pritzl gorman from Province of Saint Joseph on Vimeo.
VimeoMonday, February 28, 2011
The World Database of Happiness
Compiled by Dutch researcher Ruut Veenhoeven.
Related:
Cato Unbound profile
Thoughts on Happiness
See this previous post.
Related:
Cato Unbound profile
Thoughts on Happiness
See this previous post.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Reminder: DSPT 2011 Aquinas Lecture on March 2
Friday, February 25, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
h2o news: Reflections on the Common Good and Catholic Social Teaching
Wish I had the full paper to read.
Fr. William Rehg's faculty page
MIT Press
Crossing Boundaries: Contexts of Practices as Common Goods
Solidarity and the Common Good: An Analytic Framework (Journal of Social Philosophy)
Wish I had the full paper to read.
Fr. William Rehg's faculty page
MIT Press
Crossing Boundaries: Contexts of Practices as Common Goods
Solidarity and the Common Good: An Analytic Framework (Journal of Social Philosophy)
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
Canterbury Tales: The Two Marian Maxims of St Bonaventure
Where are they to be found in his corpus of writings?
First Maxim: "One should carefully beware of decreasing, even in the slightest, the honor that is due to Mary."
Second Maxim: "One should be ready to defend the privileges of Mary even at the risk of his life."
Where are they to be found in his corpus of writings?
Fr. Pritzl, RIP
Kurt Pritzl, O.P., RIP (via Mirror of Justice) (See also the post at Thomistica.net.)
He was the head when I was accepted at CUA. He sounded a bit disappointed on the phone when I told him that I would be going back on my acceptance and going elsewhere for my graduate education. But when I met him in person several years later over at Notre Dame he was friendly. May he rest in peace.
He was the head when I was accepted at CUA. He sounded a bit disappointed on the phone when I told him that I would be going back on my acceptance and going elsewhere for my graduate education. But when I met him in person several years later over at Notre Dame he was friendly. May he rest in peace.
Monday, February 21, 2011
Orthodox Thoughts on Capital Punishment
By Peter-Michael Preble
What do other Orthodox priests and theologians make of the following statements?
1. "Without dwelling on the facts of the case mentioned above, let us look at the view of the Orthodox Church regarding capital punishment. First, no single official speaks for the Orthodox Church; each bishop is entitled to interpret church teaching and Scripture as he sees fit for his particular jurisdiction."
2. "The entire theory of capital punishment is based on retribution. All systems of law as far back as one can be certain espouse this right of the state. However, Jesus teaches that retribution is not right in the love that we are to have toward our neighbor.
In Matthew 5, Jesus says, "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not resist one who is evil … love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you."
3. "Christians have always been opposed to capital punishment because it is the taking of a life – life that is created in the image and likeness of God. The clearest statement comes from the early Christian author Lactantius, who lived between 240 and 320 A.D:
'When God prohibits killing, He not only forbids us to commit brigandage, which is not allowed even by the public laws, but He warns us not to do even those things which are regarded as legal among men… and so it will not be lawful for a just man… to accuse anyone of a capital offense, because it makes no difference whether thou kill with a sword or with a word, since killing itself is forbidden. And so, in this commandment of God, no exception at all ought to be made to the rule that it is always wrong to kill a man, who God has wished to be regarded as a sacrosanct creature" (Institutes VI, XX, 15).'
4. "The bottom line in all of this is that each and every life is precious from conception until its natural death. Capital punishment not only plays into retribution, but it eliminates the possibility for reconciliation – another very important aspect of the life of a Christian. We now have the ability to keep a person incarcerated for the rest of his or her natural life, so the need for capital punishment no longer applies."
By Peter-Michael Preble
What do other Orthodox priests and theologians make of the following statements?
1. "Without dwelling on the facts of the case mentioned above, let us look at the view of the Orthodox Church regarding capital punishment. First, no single official speaks for the Orthodox Church; each bishop is entitled to interpret church teaching and Scripture as he sees fit for his particular jurisdiction."
2. "The entire theory of capital punishment is based on retribution. All systems of law as far back as one can be certain espouse this right of the state. However, Jesus teaches that retribution is not right in the love that we are to have toward our neighbor.
In Matthew 5, Jesus says, "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not resist one who is evil … love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you."
3. "Christians have always been opposed to capital punishment because it is the taking of a life – life that is created in the image and likeness of God. The clearest statement comes from the early Christian author Lactantius, who lived between 240 and 320 A.D:
'When God prohibits killing, He not only forbids us to commit brigandage, which is not allowed even by the public laws, but He warns us not to do even those things which are regarded as legal among men… and so it will not be lawful for a just man… to accuse anyone of a capital offense, because it makes no difference whether thou kill with a sword or with a word, since killing itself is forbidden. And so, in this commandment of God, no exception at all ought to be made to the rule that it is always wrong to kill a man, who God has wished to be regarded as a sacrosanct creature" (Institutes VI, XX, 15).'
4. "The bottom line in all of this is that each and every life is precious from conception until its natural death. Capital punishment not only plays into retribution, but it eliminates the possibility for reconciliation – another very important aspect of the life of a Christian. We now have the ability to keep a person incarcerated for the rest of his or her natural life, so the need for capital punishment no longer applies."
A New Wrinkle
Or just something I had forgotten...
For the discussion on torture over at WWWTW, I went back and reread what the CCC says about torture:
So torture as defined in the CCC includes its use for punishment.
Is Christian personalism just a variant of liberal moral theory? I wrote that this is a novelty and the appeal to human dignity and respect for the person is not reducible to what has been written by Thomists about the virtues of charity and justice. So how much weight should the CCC carry? I do not hold it to be an infallible document, and while it should be respected, I think there is a break with the past with regards to punishment. Now it might be that Sacred Tradition does not explicitly maintain the infliction of pain as punishment is licit. But it would seem that various moral theologians (and bishops?) have taught it.
Again, how is torture as it is broadly defined here different from corporal punishment by parents or lawful authorities?
Fr. Brian Harrison has an article from 2006 for This Rock, but I would think it has been superceded by his addendum.
Edit. I vaguely recall an attempt to harmonize the CCC with "traditional" teaching on the infliction of pain as a punishment, but I can find no record of having written about it on this blog. I may have written it somewhere else, or just done it mentally. One could interpret the CCC as prohibiting the torture of those who have already been sentenced and punished for an offense -- torture (or any sort of maltreatment) would in their case be going beyond what has already been determined to be a proper punishment for their offense. (Maltreatment might be justified on the grounds that they have lost human dignity, etc., but I do not think that this would be in accord with a traditional understanding of justice.)
Still, I think the more obvious sense of the sentence in the CCC is that it prohibits torture as a form of punishment. But this would only be a problem if the CCC were represent the highest teaching authority of the Church and protected by infallibility.
For the discussion on torture over at WWWTW, I went back and reread what the CCC says about torture:
Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity. Except when performed for strictly therapeutic medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations performed on innocent persons are against the moral law.[90]
2298 In times past, cruel practices were commonly used by legitimate governments to maintain law and order, often without protest from the Pastors of the Church, who themselves adopted in their own tribunals the prescriptions of Roman law concerning torture. Regrettable as these facts are, the Church always taught the duty of clemency and mercy. She forbade clerics to shed blood. In recent times it has become evident that these cruel practices were neither necessary for public order, nor in conformity with the legitimate rights of the human person. On the contrary, these practices led to ones even more degrading. It is necessary to work for their abolition. We must pray for the victims and their tormentors.
So torture as defined in the CCC includes its use for punishment.
Is Christian personalism just a variant of liberal moral theory? I wrote that this is a novelty and the appeal to human dignity and respect for the person is not reducible to what has been written by Thomists about the virtues of charity and justice. So how much weight should the CCC carry? I do not hold it to be an infallible document, and while it should be respected, I think there is a break with the past with regards to punishment. Now it might be that Sacred Tradition does not explicitly maintain the infliction of pain as punishment is licit. But it would seem that various moral theologians (and bishops?) have taught it.
Again, how is torture as it is broadly defined here different from corporal punishment by parents or lawful authorities?
Fr. Brian Harrison has an article from 2006 for This Rock, but I would think it has been superceded by his addendum.
Edit. I vaguely recall an attempt to harmonize the CCC with "traditional" teaching on the infliction of pain as a punishment, but I can find no record of having written about it on this blog. I may have written it somewhere else, or just done it mentally. One could interpret the CCC as prohibiting the torture of those who have already been sentenced and punished for an offense -- torture (or any sort of maltreatment) would in their case be going beyond what has already been determined to be a proper punishment for their offense. (Maltreatment might be justified on the grounds that they have lost human dignity, etc., but I do not think that this would be in accord with a traditional understanding of justice.)
Still, I think the more obvious sense of the sentence in the CCC is that it prohibits torture as a form of punishment. But this would only be a problem if the CCC were represent the highest teaching authority of the Church and protected by infallibility.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Lying?
ML recommends this Thomistic response to a Recent Dispute about Lying. See also Everyday Thomist.
Live Action - The Rosa Acuna Project
More:
America
Robert George
Live Action - The Rosa Acuna Project
More:
America
Robert George
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Friday, February 18, 2011
The Art of Definition
Working with elementary school students, I noticed that when asked to give definitions, students usually just give synonyms. But this is true of teachers as well. Is it also a weakness of children's dictionaries? Does this instill a bad habit that gets in the way of acquiring the intellectual virtues later on in life?
Aristotle's theory of the syllogism By Günther Patzig
Aristotle's theory of the syllogism By Günther Patzig
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Zenit: ON ST. JOHN OF THE CROSS
"If a Man Has a Great Love Within … He Endures Life’s Problems More Easily"
"If a Man Has a Great Love Within … He Endures Life’s Problems More Easily"
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
While I was driving home and thinking of my recent hospital experience, I asked if part of the problem was not an inordinate desire for health, and if the amount of money being spent on research was not an indication of our wrong priorities. If we found that a majority (if not most or all) diseases of civilization were due to diet, would our society continue to spend so much money on research? I say "so much" since the amount of funding and grant money required to pay scientists and their staff and keep medical, pharmaceutical, or biological research laboratories running must be great. Even if we eliminated 70 or 80% of the diseases that plague us as we age, would we nevertheless demand 100% eradication? Would we not be satisfied with our lot in life?
This is assuming that everyone doing research is doing so with pure intentions, and not because they seek to make money from it. We could once again ask how the surplus wealth that is necessary for research is being obtained--if our research is a form of prodigality and the means by which the money is being obtained involves great injustice, then wouldn't the whole enterprise be doubly compromised?
Still, collective sin as it is used in contemporary discourse can seem like it is poorly-defined. How much responsibility do those who benefit from the system bear, as compared to those who are in control of the system?
It's been a long day...
This is assuming that everyone doing research is doing so with pure intentions, and not because they seek to make money from it. We could once again ask how the surplus wealth that is necessary for research is being obtained--if our research is a form of prodigality and the means by which the money is being obtained involves great injustice, then wouldn't the whole enterprise be doubly compromised?
Still, collective sin as it is used in contemporary discourse can seem like it is poorly-defined. How much responsibility do those who benefit from the system bear, as compared to those who are in control of the system?
It's been a long day...
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Happiness Surveys and the Good of Ethics
We have often received reports through the MSM of the results of surveys trying to find the world's happiest country, and so on.
The most recent item I've seen that makes use of such surveys is Jim Bannon's "The Pursuit of Happiness" (EB), which uses the results of astudy comparing the 50 states, which attempted to link objective criteria with respondents' subjective life-satisfaction scores.
How does one determine unhappiness, or dissatisfaction? The failure to attain the goods that one wants or expects? How is this quantified in a survey? Some surveys may find a correlation with simplicity in lifestyle--others may not, especially when the top 5 happiest countries are industrialized. The definition of happiness is left up to the individual -- though external markers are sought to justify their impression. As far as I have seen, these surveys do not rely upon a notion of happiness universally applicable to all, a standard by which societies (and their ways of life) everywhere can be judged.
But on to my main point: it seems natural to us to think of goods as things that we possess. If we have the good or goods, then we are happy. Is this a problem of language? Does the word "good" lend itself to thinking in terms of abstractions and habits, things that we have? That is, because the word "good" is an [abstract] noun, are we inclined to seek a res that is a substance, rather than an accident. Do we find this problematic conception in other languages, or is it limited only to English? (Merriam-Webster, etymology)
Or is it more the psychology of fallen nature -- we spend much time thinking about what we wish to acquire in order to satisfy inordinate desires? Then, when we come across the word in a writings dealing with ethics, we first think of things before anything else. (Did utilitarianism/consequentialism play any role in promoting this understanding?)
Which of the Greek or Latin Fathers talked about goods as being things that are possessed? I can't remember St. Augustine's treatment. I do remember Boethius talking about the goods that are constitutive of happiness. He seems to share that conception of the relationship of "good" to happiness with many moderns. From The Consolation of Philosophy: Aristotle does enumerate "goods" (things to be possessed) which are identified by various people as being happiness in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, but this is a dialectical discussion(?) aimed at showing that these opinions are incorrect.
What needs to be recovered is an understanding of good(s) of happiness primarily as an activity, and not as something that we have/possess, either "internal" to us (e.g. virtue or office/power/ability) or external to us (e.g. family). These latter goods are instruments or occasions for activity or the exercise of virtue.
If they are to be really meaningful, these surveys should not be a "sociological" study of what people want and desire and are missing, but a study of how people live. But that would probably require too much of an academic survey.
*Boethius's account, or any traditional Catholic theology for that matter, does seem to be right with respect to naming God as our first ("highest") good. But this requires a nuanced explanation.
The most recent item I've seen that makes use of such surveys is Jim Bannon's "The Pursuit of Happiness" (EB), which uses the results of astudy comparing the 50 states, which attempted to link objective criteria with respondents' subjective life-satisfaction scores.
How does one determine unhappiness, or dissatisfaction? The failure to attain the goods that one wants or expects? How is this quantified in a survey? Some surveys may find a correlation with simplicity in lifestyle--others may not, especially when the top 5 happiest countries are industrialized. The definition of happiness is left up to the individual -- though external markers are sought to justify their impression. As far as I have seen, these surveys do not rely upon a notion of happiness universally applicable to all, a standard by which societies (and their ways of life) everywhere can be judged.
But on to my main point: it seems natural to us to think of goods as things that we possess. If we have the good or goods, then we are happy. Is this a problem of language? Does the word "good" lend itself to thinking in terms of abstractions and habits, things that we have? That is, because the word "good" is an [abstract] noun, are we inclined to seek a res that is a substance, rather than an accident. Do we find this problematic conception in other languages, or is it limited only to English? (Merriam-Webster, etymology)
Or is it more the psychology of fallen nature -- we spend much time thinking about what we wish to acquire in order to satisfy inordinate desires? Then, when we come across the word in a writings dealing with ethics, we first think of things before anything else. (Did utilitarianism/consequentialism play any role in promoting this understanding?)
Which of the Greek or Latin Fathers talked about goods as being things that are possessed? I can't remember St. Augustine's treatment. I do remember Boethius talking about the goods that are constitutive of happiness. He seems to share that conception of the relationship of "good" to happiness with many moderns. From The Consolation of Philosophy: Aristotle does enumerate "goods" (things to be possessed) which are identified by various people as being happiness in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, but this is a dialectical discussion(?) aimed at showing that these opinions are incorrect.
What needs to be recovered is an understanding of good(s) of happiness primarily as an activity, and not as something that we have/possess, either "internal" to us (e.g. virtue or office/power/ability) or external to us (e.g. family). These latter goods are instruments or occasions for activity or the exercise of virtue.
If they are to be really meaningful, these surveys should not be a "sociological" study of what people want and desire and are missing, but a study of how people live. But that would probably require too much of an academic survey.
*Boethius's account, or any traditional Catholic theology for that matter, does seem to be right with respect to naming God as our first ("highest") good. But this requires a nuanced explanation.
Monday, February 14, 2011
Fr. Michael Himes
Someone in the OLOP Young Adult Group posted this video on FB:
I was a bit curious, since I had heard one of Fr. Himes's homilies and was not impressed, despite the presence of what I considered a personality cult at his Mass. He didn't strike me as someone orthodox, but the typical American theologian who thinks he is a better authority than the bishop of Rome. I suppose I should listen to the video and read some of his stuff to have a better judgment of him as a theologian, teacher, and priest.
The talk he gave as part of BC's Last Lecture series--Boston College Front Row:
(fora.tv)
Food for Thought
Foundations of Christianity: Faith and Hope
He offers some guidance on discernment.
Heights article
Something on him and his brother.
2008: Dominican University Presents Michael Himes in Mazzuchelli Lecture
I was a bit curious, since I had heard one of Fr. Himes's homilies and was not impressed, despite the presence of what I considered a personality cult at his Mass. He didn't strike me as someone orthodox, but the typical American theologian who thinks he is a better authority than the bishop of Rome. I suppose I should listen to the video and read some of his stuff to have a better judgment of him as a theologian, teacher, and priest.
The talk he gave as part of BC's Last Lecture series--Boston College Front Row:
(fora.tv)
Food for Thought
Foundations of Christianity: Faith and Hope
He offers some guidance on discernment.
Heights article
Something on him and his brother.
2008: Dominican University Presents Michael Himes in Mazzuchelli Lecture
Sunday, February 13, 2011
Robert Araujo, Law as a Moral Idea -- a short note about Nigel Simmond’s Law as Moral Idea.
Related: Natural Law “Externalism” v. Law as a Moral Idea
Juriprudence Discussion Group
Positivism and Separation of Laws and Morals, Fifty Years On
Related: Natural Law “Externalism” v. Law as a Moral Idea
Juriprudence Discussion Group
Positivism and Separation of Laws and Morals, Fifty Years On
Loving God More than Yourself
Aquinas argues that we should love God more than ourselves, for example in the Summa Theologiae here (with reference to the angels and the natural love of God) and here (with reference to us and charity). Now, it seems that if you were to ask a simple Catholic the reason why we love God more than ourselves he would not talk about God being the common good of all creation or as the cause of happiness.
Loving God more than ourselves seems to be part of Sacred Tradition; is it explicit in Sacred Scripture? One could interpret "greatest commandment" (Matthew 22:36-40) as implying this order. It is only implicit in Luke 10:27 -- it must be read into it, from Tradition and perhaps from Matthew 22:37?
It seems that through the theological virtue of Faith we believe that God is more lovable than us or more worthy of love. If pressed for a reason we might talk about His goodness and His relationship to us as Creator to creature. He is the cause, we are the effects, we are subordinate to Him. He is also "greater" in perfection, "better" than us. It seems to me that Aquinas's argument with God as the universal good is a more sophisticated version of this line of reasoning. If asked to give an explanation of the order of charity as it pertains to God, I think many of the faithful could manage an explanation with the sort of amateur theology I've outlined above.
Loving God more than ourselves seems to be part of Sacred Tradition; is it explicit in Sacred Scripture? One could interpret "greatest commandment" (Matthew 22:36-40) as implying this order. It is only implicit in Luke 10:27 -- it must be read into it, from Tradition and perhaps from Matthew 22:37?
It seems that through the theological virtue of Faith we believe that God is more lovable than us or more worthy of love. If pressed for a reason we might talk about His goodness and His relationship to us as Creator to creature. He is the cause, we are the effects, we are subordinate to Him. He is also "greater" in perfection, "better" than us. It seems to me that Aquinas's argument with God as the universal good is a more sophisticated version of this line of reasoning. If asked to give an explanation of the order of charity as it pertains to God, I think many of the faithful could manage an explanation with the sort of amateur theology I've outlined above.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Polygenism
Nathan O'Halloran, SJ, Moving forward with polygenism?
I note that the author writes "proved" with scare quotes? The modern scientific method does not provide demonstrations; at best it gives probable arguments, if that. The "epistemological status" is even worse when it's not just a scientific claim (concerning causes and effects) but a historical one as well.
Something from Mark Shea in 2009.
I note that the author writes "proved" with scare quotes? The modern scientific method does not provide demonstrations; at best it gives probable arguments, if that. The "epistemological status" is even worse when it's not just a scientific claim (concerning causes and effects) but a historical one as well.
Something from Mark Shea in 2009.
Center for Thomistic Studies Aquinas Lectures
Thomistica.net: Online Aquinas Lecture from the Center for Thomistic Studies
Thomistica.net includes links to Germain Grisez, “The Restless Heart Blunder” and Msgr. John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Controversy Concerning Unity of Substantial Form in Human Beings”
the archive
Thomistica.net includes links to Germain Grisez, “The Restless Heart Blunder” and Msgr. John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Controversy Concerning Unity of Substantial Form in Human Beings”
the archive
Friday, February 11, 2011
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Zenit: PAPAL ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF EDUCATION CONGREGATION
"To Educate Is an Act of Love"
An act of love? To educate is ordered to love, since the act is directed to the perfection of another, but it is not necessarily an act of love. There are plenty of educators who do so not from charity, but from self-love, or love of their own glory, with no consideration for the well-being of his students. Or the raging egomaniac who believes himself to be a prophet, bringing enligthenment to the ignorant masses. He may desire their good, but it is on his terms. There's something wrong about his love, if indeed he has rejected the Holy Spirit.
The office of the teacher bears with it a great burden, as truth is the foundation for right desire.
Pope Benedict XVI links theology to the life of prayer:
He touches upon what is necessary for those involved with Catholic universities:
"To Educate Is an Act of Love"
An act of love? To educate is ordered to love, since the act is directed to the perfection of another, but it is not necessarily an act of love. There are plenty of educators who do so not from charity, but from self-love, or love of their own glory, with no consideration for the well-being of his students. Or the raging egomaniac who believes himself to be a prophet, bringing enligthenment to the ignorant masses. He may desire their good, but it is on his terms. There's something wrong about his love, if indeed he has rejected the Holy Spirit.
The office of the teacher bears with it a great burden, as truth is the foundation for right desire.
The educational endeavor seems to have become ever more arduous because, in a culture which too often makes relativism its creed, the light of truth is lacking, more than that, it is considered dangerous to speak of truth, thus instilling doubt on the basic values of personal and community life. Important, because of this, is the service carried out in the world by the numerous formative institutions that are inspired in the Christian vision of man and of reality: to educate is an act of love, exercise of "intellectual charity," which requires responsibility, dedication, consistency of life. The work of your Congregation and the choices you will make in these days of reflection and study will certainly contribute to respond to the present "educational emergency."Charity is the central virtue for Christian educators, but also for all Christians!
Pope Benedict XVI links theology to the life of prayer:
However, the theologian must not forget that he is also the one who speaks to God. Hence, it is indispensable to have theology closely united with personal and community prayer, especially liturgical prayer. Theology is sciencia fidei and prayer nourishes faith. In the union with God, mystery is, in some way, savored, it comes close, and this proximity is light for the intelligence. I would also like to stress the connection between theology and the other disciplines, considering that it is taught in Catholic Universities and, in many cases, in civil ones. Blessed John Henry Newman spoke of the "circle of knowledge," to indicate that an interdependence exists between the different branches of knowledge; but God is He who has a relationship only with the totality of the real; consequently, to eliminate God means to break the circle of knowledge.
In this perspective, the Catholic universities, with their very precise identity and their openness to the "totality" of the human being, can carry out a valuable work of promoting the unity of knowledge, orienting students and teachers to the Light of the world, "the true light that enlightens every man" (John 1:9). These are considerations that are valid also for Catholic schools. First of all, there must be the courage to proclaim the "great" value of education, to form solid persons able to collaborate with others and to give meaning to their life. Today there is talk of inter-cultural education, object of study also in your Plenary Assembly.
He touches upon what is necessary for those involved with Catholic universities:
Required in this realm is a courageous and innovative fidelity, which is able to combine the clear awareness of one's identity with openness to others, because of the exigencies of living together in multi-cultural societies. Emerging also for this end is the educational role of the teaching of the Catholic religion as scholastic discipline in inter-disciplinary dialogue with others. In fact, this contributes widely not only to the integral development of the student, but also to knowledge of the other, to mutual understanding and respect. To attain such objectives particular attention must be given to the care of the formation of leaders and formators, not only from a professional point of view, but also religious and spiritual, so that, with the consistency of one's life and with personal involvement, the presence of the Christian educator will be expression of the love and witness of the truth.
Wednesday, February 09, 2011
Tuesday, February 08, 2011
Monday, February 07, 2011
Proportionality in Warfare by Keith Pavlischek
Israel’s efforts to protect itself against Hamas and Hezbollah have been widely criticized in the press for being “disproportionate,” going beyond an eye for an eye. This is a grave misunderstanding of the term, Keith Pavlischek explains, drawing out its true meaning in the tradition of just war theory as a strategy for avoiding harm to noncombatants — an area in which Israel is far more conscientious than its enemies.
Which led me to ask the question, is it morally permissible for an entity to wage 4GW if it is the only way to achieve victory? Or are certain tactics proscribed, e.g. deliberately endangering civilians by blending in with them?
Israel’s efforts to protect itself against Hamas and Hezbollah have been widely criticized in the press for being “disproportionate,” going beyond an eye for an eye. This is a grave misunderstanding of the term, Keith Pavlischek explains, drawing out its true meaning in the tradition of just war theory as a strategy for avoiding harm to noncombatants — an area in which Israel is far more conscientious than its enemies.
Which led me to ask the question, is it morally permissible for an entity to wage 4GW if it is the only way to achieve victory? Or are certain tactics proscribed, e.g. deliberately endangering civilians by blending in with them?
Free?
The New Atlantis: How Can I Possibly Be Free? by Raymond Tallis
Do brain scans prove that free will is an illusion? Are we unfree if we are not entirely self-created? Raymond Tallis exposes the vacuity of these arguments and describes how freedom truly emerges in the development of the human being and through the development of human community.
Do brain scans prove that free will is an illusion? Are we unfree if we are not entirely self-created? Raymond Tallis exposes the vacuity of these arguments and describes how freedom truly emerges in the development of the human being and through the development of human community.
Sunday, February 06, 2011
Saturday, February 05, 2011
Rowman Littlefield
Thomas Cromwell: Machiavellian Statecraft and the English Reformation by J. Patrick Coby
Niccolo Machiavelli: The Laughing Lion and the Strutting Fox by Raymond Angelo Belliotti
How did James Keenan, S.J. land a contract with the company?
Niccolo Machiavelli: The Laughing Lion and the Strutting Fox by Raymond Angelo Belliotti
How did James Keenan, S.J. land a contract with the company?
James Chastek on Matter
Matter (1) and Matter (2)
From the second part:
From the second part:
Within the context of universal nature, any particular individual is matter. Universal nature moves by cycles, and these cycles are made by the arising of things, and the necessary corruption that is entailed by this. Matter taken in this sense causes time – though not “time” in the sense of an international agreement that a second will be 9 billion or so periods of caesium-133 but in the sense of mode of existence that arises from any particular thing being ordered by an interior impulse of universal nature to be other or something else. Aristotle thought that the last sphere of the heavens was the sole ultimate cause of this “order of any particular nature to being other or something else”, and so he concluded that the one motion of this sphere was the cause of one time. The theory fell through in its particulars, but the general structure of the argument remains: if the activity of one thing is the reason for why all particular natures are matter, then one time would arise from it; and if one activity of one thing is not responsible for this, then there would be as many times as there are actions of universal nature.
William T. Cavanaugh on the Modern Nation-State
Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State is not the Keeper of the Common Good (pdf)
I agree with his conclusions regarding the modern nation-state. He seems to believe that its power should be limited, and I would agree with that. I disagree with him on what he says about the origin of the state (government) and the nature of politics as a science:
Certainly the study of history will aid those who wish to criticize the modern nation-state. While what Aristotle or others say about the genesis of political communities may be without sufficient evidence, an account such as Aristotle's does not consist of historical claims alone. The claims that are made regarding governing of a political community may make use of assertions about history as illustrations, but they are not dependent upon them? It only needs to be shown that people desire to live in society with others for the sake of friendship, and society also serves to bring about other goods.
Does some version of the naturalistic fallacy apply to attempts to bridge normative and descriptive "sciences" or "disciplines"? And is this what someone like Aristotle is trying to do, borrowing premises from a descriptive discipline (whether it be history or anthropology) to argue for certain norms? I think rather, it is the use of the historical imagination to show how certain norms have been instantiated in the past. There may be variation in the forms of government and in the goods that are being sought, but certain aspects of political [goal-oriented] reasoning are universal? I think the claim that he takes to be of fact (the purpose of the state, i.e. the government) is really a normative claim. I do not believe that Aristotle or Aquinas link the claim about the nature and purpose of government with "other assumptions of fact," even if it is the case that this is what Charles Curran does.
Started on July 31, 2010 at 5:38 PM.
I agree with his conclusions regarding the modern nation-state. He seems to believe that its power should be limited, and I would agree with that. I disagree with him on what he says about the origin of the state (government) and the nature of politics as a science:
In Christian social ethics the assumption is often made, with a minimum of examination, that the responsibility for promoting and protecting the common good falls to the state. In this essay I want to examine that assumption. All too often Christian social ethics begins from ahistorical and idealized assumptions about the state as protector and benefactor. They are ahistorical because they assume that the state has been with us since biblical times. The state, as Charles Curran says, is “natural and necessary” and “based on creation”.2 It takes different forms—polis for Aristotle, regimen principum for Aquinas—but these different terms refer to the same essential reality; all historical forms of political community are conflated into the term “state”.3 These accounts are also idealized because they assume that society is prior to the state and broader than the state. Human society is represented as a pyramid: the family is at the base, other groups and associations are in the middle, and the state is at the top to coordinate and protect. The base has “ontological priority” to the state and calls forth the state to be at its service. Furthermore, “Society is broader than the state and includes much more.”4 The state is just one limited part of society, but is established in nature with an important role to play: “the end or purpose of the state or government [is] the pursuit of the common good”.5
What I find unhelpful about such accounts is the way that they float free from any empirical testing of their theses. Christian ethicists will commonly recognize that, in a sinful world, particular states always fall short of the ideal. Nevertheless, the ideal is presented not merely as a standard for Christian political practice but as a statement of fact: the state in its essential form simply is that agency of society whose purpose it is to protect and promote
the common good, even if particular states do not always live up to that responsibility. This conclusion is based on a series of assumptions of fact: that the state is natural and primordial, that society gives rise to the state and not vice-versa, and that the state is one limited part of society. These assumptions of fact, however, are often made without any attempt to present historical evidence on their behalf.
Certainly the study of history will aid those who wish to criticize the modern nation-state. While what Aristotle or others say about the genesis of political communities may be without sufficient evidence, an account such as Aristotle's does not consist of historical claims alone. The claims that are made regarding governing of a political community may make use of assertions about history as illustrations, but they are not dependent upon them? It only needs to be shown that people desire to live in society with others for the sake of friendship, and society also serves to bring about other goods.
Does some version of the naturalistic fallacy apply to attempts to bridge normative and descriptive "sciences" or "disciplines"? And is this what someone like Aristotle is trying to do, borrowing premises from a descriptive discipline (whether it be history or anthropology) to argue for certain norms? I think rather, it is the use of the historical imagination to show how certain norms have been instantiated in the past. There may be variation in the forms of government and in the goods that are being sought, but certain aspects of political [goal-oriented] reasoning are universal? I think the claim that he takes to be of fact (the purpose of the state, i.e. the government) is really a normative claim. I do not believe that Aristotle or Aquinas link the claim about the nature and purpose of government with "other assumptions of fact," even if it is the case that this is what Charles Curran does.
Started on July 31, 2010 at 5:38 PM.
What a straw man fallacy is not.
Fallacy: Straw Man
Logical Fallacy: Straw Man
Straw man - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Fallacies [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
The fallacy is imputing an argument to someone that isn't his, and then refuting it.
One needs to be wary of reading too much into someone's remarks; opponents may even deliberately misinterpret those remarks for the sake of rhetorical effectiveness with the audience.
The fallacy is not the same as debating an imaginary opponent to illustrate a point, so long as one is not falsely attributing the argument to anyone participating in the debate. It is also not the same as drawing out an implication from the premises that are accepted by the other side--but one should demonstrate that this is what logically obtains, if the other side does not realize it.
One must take care in identifying fallacies. As in all arguments, one should support one's point; in this case by showing how the argument is a fallacy, rather than resorting to mere assertion based on one's own authority.
When I was at Christendom one of the professors told us to avoid talking of "isms." I might elaborate on that advice some time in connection with the transformation of academic philosophy into genealogy. (I haven't tired of that critique yet.)
Logical Fallacy: Straw Man
Straw man - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Fallacies [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
The fallacy is imputing an argument to someone that isn't his, and then refuting it.
One needs to be wary of reading too much into someone's remarks; opponents may even deliberately misinterpret those remarks for the sake of rhetorical effectiveness with the audience.
The fallacy is not the same as debating an imaginary opponent to illustrate a point, so long as one is not falsely attributing the argument to anyone participating in the debate. It is also not the same as drawing out an implication from the premises that are accepted by the other side--but one should demonstrate that this is what logically obtains, if the other side does not realize it.
One must take care in identifying fallacies. As in all arguments, one should support one's point; in this case by showing how the argument is a fallacy, rather than resorting to mere assertion based on one's own authority.
When I was at Christendom one of the professors told us to avoid talking of "isms." I might elaborate on that advice some time in connection with the transformation of academic philosophy into genealogy. (I haven't tired of that critique yet.)
Temporal Happiness
Returning to an old post, I ask once again: What is temporal happiness? Is it identical to what might be called imperfect participation in happiness by Aquinas? Or is it the imperfect happiness that we can attain by our natural powers alone?* I suppose "temporal happiness" could be used to refer to either, depending on the speaker.
However, some authors, such as Henri Grenier (see the comments to that post), use "temporal happiness" to name the end of civil society. Was the use of temporal happiness in this way begun by neo-Thomists? Or can it be found in earlier Thomistic commentators? I need a Dominican Thomist to be my personal reference librarian.
For the neo-Thomists, does one's temporal good consist of the necessities of life, as well as health/life? Or are these understood as instruments for the sake of activity? I would suspect the latter --these instruments would then be necessary conditions for virtuous activity, but not sufficient conditions, obviously. I think the listing of habits (e.g. knowledge) and quasi-habits (e.g. family) as a good constitutive of happiness is a recent "development" (perhaps most prominent among New Natural Law theorists?) and involves a certain confusion about the meanings of the word "good" and how the analogous use of good is related to desire and practical reason. Are the NNL theorists just following the example of Aquinas? If happiness is convertible with both ends and goods, and it is defined as an activity by those who follow Aristotle, then can a habit or quasi-habit said to be an end or good in the same way an activity can? Is what Aquinas writes about how the precepts of the Natural Law are derived incorrect or in need of clarification? More on that later.
If temporal happiness is identified in this way, it can then be distinguished from the supernatural end or good (spiritual good?) of man. I suppose calling the supernatural good a "spiritual" good is misleading, as virtue and the temporal good are primarily goods of the soul. A related question then: Why shouldn't the Church have care of the temporal good as well as the "supernatural good"?
*I cannot say that this imperfect happiness is identical to the natural end/good of the neo-thomists. I don't understand the controversy over nature/supernature, the natural desire of man to see God, etc. well enough to say anything at this point. I do plan on getting a copy of Feingold's The Natural Desire to see God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters. (Sapientia Press has also published that collection of essays, Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of the Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought.)
I still have to finish reading Dennis Bradley's Aquinas on the Two-Fold Human Good (a review; Google Books).
Related:
Begun on July 15, 2010 at 12:41 AM.
However, some authors, such as Henri Grenier (see the comments to that post), use "temporal happiness" to name the end of civil society. Was the use of temporal happiness in this way begun by neo-Thomists? Or can it be found in earlier Thomistic commentators? I need a Dominican Thomist to be my personal reference librarian.
For the neo-Thomists, does one's temporal good consist of the necessities of life, as well as health/life? Or are these understood as instruments for the sake of activity? I would suspect the latter --these instruments would then be necessary conditions for virtuous activity, but not sufficient conditions, obviously. I think the listing of habits (e.g. knowledge) and quasi-habits (e.g. family) as a good constitutive of happiness is a recent "development" (perhaps most prominent among New Natural Law theorists?) and involves a certain confusion about the meanings of the word "good" and how the analogous use of good is related to desire and practical reason. Are the NNL theorists just following the example of Aquinas? If happiness is convertible with both ends and goods, and it is defined as an activity by those who follow Aristotle, then can a habit or quasi-habit said to be an end or good in the same way an activity can? Is what Aquinas writes about how the precepts of the Natural Law are derived incorrect or in need of clarification? More on that later.
If temporal happiness is identified in this way, it can then be distinguished from the supernatural end or good (spiritual good?) of man. I suppose calling the supernatural good a "spiritual" good is misleading, as virtue and the temporal good are primarily goods of the soul. A related question then: Why shouldn't the Church have care of the temporal good as well as the "supernatural good"?
*I cannot say that this imperfect happiness is identical to the natural end/good of the neo-thomists. I don't understand the controversy over nature/supernature, the natural desire of man to see God, etc. well enough to say anything at this point. I do plan on getting a copy of Feingold's The Natural Desire to see God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters. (Sapientia Press has also published that collection of essays, Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of the Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought.)
I still have to finish reading Dennis Bradley's Aquinas on the Two-Fold Human Good (a review; Google Books).
Related:
Richard Kraut's article on Aristotle's Ethics
entelechy, energeia, eudaimonia
Begun on July 15, 2010 at 12:41 AM.
CYA
"This website and its content, unless otherwise stated or given with an acknowledgement of its source, is copyright of T. Chan. All rights reserved."
This blog is intended to help those who are in pursuit of knowledge. However, I would ask that if you seek to use the material presented here in a published form other than the Internet that you contact me either by leaving a comment on the relevant post or by e-mail. Thank you!
*This statement has now been revised.*
10 Big Myths about copyright explained
This blog is intended to help those who are in pursuit of knowledge. However, I would ask that if you seek to use the material presented here in a published form other than the Internet that you contact me either by leaving a comment on the relevant post or by e-mail. Thank you!
*This statement has now been revised.*
10 Big Myths about copyright explained
John Kyparissiotes's Decades
Don't miss Peter Gilbert's translation of John Kyparissiotes's Decades.
Being a Disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Pursuit of Wisdom
Being a Disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Pursuit of Wisdom
The lecture by Fr. Dewan at Christendom has now been uploaded, so you can listen to it here if you don't have access to iTunes or don't want to take the trouble to download it through iTunes.
The lecture by Fr. Dewan at Christendom has now been uploaded, so you can listen to it here if you don't have access to iTunes or don't want to take the trouble to download it through iTunes.
Friday, February 04, 2011
The Dominican Province of St. Joseph: Consumed by the Holy Mysteries of this Great Sacrament
A Homily by Archbishop Augustine Di Noia, O.P.
A Homily by Archbishop Augustine Di Noia, O.P.
Thursday, February 03, 2011
Certitude and Evidence
ML asked a question on FB about defining fact and opinion, and after posting a brief response there I see this post by James Chastek: The evident.
I wrote on FB that I'd look at self-evidence as being one criterion for distinguishing the two, along with the notion of certitude. I also added that the modern distinction between fact and opinion does not correspond to the distinction between knowledge and opinion in "realist" epistemology. I also asked whether to accept the distinction between fact and opinion is not too much of a concession to modern empiricists.
I should have added that the main problem between the distinction between fact and opinion is that it is commonly presented as a dichotomy, which is not true. Some facts (i.e. that which is observable) can be known by those who are present to observe it, but others who believe such facts to be true do not have knowledge of it, only opinion or belief (and if they rely on the testimony of someone whom they trust, it is faith).
I wrote on FB that I'd look at self-evidence as being one criterion for distinguishing the two, along with the notion of certitude. I also added that the modern distinction between fact and opinion does not correspond to the distinction between knowledge and opinion in "realist" epistemology. I also asked whether to accept the distinction between fact and opinion is not too much of a concession to modern empiricists.
I should have added that the main problem between the distinction between fact and opinion is that it is commonly presented as a dichotomy, which is not true. Some facts (i.e. that which is observable) can be known by those who are present to observe it, but others who believe such facts to be true do not have knowledge of it, only opinion or belief (and if they rely on the testimony of someone whom they trust, it is faith).
Solidarity vs. Identity
Solidarity, if it is identical to social justice or perhaps benevolence, pertains to the will, while identity pertains to the intellect. The exercise of solidarity is dependent upon how one's identity, which is admittedly "subjective," in that people can identify themselves in various ways and think that each way of determining their identity is correct relative to the moral agent. But in answer to the question of "Who am I?" in relation to moral reasoning, we should look not at what is relatively insignificant (what are our pastimes or "interests" are), but firstly the role we play in creation [our function, narrowly conceived]. This role is tied to our understanding of our family (including lineage), relations with friends and associates, community, and people.
I remember someone else in the PhD program writing her dissertation on role-centered morality, but from more of an "analytic" perspective--I don't know if she is trying to turn her dissertation into a book (or if she's still in academics). If roles are so important, why didn't the medievals talk about them? Because their moral theology already presupposes an understanding of roles and related precepts (see Aquinas's discussion of the virtues related to justice and the order of charity)--there wasn't a need to write an explicit account of roles and duties. (As Fr. Cessario once said in class, "The medievals didn't have to talk about community; they lived it.") This understanding of roles is covered, implicity if not explicitly (at least not as far as I remember) in Dr. Fleming's The Morality of Everyday Life (a review here).
For us Americans, the acquisition of a "role-centered" morality is necessary for a deepening of our understanding of the lay vocation.
I remember someone else in the PhD program writing her dissertation on role-centered morality, but from more of an "analytic" perspective--I don't know if she is trying to turn her dissertation into a book (or if she's still in academics). If roles are so important, why didn't the medievals talk about them? Because their moral theology already presupposes an understanding of roles and related precepts (see Aquinas's discussion of the virtues related to justice and the order of charity)--there wasn't a need to write an explicit account of roles and duties. (As Fr. Cessario once said in class, "The medievals didn't have to talk about community; they lived it.") This understanding of roles is covered, implicity if not explicitly (at least not as far as I remember) in Dr. Fleming's The Morality of Everyday Life (a review here).
For us Americans, the acquisition of a "role-centered" morality is necessary for a deepening of our understanding of the lay vocation.
Zenit: ON THE BEATITUDES AS A PROGRAM OF LIFE
"Teaching That Comes From Above and Touches the Human Condition"
"Teaching That Comes From Above and Touches the Human Condition"
Wednesday, February 02, 2011
Tuesday, February 01, 2011
The St. Croix Review -- I received a solicitation from them last year, but I didn't subscribe due to lack of funds and sufficient interest. I gather it is a conservative publication, but how conservative?
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