Edward Feser, Fodor and Aquinas on the Extended Mind Thesis (via WWWTW)

Edward Feser takes on Brian Leiter, once again: Pants on fire

Aristotle on why the education of the young should be common

A continuation of this post.

Aristotle explains why education of citizens must be common:

Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that everyone must also have one and the same education and that taking care of this education must be a common matter. It must not be private in the way it is now, when everyone takes care of their own children privately and teaches them whatever private learning they think best. Of common things, the training too must be common.

At the same time, no citizen should even think that he belongs to himself but instead that each belongs to the city, for each is part of the city. The care of each part, however, naturally looks to the care of the whole, and to this extent praise might be due to the Spartans, for they devote the most serious attention to their children and do so in common. (Politics, 8.1 1337a21-32; trans. Peter Simpson.)

At the same time, Aristotle acknowledges that most cities neglect legislation regarding the education of the young, and do not have any sort of common regimen:

In most cities these matters are neglected , and each lives as he wishes, giving sacred law, in Cyclops' fashion, to his wife and children. So while it would be best if the care became a common one and were correctly managed and if doing this were a possibility, yet, in the absence of common care, it would seem proper for each individually to promtoe the virtue of his children and friends, or at least to make that his choice. But from what has been said, it would seem that one would be better able to do this if one became a legislator. For while common cares clearly become common through the laws, they become decent through serious laws. (NE 10.9, 1180a25-34; trans. Peter Simpson.)

And so the virtuous are left to themselves, and must become legislators within the household, setting down laws for the training of their children.

What if there is a common education, but it is not rightly ordered? Perhaps it is in accordance with the constitution of the polity, but the constitution is not a good one, or produces bad people? One should avoid that education as much as one can, and if that is not possible, consider separating and entering a different community. What choice does one have, if one is concerned with virtue and raising one's children in virtue?

The Tyranny of Liberalism

James Kalb on the Ideology's Totalitarian Impulses


By Annamarie Adkins

NEW YORK, MARCH 27, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Liberals -- on both the Right and Left -- may posit that they favor freedom, reason and the well-being of ordinary people. But some critics believe that liberalism itself erodes the very institutions -- family, religion, local associations -- necessary to restrain its excesses.

One such liberal skeptic is attorney and writer James Kalb, who recently wrote a book entitled, "The Tyranny of Liberalism: Understanding and Overcoming Administered Freedom, Inquisitorial Tolerance, and Equality by Command" (ISI).

Kalb explained to ZENIT why he believes liberalism inevitably evolves into a form of soft totalitarianism, or a “dictatorship of relativism,” and why the Church is well positioned to be its preeminent foe.

Q: What is liberalism?

Kalb: We're so much in the middle of it that it's difficult to see it as a whole. You can look at it, though, as an expression of modern skepticism.

Skeptical doubts have led to a demand for knowledge based on impersonal observation and devoted to practical goals. Applied to the physical world, that demand has given us modern natural science.

Applied to life in society, it has led to a technological understanding of human affairs. If we limit ourselves to impersonal observations, we don't observe the good; we observe preferences and how to satisfy them. The result is a belief that the point of life is satisfying preferences.

On that view, the basic social issue is whose preferences get satisfied.

Liberalism answers that question by saying that all preferences are equal, so they all have an equal claim to satisfaction. Maximum equal satisfaction therefore becomes the rational ordering principle for life in society -- give everyone what he wants, as much and as equally as possible. In other words, give everybody maximum equal freedom.

Q: How can an ideology of freedom become tyrannical?

Kalb: Equal freedom is an open-ended standard that makes unlimited demands when taken seriously.

For example, it views non-liberal standards as oppressive, because they limit equal freedom. Liberal government wants to protect us from oppression, so it tries to eradicate those standards from more and more areas of life.

The attempt puts liberal government at odds with natural human tendencies. If the way someone acts seems odd to me, and I look at him strangely, that helps construct the social world he's forced to live in. He will find that oppressive. Liberal government can't accept that, so it eventually feels compelled to supervise all my attitudes about how people live and how I express them.

The end result is a comprehensive system of control over all human relations run by an expert elite responsible only to itself. That, of course, is tyranny.

Q: You argue that liberalism, especially its "advanced" form, corrupts and suppresses the traditional aspects of life that defined and kept Western society together for centuries such as religion, marriage, family and local community. How does it do that?

Kalb: Equal freedom isn't the highest standard in those areas of life. They have to do with love and loyalty toward something outside ourselves that defines who we are. That love and loyalty involve particular connections to particular people and their ways of life.

Such things cannot be the same for everyone. They create divisions and inequalities. They tell people they can't have things they want.

So equal freedom tells us traditional institutions have to be done away with as material factors in people's lives. They have to be debunked and their effects suppressed.

At bottom, liberalism says people have to be neutered to fit into a managed system of equal freedom. They have to be encouraged to devote themselves to satisfactions that don't interfere with the satisfactions of others.

In the end, the only permissible goals are career, consumption and various private pursuits and indulgences.

That doesn't leave much room for religion or for family or communal values. The only permissible public value is liberalism itself.

Q: How does mass media advance the cause of liberalism?

Kalb: The relationship is almost mechanical. It's one of the great strengths of liberalism.

Television and the Internet give us a world chopped up into interchangeable fragments.

To make that world comprehensible to journalists and viewers it has to be put in order in a simple way that can be understood quickly without regard to particularities.

That's impossible if complex distinctions and local habits are allowed to matter.

For that reason the mass media naturally favor a top-down managerial approach to social life with a bias toward sameness and equality -- in other words, something very much like contemporary liberalism.

To put it differently, the mass media prefer things to be discussed publicly and decided centrally based on a simple principle like equality. If that's done they can understand what's going on and what it all means.

Also, they themselves will serve an important function because they provide the forum for discussion and the information for decision. That situation naturally seems appropriate to them.

Q: What about the distinction between Anglo-American liberalism and continental liberalism, and their different models of secularism? Is it inaccurate to lump everything together under the heading of "liberalism"?

Kalb: The fundamental principle is the same, so the distinction can't be relied on.

In the English-speaking world the social order was traditionally less illiberal than on the continent.

King and state were less absolute, the Church had less independent authority, standing armies were out of favor, the aristocracy was less a separate caste, and the general outlook was more commercial and utilitarian.

Classical liberalism could be moderate and still get what it wanted.

Liberalism is progressive, though, so its demands keep growing. It eventually rejects all traditional ways as illiberal and becomes more and more radical.

For that reason state imposition of liberal norms has become at least as aggressive in Britain and Canada as on the continent.

The United States is still somewhat of an exception, but even among us aggressive forms of liberalism are gaining ground. They captured the academy, the elite bar and the media years ago, and they're steadily gaining ground among the people.

The international dizziness about President Obama and the violent reaction to the narrow victory of Proposition 8 concerning same-sex marriage in California show the direction things are going.

Q: Does rejecting "liberalism" mean rejecting freedom of conscience, political equality, free markets and other supposed benefits of "liberalism"?

Kalb: No. A society can still have those things to the extent they make sense. They just need to be subordinated, at least in principle, to a larger order defined by considerations like the good life.

The Church has noted, for example, that free markets are an excellent thing in many ways. They just aren't the highest thing. The same principle applies to other liberal ideals.

Q: Both Popes Pius IX and Leo XIII condemned liberalism, but it seems the Church has embraced it since the Second Vatican Council in its defense of democracy and human rights. The tone of Church social teaching has also focused more on influencing liberal institutions, and less on shaping individuals, families, and local communities. How does one account for this shift in the Church's attitude?

Kalb: The Church apparently decided modernity was here to stay. Liberal modernity looked better than fascist modernity or Bolshevik modernity.

It claimed to be a modest and tolerant approach to government that let culture and civil society develop in their own way. So the Church decided to accept and work within it.

Also, the development of the mass media and consumer society, and the growth of state education and industrial social organization generally, meant Catholics were more and more drawn into liberal ways of thinking. Hostility to liberalism became difficult to maintain within the Church.

The problem, though, is that liberal modernity is extremely critical and therefore intolerant. In order to cooperate with it you have to do things its way.

The recent, virulent attacks on Pope Benedict for many different reasons by the liberal elite illustrate that phenomenon perfectly.

For that reason, if there's going to be joint social action today, it inevitably focuses on extending liberal institutions rather than promoting local and traditional institutions like the family, which are intrinsically non-liberal. Many people in the Church have come to accept that.

Q: You argue that religion can be the unifying force that offers resistance to advanced liberalism, and that the Catholic Church is the spiritual organization most suited to that task. Why do you think so?

Kalb: To resist advanced liberalism you have to propose a definite social outlook based on goods beyond equal freedom and satisfaction.

A conception of transcendent goods won't stand up without a definite conception of the transcendent, which requires religion. And a religious view won't stand up in public life unless there's a definite way to resolve disputes about what it is.

You need the Pope.

Catholics have the Pope, and they also have other advantages like an emphasis on reason and natural law. As a Catholic, I'd add that they have the advantage of truth.

Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture videos

Moral and political philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, honoured at UCD -- the page has an embedded video of his lecture, “On having survived the academic moral philosophy of the twentieth century.” (via The Hermeneutic of Continuity)

A Thomist: St. Thomas, Law and Grace

It reminds me of the question of whether there can be a Christian ethics (i.e. moral philosophy/science, as opposed to moral theology). Ralph McInerny has given an answer, written as a response to Jacques Maritain on the same point. One day I'll write a response to both--each is right on certain points, but...

John 3: 19-21

Part of the Gospel reading for Laetare Sunday.

It would seem to harmonize very well with the epistles of John, that one who loves God will keep His commandments, and that one who sins knowingly but claims to love God lies. If God draws us to Himself, does He not help us know that we sin? Would He really let us remain ignorant, if He wants us to be perfect? And if we know that we are sinning against God, but prefer sin to God, do we not reject His grace of conversion in order to continue to sin "comfortably"?

Investigate: God is both the object and end of charity.

Orestes Brownson on Catholicism and Republicanism by Jude P. Dougherty (Modern Age 45:4, Fall 2003) - 03/12/09

Orestes Brownson’s presence looms large in Russell Kirk’s celebrated 1953 tome, in large part because, for Kirk, Brownson represents a luminous thinker unjustly neglected by modern scholars. Even further, Brownson seems to be a central figure not only in the nineteenth-century development—or maintenance—of order in American society, but, for Kirk, is someone whose prose remains genuinely instructive for contemporary citizens; he is “one of those dead who give us life. . . .”

Public Discourse: Christopher O. Tollefsen: Liberty, Authority, and the Good of Religion

Has the Church infallibly taught that human life begins at conception?

And does this mean that the soul is infused at conception? If not, then can the conceptum really be called human except equivocally? Can it be said that a teaching that the soul is infused at conception can be found in the Deposit of Faith? It seems not--it appears that in the past, some reason has been given for the prohibition of abortion other than that the conceptum is a individual human being, and therefore abortion is murder and unjust. What, then, do recent papal pronouncements that abortion ends human life mean with regards to the status of the conceptum? To this Thomist, it appears that to hold that the conceptum is human and a rational soul is nonetheless absent (or that the soul may not be infused at conception) is incoherent.

Some contemporary authors such as Robert George have argued that it can be shown from science that the conceptum is human. It seems to me that at best these arguments do show material continuity but do not rule out the possibility that a [brute] animal soul is present and is responsible for development, rather than a rational soul. One could posit some principle of parsimony, and that a transient soul is not necessary, as the rational soul could be responsible for development and much more (and therefore a rational soul is present from the very beginning and hence infused at conception), but it seems very difficult (impossible?) to justify this assumption of parsimony. (Would Ockham's razor actually lead to the conclusion that a brute soul is present and not a rational one?)

If this reasoning concerning the identity of the conceptum is correct, then to claim that one can know from natural reason that the conceptum is a human life at conception is wrong, unless, again 'human' is being used equivocally. And, by extension, the natural law argument for the prohibition cannot definitively be founded upon the injustice of murder.

[It should be noted though that for the materialist, considerations about rational and irrational souls do not matter. As the rational soul is not needed as a formal cause defining something to be human, one could give a (false) argument that the conceptum is human, based on causality and continuity. But this seems to be a dishonest way to persuade someone of the evilness of abortion.]

Pope John Paul II's Theology of the Body
By Brian Thomas Becket Mullady

(via the Western Confucian)

Evolution's new wrinkle: Proteins with cruise control provide new perspective (via VFR)

From Kevin R. C. Gutzman, Did somebody say “Democracy”?:

The idea that a polis should rule itself was called “eleutheria”—“freedom”—by the ancient Greeks, by the way. As the example of Sparta shows, freedom in the Greek sense did not necessarily have anything to do with democracy.

Available for pre-order: The Writings of Charles De Koninck, Volume Two

Insight Scoop: Governmental expansion and the principle of subsidiarity

A letter from Magdi Cristiano Allam to Pope Benedict XVI: « CAN THE CHURCH LEGITIMATE ISLAM AS A RELIGION AND CONSIDER MOHAMMED AS A PROPHET? »

The original(?) in Italian. (His website.)

Zenit: Middle Eastern Priest Explains Islam (Part 2)

Zenit: Middle Eastern Priest Explains Islam (Part 1)

Middle Eastern Priest Explains Islam (Part 1)

Interview With Father Samir Khalil Samir

By Annamarie Adkins

BEIRUT, Lebanon, MARCH 4, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Confusion over Islam -- among Christians and Muslims -- may have peaked after Sept. 11, 2001, but many questions still remain.

That's why Jesuit Father Samir Khalil felt called to offer some answers, as an Islamic scholar, Semitologist, Orientalist and a Catholic theologian born in Egypt and based in the Middle East for more than 20 years.

The Jesuit priest teaches Catholic theology and Islamic studies at St. Joseph University in Beirut, is founder of the CEDRAC research institute and is author of, most recently, "111 Questions on Islam" (Ignatius).

In this interview with ZENIT, Father Samir speaks about his experience and efforts to build a mutual understanding between followers of the two Abrahamic faiths.

Part 2 will appear Thursday.

Q: Why did you agree to produce this book?

Father Samir: Two reasons. It was a year before 9/11 that I started discussing this topic with journalists, having interviews together. I noticed a great ignorance of Islam in the West -- Christians, non-Christians and nonbelievers.

In general, they had very poor knowledge of Islam. I thought I had to clarify. Their ignorance pushed some of them to be aggressive and negative toward Muslims. Some of them were very naïve, believing everything they heard. Some even were using Islam to be aggressive toward Christianity. All of that is a consequence of ignorance.

The second reason was to help Muslims reflect on their own religion and faith. In a previous experience with Muslim youth in a Paris suburb, I noticed they didn't know almost anything about their own religion.

Speaking with different Muslim people I met in Europe -- in Germany during the summer, or in France where I teach, or in Italy where I was living -- it was always the same. Most Christians don't know their religion, either.

I wanted to give good information about Islam to help people not to have any false information or prejudice against it.

Q: How did the interviewers choose the 111 questions from the thousands that could have been asked?

Father Samir: The journalists I worked with had a lot of questions themselves, and questions from what people were asking them: about violence; whether Muslims would accept Western civilization; and about Muslims having problems with equality between men and women.

So, in fact, the questions are more directed to Western society so it could understand Islam better.

Q: Do you think most Muslims would be satisfied by the objectivity of your answers to the 111 questions? Why or why not?

Father Samir: My effort was to be objective; I tried, but you can never truly reach a perfect objectivity.

Certainly, not everybody will be happy. Some think Islam is a violent religion, or a religion against women; they will not be happy because they will say I am not clear enough about the violence and inequality of men and women.

People who think Islam is a religion of peace and equality between men and women, and that Mohammed elevated the status of women, will not be happy either.

Everyone has a position. Few people will be satisfied, if they are against or for Islam.

But those who want to know something serious about Islam will be able to make their own opinion, because they will have the facts in front of them in my book.

Q: The introduction to the book notes that it is an attempt to foster mutual understanding between Christians and Muslims. But many of your answers paint Islam and its origins in a very negative light. How do you think the average Christian's opinion of Islam will change after reading the book?

Father Samir: I don't think it was very negative, or negative at all; my intention is a better understanding. Not a feeling, but an understanding -- something that uses the head first, then the heart.

You have to first give serious information to promote dialogue and mutual understanding. If I don't say the whole truth, the truth will appear anyway, and the situation will be worse.

I am trying to build a mutual understanding, not built on compromises and false information. Dialogue starts with serious, academic, honest information about Christianity and Islam.

The answers are trying to be useful information; some answers are negative because the point is negative.

I don't know what the average Christian thinks. Nowadays, I suppose the majority has a negative opinion of Islam, before reading any book.

We, Arabs and Muslims, are in a crisis. When we Arabs -- Muslims and Christians -- speak together, we recognize we are in a bad situation. We had a glorious time in other centuries, but now we are at the bottom.

I hope that the book will help people understand things that concern them, like terrorism; there are some explanations, but not justifications. I can't justify terrorism, but I can explain why others are led to terrorist acts, I can also show that it has some support in the Koran and the Tradition -- sunnah.

Most Muslims choose peace and nonviolence. The 10% that chooses violence is stronger than the 90% that doesn't. Sometimes the bad part of humanity, though smaller, is stronger.

Q: Is a critical examination of Islam's history and sacred texts -- that is, subjecting the faith to reason -- even possible in the Muslim world? Why or why not?

Father Samir: Usually, in the Muslim tradition, faith is over everything; it is above reason.

If you tell a Muslim the Koran says something, but the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says something contrary, the Muslim will say, "We have to follow God's words and law, and not the human rights laws."

In the Christian tradition, we find more people interpreting the Bible than Muslims interpreting the Koran. They had an interpretive movement in the Islamic world in 9th, 10th and 11th century, but then they went backward.

As for the relationship between reason and faith, today Muslims are in a negative period of their history. Certainly it is possible to unite the two, but they would have to work very hard. There are many reasons for this regression, but fundamentally, there is ignorance on the part of the Muslim clergy.

Thomistica.net: New Latin-English edition of the Summa Theologiae -- the website.

"Fair"

Does it mean the same thing as equal?

Online Etymology Dictionary:

fair (adj.)
O.E. fæger "beautiful, pleasant," from P.Gmc. *fagraz (cf. O.N. fagr, O.H.G. fagar "beautiful," Goth. fagrs "fit"), from PIE *fag-. The meaning in ref. to weather (c.1205) preserves the original sense (opposed to foul). Sense of "light complexioned" (1551) reflects tastes in beauty; sense of "free from bias" (c.1340) evolved from another early meaning, "morally pure, unblemished" (c.1175). The sporting senses (fair ball, fair catch etc.) began in 1856. Fair play is from 1595; fair and square is from 1604. Fair-haired in the fig. sense of "darling, favorite" is from 1909. Fairly in the sense of "somewhat" is from 1805; it earlier meant "totally." Fairway (1584) originally meant "navigational channel of a river;" golfing sense is from 1910. First record of fair-weather friends is from 1736.

Merriam Webster:

6 a: marked by impartiality and honesty : free from self-interest, prejudice, or favoritism b (1): conforming with the established rules : allowed (2): consonant with merit or importance : due c: open to legitimate pursuit, attack, or ridicule

The definition MW gives for "just" (2 a (1): acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good : righteous (2): being what is merited : deserved b: legally correct : lawful) conforms to our understanding of what is legally just.

I ask because some have tried to defined justice in terms of fairness. Level is a kind of equal, but it appears that fair has no link to level.

Insight Scoop: First Millennium Petrine Ministry (the article by Joseph Previtali)

Kenneth L. Grasso, Francis Canavan, S.J. (1917–2009)

What's Wrong with the World: Aquinas on Usury

Albino Barrera, "Exchange-Value Determination: Scholastic Just Price, Economic Theory, and Modern Catholic Social Thought," History of Political Economy.1997; 29: 83-116.

link

$15 to access the article for 2 days? Crazy.

A question about profit

In a society where there is perfect justice (and virtue), would it be possible for producers to make a true profit?