Ken Benfield, 'The Pursuit of Happiness': How Do Communities Make Us Happy?

Smart Growth
Smart Growth America

Word on Fire: Culture: Charles Taylor & the Secular Age

Vatican announces winners of "Ratzinger Prize in Theology"

Zenit: Winners of Ratzinger Prize Announced

Stray thoughts

There is a piece still in the works...

An evolutionist holds the assumption that because of DNA, there are a host of "forms" available to a particular organism. But has this been shown to be the case for any one organism/species? What if development is not due DNA alone, but also to epigenetic factors (and processes)? If matter is proportionate to form, then how can the matter that is proper to one form1 (or one set of forms1) be transformed to the matter proper for a different form1 (or different set of forms2) by changes in the DNA alone? One would have to show that the DNA is a cause for those epigenetic factors as well, rather than being one tool among many...

Form1 - substantial form (At the moment I think organization, a la Goodwin, is inadequate, as substantial form encompasses organization but more than that.)
Form2 - the structure(s) of the organism, which constitute its appearance

Living Tradition 148: The Second Vatican Council: A Needed Interpretation by John F. McCarthy

Paul VI, Credo of the People of God

Thomistica.net: Gratian on the Web

Kathryn Jean Lopez interviews Robert P. George: Sex and the Empire State
Losing marriage to sexual liberalism.

The Pursuit of Happiness: Can We Have an Economy of Well-Being? by Carol Graham

Eudaimonia would be the answer but we already have disputes about what constitutes the good life and the its relation to the moral law...

Sandro Magister, Bologna Speaks: Tradition Is Also Made of "Ruptures"

David Boyle, Land tax vs. land redistribution

The Stewardship Economy by Julian Pratt

VoxDay: Eco on Hawking

OpStJoseph: The Spirituality of Blessed John Henry Newman (Part I)


Part 2:


Oratorian? How did it diverge from that of St. Philip Neri?

Blessed are the Peacemakers
by Peter Kwasniewski

James Chastek, Notions of the Soul

The first real account we get of what the soul is – which is still firmly materialistic – is that the soul is some arrangement of parts which, of themselves, are not living. The Greeks called this the theory that the soul was a harmony, and it is still the simplest theory of the soul (though we would probably dump “harmony” in favor of something more scienecy- sounding). The theory is continually abandoned for various reasons, the simplest being that arrangement is a feature of position or place, but if all one does is change the position or place of something, it doesn’t cease to be what it is. If all there was to being alive was arrangement, then death wouldn’t change what a thing was – which would mean that a cow doesn’t cease to be a cow when it dies.

How does "arrangement" differ from the contemporary concept of "organization"?

Two critical reviews of Jesus of Nazareth

CRC
Robert Sungenis

Honor Harger: A history of the universe in sound


Related:

radioqualia

Pertinacious Papist: The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism. PP republishes a review, originally published in Latin Mass Magazine, by Christopher Oleson of Thaddeus Kozinski's The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism. (archive for the review)

Related:
A review at NDPR

Byzantine, Texas: A favorite Orientale Lumen Conference podcast - Sr. Dr. Vassa Larin.

Zenit: That I May See You
A Look at Benedict XVI's Catecheses on Christian Prayer
By Kevin M. Clarke

medievalists.net: Man and nature in the Middle Ages By Christian Rohr

A report on the Aquinas-Barth conference

Op-StJoseph: Thomas Aquinas - Karl Barth Dialogue

Pope Paul VI, Honor St. Thomas by studying his thought (via Rorate Caeli)

For those who cannot receive the Holy Eucharist under either species because of allergies, would the frequent reception of the Anointing of the Sick be a suitable or permitted alternative for fostering their sacramental life?

John Finnis on the Good of Marriage

Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good (via Mirror of Justice)

I have something in the works on the difference between "traditional" Thomistic moral theology/philosophy and the New Natural Theology regarding human goods. I maintain that in the former, the good to which we aim or which we intend is understood [primarily or exclusively] as an activity (or action), while it is understood within the NNLT as some sort of state or quasi-habit. This has an impact on the question of whether there is a single good which constitutes human happiness (and how various goods are integrated).

One could ask whether a model of practical reason is descriptive or normative. Some features of human practical reasoning are universal -- means-ends, the relationship of human desire to a (perceived) good (even if this is denied in a particular moral theory), the nature of practical reason as being focused on human action. Some aspects are present only to those educated (or raised) within a specific tradition.

Dr. Peter Gilbert writes an apology for his blog and gives a statement about his future plans.

Ancient Faith Radio podcasts Orientale Lumen

Here (via Mere Comments)

Daniel Tammet: Different ways of knowing


The speaker's homepage.

Emmaus Patch: Local Priest and Author Explores Orthodoxy in new Book
He says theology is not just theory and doctrine matters.

Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy

The FB page for CUA press announces that Fr. Emery's book, The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God has been released.

Pope: Man Cannot Live Without Searching for the Truth.

If bread is not a substance in itself, but a union of [substances] that constitute the bread, flour, salt, etc., then what happens when the bread is transformed into the Body of Christ? Is an accidental union replaced by a substantial union, with each part of bread a potential substance only when it is separated from the rest? Or is each part a substance unto itself?

Filioque: A Response to Eastern Orthodox Objections (via ML)

Orientale Lumen Conference

OL XV
Washington, DC
June 20-23, 2011

Peter Moskos on Flogging

Flogging Debate
Peter Moskos: Flogging versus prison

An interview with Peter Moskos

I first blogged about his book here.

Thomistica.net: Reflections on Ralph McInerny

Which reminds me, I should contact St. Augustine Press.

Was looking at the program for this year's New Wine, New Wineskins Conference and this caught my eye: Michael J. Martocchio, “The Ethics of Sustainability”

I assume this is he, listed as a member of the adjunct faculty at Duquesne.

Related:
Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church
Richard Heinberg, Five Axioms of Sustainability
Kirkpatrick Sale, The Four Pillars of Sustainability
Thriving Beyond Sustainability: Pathways to a Resilient Society by Andrés R. Edwards

Idealism, subjectivity, and Divine Revelation

Kyle R. Cupp: Patriarchy, Theology and Doctrine, More on Power, Patriarchy and Truth, and Am I a Dissenter?

In combating controversy, the Church has refrained from declaring certain philosophical systems or statements or positions as erroneous, except when they manifestly contradict her teachings. Is there a new form of Modernism afoot, which is an attack not on supernatural knowledge directly, but indirectly through questioning of natural human knowledge (and communication, which is dependent upon language). How can a false understanding of human knowledge not lead to some form of neo-Modernism? The Church may need to declare certain propositions concerning human knowledge to be errors in order to safeguard Revelation, the authority of the Church, and Apostolic Succession, if such errors ever gain prominence, instead of being the speculation of academics lacking a solid preparation in philosophy. If the object of the intellect is not the thing but an idea or concept, then how is the idea connected to the thing? How can one possibly know that the idea represents reality?

Epistemology, knowledge, truth: what is the relationship between what one believes about human knowledge and Divine revelation here? Communication or teaching is meditated through human language, which is grounded upon human knowledge. But language is also grounded upon custom; hence part of education lies in untangling the two. Belief or faith doesn't require that the proposition is evident for one to assent to it; in fact, belief or faith is only possible when the proposition is not evident. Nonetheless, that the mind can have opinions is an indication that the mind transcends the material (and sensation)? So how does the modern distinguish between nous, episteme and doxa?

Not all are careful enough to define their terms in their arguments, and so "interpretation" comes into play, especially if there is no acceptable tradition providing definitions for those terms. But with respect to human knowledge (philosophy or science), one does not learn from words alone, but by checking those propositions against reality and what one already knows.


Regardig "realism" -- Aristotelian-Thomism is sometimes said to be "moderate" realism, while Platonism is "radical" or "extreme" realism. Plato does not deny that we have true knowledge, but the things that are the object of our knowledge are the Forms, not the material world. But the realism to which I refer is not with regards to universals, but to our knowledge; the contrast between realism and idealism. Can there be such a melding of realism and idealism so that it is still realism, a la "phenomenological realism"? If we have knowledge of ideas and things, then what makes the connection, and how do we know that such relation is true?

Are some mistaking the way we transition from confusion to knowledge through refining of definitions for something else? Our understanding of things can grow, but our starting point must be the thing, and not an idea of that thing. A "philosophy of hermeneutics" might be plausible if one was dealing with just opinions, and not reality. No wonder scientists scorn philosophers.

SEP: hermeneutics, phenomenology, epistemology
Modernism

Enrico Maria Radaelli on Vatican 2

Sandro Magister, A "Disappointed Great" Breaks His Silence. With an Appeal to the Pope

(via Rorate Caeli)

Fr. Augustine Thompson: Current Status of the Dominican Rite: A Summary
Questions and Answers on the Dominican Rite

Dr. John Cuddeback on Friendship

True Friends
The How-Tos and Joys of Christian Friendship
by Joseph Pronechen

There is a FB page for Dr. Cuddeback's book, True Friendship.

The Public Discourse: The Family: What Is to Be Done?
by Scott Yenor
June 15, 2011
Marital love implies dependence on another instead of autonomy, and it shows that certain goods (sex and procreation, love and marriage, marriage and parenthood) are connected. We must recover the language of self-giving. The second in a two-part series.

I still have to finish that post on love as self-giving. The first part of Mr. Yenor's essay. From the second part:

Unable to find the permanence we need in anatomy, it is necessary to turn to moral philosophy to show how nature, as it manifests itself in marriage and family life, is connected to the permanent human good of betrothed love. For this, we must recover the logic of marital unity and put the necessities that are implicated in marriage and family life in their proper place. This is the logic of marital unity. When marriage concerns serious ends, it makes demands on the time and resources of the couple; the more serious the ends, the more serious the demands. The more time- and resource-intensive the demands, the more members of the family are likely to practice some form of the division of labor to meet those demands. Married couples strive for ends, in other words, that exist in time and space or in life—so they implicate “necessities” within a larger context of meaning.

The necessities of nature gain their dignity by their relation to the ends of marriage. While it is easy for feminists, for instance, to depict the mundane tasks of motherhood and housekeeping as Sisyphean tasks, such necessitous household activities contribute to the building of a home, which is, at least in part, a home of love. In the context of love, the household management of a mother takes on greater dignity and receives higher meaning. Dusting or washing are acts of self-giving that contribute to an environment of nurturing that can best take place in the intense order of family life. There are certainly contractual appearances to this relationship—the husband and wife say “I do” and they agree on how to divide household labors. The contractual appearance, however, is only a moment in the experience of marriage and family life. Marriage may, as Hegel, that oracle of clarity, tells us, “begin from the point of view of contract,” but it does so “in order to supersede it.” This supersession is love, and love is a permanent human good that defines the order of the family.

As we hear so often today, love makes the family. What is love? Most refrain from raising this more significant question, for fear that such a question would give rise to endless controversy or hopeless subjectivity. Here, again, I would suggest that nature or anatomy must be understood in the light of love, the permanent attribute that lends meaning to the natural. Nature points up, toward the love that defines marriage and family life. We see this in sex, which reflects a human search for completion by joining with another, and which cannot be consummated without another. Though sex does not really satisfy that desire for another and sexual desire is soon extinguished when satisfied, this does not mean that one is alone. Sex happens on the level of the passions and the body, but points to something higher than itself. Genuine love integrates and subordinates the moment of sex within this larger unified framework. A relationship based on sex is not a proper marital relationship—though sex is part of a marital relationship—because it does not put sex in its proper place.

Betrothed love also grows from two becoming one in the procreation of children. A couple practices a form of self-giving in their life together, providing a fertile ground for the self-giving of parenthood. Parenthood is a picture of marital unity. A couple’s unified love is literally present in the person of the child, which explains why parents so often love their children more than their children love them: children are living embodiments of marital unity. Married couples are more than parents, yet parenthood points to the betrothed love that makes parents, in part, more than parents.

Modern thinkers, with partial exceptions, initiated a revolution in marriage at the level of betrothed love. They questioned whether self-giving was healthy, possible, safe, or consistent with human liberty and equality. Love implies dependence on another instead of autonomy, and it shows that certain goods (sex and procreation, love and marriage, marriage and parenthood) are connected. When the self-giving of betrothed love is no longer the end of marriage, the preparation ground for parenthood erodes; divorce seems more tenable as partners hold something back; more individualistic principles fill in to justify or define marriage; and sex and procreation, no longer pointing beyond themselves toward a higher good, come to be seen as individual goods or burdens instead of as common goods.

Buzzwords in contemporary [Catholic] moral philosophy (personalism?): "dignity" and "meaning."

Robert George, A visit to Italy to discuss civic values

I have just returned from Italy, where I gave the graduation adddress for the Master of Civic Education program at the Ethica Institute in the charming city of Asti. It was a wonderful opportunity to engage some of Italy's most gifted and promising young intellectuals. Ethica is performing a great service to the Italian nation by promoting the rigorous and appreciative study of civic values that must be in place if a regime of republican liberty is to be sustained. Scholars representing a spectrum of political viewpoints are assisting in the project. Students at Ethica have the great advantage of hearing the best arguments that can be made on different sides of questions that are at the center of Italian politics today. It is often lamented by public spirited Italians that civic discourse in their nation has degenerated into the rankest forms of partisanship. They say that political discussions frequently amount to exchanges of insults and other forms of verbal abuse. Ethica is doing something to change that. Its efforts deserve praise and support.

What would believers in consolidationism have to say about civic values and republicanism? Would Robert George or mainstream Italians be willing to repudiate that project? When the scale of a polity is too great, how can political discourse not degenerate as mass man, who has been unshackled from tradition and the bounds of community, is incorporated into it?

Ethica forum di riflesione sui temi dell'etica e della morale
Maurizio Viroli

CUA Press: The Ultimate Why Question
Why Is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever?
Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Vol. 54

John P. Wippel , editor

Zenit:  Benedict XVI's Pentecost Homily
"God Is Reason, God Is Will, God Is Love, God Is Beauty" 

On the Church's Baptism Day
"The Breath of the Holy Spirit Fills the Universe"



Pope Benedict XVI conducts the holy mass of Pentecost Sunday in Saint Peter's Basilica at the Vatican June 12, 2011. (Reuters/Daylife)

Op-StJoseph: You are a Priest forever"
Ordinations to the Priesthood

"You are a Priest forever" from Province of Saint Joseph on Vimeo.

CUA: CUA President Appoints John McCarthy Dean of Philosophy School

Palestrina, Veni Creator Spiritus

Who’s Afraid of Metaphysics? by Matthew O'Brien and Robert C. Koons (the third of their 3-part series on natural law - parts one and two) [via ML]

US Episcopal Churches gaining momentum to form Ordinariate

Sandro Magister, Bishops Or Mandarins? The Dilemma of the Chinese Church

I hadn't seen this connection made between the legitimacy of the Patriotic Association and support of its autonomy before:

On the support given by American and European theologians to the "autonomy" of the Chinese Church

HON: Unfortunately, there is a theology in America and Europe that is also penetrating into the Chinese Church. This theology claims precisely autonomy in the selection of bishops, and independence from the Holy See. And so there are persons in America and Europe who are pushing the Chinese bishops to behave this way. "If you succeed," they say, "we will follow you."

Until a short time ago, these problems of independence and autonomy were only at the level of governance. Now they are also at the theological level.

Once I Was a Clever Boy: Thomist education

Social Practices

What Does it Mean to be a ‘Political Animal’?

Matthew O'Brien and Robert C. Koons, June 06, 2011

A notion of “social practice” should guide the way we think about morality and politics. The first in a three-part series.

In the contemporary American context, too often political and moral debates are cast as winner-take-all contests between the false alternatives of organic collectivism and atomistic individualism. Thus ‘conservatives’ are supposed to be individualists who assert the claims of the individual against society and ‘liberals’ are organicists who want to promote social goods by limiting individual freedom. But the rhetoric of either individualism or organicism renders the full range of human concerns inexpressible. We can see this when individualist conservatives suddenly backtrack towards organicism when, say, they defend the social importance of marriage against assertions of personal autonomy; so, too, when organicist liberals defend an extreme individual right to self-expression that conflicts with their professed concern for social welfare.

The puzzle’s solution lies in the conception of a ‘social practice,’ a conception that has played a central role in much of twentieth-century philosophy. Philosophers as diverse as Tyler Burge, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alasdair MacIntyre, Joseph Raz, John Searle, and others have shown how social practices are a significant feature of philosophical anthropology. In order to understand what social practices are, and to see their relevance to our problem, we need to shift the focus from human individuals to the acts performed by human individuals. We will also need to draw a technical distinction between what we’ll call social institutions and social practices, although these terms are interchangeable in everyday use.

In brief, the solution to the problem is this: social institutions, like a state or a university, are aggregates of the human individuals who compose them, and so the goods of human individuals are prior to the goods of the social institutions of which they are parts. Social institutions ‘host’ social practices like politics and education. Social practices, however, are comprised not of human individuals themselves, but of the acts of human individuals. Human acts are the parts that compose social practices, and human acts are determined by the social practices they compose. In other words, social practices are not mere aggregates, and the relation between individual acts and social practices is analogous to the relation between cells and the whole organism of which the cells are parts.

Thus both organic collectivism and atomic individualism have their kernels of truth, which the natural law account of social practices and social institutions preserves. The collectivist goes wrong in supposing that all social forms are, like social practices, organic wholes. The individualist goes wrong in supposing that all social forms are, like social institutions, aggregative. But the social world is populated both by aggregative social institutions (the NFL, the American Bar Association, the New York Philharmonic) and by the holistic social practices (football, law, classical music) that the corresponding social institutions promote and sustain.

On the natural law account, then, each individual human act has a dual dependency, both on the individual subject (the human agent) who performs it and on the particular practice (or practices) to which it belongs. The individual act draws its nature and its individuality from both sources: it wouldn’t be the very act it is if it had either a different subject or belonged to a different practice. For instance, consider your pulling of the voting lever in the booth on November 4, 2008; that action was what it was because of the social practices in which you were a participant. It was an act of voting, an exercise in justice of your civic duty, a parent’s teaching his child by example, and so on. You intended to pull the lever, and pulling the lever was part of the aforementioned social practices.

The human nature of each individual human being is the ground both for the capacity of the human being to enter into social practices and for the need to do so. It is in this sense that we are social or political animals. When an individual human being participates in a social practice, he allows himself to become an agent of the practice by taking into his intention the intrinsic end (telos) of the practice itself. For instance, in order to play baseball, I must act as a baseball player, which involves making the intrinsic end of the game (victory of my team in accordance with the rules) the end of my baseball-related acts. The nature or essence of the act does not depend solely on the agent’s internal psychology: it depends also on the essence of the social practice to which the act belongs.

Taking a page or two from MacIntyre's After Virtue, no?

Our actions can and should have a bearing on others and our associations, including that perfect association or community of the polis... the goods of individuals and goods of groups - same or different? I wonder if what is being expressed here through the use of "social practices" could be done more simply. Man is a social nature, and part of his good is living with others. There is o such thing as a "social" life without reference to other people; and that cannot come to be without those people existing first. When we look at groups or associations, we consider primarily the good of the friendship itself, and the good that is the foundation of the friendship, what unites the friends in the first place. We can think of social practices as those actions that are particular to the members of a group, qua members of that group -- either those that bring about the good(s) upon which the friendship is based, or the actions that belong to friendship itself.

Friendships in associations can become participations in the political common good (communal life), or forms of civic friendship. They are ordered to that, but they can also become "exclusive" and thus detrimental to the community.(E.g. the group desires its good at the expense of that of the community and acts unjustly, etc.)  We are more familiar with abstract/institutionalized forms of associations, or we may  not be aware that these are associations ordered towards friendship because of our mobility and lack of social cohesion/community. We treat such associations as merely friendships of utility and cease our participation once they are no longer useful to us.

Not all associations are potentially political? It may be easy of us to think of associations that do not involve Aristotle's "friendship of virtue" but is this because we conceive of those associations incorrectly, living the atomized lifestyles we do? What I mean is that many do associate with others for the sake of utility or pleasure, and there is no enduring basis for their association, but should we not be aiming at permanence in our relationships? Isn't that the "ideal"?

Perhaps it is time for me to re-read After Virtue.

Michael Morland on John Finnis

Spurred by the release of the 5-volume collected essays of John Finnis, Michael Moreland praises Finnis:

Even those who disagree with him must acknowledge that Finnis's work--preeminently Natural Law and Natural Rights but also his other books and these essays--is among the towering achievements in Catholic intellectual life over the past 50 years.

World-wide? Even if one were to limit the area of influence to the United States, it might still be an exaggeration to claim this about the work of John Finnis. Finnis may have had disciples in the Anglophone world, but has he really persuaded non-Catholics of his version of the Natural Law? Aren't there some Catholic intellectuals who might rank a bit higher? Yves Congar? Louis Bouyer? Perhaps they belong too much to the first half of the twentieth century. How about Joseph Ratzinger, then? Or another contemporary theologian. I'm naming people who aren't Dominicans or Thomists, just to emphasize the point-why Finnis? Is he receiving credit (by a disciple) for creating a novel account of natural law and natural law morality? He doesn't present himself as a exponent of the Thomistic tradition in moral theology/philosophy. If this world continues for another 500 years, I'd be surprised if the work of Finnis (or the NNLT) continues to find readers...



Kevin Lee, A Sample of John Finnis

Thomas Merton on St. Bernard of Clairveaux

The Archdruid's latest, In the World After Abundance, called to mind some of the comments for this thread at The Spearhead, Still They Serve, which advocated nuclear energy. We all like our American way of life, the convenience and its easiness. Some would perpetuate it at all costs, dismissing the risks involved as negligible. Some men(?) have even criticized Angela Merkel's decision to move Germany away from nuclear energy as the typical decision-making of a woman, valuing security/safety more than anything else. I haven't done the risk analysis and I question the use of statistics in arguments, but even if safety/health is not the highest good for human beings, can we say that a life of convenience is worth the risk of something really bad happening?

How does the argument from safety against nuclear energy differ from the corresponding argument for gun control/prohibition? Does it follow from whether the fear is reasonable or not? Is inaction therefore justified? (We would then have to deal with the question of risk assessments. Oh, and the commensurability of goods.) Or is it because a gun is not always in use while a nuclear power plant is? The negative effects of nuclear power are always being contained while the plant is in operation. What can the nuclear power plant be protected against, and how many different things could happen to threaten it? Only one bad thing could happen with a gun, its being misused, so in comparison the number of safeguards that are needed for a gun are fewer.

Women are typically more cautious, while men are more willing to take risks.
Each "attitude" or inclination has its place, but one must consider the reasonableness of the inclination by the goods involved. It may be foolhardy to risk death for $50. But for $200 million, if it could help one's family and village?

I haven't really focused on this aspect of moral reasoning before...

(cross-posted at The New Beginning)

The limits of human law

The Western Confucian juxtaposes the view of the state (and law) given by Nicholas Hosford in The Role of the State with John Finnis's interpretation of Aquinas in his SEP article. According to the latter, "coercive jurisdiction extends to defending persons and property both by force and by the credible threat of punishment for criminal or other unjust appropriation or damage[, b]ut it does not extend to enforcing any part of morality other than the requirements of justice insofar as they can be violated by acts external to the choosing and acting person's will."

In his article dealing with the limits of law, Aquinas writes that law prohibits "only the more grievous vices," chiefly grave forms of injustice. But it is not necessarily limited to prohibiting injustice, as Finnis (and liberals) would maintain. Because of the unity of the virtues, one could argue that law can prohibit those "private" vices which could potentially undermine justice and living up to one's obligations to the community. (Is it not the case that disordered desires can lead to the performing of unjust acts for the sake of fulfilling those desires?) Injustice is a direct threat to communal living, but it seems to me that law can be used to protect all that is ordered to virtuous life with others.


One way to counter this is deny this thesis of the unity of the virtues (as Finnis does, I believe - I will have to double-check). One can separate the acquisition of justice from the acquisition of the other virtues. Finnis does this by weakening the notion of virtue to the point that it is simply habitual rule-following. One of his disciples, Robert George, allows for the extent of law to be greater (so that it encompasses the banning of pornography, for example). I will have to see if he diverges from Finnis in his premises. (Making Men Moral and In Defense of Natural Law.)

David Werling, Why Not the Univocal?
A Response to Fr. Cavalcoli in the Ongoing Debate
Regarding Vatican II and the Traditionalist Critique

(Fr. Giovanni Cavalcoli, Why Not Univocal Indeed!)

Does God command genocide?

Two by Kyle Cupp: Genocide and Divine Command Theory and Authoritarian Ethics. See the comments to the first by Dominic Holtz, O.P. and A Sinner.

WIRED: U.N. Report Declares Internet Access a Human Right

Op-StJoseph: New Issue of Dominicana
Journal of the Dominican Students

DSPT: Reflection on Pope Benedict XVI's "Jesus of Nazareth"

View on ExposureRoom

Aquinas Lecture 2011

The Vocation of the Catholic Philosopher: From Maritain to John Paul II
John P. Hittinger , ed.

Will Catholic philosophers in the United States lead the charge for a change in Catholic higher education and how it is being handled? Who will speak the truth to power about the higher education scam? Hiding behind the defense that a Catholic liberal education is not meant to be practical will seem self-serving.

The American Maritain Association

Stefan Sagmeister: 7 rules for making more happiness

bio

I'll have to watch this some other time...

Thomistic Institute

An introduction to the new website.

Thomistic Institute Website from Province of Saint Joseph on Vimeo.