Friday, March 23, 2007

Dr. Pellegrino




Dr. Edmund Pellegrino came to BC to deliver the LaBrecque lecture in medical ethics last night--there was a good turnout. He also gave a luncheon seminar today.

Today he gave a short overview of the President's Council on Bioethics and the work that it is doing. There is a growing recognition that bioethics is increasingly a matter of public policy. The council advises the president on various ethical implications of public policy.

In 1972 bioethics was "baptized," and a national commission was established in 1977 to study various issues, especially human research. The Belmont Report came out of this national commission, laying out 4 principles of bioethics:

1. autonomy
2. beneficence
3. justice
4. non-malificence (which some distinguished from beneficence)

This commission was succeeded by a Presidential commission studying human research and the ethics of behavioral science.

In 1983 a series of reports were issued. (Not sure by whom.)

A congressional commission was formed during the 80s to study the moral status of the fetus. There was only one meeting--one of the members passed away, and Congress was unable to settle on a replacement.

Hiatus of 13 years?

President Clinton appointed the National Bioethics Advisory Committee which was stacked towards approving anything new. It was a White House appointment. Dr. Pellegrino believes the current Bioethics Council differs from the Clinton one in that it is "surprisingly well-balanced." Dr. Pellegrino sees himself as a political independent.

"Bioethics is everybody's business." The Council does not make policy, it is just advisory; its mission is to lay out issues as thoroughly as possible, both for the public and for policy makers--to lay out issues of fact. The Council does make policy recommendations, for example the moratorium on human cloning.

What place do philosophers have on the Council? There are two extremes of opinion:
1. No place whatsoever, since there is no such thing as an expert in bioethics, philosophers aren't experts at anything, they have no experience with medicine and science, etc.
2. Everyone on the council should be a bioethicist.

When it comes to actual philosophers, there is only one who is currently on the council, Alfonso Gomez-Lobo. Michael Sandel is no longer on the council. There are 18 members, all are presidential appointees.

Current topics for discussion:
1. Organ transplanation -- including, Are brain death criteria defensible? (When should a person be considered dead? Circulatory death vs. brain death.) How are organs to be allocated? Can organ donation be commercialized? Is it really morally permissible to have a living donor? (It has been discovered that those who donate do suffer from complications--kidney donors suffer from hypotension, etc.)
2. Newborn genetic screening -- should it be required? uniform on a natinoal basis? (PKU, etc.)
3. The concept of human dignity?

Dr. Pellegrino hopes these reports will be issued in the next 6 months.

All meetings of the council are public--there are no secret meetings, no executive privilege--everything is on the public record. (Sunshine laws) The members are very careful when it comes to making everything public, and Dr. Pellegrino has made things even more strict.

They are the first of 7 or 8 topics, which include justice in health care and professional ethics. The topics are chosen by the council itself, though they did receive one request from the White House, and that was to present a report on cloning.

What of the conflict of obligations? I have an obligation to my patient, but also to the common good. The individual doctor has a responsibility to his patient, they have a covenantal relationship; but he also has a duty to the common good and to decide wisely the allocation of limited resources.

(Chromosome Six, by Robin Cook -- using bonobos to create human organs)

How to define a bioethicist? What are a bioethicist's qualifications? At present there are no specific criteria for declaring someone to be a bioethicist. (Dr. Pellegrino declares that he is not one.) Generally, anyone today can declare himself to be a bioethicist if he has studied the subject. One can be trained in "bioethics" (Dr. Pellegrino does not necessarily approve); there are 105 bioethics centers around the country, but no formal process of certification. Bioethicists have a presumed expertise; people believe that they can provide a more reliable way of making ethical decisions. (But this of course is not necessarily true--one can be an "ethicist" without being ethical."

Doctors should help analyze the problem, make recommendations about the best course of medical treatment, but refrain from talking about values/ethical judgments. Doctors can consult about human relationships (getting family members to talk to one another), and prudential judgments. Doctors have medical expertise.

Dr. Byrne: autonomy and dignity are leading principles today
However, choice was initially associated with something.
For Kant, with reason. For Locke, with bodily integrity in the state of nature (law of nature). But now there is no more rational underpinning.

A lawyer and member of the council, Carl E. Schneider, has written a book on autonomy: The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions.

Dr. Pellegrino points out that autonomy also exists for the physician, nurse, etc -- one cannot violate their conscience in demanding a service. (Martin Buhl? talks about I and thou in the decision-making process.)

Dr. Pellegrino supports universal health care and a single-payer system; he believes that such a system does not entail Federal management of health care, or a new bureaucracy. Private insurance companies should be done away with. Dr. Lebrecque argues that the profit that would be generated should instead be channeled into providing health care.

Rationing/mechanisms for allocation would not be decided by the Federal Government, but health care would be Federally funded.

Dr. Byrne: The profitability of insurance companies drives efficiency, cost-effectiveness?

Dr. Pellegrino: Mandatory health care insurance, one pays in terms of net income--everyone should have access to basic medical care. HMOS: control costs to increase top-end profitability.

Bad fortune cannot be avoided, but what about responsibility for one's own health?

Another member of the Lebrecque family argued that costs for private insurance increase because of mandates by individual states.

Dr. Pellegrino: Is health care a commodity? Is it fundamental? What kind of society do we want?
Adam Smith would not treat it as a commodity, not subject it to the "laws" of the marketplace.
You get the kind of health care you want. How does health care fall under justice? He claims that we can afford it. In a survey of officials of different countries, they prioritized health care needs as follows:

1. sure access of everyone to emergency health care
2. chronic/disabling illness
3. maternal/child health

Very few talk about preventive medicine; to do it well is expensive, as it requires constant human input and behavior modification. (Habits are involved.)

But how important is life and the good of health? Enough that others should pay for my health care when I have failed to be responsible for my own health? One should have access to a doctor; but where do the expenses come in? Diagnostics? Treatment and procedures?

Dr. Pellegrino claims that in rural areas there are a lot of people who are untreated. (His first job was in rural medicine.) However, this may be a question of lack of proper public education and lack of transportation, not necessarily lack of quality health care.

Can certain skills be taught as a part of domestic arts? For example, first aid skills and other simple procedures for non life-threatening illnesses. What about chronic illness and disease? Old age? How much health care do I need before I should say enough is enough, and stop being a burden to others?

What are the different levels of health care that would exist in a universal system? Though the Comptroller General advocates universal health care and a single-payer system, how does he reconcile this with his warnings about the impending bankruptcy of the Federal Government?

At the Modernity conference someone gave a talk on health care--was it Peter Riola?--he emphasized that the basics of public health included sanitation, water, and infrastructure. As for the other details... I'd have to try to remember them, but if his paper got published that would be good.

What of obesity and the illnesses that are caused by it?

Georgetown Clinical Bioethics page; Philosophy page

Virtual Mentor profile
CBHD: Meet Edmund Pellegrino
bioethics.net :: Reflections on the Appointment of Edmund ...
blog.bioethics.net

Thursday, March 22, 2007

Ben Douglass's new apologetics website

Pugio Fidei

His critique of Robert Sungenis; Robert Sungenis's response (pdf)

Interview with Charles Taylor

recipient of the 2007 Templeton Prize

Wednesday, March 21, 2007

Skeletons in the Conciliar Closet

Skeletons in the Conciliar Closet
Fr. Brian W. Harrison, O.S.
REMNANT COLUMNIST, Puerto Rico



Like Christopher Ferrara, I saw George Sim Johnston’s article, “Why Vatican II Was Necessary” in the March 2004 issue of Crisis magazine, and I must confess I reacted in much the same way as Mr. Ferrara (Remnant, March 15, 2004). Johnston’s attempt to convince us why the Council was so necessary, valuable and important, in spite of its generally chaotic aftermath, struck me as consisting mainly of hollow, shopworn and unsubstantiated generalizations. I give my assent to Vatican II’s doctrinal teachings (interpreted, in the case of obscurities and ambiguities, in the light of Tradition). But I am inclined to agree that a strong case can be made out, with the benefit of nearly forty years of historical hindsight, for its overall lack of opportuneness.

I am afraid that Mr. Ferrara’s less-than-enthusiastic view of the Council tends to be supported by certain other skeletons in the conciliar closet that I have personally discovered in the last few weeks. They are ‘buried’ in the dozens of huge (and largely inaccessible) Latin tomes containing the complete record of everything officially done and said at the Council (the Acta Synodalia), and I doubt whether they have been made known to the general public so far.

One of the many difficulties in interpreting the Council’s Declaration on Religious Liberty, and reconciling it with traditional doctrine, lies in the fact that while the key article 2 of this document, Dignitatis Humanae (DH), begins by affirming that the right to religious liberty has to do with conscientiously held religious beliefs, it ends by affirming that the same right is enjoyed even by those who are not in good conscience (that is, those who “do not fulfill their obligation of seeking and adhering to the truth”). Curious as to whether this confusing, and at first sight contradictory, treatment of conscience in DH #2 was officially explained to the Council Fathers before they voted on it, I started fishing around in the Acta Synodalia (AS) in our university library. And what I dredged up struck me as a choice example of how that famous ‘Rhine’ flowed into the ‘Tiber’ during Vatican II: manipulation of the more conservative, but rather complacent and unsuspecting, majority by the powerful and ‘progressive’ Northern European bishops and their periti.

The above passage recognizing immunity from coercion for those whose religious propaganda is not in good conscience was absent from the first three drafts of DH. It finally appeared in the fourth (second-last) draft, presented on October 25, 1965, only a few weeks before the end of the Council (cf. AS IV, V, p. 79). Bishop Emil De Smedt, the Dutch relator (official spokesman for the drafting Commission), then gave his relatio (speech) to the assembled Fathers officially explaining this fourth draft and its changes to the previous draft. However, in doing so he did not even mention this important addition to the text! On the contrary, in commenting on the new version of article 2, De Smedt repeatedly stressed the importance of conscience, citing the (unchanged) words in the first paragraph of #2 which assert that the human person must not be forced to act against (or be prevented from acting in accordance with) “his conscience” (“suam conscientiam” – see ibid., pp. 101-102). True, the Fathers all had on their desks printed copies of the old and new drafts in parallel columns, but it looks as if De Smedt was hoping that if he didn’t draw their attention to this change, many would either overlook it or not attach much importance to it.

In another lengthy hand-out, which was not read on the floor of the Council, we find in the fine print that this change had been requested “in the name of more than one hundred” Fathers (ibid.,p. 116, #25). But the reader is not told who these hundred-plus Fathers were; and there is still not the slightest explanation from De Smedt as to how the role of conscience in religious liberty was now to be understood in the light of these contrasting statements within the same article of the document.

Did Bishop De Smedt perhaps honestly think this textual addition wasn’t important enough to warrant an official explanation? That excuse looks lame on the face of it, and looks even lamer in the light of what finally transpired. For during the next few weeks, when the fifth and final draft of DH was being worked on, three Fathers submitted a request to the Commission that this confusing addition favoring persons in bad conscience be simply omitted. A number of others asked that it be significantly amended. But in his final relatio, De Smedt acknowledged these requests only to dismiss them summarily, stating that the addition was too important and substantial to be omitted, and, moreover, it had already been approved by a large majority in the vote on the fourth draft taken back in October! But did the Dutch prelate finally give the Fathers at least some explanation of this “substantial” change which he now declared was immutable? No way. Still not a word. The unexplained amendment had been quickly, quietly, and misleadingly, pushed through without any debate and without public attention being drawn to it. But afterwards, when some more conservative Fathers finally expressed their disagreement with the amendment, they were told abruptly that it was now set in stone.

Another discovery I have made in the Acta Synodalia is relevant to the scandal provoked nearly two years ago when Cardinal William Keeler announced that, as far as he and an important committee of American theologians were concerned, the Catholic Church no longer believes it necessary, or even legitimate, to try and convert Jews to Christianity. Cardinal Keeler was soon backed up (with perhaps a minor nuance or two) by the top Vatican official entrusted with ecumenism and dialogue with Jews, the German Cardinal Walter Kasper.

Well, what, if anything, did the Council itself say in this point? In researching the textual history of the Vatican II Declaration on Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate (NA), I have found that the original draft of article 4 in that document was actually quite up-front and positive about Catholic hopes for Jewish conversions to the true faith. It included this passage: “It is important to recall that the integration of the Jewish people into the Church is part of Christian hope. For, according to the Apostle’s teaching (cf. Rom. 11: 25), the Church awaits with unshakable faith and deep longing the entry of this people into the fullness of the People of God, which has been restored by Christ” (AS III, VIII, p. 640, my translation). In the biblical verse cited here, the Holy Spirit, through Saint Paul, speaks of the “blindness” of the unbelieving Jews as being temporary, and prophesies in the next verse the salvation of Israel as a nation, after the “fullness of the Gentiles” has come into the Church.

Now, readers will probably agree that this original draft of NA #4, together with its biblical citation, doesn’t sound exactly in the ‘spirit’ of Their Eminences Keeler and Kasper. Come to think of it, have you ever heard any post-conciliar Pope or Vatican official declare that he is awaiting with “unshakable faith and deep longing” (fide inconcussa ac desiderio magno) the massive entry of Jews into the Catholic Church? And as for their present “blindness”, why, any official mention of that would now be out of the question! For it would of course be immediately drowned in worldwide howls of indignant media protest at such a recrudescence of top-level Catholic “anti-Semitism”.

In fairness, it should be added here that the new Catechism of the Catholic Church does present us with St. Peter at Pentecost preaching to the Jews their need for conversion, and continues to teach the revealed truth that Israel, after her present “hardening”, will eventually recognize Christ as her Messiah (see #674). Also, the Church in her post-conciliar Liturgy of the Hours, or Divine Office, still prays for the conversion of the Jews several times during the year (at least in the original Latin edition that I use – I can’t vouch for the generally more liberal English version). But, of course, we never hear any modern Church leaders publicly draw attention to these little-known official texts supporting the traditional doctrine. Nor do we hear any Vatican praise and encouragement for those few remaining Catholic individuals and small groups who actually make some concrete effort to evangelize Jews.

Let us return to Nostra Aetate. I have discovered that the near-silence and inactivity of the post-conciliar Church establishment regarding the Jews’ need for conversion can probably be traced to a conscious decision of the Council itself during the preparation of this Declaration. When the revised draft of NA was circulated, with the original draft in parallel columns, the Fathers found that the aforesaid section in article 4 about the conversion of the Jews, with its specific citation of Romans 11: 25, had now been totally omitted. And (unlike Bishop De Smedt) the relator for this document, the German Jesuit Cardinal Augustin Bea, was quite open about the reason why the original version was now considered unacceptable: “Very many Fathers,” Bea announced in his relatio, “have requested that in talking about this ‘hope’, since it has to do with a mystery, we should avoid every appearance of proselytism. Others have asked that the same Christian hope, applying to all peoples, should also be expressed somehow. In the present version of this paragraph we have sought to satisfy all these requests” (ibid., p. 648, emphasis added). The tactic of His Eminence and all those “very many” (but unnamed) Fathers was thus to tarnish the previous draft with the pejorative label “proselytism”, and to ‘elevate’ the future conversion of the Jews to the ethereal status of a “mystery”, thereby insinuating that it will somehow ‘just happen’ spontaneously one day without the necessity of any human missionary activity on the part of Catholics.

The tactic, combined with the great personal prestige of Cardinal Bea, worked perfectly. The vast majority of the Fathers duly voted in favor of the new draft, thereby relegating to the finest of fine print this particular point of our “unshakable faith” regarding the Jews. It proved to be literally unmentionable in a modern conciliar document, and so has been ‘buried’ in the middle of a much longer passage of the Epistle to the Romans which is indicated (but not cited) among various other biblical references to NA #4. What now appears in that passage is a much blander statement referring to Christian hopes for mankind in general. And in accord with the non-threatening spirit of this ‘pastoral’ Declaration, all explicit mention of anyone actually joining, entering or returning to the Catholic Church has been carefully excised. We read that “the Church awaits the day, known to God alone, when all peoples will call on God with one voice and ‘serve him shoulder to shoulder’ (Soph. 3:9; cf. Is. 66:23; Ps. 65: 4; Rom. 11: 11-32)”.

Doesn’t that sound a whole lot more . . . friendly than the original draft? At any rate, the history of this textual change perhaps helps explain why the top-level talk disparaging any further evangelization of the Jews has still, after nearly two years, not elicited any rebuttal from either the Supreme Pontiff or Cardinal Ratzinger (both of whom, of course, were active at Vatican II). For if he were challenged on this issue, Kasper the Friendly Dialogue-Partner could point straight back to the Friendly Kouncil. After all, how much difference is there between its officially endorsed admonition to “avoid every appearance of proselytizing” Jews and the Keeler/Kasper doctrine that Catholics should not “target the Jews for conversion”? It is not that Vatican II actually taught this falsehood now being propagated with impunity even by Princes of the Church; but we can see now that the Council paved the way for the diffusion of that error by consciously declining to teach – or even to suggest – the opposing, but ‘politically incorrect’, truth.

Dr. Long has 2 new books coming out

According to his faculty page:

His book The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act is forthcoming from Sapientia Press. Also, a collection of Dr. Long's essays, tentatively titled Thomistic Disputations: Providence, Freedom, and Law has been accepted for publication and is forthcoming from Sapientia Press. He holds an M.A. from the University of Toledo and a Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America.

Monday, March 19, 2007

"Sacramentum Caritatis" and Liturgical Beauty

"Sacramentum Caritatis" and Liturgical Beauty

Interview With Father Edward McNamara

ROME, MARCH 19, 2007 (Zenit.org).- The true beauty of the liturgy comes about when the priest and the congregation participate in it actively and piously, says Legionary of Christ Father Edward McNamara.

Father McNamara, a professor of liturgy at the Regina Apostolorum university in Rome, writes the weekly liturgy column for ZENIT.

ZENIT interviewed him about Benedict XVI's postsynodal apostolic exhortation, which gathers the conclusions of the October 2005 Synod of Bishops. Father McNamara served as a "peritus," or expert, in that synod.

Here, he expounds on some of the specific observations and invitations that the Pope made in "Sacramentum Caritatis."

Q: In No. 35 the Pope writes: "Like the rest of Christian Revelation, the liturgy is inherently linked to beauty: it is 'veritatis splendor.'" Is it too much to say that beautiful liturgy is a sine qua non of a vibrant Catholic community?

Father McNamara: As the Holy Father says, beauty is inherent to liturgy, it is intimately bound up with authentic liturgy.

Beauty however does not only mean splendid sacred buildings and sublime music. The primary beauty in liturgy is that of a community united heart and soul in prayerful celebration of Christ's sacrifice. It is the beauty of priest and people engaged in full, active and pious participation in the mystery.

This beauty is achieved, in spite of a possible lack of external splendor, whenever the sacred ministers and each member of the faithful strive to live the liturgy to the full.

Other forms of beauty: music, art, poetry, and a sober solemnity in the ritual derive naturally from this inner beauty because the deeper a community lives and comprehends the beauty of the liturgical mystery the more it strives to express it in wonderful outer forms. It is the natural understanding that only the very best we can offer is truly worthy of the Lord.

Thus there is strong historical evidence that even before the end of the era of persecutions; Christians sought to celebrate the Eucharist with the finest materials available. This explains why the construction boom in imposing basilicas, as soon as the persecutions were over, along with the more solemn ritual forms required by these new buildings, was perceived as a natural development and not a rupture with earlier practice.

It is this same understanding which led generations of poor immigrants to the United States to sacrifice so much in order to endow their parishes with majestic churches replete with fine arts and crafts.

Ugliness, blandness, banality and bad taste on the other hand diminish the liturgy and betray a lack of appreciation of the mystery and sometimes, alas, a certain lack of faith.

Q: In No. 37 the Holy Father writes: "Since the eucharistic liturgy is essentially an 'actio Dei' which draws us into Christ through the Holy Spirit, its basic structure is not something within our power to change, nor can it be held hostage by the latest trends." Is this statement aimed at the clergy?

Father McNamara: It is certainly aimed at the clergy but not only. First of all it addresses the fundamental structure of the liturgy, and not just the rubrics, saying that the liturgy is primarily God's action counters all those who attempt to reduce it to a mere sociological expression that can be freely adapted as societies change.

The danger of holding the liturgy hostage to the latest trends not only concerns the clergy but to all those engaged in liturgical preparation. There are certainly priests who arbitrarily change the liturgy at their own whim but there are also readers who spontaneously adjust readings for ideological purposes and music directors who subject the liturgy to the demands of music and not vice versa, or who introduce inappropriate musical forms in the name of relevance.

I think the point the Holy Father is trying to make is that we relearn to receive the liturgy as a precious heirloom to be treasured and less as a toy to play around with.

Q: Benedict XVI says bluntly in No. 47 that "Given the importance of the word of God, the quality of homilies needs to be improved." What is the best way priests can improve in this area?

Father McNamara: There are many excellent resources available in books and on the Internet but I think there is no substitution for the three P's in improving the qualities of homilies: prayer, preparation and practice. First and foremost the homily must be the fruit of prayer, of a genuine conversation with God regarding the text.

It may sound harsh but a priest or deacon whose homily is not the fruit of meditation really has nothing worth saying because he can only give himself. An 8- to 10-minute homily requires a lot of preparation in order to put what God wants said into the best human form possible.

Preparation also means that a priest or deacon continually nurtures his soul and mind with ongoing formation. A good preacher also tries to practices before delivering his homily, practicing his diction, inflections and also timing himself. This last recommendation is especially necessary for younger priests and deacons whose enthusiasm combined with lack of experience often leads them to try to say too much at once.

Q: In No. 6 of the exhortation the Pope writes: "Every great reform has in some way been linked to the rediscovery of belief in the Lord's eucharistic presence among his people." Would this emphasis on the Eucharist have to precede other priorities such as ecumenism, restoring family life, and reaching out to Islam?

Father McNamara: I believe that it is more a question of the quality of these endeavors that a chronological priority. Unless we Catholics are deeply rooted in the central tenets of our faith and practice then engaging in these other priorities such as ecumenism or reaching out to Islam will be shallow and hollow affairs based on false irenics and empty rhetoric.

For example, a fervent evangelical Christian steeped in biblical culture, would probably be more at home with a Catholic of deep Eucharistic piety than with a one lacking in devotion. Perhaps they would agree on little from a theological standpoint, but would have a much better grasp of each other as people for who the question of God's presence is a lived reality. Something similar could perhaps also be said for pious Muslims.

Q: The exhortation encourages a wider use of Latin when celebrating the Eucharist. What are some of the advantages of that could come from a more frequent use of Latin and how can this be done in a world that has largely lost familiarity with Latin?

Father McNamara: The advantages are manifold. Think what a difference it could make to next years World Youth Day in Sydney if 500,000 young voices were able to sing "Sanctus, Sanctus" or the Lord's Prayer in unison, and not just listen to the choir. The sense of belonging to one Church could be greatly enhanced.

From other perspectives the occasional or even frequent celebration of Mass in Latin as well as the use of Latin Gregorian chant in vernacular Masses would help recover the sense of the sacred in the liturgy as many of these chants do a far better job of transforming text into musical prayer than most vernacular adaptations.

It is true that there is far less familiarity with Latin than before, but counterintuitively, the fact that the vernacular translations are already impressed on the memory could actually facilitate the occasional use of Latin. Most people would know by heart the meaning of the text in their native language and are able to appreciate the beauty of the Latin texts, especially the chants.

Some say that it is a quixotic adventure to attempt such a restoration, and yet, there are many examples of parishes around the world which have achieved a balance of vernacular and Latin in both texts and music from which all have spiritually benefited.

Q: A section of the document deals with the social implications of the Eucharist. How is our Eucharistic life related to a greater concern for justice and charity?

Father McNamara: As No. 37 quoted above says, the Eucharistic liturgy draws us into Christ through the Holy Spirit. The more a soul is drawn into Christ the more it becomes identified with him and seeks to imitate him.

Being drawn into Christ leads us to recognize him in others, especially in the hungry, thirsty, naked, ignorant, sick and imprisoned. Being drawn into Christ, means being drawn into his supreme act of self-offering on Calvary, a self-offering that culminate his teaching of the beatitudes. In this way there can be no genuine Eucharistic piety that does not bear fruit in concern for justice and charity.

For some, this concern will mean engaging in specific activities promoting justice and charity as a fruit of Eucharistic participation, for others, their genuine concern will be expressed through prayer and sacrifice for those in need. For all, it means practicing justice and charity in their daily lives and dealings with others.

Friday, March 16, 2007

E-sangha

e-sangha

Introduced to me by muikhim...

Website of Dr. Lauren Pristas

here

Thanks to someone leaving a comment at NLM.

Thursday, March 15, 2007

Questions on gold and money

If gold (or any other natural resource) is traded away, and its quantity decreases and becomes more scarce, does it not become more valuable as a result?

What is the impact of moving resources away from a local community on its ecology?

Is there a difference between a trade in natural resources and one specializing in finished goods? And what should be the basis of exchange, if it is not a barter system? Paper money? Or precious metal or some other resource?

What is the comparative value of using gold as the medium of exchange as opposed to salt?

If a country imports goods from another country and pays out in gold or silver (etc.), what effect does this have if the gold is also what backs the currency? What if the one importing is not the government but private individuals/companies?

If paper currency represents a certain unit of gold, but it is also treated as a commodity in itself, then if it becomes more scarce, will not deflation result? Prices, if dependent on the value of currency, will fall, but it should not have an impact on the standard of living? Unless other factors come into play?

Using gold from a private store vs. gold from a community's treasury
Even if gold is used from a private store, if the total amount of gold within the community is not replaced, will not the remainder within the community increase in value?

If paper currency is paid out for goods that are imported, and paper currency is a claim on x which is held in the community's treasury... how is it possible for a community to go into debt? What is being exchanged? If consumption replaces production? Where does the purchasing power originally come from though?

Certain things are made or services are exchanged--how are prices to be fixed? What is the basis of comparing value?

What makes fiat currency viable?

Trade and stratification: they are certainly features of certain societies, but how necessary are they?

Wednesday, March 14, 2007

Ordo theologiae

Just because metaphysics/natural theology/the preambles of faith are written down first in a theological exposition does not mean that one is proceeding merely by natural reason. After all, it may be the case that the light of faith is illuminating such knowledge so that it can be incorporated within theology. Let us recall that theology, according to Aquinas, is both science and a form of wisdom, and its first principles are revealed, proper to the supernatural virtue of faith. What is written may not give an accurate picture of what has gone on in the soul or in the intellect; objections to Aquinas' ordo or method seem to ignore what he himself said about the matter.

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

The Twisted Crosses on Which Catholics are Being Hung

Dr. John Rao's latest

From Irenaeus to Grotius

A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought 100-1625, edited by Oliver O'Donovan and Joan Lockwood O'Donovan

Featuring:
Irenaeus of Lyons
Tertullian
Clement of Alexandria
Origen
Lactantius
Eusebius of Caesarea
Ambrose of Milan
John Chrysostom
Augustine
Paulus Orosius
Gelasius I
Agapetos
Justinian
Gregory I
Isidore of Seville (Sentences and Etymologies)
John of Damascus
Joans of Orleans (Institution of the King)
Sedulius Scottus (On Christian Rulers)
The Donation of Constantine
Gregory VII (Dictatus Papae, Letter 8.21)
Norman Anonymous (The Consecration of Bishops and Kings)
Honorius Augustodunensis (Summa Gloria)
Bernard of Clairvaux (On Consideration)
John of Salisbury (Policraticus)
Rufinus the Canonist (Summa Decretorum)
Nikephoros Blemmydes (The King's Statue)
Bonaventure (A Defence of the Mendicants)
Thomas Aquinas
Giles of Rome (On Ecclesiastical Power)
James of Viterbo (On Christian Government)
John of Paris (On Royal and Papal Power)
Dante Alighieri (Monarchia)
Marsilius of Padua (Defens0r Pacis)
William of Ockham (A Dialogue on Papal and Royal Dignity, Eight Questions on Papal Power, A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Ascendancy of the Pope)
Nicolas Cabsilas (Rulers' Illegal Outrags against Sacred Property)
John Wyclif (Divine Lordship, Civil Lordship)
Antonios IV (Letter 447)
Jean Gerson (On Church Power and the Origin of Law and Right)
John Fortescue (The Nature of the Law of Nature, A Treatise in Commendation of the Laws of England)
Nicholas of Kues (The Catholic Concordance)
Thomas More
Desiderius Erasmus (The Complaint of Peace)
Martin Luther (Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, The Sermon on the Mount, Trade and Usury)
Francisco de Vitoria (The American Indians)
The Schleitheim Articles
Hans Hergot (The New Transformation of Christian Living)
Stephen Gardiner (On True Obedience)
Philipp Melanchthon (Loci Communes)
John Calvin (Institutes of the Christian Religion)
John Knox (The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women, The Appellation of John Knox)
John Ponet (A Short Treatise of Political Power)
Thomas Cartwright (A Reply to An Answer, The Second Reply against the Second Answer)
Vindiciae, contra Tyrannos
Francisco Suarez (Laws and God the Lawgiver, On Charity, Disputation 13, War)
Richard Hooker (Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity)
Johannes Althusius (Politica Methodice Digesta)
William Perkins (A Treatise of Christian Equitie)
The Convocation Book
Hugo Grotius (The Right of War and Peace, The Satisfaction of Christ)

Liberty Fund: Online Library of Liberty

OUP books

The common good in late medieval political thought by M. S. Kempshall
John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature
Plato, Res Publica
Anthony Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life
Richard Kraut, Aristotle
Joseph Raz: Engaging Reason, The Authority of Law, The Morality of Freedom
Plato Opera Vol. V
De Anima
Aristotle Ars Rhetorica
Aristotle Fragmenta Selecta
Aristotle Atheniensium Respublica

David Hume: social contract
Cicero: De Re Publica
Cavanaugh (Double Effect)De Arte Poetica

Plus... Bonaventure by Christopher M. Cullen
Aristotle De Arte Poetica ?

edit: (June 1)
see also Malcolm Schofield's Plato: Political Philosophy
George, Making Men Moral

Monday, March 12, 2007

Dark Matter

March 11, 2007

Out There

Three days after learning that he won the 2006 Nobel Prize in Physics, George Smoot was talking about the universe. Sitting across from him in his office at the University of California, Berkeley, was Saul Perlmutter, a fellow cosmologist and a probable future Nobelist in Physics himself. Bearded, booming, eyes pinwheeling from adrenaline and lack of sleep, Smoot leaned back in his chair. Perlmutter, onetime acolyte, longtime colleague, now heir apparent, leaned forward in his.

“Time and time again,” Smoot shouted, “the universe has turned out to be really simple.”

Perlmutter nodded eagerly. “It’s like, why are we able to understand the universe at our level?”

“Right. Exactly. It’s a universe for beginners! ‘The Universe for Dummies’!”

But as Smoot and Perlmutter know, it is also inarguably a universe for Nobelists, and one that in the past decade has become exponentially more complicated. Since the invention of the telescope four centuries ago, astronomers have been able to figure out the workings of the universe simply by observing the heavens and applying some math, and vice versa. Take the discovery of moons, planets, stars and galaxies, apply Newton’s laws and you have a universe that runs like clockwork. Take Einstein’s modifications of Newton, apply the discovery of an expanding universe and you get the big bang. “It’s a ridiculously simple, intentionally cartoonish picture,” Perlmutter said. “We’re just incredibly lucky that that first try has matched so well.”

But is our luck about to run out? Smoot’s and Perlmutter’s work is part of a revolution that has forced their colleagues to confront a universe wholly unlike any they have ever known, one that is made of only 4 percent of the kind of matter we have always assumed it to be — the material that makes up you and me and this magazine and all the planets and stars in our galaxy and in all 125 billion galaxies beyond. The rest — 96 percent of the universe — is ... who knows?

“Dark,” cosmologists call it, in what could go down in history as the ultimate semantic surrender. This is not “dark” as in distant or invisible. This is “dark” as in unknown for now, and possibly forever.

If so, such a development would presumably not be without philosophical consequences of the civilization-altering variety. Cosmologists often refer to this possibility as “the ultimate Copernican revolution”: not only are we not at the center of anything; we’re not even made of the same stuff as most of the rest of everything. “We’re just a bit of pollution,” Lawrence M. Krauss, a theorist at Case Western Reserve, said not long ago at a public panel on cosmology in Chicago. “If you got rid of us, and all the stars and all the galaxies and all the planets and all the aliens and everybody, then the universe would be largely the same. We’re completely irrelevant.”

All well and good. Science is full of homo sapiens-humbling insights. But the trade-off for these lessons in insignificance has always been that at least now we would have a deeper — simpler — understanding of the universe. That the more we could observe, the more we would know. But what about the less we could observe? What happens to new knowledge then? It’s a question cosmologists have been asking themselves lately, and it might well be a question we’ll all be asking ourselves soon, because if they’re right, then the time has come to rethink a fundamental assumption: When we look up at the night sky, we’re seeing the universe.

Not so. Not even close.

In 1963, two scientists at Bell Labs in New Jersey discovered a microwave signal that came from every direction of the heavens. Theorists at nearby Princeton University soon realized that this signal might be the echo from the beginning of the universe, as predicted by the big-bang hypothesis. Take the idea of a cosmos born in a primordial fireball and cooling down ever since, apply the discovery of a microwave signal with a temperature that corresponded precisely to the one that was predicted by theorists — 2.7 degrees above absolute zero — and you have the universe as we know it. Not Newton’s universe, with its stately, eternal procession of benign objects, but Einstein’s universe, violent, evolving, full of births and deaths, with the grandest birth and, maybe, death belonging to the cosmos itself.

But then, in the 1970s, astronomers began noticing something that didn’t seem to fit with the laws of physics. They found that spiral galaxies like our own Milky Way were spinning at such a rate that they should have long ago wobbled out of control, shredding apart, shedding stars in every direction. Yet clearly they had done no such thing. They were living fast but not dying young. This seeming paradox led theorists to wonder if a halo of a hypothetical something else might be cocooning each galaxy, dwarfing each flat spiral disk of stars and gas at just the right mass ratio to keep it gravitationally intact. Borrowing a term from the astronomer Fritz Zwicky, who detected the same problem with the motions of a whole cluster of galaxies back in the 1930s, decades before anyone else took the situation seriously, astronomers called this mystery mass “dark matter.”

So there was more to the universe than meets the eye. But how much more? This was the question Saul Perlmutter’s team at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory set out to answer in the late 1980s. Actually, they wanted to settle an issue that had been nagging astronomers ever since Edwin Hubble discovered in 1929 that the universe seems to be expanding. Gravity, astronomers figured, would be slowing the expansion, and the more matter the greater the gravitational effect. But was the amount of matter in the universe enough to slow the expansion until it eventually stopped, reversed course and collapsed in a backward big bang? Or was the amount of matter not quite enough to do this, in which case the universe would just go on expanding forever? Just how much was the expansion of the universe slowing down?

The tool the team would be using was a specific type of exploding star, or supernova, that reaches a roughly uniform brightness and so can serve as what astronomers call a standard candle. By comparing how bright supernovae appear and how much the expansion of the universe has shifted their light, cosmologists sought to determine the rate of the expansion. “I was trying to tell everybody that this is the measurement that everybody should be doing,” Perlmutter says. “I was trying to convince them that this is going to be the tool of the future.” Perlmutter talks like a microcassette on fast-forward, and he possesses the kind of psychological dexterity that allows him to walk into a room and instantly inhabit each person’s point of view. He can be as persuasive as any force of nature. “The next thing I know,” he says, “we’ve convinced people, and now they’re competing with us!”

By 1997, Perlmutter’s Supernova Cosmology Project and a rival team had amassed data from more than 50 supernovae between them — data that would reveal yet another oddity in the cosmos. Perlmutter noticed that the supernovae weren’t brighter than expected but dimmer. He wondered if he had made a mistake in his observations. A few months later, Adam Riess, a member of a rival international team, noticed the same general drift in his math and wondered the same thing. “I’m a postdoc,” he told himself. “I’m sure I’ve messed up in at least 10 different ways.” But Perlmutter double-checked for intergalactic dust that might have skewed his readings, and Riess cross-checked his math, calculation by calculation, with his team leader, Brian Schmidt. Early in 1998, the two teams announced that they had each independently reached the same conclusion, and it was the opposite of what either of them expected. The rate of the expansion of the universe was not slowing down. Instead, it seemed to be speeding up.

That same year, Michael Turner, the prominent University of Chicago theorist, delivered a paper in which he called this antigravitational force “dark energy.” The purpose of calling it “dark,” he explained recently, was to highlight the similarity to dark matter. The purpose of “energy” was to make a distinction. “It really is very different from dark matter,” Turner said. “It’s more energylike.”

More energylike how, exactly?

Turner raised his eyebrows. “I’m not embarrassed to say it’s the most profound mystery in all of science.”

Extraordinary claims,” Carl Sagan once said, “require extraordinary evidence.” Astronomers love that saying; they quote it all the time. In this case the claim could have hardly been more extraordinary: a new universe was dawning.

It wouldn’t be the first time. We once thought the night sky consisted of the several thousand objects we could see with the naked eye. But the invention of the telescope revealed that it didn’t, and that the farther we saw, the more we saw: planets, stars, galaxies. After that we thought the night sky consisted of only the objects the eye could see with the assistance of telescopes that reached all the way back to the first stars blinking to life. But the discovery of wavelengths beyond the optical revealed that it didn’t, and that the more we saw in the radio or infrared or X-ray parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, the more we discovered: evidence for black holes, the big bang and the distances of supernovae, for starters.

The difference with “dark,” however, is that it lies not only outside the visible but also beyond the entire electromagnetic spectrum. By all indications, it consists of data that our five senses can’t detect other than indirectly. The motions of galaxies don’t make sense unless we infer the existence of dark matter. The brightness of supernovae doesn’t make sense unless we infer the existence of dark energy. It’s not that inference can’t be a powerful tool: an apple falls to the ground, and we infer gravity. But it can also be an incomplete tool: gravity is ... ?

Dark matter is ... ? In the three decades since most astronomers decisively, if reluctantly, accepted the existence of dark matter, observers have eliminated the obvious answer: that dark matter is made of normal matter that is so far away or so dim that it can’t be seen from earth. To account for the dark-matter deficit, this material would have to be so massive and so numerous that we couldn’t possibly miss it.

Which leaves abnormal matter, or what physicists call nonbaryonic matter, meaning that it doesn’t consist of the protons and neutrons of “normal” matter. What’s more (or, perhaps more accurately, less), it doesn’t interact at all with electricity or magnetism, which is why we wouldn’t be able to see it, and it can rarely interact even with protons and neutrons, which is why trillions of these particles might be passing through you every second without your knowing it. Theorists have narrowed the search for dark-matter particles to two hypothetical candidates: the axion and the neutralino. But so far efforts to create one of these ghostly particles in accelerators, which mimic the high levels of energy in the first fraction of a second after the birth of the universe, have come up empty. So have efforts to catch one in ultrasensitive detectors, which number in the dozens around the world.

For now, dark-matter physicists are hanging their hopes on the Large Hadron Collider, the latest-generation subatomic-particle accelerator, which goes online later this year at the European Center for Nuclear Research on the Franco-Swiss border. Many cosmologists think that the L.H.C. has made the creation of a dark-matter particle — as George Smoot said, holding up two fingers — “this close.” But one of the pioneer astronomers investigating dark matter in the 1970s, Vera Rubin, says that she has lived through plenty of this kind of optimism; she herself predicted in 1980 that dark matter would be identified within a decade. “I hope he’s right,” she says of Smoot’s assertion. “But I think it’s more a wish than a belief.” As one particle physicist commented at a “Dark Universe” symposium at the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore a few years ago, “If we fail to see anything in the L.H.C., then I’m off to do something else,” adding, “Unfortunately, I’ll be off to do something else at the same time as hundreds of other physicists.”

Juan Collar might be among them. “I know I speak for a generation of people who have been looking for dark-matter particles since they were grad students,” he said one wintry afternoon in his University of Chicago office. “I doubt how many of us will remain in the field if the L.H.C. brings home bad news. I have been looking for dark-matter particles for more than 15 years. I’m 42. So most of my colleagues, my age, we are kind of going through a midlife crisis.” He laughed. “When we get together and we drink enough beer, we start howling at the moon.”

Although many scientists say that the existence of the axion will be proved or disproved within the next 10 years — as a result of work at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory — the detection of a neutralino one way or the other is much less certain. A negative result from an experiment might mean only that theorists haven’t thought hard enough or that observers haven’t looked deep enough. “It could very well be that Mother Nature has decided that the neutralino is way down there,” Collar said, pointing not to a graph that he taped up in his office but to a point below the sheet of paper itself, at the blank wall. “If that is the case,” he went on to say, “we should retreat and worship Mother Nature. These particles maybe exist, but we will not see them, our sons will not see them and their sons won’t see them.”

The challenge with dark energy, as opposed to dark matter, is even more difficult. Dark energy is whatever it is that’s making the expansion of the universe accelerate, but, for instance, does it change over time and space? If so, then cosmologists have a name for it: quintessence. Does it not change? In that case, they’ll call it the cosmological constant, a version of the mathematical fudge factor that Einstein originally inserted into the equations for relativity to explain why the universe had neither expanded nor contracted itself out of existence.

After the discovery of dark energy, Perlmutter concluded that the next generation of dark-energy telescopes would have to include a space-based observatory. But the search for financing for such an ambitious project can require as much forbearance as the search for dark energy itself. “I don’t think I’ve ever seen as much of Washington as I have in the last few years,” he says, sighing. Even if his Supernova Acceleration Probe didn’t now face competition from several other proposals for federal financing (including, perhaps inevitably, one involving his old rival Riess), delays have prevented it from being ready to launch until at least the middle of the next decade. “Ten years from now,” says Josh Frieman of the University of Chicago, “when we’re talking about spending on the order of a billion dollars to put something up in space — which I think we should do — you’re getting into that class where you’re spending real money.”

Even some cosmologists have begun to express reservations. At a conference at Durham University in England last summer, a “whither cosmology?” panel featuring some of the field’s most prominent names questioned the wisdom of concentrating so much money and manpower on one problem. They pointed to what happened when the government-sponsored Dark Energy Task Force solicited proposals for experiments a couple of years ago. The task force was expecting a dozen, according to one member. They got three dozen. Cosmology was choosing a “risky and not very cost-effective way of moving forward,” one Durham panelist told me later, summarizing the sentiment he heard there.

But even if somebody were to figure out whether or not dark energy changes across time and space, astronomers still wouldn’t know what dark energy itself is. “The term doesn’t mean anything,” said David Schlegel of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory this past fall. “It might not be dark. It might not be energy. The whole name is a placeholder. It’s a placeholder for the description that there’s something funny that was discovered eight years ago now that we don’t understand.” Not that theorists haven’t been trying. “It’s just nonstop,” Perlmutter told me. “There’s article after article after article.” He likes to begin public talks with a PowerPoint illustration: papers on dark energy piling up, one on top of the next, until the on-screen stack ascends into the dozens. All the more reason not to put all of cosmology’s eggs into one research basket, argued the Durham panelists. As one summarized the situation, “We don’t even have a hypothesis to test.”

Michael Turner won’t hear of it. “This is one of these godsend problems!” he says. “If you’re a scientist, you’d like to be around when there’s a great problem to work on and solve. The solution is not obvious, and you could imagine it being solved tomorrow, you could imagine it taking another 10 years or you could imagine it taking another 200 years.”

But you could also imagine it taking forever.

“Time to get serious.” The PowerPoint slide, teal letters popping off a black background, stared back at a hotel ballroom full of cosmologists. They gathered in Chicago last winter for a “New Views of the Universe” conference, and Sean Carroll, then at the University of Chicago, had taken it upon himself to give his theorist colleagues their marching orders.

“There was a heyday for talking out all sorts of crazy ideas,” Carroll, now at Caltech, recently explained. That heyday would have been the heady, post-1998 period when Michael Turner might stand up at a conference and turn to anyone voicing caution and say, “Can’t we be exuberant for a while?” But now has come the metaphorical morning after, and with it a sobering realization: Maybe the universe isn’t simple enough for dummies like us humans. Maybe it’s not just our powers of perception that aren’t up to the task but also our powers of conception. Extraordinary claims like the dawn of a new universe might require extraordinary evidence, but what if that evidence has to be literally beyond the ordinary? Astronomers now realize that dark matter probably involves matter that is nonbaryonic. And whatever it is that dark energy involves, we know it’s not “normal,” either. In that case, maybe this next round of evidence will have to be not only beyond anything we know but also beyond anything we know how to know.

That possibility always gnaws at scientists — what Perlmutter calls “that sense of tentativeness, that we have gotten so far based on so little.” Cosmologists in particular have had to confront that possibility throughout the birth of their science. “At various times in the past 20 years it could have gotten to the point where there was no opportunity for advance,” Frieman says. What if, for instance, researchers couldn’t repeat the 1963 Bell Labs detection of the supposed echo from the big bang? Smoot and John C. Mather of NASA (who shared the Nobel in Physics with Smoot) designed the Cosmic Background Explorer satellite telescope to do just that. COBE looked for extremely subtle differences in temperature throughout all of space that carry the imprint of the universe when it was less than a second old. And in 1992, COBE found them: in effect, the quantum fluctuations that 13.7 billion years later would coalesce into a universe that is 22 percent dark matter, 74 percent dark energy and 4 percent the stuff of us.

And if the right ripples hadn’t shown up? As Frieman puts it: “You just would have thrown up your hands and said, ‘My God, we’ve got to go back to the drawing board!’ What’s remarkable to me is that so far that hasn’t happpened.”

Yet in a way it has. In the observation-and-theory, call-and-response system of investigating nature that scientists have refined over the past 400 years, the dark side of the universe represents a disruption. General relativity helped explain the observations of the expanding universe, which led to the idea of the big bang, which anticipated the observations of the cosmic-microwave background, which led to the revival of Einstein’s cosmological constant, which anticipated the observations of supernovae, which led to dark energy. And dark energy is ... ?

The difficulty in answering that question has led some cosmologists to ask an even deeper question: Does dark energy even exist? Or is it perhaps an inference too far? Cosmologists have another saying they like to cite: “You get to invoke the tooth fairy only once,” meaning dark matter, “but now we have to invoke the tooth fairy twice,” meaning dark energy.

One of the most compelling arguments that cosmologists have for the existence of dark energy (whatever it is) is that unlike earlier inferences that physicists eventually had to abandon — the ether that 19th-century physicists thought pervaded space, for instance — this inference makes mathematical sense. Take Perlmutter’s and Riess’s observations of supernovae, apply one cornerstone of 20th-century physics, general relativity, and you have a universe that does indeed consist of .26 matter, dark or otherwise, and .74 something that accelerates the expansion. Yet in another way, dark energy doesn’t add up. Take the observations of supernovae, apply the other cornerstone of 20th-century physics, quantum theory, and you get gibberish — you get an answer 120 orders of magnitude larger than .74.

Which doesn’t mean that dark energy is the ether of our age. But it does mean that its implications extend beyond cosmology to a problem Einstein spent the last 30 years of his life trying to reconcile: how to unify his new physics of the very large (general relativity) with the new physics of the very small (quantum mechanics). What makes the two incompatible — where the physics breaks down — is gravity.

In physics, gravity is the ur-inference. Even Newton admitted that he was making it up as he went along. That a force of attraction might exist between two distant objects, he once wrote in a letter, is “so great an Absurdity that I believe no Man who has in philosophical Matters a competent Faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.” Yet fall into it we all do on a daily basis, and physicists are no exception. “I don’t think we really understand what gravity is,” Vera Rubin says. “So in some sense we’re doing an awful lot on something we don’t know much about.”

It hasn’t escaped the notice of astronomers that both dark matter and dark energy involve gravity. Early this year 50 physicists gathered for a “Rethinking Gravity” conference at the University of Arizona to discuss variations on general relativity. “So far, Einstein is coming through with flying colors,” says Sean Carroll, who was one of the gravity-defying participants. “He’s always smarter than you think he was.”

But he’s not necessarily inviolate. “We’ve never tested gravity across the whole universe before,” Riess pointed out during a news conference last year. “It may be that there’s not really dark energy, that that’s a figment of our misperception about gravity, that gravity actually changes the way it operates on long ranges.”

The only way out, cosmologists and particle physicists agree, would be a “new physics” — a reconciliation of general relativity and quantum mechanics. “Understanding dark energy,” Riess says, “seems to really require understanding and using both of those theories at the same time.”

“It’s been so hard that we’re even willing to consider listening to string theorists,” Perlmutter says, referring to work that posits numerous dimensions beyond the traditional (one of time and three of space). “They’re at least providing a language in which you can talk about both things at the same time.”

According to quantum theory, particles can pop into and out of existence. In that case, maybe the universe itself was born in one such quantum pop. And if one universe can pop into existence, then why not many universes? String theorists say that number could be 10 raised to the power of 500. Those are 10-with-500-zeros universes, give or take. In which case, our universe would just happen to be the one with an energy density of .74, a condition suitable for the existence of creatures that can contemplate their hyper-Copernican existence.

And this is just one of a number of theories that have been popping into existence, quantum-particle-like, in the past few years: parallel universes, intersecting universes or, in the case of Stephen Hawking and Thomas Hertog just last summer, a superposition of universes. But what evidence — extraordinary or otherwise — can anyone offer for such claims? The challenge is to devise an experiment that would do for a new physics what COBE did for the big bang. Predictions in string theory, as in the 10-to-the-power-of-500-universes hypothesis, depend on the existence of extra dimensions, a stipulation that just might put the burden back on particle physics — specifically, the hope that evidence of extra dimensions will emerge in the Large Hadron Collider, or perhaps in its proposed successor, the International Linear Collider, which might come online sometime around 2020, or maybe in the supercollider after that, if the industrial nations of 2030 decide they can afford it.

“You want your mind to be boggled,” Perlmutter says. “That is a pleasure in and of itself. And it’s more a pleasure if it’s boggled by something that you can then demonstrate is really, really true.”

And if you can’t demonstrate that it’s really, really true?

“If the brilliant idea doesn’t come along,” Riess says, “then we will say dark energy has exactly these properties, it acts exactly like this. And then” — a shrug — “we will put it in a box.” And there it will remain, residing perhaps not far from the box labeled “Dark Matter,” and the two of them bookending the biggest box of them all, “Gravity,” to await a future Newton or Einstein to open — or not.

Richard Panek is the author of “The Invisible Century: Einstein, Freud and the Search for Hidden Universes.”

Fr. Lang on the Anaphora of Addai and Mari

Thanks to Fr. Finigan:
A couple of people have asked for more information about the article by Fr Lang on the Anaphora of Addai and Mari. The article was entitled "Eucharist without institution narrative? The anaphora of Addai and Mari revisited" and was written in the 2004 edition of the journal Divinitas published at the Vatican. (Source and online ordering information.)

There was a notice about the article in the German kreuz.net:
Das Rätsel der Liturgie von Addai und Mari.

I understand that Fr Lang may be intending to publish this material more widely in due course.

Saturday, March 10, 2007

Public Reason and the Truth of Christianity

Public Reason and the Truth of Christianity

Bishop Crepaldi Examines the Teachings of Benedict XVI

VATICAN CITY, MARCH 10, 2007 (ZENIT.org).- Here is an essay written for ZENIT by Bishop Giampaolo Crepaldi, secretary of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace and the director of the Cardinal Van Thuân International Observatory, on the teachings of Benedict XVI on the role of reason and Christianity in the public square.

* * *

Public Reason and the Truth of Christianity in the Teachings of Benedict XVI

Public reason is human reason that believes it can attain, through dialogue and research, certain truths about man and, in particular, about man in society. Public reason is certainly a critical reason, but is also a constructive reason that is not only capable of achieving the "consensus" of opinions, but can also attain the truth and the good of man in society for which it has a cognitive and an arguing ability.

The ability to understand the foundations of the dignity of the person, the main elements of the common good, the inalienability of human rights, justice, the meaning of individual freedom and of community ties, all depend on the possibility of a public reason.

The primary problem of public reason is to determine if it is possible and, secondarily, whether it is self-sufficient, or whether it needs a relationship with religion and, in particular, with the Christian religion. Benedict XVI has addressed this topic on several occasions and in different places, talking on the one hand of the truth of reason and, on the other, of the truth of religions.

The public use of reason and relativism

Public reason is not possible in a culture that is dominated by the "dictatorship of relativism,"[1] for a very simple reason: Relativism is a dogma and therefore it a priori rejects rational argumentation, even toward itself. Those with a taste for paradox could say that relativism is a fundamentalism.

On several occasions, Benedict XVI said that now it has become a dogma, or a presumption, and that it cannot be sustained if not through some sort of faith.[2] Hence, relativism rests upon blind faith. This is unquestionably contradictory because the words "dogma" and "relativism" are incompatible.

The thing is that relativism becomes a faith in order to overcome its internal contradiction, only to fall into a new one. Relativism, in fact, cannot be argued; otherwise it would refer to a capability of reason to argue the truth. In this case, relativism would contradict itself because it would admit the possibility of non-relative truths. Thus, relativism can only be "dogmatically assumed."

The "dictatorial" character -- in the cultural sense -- of relativism, prevents the use of public reason because it prevents the public use of reason. At this point, it could be interesting to go back to the writing where this public use was strongly proclaimed for the first time -- the short essay entitled "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" written by Kant in 1784.

For Kant, reason has a public use that serves a critical purpose. To illustrate this public use, Kant especially dwells on the rational critique of religion, i.e. the complete freedom of citizens, indeed even the calling, "to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol, as well as his suggestions for the better arrangement of religious and church matters."[3]

Reason, with its own categories, claims to be the testing ground and the measure of faith and religion too. Why is a public reason to which Kant assigned such challenging tasks now reduced to relativism, which is incapable of critiquing not just religion, but even itself?

Public reason and the self-limitation of reason

The reason lies in the "self-limitation" of reason, as Benedict XVI has suggested many times.[4] This self-limitation underpins the dogmatically blind assumption of relativism and its inability to play any kind of critical role. The faith in relativism can exist only when the scope of reason has been drastically limited.

The self-limitation of reason consists in its being reduced to mathematical-experimental[5] knowledge, i.e. a type of rationality that is incapable of founding even relativism. This type of knowledge -- the mathematical-experimental type -- simply has "no evidence" of relativism, nor can have any because it is not an empirically observable fact.

Relativism is a philosophy and not a fact, and its foundation would require a different kind of reasoning which, however, is excluded by self-limited reason. This is why relativism can only either be "implicit" -- lived and not justified -- or dogmatically "assumed" -- accepted, for example, by an act of faith. In this sense then, the "dictatorship of relativism" is the necessary conclusion of the "self-limitation" of reason. However, with relativism, the public role of reason fails.

Actually, this self-limitation was already present in Kant's thought. In the above-mentioned 1784 short essay he "pretended" to assign to reason the public role of critiquing even religion, but it was an incautious claim as his vision of reason was already confined to mathematical-experimental knowledge. This is why that claim has to be denied, however, while nevertheless rejecting it and showing how it leads to relativism. It must also be said that a different reason, a reason that can fully breathe, can play a public role and can also engage in some sort of critique of religion.

In 2004, Cardinal Ratzinger participated in a debate with philosopher Jurgen Habermas in Munich that focused exactly on the public role of reason.[6] On that occasion, he argued that if terrorism that is fuelled by religious fundamentalism is the symptom of a pathology of religion that must be corrected by reason, then in the same way the technical-scientific capability of producing human beings is the symptom of a pathology of reason that needs to be corrected by religion.

This is his conclusion: "There are extremely dangerous pathologies in religion that require us to consider the divine light of reason as a control mechanism ... there are also pathologies of reason that are not less dangerous … therefore reason has to accept warning as to its limits and must be willing to listen to the great religious traditions of mankind."[7] As we can see, he credits reason with the ability of "controlling" religion. Christianity, then, does not ask reason to shrink from its public role but to fully fulfill it; however, in order to do that, reason needs to rediscover its own greatness. Christianity wants a reason that is able to breathe and is willing to help reason do that. It wants to be "put to the test" by this reason.

Philosophical relativism and religious relativism

What are the repercussions of the dictatorship of relativism and of such a reductive vision of religions on the part of reason? The consequence of philosophical relativism can only be religious relativism: All religions are different and yet actually the same. They are irrational, they are the result of an unfounded choice, and thus they cannot be compared.

Relativism, unfoundedly dogmatic, views religions as unjustified beliefs. Because it does so in an unfounded manner, it cannot demonstrate it, hence it simply "believes it." Relativism "believes" that religions are unfounded, thus they cannot be compared. In other words, it believes that religions have nothing to do with reason and truth. Then all religions are dogmatic, in the trivial sense of the word, i.e. in the sense of "accepted without evidence" (just like relativism, but relativism does not seem to be aware of that).

In the current relativistic vulgate, in fact, the word dogma generically and superficially means "something that is accepted without evidence and thus in a dogmatic manner." Just as philosophical relativism deprives religion of a true public role, the corresponding religious relativism deprives religion from playing its public role. As we will see better later, the public role of reason and that of religious faith either stand together or die.

In this way, all religions are reduced to myth, i.e. to a way of exorcizing mysterious, bizarre and irrational forces. If religions are unfounded, it means that the divine forces they refer to are irrational and that arbitrariness rules the word. If the primordial forces are arbitrary, religion is a form of insurance against the repercussions of this imponderableness. Therefore religious relativism regresses to a kind of religious primitivism: religion is a way of exorcizing irrational forces.

The critique of religion as myth of the Greeks and Israel

To consider religion as something irrational, according to Benedict XVI, is entirely inconsistent with our whole Western and Christian history. In fact, both Greek thought and the Jewish religion, as well as Christianity, of course, rejected the vision of religion as myth and conceived religion as knowledge and God as Logos.[8]

Let us take a brief look at Greek thought. If we examine the Greek religions of "the mysteries" and even the Olympic religion, we find the characteristic features of the pre-rational myth: mysterious and unfathomable forces, arcane, obscure, underground impulses, the arbitrariness of the gods where the same human action can be either good or bad depending on the deity, man's struggle to placate divine wrath and exorcize these unforeseeable forces.

Nevertheless, Ionian Physics search for the "Arché," which is the nomos that transforms a chaos into a cosmos, the Pythagoreans say that everything is measure and for Anaxagoras a distinct and highly noble pure Mind rules all things. In Plato's Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro what holiness is and when an action can be said to be holy. Euthyphro answers that holiness is that which is dear to the gods. However, Socrates notes that different things are dear to different gods and then asks the crucial question: "The holy is holy because it is dear to the gods or is dear to the gods because it is holy?"

In the first case, the gods are arbitrary, in the second case they are connected with truth and good. As we can see, the issue raised by Benedict XVI in Regensburg, using a quotation from Manuel II Paleologus, emperor of Constantinople -- "not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God's nature"[9] -- has deep and ancient roots. Socrates' question raises the issue of whether the gods are capricious and arbitrary like acrobats and jugglers or whether they follow the good and the truth.

Euthyphro does not answer, but the path had been opened by Socrates and will be ratified by Plato: "The gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way" ("The Republic," II, 376 c). Therefore Greek philosophy detaches itself from myth and definitely turns to God as Logos. For Aristotle, the supersensible Substance is Intelligence that eternally grasps itself. The world has an order that is transparent to reason and reason can know it because the gods are rational and act according to truth, as Plato's Demiurge, who does not mould and shape things at random, but drawing inspiration from the truth of eternal forms.

If we look at the Jewish religion, we find the same path.[10] The "God of the Fathers" Israel looks to is not a local or a political god, he is not Baal nor Moloch. He is "he who is," he who existed before all powers and will continue to exist even after them. The God of Abraham is not fixed in one place but is everywhere. He is not linked to any specificity, he does not depend from a people, he does not even depend from the Temple, he does not need sacrifices. He is the Spirit of which the world is a reflection, he is the Spirit that is capable of creating matter.[11] Just as Greek philosophy surpasses itself and goes beyond its own religion of myth, the faith of Israel saves him from belonging to a people.

For all these reasons, Benedict XVI said at Regensburg that there is a profound harmony between what is Greek in the best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God.

Christianity was the ultimate synthesis of all this: For the Gospel of St. John, Jesus is the Logos, he is the spirit of God that created all things. Christianity does not borrow from the many religions of the time, the religions of the myth, but presents us with God-truth reconnecting directly with Greek thought and developing the experience of Israel. It relates "to that divine presence which can be perceived by the rational analysis of reality … In Christianity, rationality became religion."[12]

We believe that at the beginning of everything is the eternal Word, with Reason and not Unreason.[13] Justin (second century) believed that the Word had sown its seeds in Greek philosophy because what is true for reason comes always from the Word. Clement of Alexandria even thought that Greek philosophy had been a natural revelation of the Christian God. There was often the danger of sliding toward an irrational God but it has always been met and overcome by the authentic orthodox line that was embraced by the Church.

William of Ockham, in the 14th century, argued that God, in his omnipotence, could quite as well have created a diametrically opposite world. He, in his absolute power, could have given us one table of the law that was the exact opposite of the Ten Commandments. Ockham embraced and echoed many similar ideas that had already been expressed before and would be expressed again in later centuries, especially after the Protestant Reformation. They believed that a God who was subject to truth was not an omnipotent God. The point is this: Not even God can produce something that is intrinsically impossible.

This is precisely what Ockham thought: To say that God cannot produce something that is intrinsically impossible would be to limit the divine freedom and omnipotence. Then came St. Thomas. His opinion is the following: "Whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them." Divine omnipotence is wise, not arbitrary and capricious.

Christianity and the public use of reason

Christianity, and especially Catholicism, cannot accept philosophical relativism, cannot be linked to philosophies that exclude the problem of the truth. This would mean to negate creation and the existence of a creative Spirit. For the same reason, the rational notion of "human nature," which is currently questioned, is not relinquishable.

Therefore, Christian faith confirms and supports the rational search for truth and calls for a public role of reason that will also include the critique of religions. In fact, we cannot say that all religions relate to truth and reason in the same way as Christianity. They relate to truth and reason in a different manner, which is the same as saying that they are more or less rational and that they can more or less adequately support the public role of reason. This was the theme touched upon by the Holy Father at Regensburg. A God who preaches violence is not a rational God, because reason rejects violence as means of transmission of faith. What is not rational cannot come from the true God.

We see here a very important criterion for the evaluation of religions that, in some way, is new to our eyes. Religions are concerned with eternal salvation. Religious relativism says that as far as salvation is concerned, religions are incommensurable, it is not possible to establish which is the most rational. Religions, however, in addition to the promise of an eternal salvation, also say that it starts here on earth.[14]

If a religion teaches a way of life that is not righteous, it cannot be a true religion. Only when man has lost sight of the ability to know what is good and what is true, then all offers of salvation become the same. If we do not have any standards of right living, then all religions are the same. If the standards for right living are relativized, man remains trapped inside religions. Again, this demonstrates that religious relativism is founded on philosophical relativism. Cardinal Ratzinger points out that St. Paul (Romans 2:14ff) does not say that non-Christians will be saved by following their religion, but by following natural religion.

We have to always bear in mind that also the reverse influence is true as well: Religious pluralism in turn produces philosophical relativism. In fact, Benedict XVI reminded us that "The convergence of differences must not convey an impression of surrendering to that relativism which denies the meaning of truth itself and the possibility of attaining it."[15]

The common good and the truth of religions

If it is possible to criticize religions starting from the reasons of man, then it must also be possible to criticize them starting from the reasons of man in society,[16] that is from a public religion. Then it becomes clear that not all religions are equally respectful of the good of man in society.

It is also clear that the political power that seeks to organize society according to reason not only cannot relate to all religions in the same way, but should also cherish its obligations to the true religion. Of course, if the political power is based on the relativistic democracy, it will not feel any obligation in this regard. Relativism, in fact, can only express a procedural public reason. When the truth is replaced by the decision of the majority, culture is set against truth. The relativistic presumption leads to the tearing up of people's spiritual roots and the destruction of the network of social relationships.[17]

Relativism regards all religions as equivalent. It does so because it is incapable of engaging in a public critique of religions because for relativism common good cannot be rationally identified. By doing so, it precludes the possibility for the true religion to religiously support what men do to attain the common good. Here, too, we see a negative spiral. Relativistic democracy produces religious relativism and this strengthens ethical and social relativism.

All this happens when a society is no longer able to use public reason to criticize religions that proclaim polygamy, that incorporate the rite of physical mutilation, that do not respect the dignity of women, that preach violence or offer religious paths that depersonalize and hamper human reason and knowledge. How will our public reason be able to discern between religions if it loses sight of authentic humanity?

The state, the Church and the problem of reciprocity

The respective roles of state and Church are clear, in their complementary distinction, if we take the example of the so-called reciprocity. Benedict XVI has often stressed the importance of interreligious dialogue. He particularly focused on this issue during his trip to Turkey.

However, dialogue requires reciprocity without which there is no real dialogue. The problem is this: Who should demand such reciprocity, the Church or to the state? Not the Church, who must be guided by charity and truth. Her only duty toward the faithful of the other religions is to bear witness to the charity and the truth of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, reciprocity should guide the actions of the states that recognize elements of public truth in Christianity, i.e. a fundamental contribution to the common good. These states often acknowledge the contribution of Christianity to their history and to the formation of their cultural identity.

This is extremely important: Acknowledging that their roots are grounded in Greek thought, in the Jewish religion and in Christianity is a crucial step for developing the awareness of their own identity. However, it is not sufficient because, unfortunately, the past can be forgotten and, given the rapid disenchantment of the new generations, it is possible to lose sight of the importance of Christianity even in the face of historical, artistic and cultural examples that bear witness to its civilizing function.

Alongside the criteria of history and culture we also need the criterion of truth, i.e. of public rationality. This, then, will also foster appreciation for our history and the pride of our own identity. If, instead, we lose sight of the idea that Christianity expresses a truth that relates to the human being and that Christianity corresponds to authentic public reason more than other religious confessions, we also lose appreciation for our history and the pride of our identity. When Benedict XVI bitterly wondered if the West truly loved itself,[18] this is exactly what he meant: Does it truly love the truth it has inside itself?

Interreligious dialogue is not founded on religious relativism or indifferentism. This is true for the Catholic religion, but is also true for a public reason that has not entirely surrendered to the dictatorship of relativism. By proclaiming the right to religious freedom, the Church has never meant to deny that Christianity is the true religion or that the state has obligations towards the true religion.

According to the declaration "Dignitatis humanae" of the Second Vatican Council, the right to religious freedom "leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ."[19] Now, from where does the state, which is secular, derive these obligations to the true religion?

Not from being a "Christian" state, but from reason, that is from the natural ability to see truths about man in society, from the ability to understand the common good. This also founds the ability to see that one religion consolidates and helps pursue humanization objectives while another contributes to the degradation of man. Christian religion has this claim, the claim of preaching a "God with a human face."[20]

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[1] "Today, having a clear faith based on the creed of the Church is often labeled as fundamentalism. Whereas relativism, that is, letting oneself be 'tossed here and there, carried about by every wind of doctrine,' seems the only attitude that can cope with modern times. We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and desires" (Joseph Ratzinger, Homily at the Mass "Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice," April 18, 2005). See also Benedict XVI, Address at the Basilica of St. John Lateran to the Participants at the Ecclesial Convention of the Diocese of Rome, June 8, 2005, p. 7. See the analysis of G. Crepaldi, "Brief Notes on Laity According to Joseph Ratzinger-Benedict XVI," in "Social Doctrine of the Church Bulletin," January-February 2006, pp. 3-16.

[2] Expressions such as "the dogma of relativism," "the presumption of relativism," or relativism as "the religion of modern man" are frequent in the book: Joseph Ratzinger, "Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions," Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2004.
[3] Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," translated by Ted Humphrey in "Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays," Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983, pp. 41-46.

[4] "Self-limitation of reason" is the expression used by Ratzinger (Joseph Ratzinger, "Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures -- The Europe of Benedict," Ignatius Press, San Francisco 2006).
[5] It is a "purely functional rationality" that "maintains that you can only call rational what can be proven with experiments" (Joseph Ratzinger. "Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures -- The Europe of Benedict," cit.).

[6] Joseph Ratzinger, "Ragione e fede. Scambio reciproco per un'etica comune" [Faith and Reason. Mutual Exchange for a Common Ethics], in J. Habermas-J. Ratzinger, "Ragione e fede in dialogo" [The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion], Marsilio, Padua 2005.
[7] Joseph Ratzinger, "Ragione e fede. Scambio reciproco per un'etica comune," [Faith and Reason. Mutual Exchange for a Common Ethics] cit., pp. 79-80.

[8] Joseph Ratzinger, "The God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers" in "Introduction to Christianity," Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1990, pp. 93-104.
[9] Benedict XVI, Lecture at the University of Regensburg, Sept. 12, 2006.

[10] Joseph Ratzinger, "Introduction to Christianity" cit., pp. 77-93: "The Biblical Belief in God." Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1990.
[11] Many times and in many places Benedict XVI wonders, rhetorically, whether it is more rational to think of a Spirit that creates matter or of matter that creates spirit.

[12] Joseph Ratzinger, Conference "2000 Years After What?," University of Sorbonne, Paris, Nov. 27, 1999 in "Christianity. The Victory of Intelligence Over the World of Religions," English text in 30 Days, no. 1/2000, pp. 33-44
[13] "So we end up with two alternatives. What came first? Creative Reason, the Creator Spirit who makes all things and gives them growth, or Unreason, which, lacking any meaning, yet somehow brings forth a mathematically ordered cosmos, as well as man and his reason" (Benedict XVI, Homily at "Islinger Feld," Regensburg, Sept. 12, 2006).

[14] "We have to ask what heaven is and how it comes upon earth. Future salvation must make its mark in a way of life that makes the person "human" here and capable of relating to God" (Joseph Ratzinger, "Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions" cit., p. 205. Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2004).
[15] Benedict XVI, Message to the Bishop of Assisi on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Interreligious Meeting of Prayer for Peace of Oct. 27, 1986. "One cannot simply see in any and every religion the way for God to come to man and man to God" (Joseph Ratzinger, "Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions" cit., p. 75). Ratzinger reflected on the theme of interreligious prayer for peace and on the possibility that it could foster relativism and provided clear answers also in "Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions" cit., pp. 106-112.

[16] "Salvation begins with becoming righteous in this world -- something that always includes the twin poles of the individual and society." (Joseph Ratzinger, "Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions" cit., p. 205).
[17] Joseph Ratzinger, "Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions" cit., p. 76. Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2004.

[18] Joseph Ratzinger, "The Spiritual Roots of Europe: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," in Joseph Ratzinger & Marcello Pera, "Without Roots: the West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam," Basic Books, New York, 2006, p.86.
[19] Second Vatican Council, Declaration on religious freedom "Dignitatis humanae," Dec. 7, 1965, No. 1.

[20] Benedict XVI, Address to the Participants in the Fourth National Ecclesial Convention of Verona, Oct. 19, 2006. The Holy Father also mentioned "God with a human face" on Nov. 3, 2006 in the Address at the Gregorian Pontifical University.

[Text adapted]

Tuesday, March 06, 2007

Gratian's Decretum online

here

Some stuff on Orthodox Christianity

http://www.jacwell.org/Fall_Winter99/Fr_Schmemann_The_liturgical_problem.htm
http://www.stnina.org/journal/art/1.3.7
http://www.orthodoxnet.com/
http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/11/1/6.aspx
http://www.fatheralexander.org/booklets/english/history_timothy_ware_2.htm
http://www.hts.edu/seminary/academics.html
http://www.schmemann.org/byhim/westernrite.html
http://jacwell.org/Acrobat/Jacobs%20Well%208_00.pdf
http://www.theandros.com/existential.html
http://www.orthodox.net/articles/index.html
http://www.stpaulsirvine.org/html/orthodoxy.htm
http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/hopko_bem.aspx
http://www.oca.org/OCRecommendedreadings.asp?SID=2

Stuff from Thomistica.net

Excerpts from Garrigou-Lagrange's commentary on De Eucharistia
Kwasniewski provided two documents, the first covering Garrigou-Langrange's
commentary on the Tertia pars, qq. 73-82 (in Word or PDF format) and another with comments of Garrigou-Langrange on the other sacraments and things pertaining to the sacraments (again, in Word or PDF
format).


Get your Quaracchi editions of Franciscan writers Frati Quaracchi is offering various works by Franciscans for sale.

The status quaestionis of Gratian Studies Anders Winroth's page for Gratian Studies

On Remigius of Florence

Matt Levering interview