Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Monday, June 29, 2009
Saturday, June 27, 2009
When we simply plow through Aristotle’s text changing every “what is” to “essence” we will be prone to fall into exactly the sort of error that is thoroughly discredited by the insights of evolution. In Aristotle’s system, the “what”, when said of a natural thing, refers to a compositeof matter and form; when said of a being without matter thing, it refers to form alone. The first “what” is inseparable from a change and flux so far as it is defined with matter, and so if we say that “the what” means “essence” than the essence of natural things is changeable. Changeability is not the whole of its essence (for form is essential to its essence too) but it is inseparable from it. In this sense of essence, the essences of the things the natural scientist studies are changeable. The difficulty is that “essence”, because of its absolute character, cannot mix with the idea of being changeable. The mind recoils from the idea of “changeable essence” as a contradiction, or at least an extremely poor choice of words. This is why when we find various good reasons to say that essences (or what we thought were essences) are not fixed, it is better to junk the idea of essence altogether. This is fine, but even after we junk the word “essence” we are still left with Aristotle’s “the what”, which, when applied to natural things, includes matter and is therefore capable of change.
But Aristotle also says that nature is more form than matter, does he not, even though it is made up of both? And matter is proportioned to form -- so how much change can a thing tolerate before its potencies are affected, and it no longer has the same potencies as before?
Thursday, June 25, 2009
It would be interesting to develop St. Thomas’s notion of logic as a manual like “the proper use of a human intellect”.
int.) Human powers can function well or poorly. Digestion can happen either effortlessly, or with difficulty and pain; vision can be either 20/20 or obscured by glaucoma, nerve damage, etc; the endocrine system can work or be impaired by diabetes; our ability to make a jump shot can be trained and coached, etc.
1.) Intellect: a power which knows what things are. We pass over any consideration of the nature of this power, unless we need to know it in order to use the intellect properly.
2.) We come to know by learning. So intellect learns what things are. Like other human powers, sometimes this development is automatic, other times it must be trained or coached. We are only interested here in the part that can be trained or coached (that is, educated).
3.) Learning involves getting a more perfect knowledge of something, and so begins with what is more imperfect. Learning simply speaking therefore begins with a concept that is most imperfect, simply speaking.
4.) The learning in question is of what something is. The most imperfect grasps of what something is, is our awareness that it is at all in some way. One the one hand, this is a real awareness of what something is; on the other hand it is so imperfect and indeterminate that it tells us almost nothing, and is always taken for granted in our thought.
(more examples)
The logic from names to definition(s)
The Death of an Interesting Theory
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Monday, June 22, 2009
John R. T. Lamont
B) Problems with the Neo-Scholastic Approach to Doctrine, and Their Remedy
The ideas about the interpretation of Church teachings that have been criticized so far emerge from "progressive" theological currents that have become widely accepted only since the 1950s. Immediately before this period, the predominant approach to the interpretation of Church teachings was that of neo-Scholastic theologians, itself a development of the views of baroque Scholastics. Although this approach is still the one generally used by theologians who reject the heterodoxy of the progressive notions, resorting to the neo-Scholastic approach is not a satisfactory method for evaluating certain conciliar teachings, such as that on religious liberty. While this approach is not heterodox, it nonetheless has serious shortcomings. Remedying them requires some constructive work on the issue of the interpretation of Church teachings.
One class of shortcomings arises from its dependence on a mistaken theory of revelation, which I have dubbed the "magis-terial" theory of revelation, and criticized elsewhere.(41) This theory underlies the neo-Scholastic system of theological notes, which divides teachings into the categories of de fide divina, de fide divina et catholica, de fide catholica, de fide in genere, theologice certa, doctrina catholica, and proxima fidei. The falsity of the magisterial theory and of the theories of the development of doctrine that are associated with it means that these classifications are mistaken or inadequate.(42) However, since most of these notes are intended to be applied to teachings that are infallibly taught, we need not go into their shortcomings in detail. The feature of the neo-Scholastic system that does concern us closely is its general approach to Church teachings, which conceives of assent to these teachings as primarily obedience to a command.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Friday, June 19, 2009
Arautos do Evangelho: Il Prof. P. Bruno Esposito, O.P. Vicerettore Accademico della Pontificia Università san Tommaso d'Aquino a Roma - "Angelicum" ci parla della sua visita in Brasile, sulla fede dei brasiliani e commenta la spiritualità degli Araldi del Vangelo. - visite: www.tv.arautos.org.br - Arautos do Evangelho.
Christopher West and the dangers of overanalogizing Mary
A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.
Aristotle argues that a defining trait of a first principle is being indemonstrable, and that to think otherwise shows lack of paideia- that is, lack of a proper formation (lack of proper upbringing, culture, liberal education, etc)
Mr. Chastek expands on this by looking at what St. Thomas says in his commentary on the Metaphysics. I don't think I can think of a better critique of modern education than what is presented here. Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of miseducation or deformation than education. Students cannot distinguish between knowledge and opinion, nor do they know what is apparent and what is not.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Yahoo: Transparent frog discovered
Scientists find a "crystal" frog whose organs appear through its clear skin.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
For the sake of precision
Monday, June 15, 2009
I must have reed St Thomas a thousand times before it hit me that he defined logic in relation to the rational faculty. Logic, by his definition, is the art that directs reason in its own act. This act is governed by the proper object of reason, the what-sensible-things-are. On this account, logic is subordinate to things by definition. The goal is not to give a universal system of all possible arguments, but to give a general account of how we figure out what things are. On St. Thomas’s account logic is the answer to the question: “generally speaking, how does one use an intellect?” or “how does an intellect work?” On this account, you first give its object, then the order we follow to attain the object (general to particular) then the most general things known that can do logical work (the categories) and then how we can refine these general things into definitions (Topics) then the laws that govern how we combine them to form a proposition (de interpretatione) and an argument (the books of Analytics)
The part on the Topics would be the easiest one to leave out, and the one we contemporary thinkers are most in need of.
Logic. Something all aspiring academics should be studying; it would also be useful for those who are engaged in ecumenical dialogue, particularly the "Latins" and the "Greeks". Most philosophy departments that take a historical approach to teaching philosophy do not have a basic logic course for both majors and non-majors. How much would majors benefit from having just one good logic course. It would help them deal with the sort of 'relativism' that one finds in such departments.
Papal Address to Social Doctrine Group
Papal Address to Social Doctrine Group
"Economic and Financial Paradigms … Must Be Rethought"
VATICAN CITY, JUNE 14, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Benedict XVI gave Saturday upon receiving in audience members of the Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation, which promotes the social doctrine of the Church.
* * *
Venerable brothers in the episcopate and the priesthood,
Illustrious and dear friends!
Thank you for your visit that you are making on the occasion of your annual meeting. I greet all of you with affection and am grateful to you for what you do, with proven generosity, at the service of the Church. I greet and thank Count Lorenzo Rossi di Montelera, your president, who interpreted your sentiments with refined sensibility, expounding the foundation's activities with broad brush strokes. I also thank those who, in different languages, wanted to present me with an attestation of their common devotion. Your gathering today assumes a significance and particular value in light of the situation that all of humanity is experiencing in this moment.
In effect, the financial crisis that has struck the industrialized nations, the emergent nations and those that are developing, shows in a clear way how the economic and financial paradigms that have been dominant in recent years must be rethought. Your foundation has done well, then, to confront, in the international conference that took place yesterday, the theme of the pursuit and identification of the values and guidelines that the economic world must stick to in order to bring into being a new model of development that is more attentive to the demands of solidarity and more respectful of human dignity.
I am happy to see that you have especially examined the interdependency between institutions, society and the market, beginning -- in accord with the encyclical "Centesimus Annus" of my venerable predecessor John Paul II -- from the reflection according to which the market economy, understood as "an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector" (No. 42), can only be recognized as a way of economic and civil progress if it is oriented to the common good (cf. No. 43). Such a vision, however, must also be accompanied by another reflection according to which freedom in the economic sector must situate itself "within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality," a responsible freedom "the core of which is ethical and religious" (No. 42). This encyclical opportunely affirms that: "The person fully realizes himself in the free gift of self, so too ownership morally justifies itself in the creation, at the proper time and in the proper way, of opportunities for work and human growth for all" (No. 43).
I hope the research developed by your work, inspired by the eternal principles of the Gospel, will elaborate a vision of the modern economy that is respectful of the needy and of the rights of the weak. As you know, my encyclical on the vast theme of economics and labor will soon be published: It will highlight what, for us Christians, are the objectives to be pursued and the values to be promoted and tirelessly defended, with the purpose of realizing a truly free and solidary human coexistence.
I also note with pleasure what you are doing on behalf of the Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, to whose aim, an aim which you share, I attribute great value for an increasingly fruitful interreligious dialogue.
Dear friends, thank you once again for your visit; I assure each of you a remembrance in prayer as I bless you all from my heart.
[Translation by Joseph G. Trabbic]
Friday, June 12, 2009
This then is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by some superior being: and, in those creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature itself subsists, for it's existence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is necessary that he should in all points conform to his maker's will.
This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.
Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian[1] has reduced the whole doctrine of law.
But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be obtained than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wanted some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance it's inseparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to inquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, "that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other-It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.
source: Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, Section 2
Thursday, June 11, 2009
A good piece regarding endoxa. When it comes to the discussion of morality in high schools and colleges, traditional values are questioned, but modern ones (especially modern rights) are not -- evidence that liberalism is just another tradition despite its pretense to the contrary? When I was in high school, I found that the students were the ones who were questioning received attitudes, while the teachers would act as "neutral" moderators, doing nothing to defend tradition or to lead the "liberated" students to question their own values. There is one classmate in particular who annoyed me greatly with his smart-ass attitude. To this day I have no inclination to talk to him. (Or friend him on Facebook.)
One can see this liberal bias against endoxa (or their rejection by those who desire license) clearly with respect to morality. It seems to happen less with respect to the speculative sciences. However, a similar critique can be made of professional educators. It may be part of the standard narrative that what was believed in the past has been rendered obsolete or false through new discoveries; but for what cannot be immediately be verified, even these supposed new "truths" are taken as assumptions, rather than proved. No attempt is usually made to show why someone reasonable might hold to those beliefs in the past.
People are critical of what they have rejected, but they do not undertake to examine their own beliefs in the same way. Is that close-mindedness? It is certainly proud ignorance to claim that one is "open-minded" or "critical" when one is not really so.
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Tuesday, June 09, 2009
Monday, June 08, 2009
David Schindler calls time-out in dispute over Christopher West's teachings
A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.
Response to Profs. Smith and Waldstein Regarding Christopher West, by David Schindler
Let's not even get into women's groups, which sound like an excuse for women to complain to other women about their husbands. Not exactly a good way to strengthen one's marriage, especially if it is used primarily as a means of validating their complaints.
Thursday, June 04, 2009
According to Dodar, St. Augustine held that
When good does result from human efforts, it is because they are never without divine assistance. Knowledge and love of God, the proper worship of God, are impeded by the dissonance of this free-floating selfhood. Augustine describes the sin of Adam and Eve as self-worship as opposed to the correct worship of God...Does Augustine define worship in this way? Aquinas distinguishes between charity and religion (both its internal and external acts). It does seem that for Aquinas, there can be no religion without charity.
The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. (ST II II 81, 5 ad 1)
The body of the article, Aquinas on whether religion is a theological virtue:
Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.