to fit in this case: "The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multitude."
Perhaps the response is that one is not really living apart from others--that the supernatural communion the hermit shares with other members of the Church is the fulfillment of the precept. The precept is not be fulfilled at one level, but is at a higher level.
It would seem from his treatment of the lawfulness of virginity that St. Thomas would affirm that there is, indeed, a precept to live with others. If someone is not needed for the earthly civitas for its perfection, but set aside by God for something greater, are they dispensed from the precept? I don't see how the duty to live with others can be anything but a duty of the individual. The duty of the multitude, as described by St. Thomas, does not seem to fit in this case: "The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multitude."
Perhaps the response is that one is not really living apart from others--that the supernatural communion the hermit shares with other members of the Church is the fulfillment of the precept. The precept is not be fulfilled at one level, but is at a higher level.
Wednesday, July 08, 2009
Fr. Pinckaers on St. Alphonsus Liguori
After all the shifts and variations of ethicists through two centuries--and they were at times extreme--St. Alphonsus' system established a certain balance by its return to considered reason. There followed a measure of calm in regard to the probabilist dispute, and in 1831 the Church confirmed this by declaring that the moral theology of Blessed Alphonsus might be safely taught and used in the confessional. Withotu going so far as to assert explicitly that his 'theory of equal probability' was the best system for moral theology, the Church declared him a Doctor in 1871. Thus Alphonsus became the patron of moralists.
The patronage of St. Alphonsus, which merits our respect and esteem for his achievements, still leaves ethicists free in regard to following his reasoning. They retain this freedom as long as no definite law constrains them. This freedom is all the more necessary as the limitations of casuist morality, of which St. Alphonsus was teh most highly authorized representative, have become more apparent in our day. We can now better perceive the fundamental differences in organization and structure as well as in problematics that separate it from the moral theology of St. Thomas and the Fathers of the Church. Incontestably, post-Tridentine moral theology, in concentrating on cases of conscience and the dispute over probabilism, narrowed its horizon. We see now how it contrasts with the breadth fo the views on human action and on God that we find in the Fathers and the great scholastics. The link has not been broken, but there has been a shrinkage and a slight distortion.
The Sources of Christian Ethics, 277
Tuesday, July 07, 2009
Moral Choices: The Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus Liguori, by
Worth getting? It seems that St. Alphonsus' Theologia Moralis is not easy to come by. I should review what Fr. Pinckaers says about St. Alphonsus and the debates over probabilism. Dr. Fleming esteems St. Alphonsus highly.
CE
Doctors of the Church
A Short History of Moral Theology
Redemptorists USA
Defending Probabilism: The Moral Theology of Juan Caramuel by Julia Fleming (Google Books)
Worth getting? It seems that St. Alphonsus' Theologia Moralis is not easy to come by. I should review what Fr. Pinckaers says about St. Alphonsus and the debates over probabilism. Dr. Fleming esteems St. Alphonsus highly.
CE
Doctors of the Church
A Short History of Moral Theology
Redemptorists USA
Defending Probabilism: The Moral Theology of Juan Caramuel by Julia Fleming (Google Books)
American Papist: Text: Caritas in Veritate on 'urgent need of a true world political authority'
Pope Benedict's third encyclical is a mammoth work which will take some time to digest, but here is a third important paragraph I'd like to highlight, one that is sure to generate some vigorous debate back-and-forth:... globalization and development are dependent upon... cheap energy...67. In the face of the unrelenting growth of global interdependence, there is a strongly felt need, even in the midst of a global recession, for a reform of the United Nations Organization, and likewise of economic institutions and international finance, so that the concept of the family of nations can acquire real teeth. One also senses the urgent need to find innovative ways of implementing the principle of the responsibility to protect and of giving poorer nations an effective voice in shared decision-making. This seems necessary in order to arrive at a political, juridical and economic order which can increase and give direction to international cooperation for the development of all peoples in solidarity. To manage the global economy; to revive economies hit by the crisis; to avoid any deterioration of the present crisis and the greater imbalances that would result; to bring about integral and timely disarmament, food security and peace; to guarantee the protection of the environment and to regulate migration: for all this, there is urgent need of a true world political authority, as my predecessor Blessed John XXIII indicated some years ago. Such an authority would need to be regulated by law, to observe consistently the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, to seek to establish the common good, and to make a commitment to securing authentic integral human development inspired by the values of charity in truth. Furthermore, such an authority would need to be universally recognized and to be vested with the effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice, and respect for rights. Obviously it would have to have the authority to ensure compliance with its decisions from all parties, and also with the coordinated measures adopted in various international forums. Without this, despite the great progress accomplished in various sectors, international law would risk being conditioned by the balance of power among the strongest nations. The integral development of peoples and international cooperation require the establishment of a greater degree of international ordering, marked by subsidiarity, for the management of globalization. They also require the construction of a social order that at last conforms to the moral order, to the interconnection between moral and social spheres, and to the link between politics and the economic and civil spheres, as envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations.
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