Thom Brooks, "Retribution and Capital Punishment"

SSRN (via Mirror of Justice)

It is similar to the argument that capital punishment is to be avoided since it can't be undone, and can be considered a development of that argument, by looking at what is required by justice for the execution of human justice, in the conviction and punishment of individuals.

What is required for the possession of moral certitude on the part of the judge or jury? Is does justice necessitate that one should consider (or eliminate) the potential for error beyond this?

Reasonably Vicious

Something KK is examining in her disssertation -- Reasonably Vicious by Candace Vogler. (Her faculty page.) Last time I asked (a while ago) KK's dissertation was on the practical syllogism. There is a recommendation by Alasdair MacIntyre on the back cover...

Google Books

A review.
SEP: Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions

Something by Fr. Flannery: "Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds"

Fr. Koterski on Charlie Rose

Talking about the funeral of Pope John Paul II.

Another question about theology of the body.

Does it seem like some theology of the body enthusiasts take their direction from romance novels written for women? Is the source to be found in Love and Responsibility? We can say men should be considerate, caring, and so on to their wives, at all times in their marriage, and prior to and during mraital relations, but does this always manifest itself in the same external actions? How specific do TOB enthusiasts get in their recommendations? And how much should be left to the discretion of spouses, as they learn to appreciate each other and the differences between men and women? Some might claim that the man "taking the lead" or showing some dominance is too animalistic (perhaps because this is instinctual, but for other reasons as well), but is it possible that going to the other extreme is problematic, leading to a "disembodied sexuality" (even if it sounds oxymoronic) as it does not take into account the differences between male and female psychology. One can criticize men for being "selfish" but is it possible that a man we might characterize as being "selfish" nonetheless satisfies his wife? And if that is the case, is it really being selfish? (Or is that behavior really wrong?) Can we always judge this to be selfish behavior? Should Catholic moralists really go beyond giving concrete guidelines and proceed into the "privacy of the bedroom" and examine everything that happens there? Barring those actions that have been judged to be immoral by "traditional" moral theology, should we judge what happens between a husband and his consenting wife as not attaining to some higher, "spiritual" standard, and thus guilt them for not being good "Catholics"?

Thomistica.net: Forum for discussion created

InsideCatholic.com

Jeremiah Bannister on InsideCatholic.com's decision to delete responses by various editors of Distributist Review to the recent piece by Jeffrey Tucker.

The Scriptural Roots of St. Augustine's Spirituality by Stephen N. Filippo (via Insight Scoop)

FPJ coverage of the rule of law

Natural Law, the Rule of Law, and Liberty by Edward B. McLean 

Rule of Law: The Great Foundation of Our Constitution by Matthew Spalding 

The Common Law between England and America by Roger Scruton

Insight Scoop: Pope Benedict XVI is meeting with Fr. Joseph Fessio, S.J., and...

Eirenikon: “Orthodox Constructions of the West”: Report (4)

De Unione Ecclesiarum: Kyparissiotes: Decade 1.1

The Illusion of Freedom Separated from Moral Virtue by Raymond L. Dennehy

Ignatius Insight ( via Insight Scoop)

Ite ad Thomam: Louis Bouyer: Enemy of Traditional Theology.
:
There is much that is debatable within the quoted passage, and a discussion of the questions of method that are raised seems proper to theology. A more sustained critique of Fr. Bouyer would require his own account of what theology is and its proper method?

That this is true of “John of St Thomist” theology, {note the audacious ad hominem, a mockery of traditional Thomistic theology} right from its very beginning, is revealed by that theologian’s understanding of what, following St Thomas, he calls a “theological conclusion.”  According to him it is possible, even while adhering to a strict application of syllogistic reasoning, to have two kinds of theological conclusions—one flowing from two revealed premises, the other from one revealed and one philosophical premise.  And this latter kind by its very nature will widen the field, if not precisely of revelation as such, at least of the knowledge we can draw from it.  This may appear at first sight to be a quite innocuous and legitimate development of St Thomas’ idea of a theological conclusion.  In fact, it transforms it to the point of being unrecognizable.  The whole meaning of theological endeavor is at a stroke radically altered, and at the same time even our very conception of revelation.

For St Thomas there are not and cannot be theological conclusions which are not already comprised within revelation.  A theological conclusion is and can only be a revealed doctrinal affirmation of which one has established the logical relationship it has with other doctrinal affirmations of the same species.  The whole of theology moves within faith and so within revelation.  To suppose that it can evade it in order to increase its scope (!) is no longer to understand anything about revelation itself, {thus, pretty much all of post-Tridentine theology, which is founded on this doctrine, is unable to understand revelation} as if theology could ever flatter itself of having gone so far beyond revelation as to be able to complete it.

Can one apply human reasoning to truths about the faith? And if not, would not the truths of revelation be cut off from the truths we come to know about reality?

De un

De unione ecclesiarum: John Kyparissiotes: Preface to the Decades

Publishers of books for Catholics

Sheed & Ward has been part of Rowman & Littlefield for a while. While some "classic" texts like Jacques Maritain's introduction to philosophy are in print, its more recent titles are a mixed bag. Looking through its catalog, I found several titles by James Keenan, S.J., along with books opposing the legal prohibition of abortion and supporting stem cell research. At the "opposite" end of the spectrum are a defense of Pope Pius XII and books by Alasdair MacIntyre on the Catholic University and Edith Stein. Of course there is also a book that condemns the Vatican for its failure to prevent the Holocaust. I suppose that is what happens when the publisher and its editors do not act as judges of orthodoxy, but are interested in "promoting discussion" among those who call themselves Catholics.

Academics and other authors may not be motivated by money to write, but spreading falsehoods, dissent, and attacks on the Church  is a serious sin as they intend to communicate this to others and to influence them. And they do benefit from this by being able to pad the publications portion of their CVs. And what about associating with those responsible for allowing this to happen by directly facilitating the books' publication? Should Catholics have no interest in what sort of publishers they pick? It's just business isn't an excuse. "They may publish some bad books, but they are willing to publish good ones (like mine) as well," may sound self-serving.

If the authority of the imprimatur were restored (instead of being a rubber stamp in the many cases when it is actually sought instead of just being ignored) we could also do something to limit consumerism and the waste of resources. How's that for a social sin, by publishing bad books one contributes to the wastefulness endemic to Western political economies?

Still, there may be one or two others titles that might be of interest: Byzantine Rome and the Greek Popes.

Zenit: Adoption Isn't a "Right" for Gays or Others
Interview With Mexican Jurist, Historian

ZENIT: The result now is that law becomes an instrument of tyranny, when law theory states altogether the contrary?
 
Traslosheros: The term "tyranny of rights" should be an oxymoron as, in theory, rights exist to protect the citizen against the authoritarian tendencies of those who hold power.

However, it has been proper to the culture of Mexican politicians to create special support groups, which they later adorn with privileges in detriment to the whole of society. It is a very old Mexican experience of which, for example, the corrupt union boss is a typical example, and the reason why the health and education systems languish in mediocrity.
 
Now, by decision of the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, dominated by the Democratic Revolution Party [...], by the government of [Mexico] City and the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, a further step has been taken in deepening this pernicious tendency that has nothing to do with democracy and which has found in the so-called gender and gay ideology a significant stimulus.
 
ZENIT: They say that equity, equality and justice are being protected; that pure law is being applied. Do you believe this?
 
Traslosheros: In theory, law should create an ensemble of rights for the whole population, in order to guarantee conditions of equality, justice and liberty for any person based on two principles: that we are all equal in dignity and that the strong have the obligation to help the weak. By the same token, when someone finds himself in a vulnerable situation, special juridical conditions of equity must be created for the time necessary, even if they become permanent. Classic examples are the pregnant woman and the woman in labor, refugees, the handicapped, the sick and, especially, children.
 
The raison d'etre of this juridical culture is the person. Juridical culture centered on the person, as is easy to see, is the very opposite of one that creates privileged groups and which is proper to authoritarian regimes without distinction, no matter their color.
 
ZENIT: Isn't the centrality of the person being protected when the rights of homosexuals are protected? This is an argument often used today.
 
Traslosheros: When the centrality of the person is abandoned, then law is used to create statutes of privilege that, in turn, favor specific groups above the whole of society generating situations of injustice and, consequently, of violence. Obviously what is abandoned with this is the obligation to protect the weak, while confirmed is the law of the strongest. Such is what is now happening with the so-called right of adoption created allegedly to protect the principle of non-discrimination of homosexuals. The right of adoption, by this combination with non-discrimination, becomes an obligation to give children in adoption to homosexual couples who so request.

ZENIT: Let's return to the underlying topic, that a right is "being created" in Mexico.
 
Traslosheros: It is very important to keep in mind that the so-called right to adoption never existed in Mexico because it was well understood that children don't exist to satisfy the desires or needs of adults, no matter how legitimate or justified they might seem.
 
Because of the higher interests of the child, the adoption processes were governed by the logic that adults must be subjected to rigorous aptitude tests, where the factors of emotional, social, economic, marital or personal stability have played a very important role, among many other things.

Hence, adults have never in any way had the right to adoption. On the contrary, they have had to demonstrate in deeds that, beyond ideologies and any doubt, they are fit to take on a child with full responsibility.
 
Parenthood, as we well know, is a gift and a responsibility, it isn't a right in itself. In any case, it would be a consequence and always subject to the exercise of responsibility. As we can easily see, as the higher interest of the child demands, the right of adoption must not exist for anyone regardless of their quality, condition, religion, race, ethnic group or sexual preference. Children are not things to satisfy the needs of adults.

E Pluribus Unum

Origin and meaning of the motto. (Wiki.) Note that it dates back to 1776, before the ratification of the Constitution. Do we understand the one to be a "national" union or a "federal" union? How do we interpret this? What is the proper hemeneutics? No doubt there are many Americans today who understand it to mean the former and the latter. But we need to look at the motto's historical background to find the right definitions, and this means we need to look to those who first commissioned the motto, the Continental Congress and the American founding fathers, and understand it as they understood it.


This serves to underscore the necessity to inquire and understand how terms are used by the speaker instead of making a guess based on our assumptions. This is a very important lesson of logic, particularly when we are engaged in an  discussion with someone else, but it is also needed for the correct reading of texts. It also underscores the need for a "living tradition" with some sort of authority to explain how texts should be understood when the texts themselves do not supply definitions for the terms that it uses.


Related:
The E Pluribus Unum Project at Assumption College (which seems intent on promoting a national identity, despite a seeming openness to different answers to the questions posed on the homepage).
Bradley Project final report -- an endorsement of the proposition nation.

Courtesy of DG, De Regno (pdf).

Lee Faber critiques Matthew Levering's Participatory Biblical Exegesis

The Fourteenth-Century Metaphysical Shift

Ahappiness

James Chastek, On fact and Ahappiness. From the latter:

The front end of contemporary culture – the part of culture that establishes our ethos or ethics – is a great celebration of personal autonomy and the freedom to choose. This is the glossy, well-known, advertised face of our ethos, which is usually just taken for granted in political and ethical discussions. Like any ethos it reveals some truths and hides others, and so it deserves more than an unqualified up-or-down judgment of its value. But the back end of our ethos, or the fine print on the total autonomy contract, is something for which the contemporary world has no name but which can be called ahappiness. Contemporary persons are not happy or unhappy, they are simply ahappy. Happiness is not taken in earnest or afforded a place in any serious discussion.

One of his comments is interesting:

Full disclosure, I’ve never read a single word of MccIntyre – not even a random article, book jacket, or block quote in someone else’s writing. I just never got around to it. I don’t’ study much ethics anyway because I’m bad at it and I have a terrible tone-deafness to ethical thought. So to your question: while it is superfluous to point out that no one fugure or date will be an absolute turning point, my basic conviction is that the modern world is just shorthand for speaking about the Protestant world, and that in the judgment of history this age will be called the Protestant age (“Modern” is incoherent, since anyone who has ever lived has been modern). What we now call post – modern is is really just post protestantism, and the death of the modern world is largely a recognition that (mainline) protestantism is now just a lesbian in a miter giving a sermon to empty pews. NTTAWWT! (All) Protestantism is now capable of equally celebrating both sodomy and the papacy, which is to say that it’s deader than Nixon and it ain’t coming back. I miss a great deal about it – it was really tolerant, quite good at being a national religion, it founded my country, it promoted the classics (see the original curricula of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, etc.) it did a great deal to promote liberty and freedom, and it produced some statesmen who are safely immortal. There are some other parts about it that I am giddy to see die – its absolute division of nature and grace, its denigration of nature, its tendency to reduce everything to one order of either God or free will, either reason or revelation, etc. There is also, of course, its congenital antipathy to Scholasticism (yes yes, I know there were Protestant scholastics, and that even now ther are many better at it than I will ever be; and it goes without saying that this is not a judgment on any particular protestant). Nonetheless, the reality of ahappiness – at least in the West and especially in the English speaking world – is, IMO, going to be in large part a commentary or footnote to protestant doctrine.

The Protestant Age? Hmmm... I'll have to think about that.

How do we explain why so many are on anti-depressants? And what of those happiness surveys whose results are cited from time to time to remind us that not all is well in the United States? I think we do have a sense that happiness is tied to our actions. The problem is that happiness is too often reduced to an emotion linked to a quasi-Boethian understanding of happiness as the possession of all the goods that we want. We may have some understanding that how we get these goods is governed by a set of rules, but it is a set that has been whittled down in accordance with liberalism, social fragmentation, bad education, and other trends and in reaction to Christianity.

Was authority (and tradition) discredited by the Enlightenment? How many truly deceive themselves into thinking they are self-made men, with respect to their use of reason?

On meditation and contemplation

Inner Explorations has a chapter dealing with the "spiritual" theology of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.: Reginald Garrigou-LaGrange and the Renewal of the Contemplative Life.

At first glance, these assertions may appear as subtle points of interest only to historians of Western Christian spirituality, or theologians of mystical theology. They are not. They give a very definite answer to the question of just what contemplation is. The universal call to contemplation, and this identification of contemplation with infused contemplation are the twin pillars that support Garrigou-LaGrange’s mystical theology, and instead of being forgotten, they ought to remain in the forefront of our minds when we look at the contemporary attempts to renew the contemplative life.

When a new interest in the contemplative life arose after the Second Vatican Council, these battles, when they were remembered at all, were remembered with distaste, and while Garrigou-LaGrange’s idea of the universal call to contemplation had gone mainstream, and thus survived, his insistence on contemplation as infused contemplation was forgotten.

Today movements to renew the Christian contemplative life, like centering prayer and the Christian meditation movement based on the teaching of John Main, OSB, have had the great merit of introducing people to the serious practice of the life of prayer.

How should we evaluate them in the light of the two foundational principles of Garrigou-LaGrange’s mystical theology? They both have clearly accepted the first one, that is, the call of all people to contemplation. In fact, it may even be wondered if they have overdone their acceptance of it and forgotten the nuances it had in the days when it was first formulated. They seem to invite everyone, even those at the beginning of their life of prayer, to practice contemplative prayer without inquiring how well they are grounded in the more discursive forms of prayer like meditation and affective prayer.

But how else can people be rather indiscriminately invited to practice contemplative prayer unless contemplation is understood as something within our power to do? But if it is something that we can do, then it is a matter of the exercise of the human faculties, however subtly we are urged to exercise them, and it is not the infused contemplation which Garrigou-LaGrange accepts at being at the heart of the Christian mystical tradition. In centering prayer, for example, which claims John of the Cross as part of its inspiration, the clear distinction in St. John between meditation and infused contemplation, that is, between the kinds of prayer we can do whenever we want, and the gracious gift on God’s part of contemplation, is blurred. Contemplation becomes something more akin to the kinds of acquired or active contemplation that flourished for a time in the 17th century.

Both centering prayer and the Christian meditation movement operate in a kind of historical and theological vacuum that prevents them from examining not only what happened in the first half of the 20th century, but what transpired in the centuries before that time. This is regrettable. The unresolved crisis in mystical theology that led to the dark night of the mystics in the 17th century came to light in the first years of the 20th century where Garrigou-LaGrange played a major role in unsuccessfully trying to resolve it. Will the now popular interest in contemplative spirituality lead to a similar crisis when it collides with this still unresolved question of the nature of contemplation?

The failure of centering prayer and the Christian meditation movement to come to grips with Garrigou-LaGrange’s ideas on the nature of contemplation, and through him with the debates of those times is a fitting symbol of a wider failure of contemporary Christian spirituality which is curiously blind to its own history when it comes to the question of the nature of contemplation. Contemplation is promoted as a way of praying accessible to all, while contemplation in the sense of the gift of infused contemplation and the goal and summit of the spiritual life is forgotten.

What is the heart of Christian spirituality? Does G-L claim that infused contemplation is the heart of Christian spirituality? Or is he looking instead at the goal in which the Christian spiritual life culminates? Or is it both? It depends on the stage of the Christian. What we do in the spiritual life is always in tandem with grace. All are called to holiness, and infused spirituality is a gift that God intends to make available to all who follow Him.

The author of this piece agrees with G-L that authentic meditation is not the same as infused contemplation. G-L discusses how mental prayer is important for beginners; he also teaches that meditation or acquired contemplation can develop into mental prayer and lead to the act of caritas, while contemplation follows it. I do not know if there is a more thorough critique of centering prayer and modern "meditation" practices at Inner Explorations, but for those interested in the history of Catholic spirituality, this might be interesting: From St. John of the Cross to Us: The Story of a 400 Year Long Misunderstanding and what it means for the Future of Christian Mysticism. However, the author seems to be too accepting of the claims of depth psychology? (The author has also written this book: St. John of the Cross and Dr. C.G. Jung.)

30 Giorni interview with Fr. Charles Morerod, O.P.

30 Giorni: Il non protagonismo aiuta l’ecumenismo

Intervista con il domenicano Charles Morerod, segretario generale della Commissione teologica internazionale e rettore della Pontificia Università San Tommaso

"Some conversations have only beginnings and middles"

That was the catch-phrase for a Blackberry ad I saw today. But if there is no end, can there really be a middle?

Christopher Tollefsen on the New Natural Law Theory

In a previous post I mentioned that Christopher Tollefsen can be considered to be a disciple of Germain Grisez. From this I concluded that he is probably an advocate of the New Natural Law Theory. It turns out that I surmised correctly. I also noted in another post that the Philosophy Department at St. Anselm College has a blog. Today I discovered that there is a journal of philosophy associated with the college as well--Lyceum. There is also a blog dedicated to the discussion of articles from the journal. Browsing through the archive, I find that Dr. Tollefsen has written an article discussing the New Natural Law Theory (pdf). This article is recent, so it should provide a good overview of the state of the controversies raging between adherents of the NNLT and traditional Thomists (or neo-Thomists, as some NNLT proponents label some of them--let's set aside the question of whether neo-Thomism is rightly used as a pejorative or not). It also seems to me that the introduction by Tollefsen could serve as a basis for an "informal" (i.e. not published in an academic journal) response (or a formal, published response) by traditional Thomists to the assertions of New Natural Law theorists.

I wish to concentrate solely on what Dr. Tollefsen says about the common good and to make some notes.

4. Political Authority and the Political Common Good
In 1979, Grisez and Boyle published Life and Death with Liberty and Justice; in 1980, Finnis published Natural Law and Natural Rights. Together the two books marked the beginnings of a “discussion of political theory” carried on between the three thinkers.[30] Grisez and Boyle describe their early part in this discussion as conceding “somewhat too much to political theories that are prevalent in the United States.”[31] By this, they refer to an indebtedness to John Rawls’s antiperfectionism. In Life and Liberty Boyle and Grisez allowed that it would be wrong for the state to incorporate substantive moral values, such as the good of life, into its governing principles, and hence into its conception of the common good of the state. In part this was motivated by a need to find a principled limit on the state’s sovereignty over the lives, including the moral and religious lives, of its subjects.

Finnis’ work in Natural Law and Natural Rights, by contrast, argued for a perfectionist account of the state: the basic goods of human persons were not to be ruled out of the practical considerations at the heart of political rule, as in Rawls’s work. Yet Finnis too, like Grisez and Boyle, has been sensitive to the need for liberty in the state, and the limits of state sovereignty over individuals; all three oppose the view, encouraged by what Finnis calls a “quick” reading of Aquinas, according to which “government should command whatever leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people from evil-doing and induce them to morally decent conduct.”[32]

Accordingly, Grisez, Finnis and Boyle have converged on an account of political authority and the common good that, while rooted in the basic goods, nevertheless sees the state as a “community co-operating in the service of a common good which is instrumental, not itself basic.”[33] Political authority is necessary because individuals, families, and groups, while sufficient in one sense for the pursuit of all the basic goods, including the goods of marriage and religion, are nevertheless thwarted in their pursuit of these goods by (a) lack of social coordination; (b) the hostility of outsiders; (c) the predatory behavior of some insiders; and (d) circumstances beyond the control of individuals that leave them in conditions of more than usual dependence but without the usual personal and social aids, as, for example, widows, orphans, the sick, and the disabled.

Political authority, and optimally, a political authority itself subject to law, is necessary to efficiently and fairly pursue these goals; but together, these goals comprise a set of conditions instrumentally necessary for individuals and groups to directly pursue the basic goods, individually and cooperatively. The political common good is thus described by Finnis as “the whole ensemble of material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration, that tend to favor, facilitate, and foster the realization by each individual [in that community] of his or her personal development.”[34]

In putting forth this account of political authority and the common good, Finnis has criticized the idea, mentioned above, that the common good includes the complete well-being, including the moral well-being, of the state’s citizens. In contrasting this Aristotelian idea with what he takes to be the true Thomistic view, Finnis has drawn criticism from some Thomists, who read St. Thomas as more similar to Aristotle than does Finnis. He has also generated some debate internal to the New Natural Law theory concerning the proper limits of political authority.[35]

Finnis holds that recognition of the instrumental nature of the state means that, as George summarizes his position, “law and the state exceed their just authority – thus violating a principle of justice – when they go beyond the protection of the public moral environment and criminalize 'even secret and truly consensual adult acts of vice.’”[36] But, says George in response, “it does not follow, or so it seems to me, from the instrumental nature of the political common good that moral paternalism, where it can be effective, is beyond the scope of that good.”[37] And so George, unlike Finnis, holds that the legitimate limits on legislation where morality is concerned are prudential, not principled.

Please refer to the on-line article for the footnote references.

1. Why is political authority necessary? It is not made necessary by the good involved (being common as opposed to private or singular), but for the reasons listed above, which cover interpersonal conflict. The presence of social coordination would facilitate individuals and families attaining the basic goods. But otherwise, individuals and families are sufficient to attain the basic goods. In contrast, Aquinas maintains that political authority is necessary because the good to which it is ordered is not the same as the private good of the individual. This is the holistic good, the good of the community as a whole.

(Something must adjudicate between competing desires and plans?)

2. "Yet Finnis too, like Grisez and Boyle, has been sensitive to the need for liberty in the state, and the limits of state sovereignty over individuals; all three oppose the view, encouraged by what Finnis calls a “quick” reading of Aquinas, according to which “government should command whatever leads people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects them from it, and coercively deter people from evil-doing and induce them to morally decent conduct.”[32] "

Aquinas recognizes that there are limits to human law. And yet if we take him seriously as an intellectual, we would gather that he thinks this is compatible with the common good being the good of the community as a whole.

"Finnis has criticized the idea, mentioned above, that the common good includes the complete well-being, including the moral well-being, of the state’s citizens. In contrasting this Aristotelian idea with what he takes to be the true Thomistic view, Finnis has drawn criticism from some Thomists, who read St. Thomas as more similar to Aristotle than does Finnis. He has also generated some debate internal to the New Natural Law theory concerning the proper limits of political authority.[35]"

What is the "complete" well-being? Can government bring about complete virtue? Probably not. But can it prohibit those actions which harm others or lead to bad moral states? Aquinas would agree that enforcement of the "no-harm principle" is important for the well-being of any community. But should law should be limited to this or not?

While Aquinas argues that law should not prohibit all vices, he does not give as a reason the question of enforceability. He focuses more on the question of observance. Would the lack of enforceability be a reason acceptable to Aquinas? Or would he reject this reason on other grounds?

Even if it is the case that law should be mostly limited to enforcing the no-harm principle, that does not mean that there is not a communal good distinct from the basic goods listed under the New Natural Law Theory. Is the complete well-being of the state's citizens the same as citizens living well with one another? I do not think so. And this is the problem, if Tollefsen is correct in his summary. (I'll have to double-check Finnis's Aquinas eventually.) The common good of the political community is not the complete well-being of its citizens. Rather, it is their life in common. It is not surprising that we who live as atomists or liberals fail to recognize this good, since for the most part we do not aim to achieve it in our own lives.

The dissertation by M. Therrien on the pedagogical nature of law should help one understand how law trains people in virtue.

*No-harm principle: No one can harm or injure (commit an act of injustice, not just physically hurt) another.

Elizabeth Anscome on Just War theory and the atomic bombings

Elizabeth Anscombe, "War and Murder" (pdf) and "Mr. Truman's Degree"

Fribourg Dissertations

Not sure if I've posted this link before -- here are some dissertations done at Fribourg. This looks interesting: Law, Liberty and Virtue: A Thomistic Defense for the Pedagogical Character of Law, by Michel Therrien. (Written under the direction of Fr. Sherwin, O.P.)

Theology must be Christocentric

From Sandro Magister's latest:

AN INFALLIBLE METHOD FOR RENEWING THEOLOGY

by Inos Biffi


If the Christian mystery stands at the origin of theology, and this can be defined as "understanding of the faith," it is unthinkable that at any point in time remaking it from scratch can be contemplated. In the diversity of the times, it is nourished by an uninterrupted tradition of content and also of language, which does not admit drastic and revolutionary discontinuities, on pain of losing its identity. It is permissible at least to harbor some perplexity before a theology convinced that it is presenting unusual and singular theological doctrines, never before taught.

Nevertheless, this does not doom theology to pure repetition. The history of theology itself shows how much, without breaking continuity, it has been variously and profoundly renewed: but not by somehow obscuring or ignoring the mystery; on the contrary, by allowing it to emerge with greater power and consistency.

Theology does not let itself be unsettled and influenced by the myth of becoming and progress, aware that it was born and is continually reborn from the inexhaustible and unchangeable resources of divine revelation, which is complete and does not wear out, from communion with the Word of God, ancient and always new.

It is also true that the renewal of theology can be accompanied by a new philosophy, but on the condition that it offer, so to speak, a space more open to the predominance and understanding of the mystery, and that it be exercised within the "understanding of the faith."

It is significant that the brilliant historian of medieval theology Marie-Dominique Chenu should affirm that "it is not the introduction of Aristotle that determines the thought of Saint Thomas, just as it is not the rebirth of Antiquity that constitutes the theology of the thirteenth century." The rebirth represents only one component of renewal: its impulse and its advance are attributed to "evangelism," as he calls it.

It goes without saying that it can never be philosophy that judges the validity of a theology: this judgment belongs only to the Word of God, while the same theology can judge the pertinence or lack thereof of a philosophy in contributing to the understanding of the faith.

*

Here, however, we are not interested in illustrating the relationship between philosophy and Christian theology, but in indicating the decision through which theology could and should receive a profound renewal or new arrangement: a decision that is unavoidable, because it is founded on the event from which emerges the faith, and therefore the "understanding of the faith."

This way is Christocentrism.

Truly, this is by no means a novelty. Christian theology has always had Jesus Christ at its center; it was born and developed from the event that is him.

But perhaps this original centrality requires a more rigorous, more consistent, and more complete translation. Above all beginning with the very definition of Christocentrism.

This does not signify only the excellence of Christ with respect to all the rest, but his predestination to be the unconditional reason for all that which God has called and calls into existence.

But other indispensable and essential clarifications are required. When one speaks of Christocentrism, one intends to affirm not only the primacy of the Word, but also the primacy or "precedence" in God's plan of the incarnate Word, who died and was raised, through whom, in whom, and in view of whom "were created all things in heaven and on earth, the visible and the invisible" (Colossians 1:15-17). Obviously, as a complement rather than an alternative to the Johannine perspective, according to which there is nothing that has not been made through the Word (John 1:3).

The "Preeminent over all things" (Colossians 1:18) is, precisely, the glorified Crucified One, who comes before everything and from whom everything departs. It is as if to say that Jesus the redeemer, with the grace of his forgiveness, is the ontological foundation and the historical motive of all things (cf. Colossians 1:17), the Object of God's eternal "purpose."

The first letter of Peter speaks of the "the precious blood of Christ as of a spotless unblemished lamb," "known before the foundation of the world," revealed in the final time" (1:19-20). And as for the prophets, it says that they were "investigating the time and circumstances that the Spirit of Christ within them indicated when it testified in advance to the sufferings destined for Christ and the glories to follow them" (1:11).

But if Jesus risen from the dead is the Predestined One, this means the figure of humanity originally conceived and "preferred" by God is the glorified humanity of the Son, the achievement to which all of history is oriented.

In it, all humanity finds its rationale and model: all men are predestined, created "in grace," or "predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, so that he might be the firstborn among many brothers" (Romans 8:29).

We can define everything that we have described in the words of Paul: "the mystery of God that is Christ" (Colossians 2:2), or more precisely: "the wise mystery of God" that is "Christ crucified" (cf. 1 Corinthians 1:21,23).

*

So then, the task of theology is the exploration of this mystery. Those who dedicate themselves to it have the mission of "speaking God's wisdom, mysterious, hidden, which God predetermined before the ages" (1 Corinthians 2:7).

It is on this realism that Christian theology is built, with no interest in watering itself down in the world of hypothetical divine plans or designs. Only God knows what he could have done. Everything has been created in the grace of Jesus crucified and risen.

In particular, the nature of man was grounded on that grace. A "pure nature," for a "pure" and "natural" end, has never existed, and we can know nothing about it.

In fact, the "Original" that sacred doctrine intends to know above all, and therefore, the first object of theological interest, is the glorious Crucified One predestined from all time, and therefore, his life with its events, among which takes place the particularized manifestation of the eternal plan generated and motivated by the divine mercy.

In this sense, Christian theology is originally Christic: Christ risen from the dead describes and exhaustively offers all of his object. He is the Object that is to be understood, as the concrete and historical "narration" of the plan (cf. John 1:18). He is the dimension that Christology must take on.

But Christ does not stop at himself: he is the Son, and thus he refers to the Father, whom no one has seen and of whom he is the epiphany, and he is the attestation of the Spirit. In him is found the Trinity, which reveals itself as the creating and merciful Trinity, which stands at the origin of an order intended as an initiative of mercy.

This is the order that the theologian is called to study, which in particular concerns man, although he appears to be preceded, before his creation, by an angelic world already marked by Christ and by the decisions related to him: of acceptance, but also of rejection, or sin.

In particular, Christ unveils for us a God who, in his merciful love, gives the Son, predetermined as forgiveness for the sin of man, who in this way finds his advantage not in coming into the world, but in being redeemed. As Saint Ambrose writes, "Non prodesset nasci, nisi redimi profuisset" (Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam, II, 41-42).

Sacred doctrine, then, deals with anthropology, meaning man as existing solely as disposed in the grace and glory of the Cross: a grace and a glory at work in the sacraments, which Thomas Aquinas sees entirely suspended in the "energy of the passion of Christ" (Summa Theologiae, III, 62, 5, c).

So it is easy to see what ecclesiology deals with: precisely with the humanity that emerges from the Passover of Christ and finds itself configured and intimately associated with the Lord risen from the dead.

As for eschatology, this is the exploration of the glory and therefore of the achievement of the Crucified One: a glory that transcends and attracts history and is the end for which man and together with him all things were created and desired from eternity.

If it is true that Christian theology has always done this, I would in any case maintain that is is possible, even necessary, to refocus this in an even more consistent and profound way on Christocentrism. It is only from here that a strong, admirable impulse of renewal could come, which would be sought in vain elsewhere.

Ite ad Thomam: Hermeneutics of Discontinuity? JP2 vs. Florence on the Revocation of the Mosaic Covenant

Catholic Dualists

Original posted at The New Beginning. I'm reposting it here, with some small changes.

To deny that there are differences between men and women in how they think, materialists and feminsits must be "subtle" in attacking the data. (One strategem is to argue that since not all of one sex exhibit a trait to the nth degree that therefore this trait is not more exemplary of one sex than another. That is to say, a distribution curve is insufficient--one is needed is two distinct and sharp peaks.) In contrast, it is likely that Catholic egalitariansno matter how much they may criticize Descartes for being a father of modernity, must partially embrace a form of dualism that is similar to his if they are to dismiss the generalizations that have been made about the cognitive differences between men and women. They may claim to accept the hylomorphic account of the relation of soul to body, but on this point they become a dualists. They have to argue that because the soul is equal in all that all reason equally or in the same way.

They may acknowledge that there are differences in the exercise of the intellect or intellectual performance, as some are clearly more intelligent than others, but the power is the same in all. Now I think some distinctions need to be made. While the intellectual power may be the same in all, it is not exercised, in this life, by itself, but in conjunction with the sense powers. It is also influenced by other factors, such as one's emotions. The conjunction of body and soul is not something that is accidental to our way of reasoning in this life. That the body may have a regular (and not necessarily determintal) influence on how we reason may be part of God's design--sex differences in reasoning are "natural."

John Finnis is a Catholic egalitarian, and as far as I know, he has not written specifically about the soul or Descartes. But perhaps his egalitarianism is tied to his understanding of human dignity, and human dignity upon the spiritual nature of man.

Dropping “Patriarch of the West” and changing titles of Roman Basilicas to “Papal”

See the comments for what some think the implications of these acts for Catholic ecclesiology are.

Thomistica.net: Call for papers: Fordham conference on the Metaphysics of Aquinas (March 26-27, 2011)

Edward Feser comments on the Prop. 8 decision

Some thoughts on the Prop 8 decision (entry at his own blog)

The Catholic Thing: Tradition, Continuity, and Vatican II By David G. Bonagura, Jr

Yet an effort to avoid polemics is a mere surface reason for Benedict’s choice of the word. By insisting that Vatican II be interpreted in continuity with the Church of all ages, the pope is saying that the council is part of the Church’s Tradition (with a capital “T”), that is, part of the Church’s authoritative interpretation of divine revelation. Vatican II, therefore, is not a “rupture” in the Church’s Tradition (interpretation of God’s word) or traditions (ecclesial practices descended from the Apostles) resulting in a completely new way of believing, as Professor Hans Küng on the Left and the followers of Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre on the Right maintain. For Benedict, Vatican II is a legitimate development in the Church’s ongoing understanding of Christ and His saving message for the world.

With respect to the sentences in bold -- I don't see how the second necessarily follows from the first.

Thomistica.net: Thomistic commentators online and Thomistic commentators online

Public Discourse: The Abiding Significance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by Christopher O. Tollefsen

Americans must still wrestle with what it means to take the lives of innocent civilians intentionally.

There are, finally, some problem areas, puzzles regarding which we have not yet determined how the lessons of World War Two are to be brought to bear. As I noted, military ethics now take for granted that civilians are not to be targeted. Perhaps, however, that has simply made our leaders more scrupulous about calling civilian casualties “collateral damage,” even when they are willing to accept many more such casualties than they would harm to our own troops. But the original precept against killing the innocent no matter what the consequences is based on an even deeper truth: the fundamental and radical equality of all human beings as persons, as free and rational beings whose lives are each loci of intrinsic and incommensurable value. The West’s willingness to bomb at a distance, engage in drone attacks, and tolerate, in Iraq and Afghanistan, wildly disproportionate numbers of civilian casualties, suggests that our soldiers do indeed count more than their wives, children, and elderly. While this may be an understandable viewpoint in any society, it is not, for all that, a correct one.

I find it odd that someone who has studied MacIntyre would employ a modern notion of justice to explain the precept against murder. But as Grisez was very influential on Professor Tollefsen, it is not unexpected. This sort of explanation is employed by other contemporary Catholic intellectuals and by a few bishops as well. The explanation is serviceable, but it fails to distinguish the difference between justice from charity. (Since Grisez is not interested in keeping the Thomistic account of the virtues, it may not seem important, but if there is going to be more than a verbal difference between charity and justice then... )

A Prayer Rule by St. Theophan the Recluse

here

Other resources
Orthodox Information Center

Did Cardinal Ratzinger think that Vatican I is non-negotiable?

It would seem so, with respect to its teachings on the office of the pope. From the CDF's Doctrinal Commentary on Ad Tuendam Fidem:

With respect to the truths of the second paragraph, with reference to those connected with revelation by a logical necessity, one can consider, for example, the development in the understanding of the doctrine connected with the definition of papal infallibility, prior to the dogmatic definition of the First Vatican Council. The primacy of the Successor of Peter was always believed as a revealed fact, although until Vatican I the discussion remained open as to whether the conceptual elaboration of what is understood by the terms 'jurisdiction' and 'infallibility' was to be considered an intrinsic part of revelation or only a logical consequence. On the other hand, although its character as a divinely revealed truth was defined in the First Vatican Council, the doctrine on the infallibility and primacy of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff was already recognized as definitive in the period before the council. History clearly shows, therefore, that what was accepted into the consciousness of the Church was considered a true doctrine from the beginning, and was subsequently held to be definitive; however, only in the final stage - the definition of Vatican I - was it also accepted as a divinely revealed truth.

I don't see why he would have changed his mind once become pope.