Zenit
Beautiful in its use of biblical metaphors.
Wednesday, July 06, 2011
Papal Address to Ratzinger Prize Winners
Zenit
Papal Address to Ratzinger Prize Winners
"The Real Question": "Is What We Believe True or Not?"
VATICAN CITY, JULY 1, 2011 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Beneedict XVI gave Thursday when he conferred the Ratzinger Prize on its first three winners. The prize recognizes work in theology.
NCR: East-West Catholic Dialogue in D.C.
Orientale Lumen conference tussles over the role of the papacy. Greek Orthodox bishop suggests a Ratzingerian solution.
Orientale Lumen conference tussles over the role of the papacy. Greek Orthodox bishop suggests a Ratzingerian solution.
Tuesday, July 05, 2011
MB posts a link to this: Nut and gristle, a response to a lecture by Dr. Christos Yannaras.
Related:
Dr. Yannaras Receives Honorary Doctor of Divinity
Citation: Bestowal of Honorary Doctorate upon Dr. Christos Yannaras
Address: Dr. Christos Yannaras 14 September 2010
Towards a New Ecumenism
ΠΑΝΤΕΙΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ
Related:
Dr. Yannaras Receives Honorary Doctor of Divinity
Citation: Bestowal of Honorary Doctorate upon Dr. Christos Yannaras
Address: Dr. Christos Yannaras 14 September 2010
Towards a New Ecumenism
ΠΑΝΤΕΙΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ
Monday, July 04, 2011
In reference to Jude Doughtery's synthesis of Aquinas with modern rights theories:
As much as I respect Dr. Dougherty as a senior, I think he is incorrect in his attempt to harmonize a modern rights theory with Aquinas. I don't think he's modified his views since he wrote that piece (which was in the 80s), but then again, I haven't read through his entire corpus. The tendency of modern Thomists to talk about "metaphysical" bases can be rather confusing, though I can see what he is trying to do, to exact a metaphysical argument from Aquinas's theology, just as someone might try to extract an account of ethics or natural law from it. But nonetheless, I think equality of nature is mostly irrelevant to Aquinas's treatment of justice -- it is important in his explanation of charity, the love of neighbor, and that part of the Great Commandment, so it's foundational in that sense to his moral theology. But it doesn't explain what the virtue of justice is, except in so far justice is directed towards other human beings.
My interlocutor writes:
But I did read below the Aquinas citation, and was roughly familiar with Aquinas terms for justice and what they mean before. I'm well aware of what you say about not being able to ground modern conceptions of rights and justice in Aquinas. I agree. But it isn't clear to me it does any good to say he "doesn't talk about justice being founded upon the fact that people are equal because they have the same nature," because it seems to me this just begs the question of what relevant thing it is that people share, in part because the statement "people are equal" is pretty vacuous. I'm not interested in defending modern conceptions of rights and justice. Aquinas is famously inexplicit about moral first principles, still what reasons does he give for his supreme one, neighbor-love? What is the rational basis for the golden rule, or is there one?
The New Natural Law theorists have complained that Aquinas doesn't clearly derive the precepts of the Natural Law from human goods and the like. His discussion of the precepts of the Natural Law in I II 94, 2 is admittedly brief. But Aquinas just doesn't have the same project as the NNL theorists, who wish to focus on the precepts in their model of practical reason. Rather, the precepts are associated with the virtues, and subordinate to them. So when he writes,
Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. (I II 94, 2)
We need to know what is good for man but we also have to understand this in the context of his discussion of the virtues. He doesn't reason out the precepts for the reader, but perhaps it should be fairly obvious.
As for charity, charity extends to neighbor on account of God, who desires to share Himself with rational creatures. So those who have the same nature and end, other human beings, are loved with charity. But so are those that do not have the same nature but are higher, the angels.
As much as I respect Dr. Dougherty as a senior, I think he is incorrect in his attempt to harmonize a modern rights theory with Aquinas. I don't think he's modified his views since he wrote that piece (which was in the 80s), but then again, I haven't read through his entire corpus. The tendency of modern Thomists to talk about "metaphysical" bases can be rather confusing, though I can see what he is trying to do, to exact a metaphysical argument from Aquinas's theology, just as someone might try to extract an account of ethics or natural law from it. But nonetheless, I think equality of nature is mostly irrelevant to Aquinas's treatment of justice -- it is important in his explanation of charity, the love of neighbor, and that part of the Great Commandment, so it's foundational in that sense to his moral theology. But it doesn't explain what the virtue of justice is, except in so far justice is directed towards other human beings.
My interlocutor writes:
But I did read below the Aquinas citation, and was roughly familiar with Aquinas terms for justice and what they mean before. I'm well aware of what you say about not being able to ground modern conceptions of rights and justice in Aquinas. I agree. But it isn't clear to me it does any good to say he "doesn't talk about justice being founded upon the fact that people are equal because they have the same nature," because it seems to me this just begs the question of what relevant thing it is that people share, in part because the statement "people are equal" is pretty vacuous. I'm not interested in defending modern conceptions of rights and justice. Aquinas is famously inexplicit about moral first principles, still what reasons does he give for his supreme one, neighbor-love? What is the rational basis for the golden rule, or is there one?
The New Natural Law theorists have complained that Aquinas doesn't clearly derive the precepts of the Natural Law from human goods and the like. His discussion of the precepts of the Natural Law in I II 94, 2 is admittedly brief. But Aquinas just doesn't have the same project as the NNL theorists, who wish to focus on the precepts in their model of practical reason. Rather, the precepts are associated with the virtues, and subordinate to them. So when he writes,
Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. (I II 94, 2)
We need to know what is good for man but we also have to understand this in the context of his discussion of the virtues. He doesn't reason out the precepts for the reader, but perhaps it should be fairly obvious.
As for charity, charity extends to neighbor on account of God, who desires to share Himself with rational creatures. So those who have the same nature and end, other human beings, are loved with charity. But so are those that do not have the same nature but are higher, the angels.
Yes! Magazine: Sarah Van Gelder, Rehabilitation, Not Punishment: A Better Solution to Crime
This is not exactly voluntary, prisoners aren't free to come and go as they please -- there is still a penal aspect to it.
This is not exactly voluntary, prisoners aren't free to come and go as they please -- there is still a penal aspect to it.
Sunday, July 03, 2011
This comment over at WWWTW forced me to return to the diss. to check my notes. (I confess that I was motivated by the desire to give someone a written smackdown.) It was at the very least a good exercise in thinking about ius, and as a result of my new notes I may revise the first chapter or even start from scratch. I was thinking about committing myself to its writing during Mass - maybe a bad distraction. Whether it will happen, we'll see. It is time to check the last revision of the outline.
Saturday, July 02, 2011
LY Faber criticizes remarks made by Francis Cardinal George regarding Duns Scotus.* These days I cringe whenever a bishop or theologian does intellectual history -- the narrative they provide usually seems facile and poorly informed? Who has the time to do history and become an expert on more than one thinker? Very few specialists. A bishop should study good theology instead and not worry about who said what, but too many Catholic intellectuals seek to explain "modernity" and its problems through intellectual currents of the past. Too much of an academic exercise, and not sufficiently "pastoral" -- what do the Christian faithful really need, an egghead or a pastor who will teach them about God?
Unfortunately the tendency to do bad intellectual history seems to be a fault of Joseph Ratzinger as well.
*They are in an unpublished manuscript, “Catholic Christianity and the Millennium: Frontiers of the Mind in the 21st Century.”
Unfortunately the tendency to do bad intellectual history seems to be a fault of Joseph Ratzinger as well.
*They are in an unpublished manuscript, “Catholic Christianity and the Millennium: Frontiers of the Mind in the 21st Century.”
Friday, July 01, 2011
A critique of a recent essay by R. R. Reno giving suggestions as to how we would best help the poor: R. R. Reno's "Preferential Option for the Poor" (from a link posted at FPR)
I can understand why those with families would wish to avoid living in poor areas. A universal precept that aone should move to such areas seems inappropriate. But we should do what we can to build up community and to live in solidarity with the poor, giving up luxuries that are not necessary (and may even interfere with progress in charity) and working for a more just political economy.
What can be done to improve the moral condition of poor areas, if they are beset by moral problems in addition to material poverty? The lack of fathers has had an impact, and government intervention and welfare has not done much.
I can understand why those with families would wish to avoid living in poor areas. A universal precept that aone should move to such areas seems inappropriate. But we should do what we can to build up community and to live in solidarity with the poor, giving up luxuries that are not necessary (and may even interfere with progress in charity) and working for a more just political economy.
What can be done to improve the moral condition of poor areas, if they are beset by moral problems in addition to material poverty? The lack of fathers has had an impact, and government intervention and welfare has not done much.
Rome Reports: Spanish youth tackling controversial issues in Church for WYD 2011 in Madrid
WYD 2011 Madrid (FB)
Pilgrimage Office?
WYD 2011 Madrid (FB)
Pilgrimage Office?
Thursday, June 30, 2011
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