Fundamentalists? We?

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October 3, 2006 12:00 AM

Fundamentalists? We?
Bad science, worse philosophy, and McCarthyite tactics in the human-embyro debate.

By Patrick Lee & Robert P. George

We have in many places argued for the humanity and fundamental dignity of human beings in the embryonic stage of development and all later stages. In defending embryonic human life, we have pointed out that every human adult was once an embryo, just as he or she was once an adolescent, and before that a child, and before that an infant, and before that a fetus. This is not a religious claim or a piece of metaphysical speculation. It is an empirical fact. The complete human organism — the whole living member of the species Homo sapiens — that is, for example, you the reader, is the same human individual that at an earlier point in his or her life was an adolescent, a child, an infant, a fetus, an embryo. From the embryonic stage forward, all you needed for your survival and continued growth towards adulthood along the continuum of human development was a suitable environment, adequate nutrition, and freedom from grave disease.

In short, we have argued — though it is fairer to say that we have pointed out, since the scientific facts are not in dispute — that human embryos do not differ in kind from (other) human beings; rather, they differ from other human beings merely in respect of their stage of development. Embryos, fetuses, infants, adolescents, and adults are not different kinds of being — the way a human, an elk, a spider, a cucumber, and an amoeba are different kinds of being. Embryos, fetuses, infants, adolescents, and adults are the same kind of being at different developmental stages.

Still, Lee Silver in “The Biotechnology Culture Clash,” published in Science and Theology News (July 18, 2006), and more fully in a new book entitled Challenging Nature, insists that our views about the humanity and dignity of the human embryo are grounded in religious beliefs. He accuses us of concocting a scientific sounding case against embryo-destructive research in an effort to impose our religious beliefs on others while evading the constitutional prohibition of laws respecting an establishment of religion.

So Now We’re Fundamentalist Theologians?
Silver says that the claim that human embryos are human beings at an early stage of development is “hidden theology.” This could mean two different things. First, as this claim is presented in the book, Silver asserts that we actually hold our position on the status of the human embryo on theological grounds. We are, he suggests, hiding this fact, manufacturing arguments that sound scientific, but are in reality merely a cover for our real, theological, and indeed, “fundamentalist” grounds.

To describe such a claim as an ad hominem argument is to exaggerate its standing. It is nothing more than ad hominem abuse. Silver knows that we are Catholics, and so he uses that fact to suggest that our real ground for believing that human embryos are human beings is Catholic doctrine. But here he has things exactly backwards. Our ground for believing that human embryos are human beings is the indisputable scientific fact that each human embryo is a complex, living, individual member of the human species. Although our claim does not rest on the authority of the Catholic Church, or any other religious body or tradition, we find the Church’s teaching against human embryo-killing credible precisely because it — unlike Silver’s contrary teaching — is in line with the embryological facts. If “fundamentalism” consists in obstinately clinging to a moral, religious, or political view in defiance of empirically demonstrable findings of science that falsify its premises, we are not the fundamentalists in this debate. It is Lee Silver himself who has fallen into a form of fundamentalism.

The biological fact that human embryos are human beings in the earliest stages of their natural development is, to say the least, inconvenient for Professor Silver. So he commits the very offense of which he accuses us and others who oppose his agenda. He hides his ideology under a veneer of science. But the veneer is easily pulled off and the truth exposed. Just examine any of the major embryology texts now in use in American medicine. What you will find is the teaching that a new human individual exists from the earliest embryonic stage forward. That individual is a complete, though, of course, developmentally immature, member of the human species, whose life — whether it lasts for nine minutes, nine days, nine years, or nine decades — is a human life.

The second thing Silver could mean by his “hidden theology” allegation is that our argument depends on an implicit theological premise, whether or not we are aware of it. In the bulk of his analysis, this seems to be Silver’s claim against us. It is a bold charge, and to support it, Silver would have to show that at least one of the premises of our argument is such that anyone asserting that premise must depend on religious faith for his presumed awareness of it. For example, if one could show that a person could advance a particular argument only if he presupposed that God is three persons in one being, or that God became man — propositions about the inner life of God or about his free choices, and so in principle not provable by reason unaided by faith — then it would follow that the argument depended on a theological premise. So, what religious dogma does Professor Silver find lurking in our premises? What is the unstated religiously dogmatic assumption of our argument? At what point are we “stealthy servants of God” (as Silver characterizes us on p. 116)? The hidden assumption, according to Silver, is the following: that a thing either is or is not a human being (though, curiously, on p. 83 Silver actually quotes Robert George openly asserting this supposedly “hidden” assumption).

According to Silver, “This assumption comes from an interpretation of Genesis by certain religious groups that strictly follow the Bible. Genesis 1:27 says, ‘God created man in His own image.’ And that is interpreted by some as meaning that God created man instantaneously. There can be no such thing as gradual creation because then you have partial man, and man would not be in the image of God. There is no such thing as a partial God. God is absolute.”

This is risible. First, the supposed theological argument grounding the key assumption does not even make sense. Formally, the argument would be: “God is not partial; humans are like God; therefore no humans are partial.” But by this argument pattern one could also conclude that humans must be uncreated, perfect, infinite, and eternal. Is it really likely that such nonsense would be the hidden inference bolstering our assertions?

Second, the idea that a thing either is or is not a human being is not a proposition about the inner life of God or about God’s free choices — propositions beyond the reach of reason unaided by faith. Why assume that a very straightforward proposition about human individuals is something knowable only by religious faith?

Third, many philosophers, both ancient and contemporary, some religious and some not religious (e.g., Aristotle, David Wiggins, Roderick Chisholm, Peter Van Inwagen, E. J. Lowe, and many others) have ably defended this proposition on philosophical grounds.

Fourth, this proposition is part of common sense (a fact that doesn’t by itself prove it, but does provide support for it). Most people believe that they persist through time, and so, by implication, that there is a profound difference between their becoming this or that (say, tall or tan), and their coming to be at all. If I am the same concrete being yesterday and today, then I exist completely at each time that I exist (though I constantly change by acquiring new qualities, changing in quantity, and so on). And if I exist wholly at each time that I exist, it follows that I came to be, that is, began to exist, at once and not gradually. Otherwise, during my coming to be I would exist partially, not wholly. Thus, as common sense would have it: there are degrees in various qualities and quantities, such as colors or sizes, but there are no degrees about whether an individual exists or not; either he exists (however developmentally immature or tiny) or he does not.

Finally, there are strong philosophical arguments in favor of this common sense view. The denial of it logically entails what is sometimes called “perdurantism,” or “the temporal parts view” — namely, that a person is only a series of events or experiences spread out in time, like a baseball game or a song. On this view, the temporal extent of a person is part of what he is, and at any one time he exists only partially, not fully. As a consequence, according to this view, “I today” and “I yesterday” refer not to the same concrete individual, but to different temporal phases of the whole series temporally extended.

Were You You Yesterday?
This view has several grave problems, two of which we will mention here. The first difficulty is that, according to this view, a human being (or any ultimate subject of existence) is the sum of time-slices suitably connected (say, by biological or psychological continuity). But what is a time-slice, and, how could time-slices give rise to a human organism’s (or any organism’s) extension through time? If the time-slice itself does not have temporal extent, then the addition of any number of time-slices to each other will not give rise to a temporally extended series — just as the addition of any number of unextended points will not produce an extended line. On the other hand, if the time-slice of a human being does have temporal extent, then no explanatory gain has been achieved by denying a persisting human being, since one will then (by necessity) have admitted that an individual as a whole can persist through at least some extent of time. But if one must admit persistence through time at one level, why not admit it at the level that common sense and explanatory practice seem to demand — that is, the lifetime of a human individual who persists through time?

A second problem with the temporal-parts view is that, in effect, it actually implies the complete denial of change. On the temporal-parts position, a particular object, such as a human being, is not wholly present at any given time. Rather, just as an object has spatial parts, so that at small portions of space only part of it is present, so (on the temporal parts view) each object has temporal parts. An object, for example an apple, has a part that is present at one time, say on Monday, and another part that is present at another time, say on Tuesday. The apple is composed of different temporal parts or stages. Thus, the apple is green at one temporal stage (Monday) and red at another temporal stage (Tuesday). But on this view it follows that in the strict sense there simply is no change. A flagpole that is green at one spatial part and red at another part does not involve any change; but by the same token, an apple that is green at one temporal part and red at another temporal part involves no change either. For real change to occur, the same subject must first be characterized in one way and then in another way.

But it is obvious that change does occur. Consequently, an object (a substance) is not just a series of events, but exists wholly at each time that it exists. When it comes to be, it must come to be at once (though, of course, once it comes into being it may, depending on the kind of substance it is, grow in size and proceed through various developmental phases towards maturity). Changes can precede this substantial coming to be, changes that dispose the future constituents of the substance more and more to that substantial change. For example, fertilization is a gradual process that results in the coming to be of a new organism. But the organism itself does not exist until the process is completed. Prior to the completion of this process it is not correct to say that the new organism partially exists. (It does not “partially exist” during the process.) When it comes into existence, it comes into existence as a whole organism. But the substantial change itself — the actual change from not existing to existing — must be at once.

Thus, both common sense and philosophical arguments provide strong support for the proposition that human beings cannot partially exist, that a human being either is or is not. It is ridiculous to claim — as Silver does — that this proposition is a hidden theological assumption. (Indeed, it would be ridiculous to classify it as a theological belief, as opposed to a philosophical one, even if it could be shown to be incorrect.)

Part and Whole: A Basic Distinction
In addition to claiming that our position is based on “hidden theology,” Silver presents an argument in the form of a reductio ad absurdum for his denial that early stage human embryos are embryonic human beings. He says: “Embryonic stem cells can develop into an actual person. So, based on the definition of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, embryonic stem cells are equivalent to embryos. Yet based on the molecular signals that you give the cells, the cells can change from embryonic to nonembryonic and back to embryonic. You can do this easily.” But the first sentence just quoted from Silver is simply false. Embryonic stem cells are functionally parts of a complete organism; they are not themselves complete human organisms. (When separated from the whole human organism, they are no longer functioning parts of that organism; they become mere cells — fundamentally different from whole, though immature, members of the human species.)

A human embryo — precisely because it is a complete member of the human species — can develop towards maturity, given a suitable environment and adequate nutrition. The embryo possesses the genetic and epigenetic primordia and the active disposition for self-directed growth towards the next more-mature stage. But this is not true of a stem cell or even of a mass of stem cells. Like somatic cells that might be used in cloning, they possess merely a passive capacity to be subjected to various techniques of asexual reproduction and so become parts of a new human organism.

Silver bases his claim that “embryonic stem cells are equivalent to embryos” on the fact that mouse embryos can be generated from embryonic mouse stem cells and have all of their genetic makeup, and cell lineage, derived from those initial stem cells. A tetraploid embryo-like entity known, though controversially, as a tetraploid “embryo” (“tetraploid” meaning that the entity has four sets of chromosomes rather than the normal two sets) is developmentally defective, so it can give rise only to trophoblastic cells (precursors of the placenta and associated tissues) and not to the cells of the “embryo proper.” When combined with mouse ES cells (ones that have a normal number of chromosomes), these can produce a chimeric mouse in which the cell lineage of its placenta and associated tissues is derived from the tetraploid entity (or “embryo”), and the cell lineage of the mature embryo (the “embryo proper”) is derived from the ES cells. From this, Silver infers that ES cells can by themselves develop into the mature stage of the animal (see his book, p. 140) — “by themselves” in the sense that the DNA in all of the mature embryo’s cells is identical to that in the ES cells.

Since it is often argued that human embryos are human beings because they can “by themselves” develop into mature humans, it follows — on Silver’s argument — that embryos and stem cells are (ontologically and morally) equivalent. But since it is absurd to think that ES cells are human beings, it also is absurd (Silver’s argument continues) to think human embryos are human beings.

This argument is a descendent of an earlier, similar argument that embryos are morally equivalent to somatic cells (such as skin cells) because somatic cells can produce mature human beings by way of cloning via somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). In SCNT the nucleus of a somatic cell is inserted into an enucleated ovum and they are caused to fuse by an electrical stimulus, the result (if all goes as planned) being a cloned embryo. It was argued (by Ronald Bailey, Peter Singer, and others) that since somatic cells are converted into embryos, and these grow into mature members of the relevant species, human embryos have no more exalted a status than ordinary somatic cells, such as skin cells. Some critics of this argument replied that the somatic cells cannot by themselves develop into mature humans, which is certainly true. The important point, though, is that the SCNT process makes use of the somatic cells to create entities of a different nature — using parts of human organisms (somatic cells) to make new complete human organisms at the embryonic stage of development.

Thus, in the context of SCNT cloning, somatic cells are analogous to sperm and oocytes (parts of whole organisms) rather than to embryos (which indeed are whole organisms). But Silver thinks production of a mature mouse by tetraploid complementation answers that reply: In this process, the more mature organism is derived directly from the ES cells, so the ES cells do (according to Silver) in some sense by themselves become whole embryos. He thinks this process shows that, just like embryos, ES cells also can develop into mature members of their species if they are just given a suitable environment.

Confusion over Tetraploid Complementation
However, this fundamentally misinterprets the results of tetraploid complementation. In addition, it repeats the mistake in the earlier argument. Tetraploid complementation does not show that the “entire embryo” can be derived from ES cells. The embryo (or embryo-like entity) generated from tetraploid complementation is a chimera, with parts derived from the original embryo that was induced to become tetraploid and parts derived from the ES cells. The placenta and other organs generated from the tetraploid cells are parts of the embryo. They are bodily organs that function only during embryonic life, but they are bodily organs none the less — analogous to baby teeth, which also function only during a portion of the animal-organism’s life cycle. The placenta is a vital organ of the embryo, and it is not directly made by the ES cells.

Moreover, in tetraploid complementation, the ES cells do not by themselves generate a mouse since they do not by internal self-direction develop into a mouse. So the ES cells are not mouse embryos or their equivalent, and never were. True, the mature mouse’s cell lineage is completely derived from the ES cells, but an analogous point is also true in SCNT cloning — the DNA of the mature mouse or sheep or other animal is identical to that of the donor somatic cell (although the cytoplasm from the enucleated ovum also has a determinative effect). The central point is that, just as in SCNT cloning, so here: the manipulation (in this case, the combining of the ES cells with the tetraploid entity or “embryo”) generates a new type of biological entity. This is demonstrated by the profoundly new type of behavior observed in the entity produced by the process or processes of tetraploid complementation. The manipulations involved do much more than merely release an inner capacity of the stem cells. The combining of the stem cells with the tetraploid embryo does not merely place these cells in an environment hospitable to the process of organismal development. Rather, it transforms them from functional parts to components of an actively developing whole organism. Or, more precisely expressed: the combining of the stem cells with the cells of the tetraploid embryo generates a new organism, an organism that is not a stem cell.

The tetraploid complementation procedure is simply a type of cloning. In the most common form of cloning — SCNT — a new organism is generated; it comes into being as an embryo which immediately begins actively developing itself into the more mature form of the whole organism it now is. Completely analogous to what occurs in tetraploid complementation, the new embryo in SCNT cloning has the same genetic code as the somatic cell. The combining of stem cells with a tetraploid embryo does to the mouse stem cells what fusing an enucleated ovum does to a somatic cell in SCNT, the procedure that generated Dolly the sheep and many other cloned mammals — namely, it produces a distinct, whole organism.

So a stem cell does not “become” an embryo (the way an embryo truly does become a fetus, an infant, a child, an adolescent, and an adult). Rather, many stem cells are used in a cloning process that, if successful, results in the production of a new and distinct organism. The proof that this results in an entirely new and distinct organism is that it has a radically different trajectory of growth.

Thus stem cells are not equivalent to embryos. They lack the defining feature of embryos, namely, the internal active disposition to develop themselves to the mature stage of the organism of the relevant species. If placed within an environment suitable for the development of human embryos, human stem cells do not do what embryos do. (The crucial fact that by themselves — that is, when not introduced into a pre-existing, albeit defective, tetraploid embryo — ES cells produce only disorganized masses of tissue, either embryoid bodies or teratomas, is conveniently ignored by Silver.) Only if human stem cells are joined with other factors so as to generate a distinct and whole organism in SCNT, or in the combining of stem cells with tetraploid embryo-like entities, does an embryo come to be.

Several passages in Silver’s book indicate that he regularly fails to see the significance of the distinction between a whole organism, on the one hand, and a tissue or part of an organism, on the other hand. Thus, he believes our argument is easily refuted by pointing out that a single human skin cell or a teratoma has the same genetic code as other (whole) members of the relevant species. But our argument has never been simply that human embryos are human beings because they have the full genetic code. Rather, we have always argued that their full genetic code, plus (and more importantly) their internal active disposition for self-directed development toward the mature stage of a human, show that they are what the standard embryology texts say they are, namely, distinct and whole (though immature) individuals of the human species.

Stem Cells Are Human Too?
Having assumed erroneously that one can convert a human stem cell into a human embryo and back again quite easily, Silver then says:

So then you can ask, ‘How many human beings are there in a dish of embryonic stem cells?’ If there are a million cells in the dish, and you separate all the cells, then you have a million human beings. But you can then put them back together to form a single organism. What happened to the 999,999 human beings? Robert George would say they all died.

He supposes that this is a decisive argument, but in truth it is a failure. The prospect of actually creating and then killing almost a million human embryos merely by separating cells is a figment of Silver’s imagination.

To the question, “How many human beings are there in a dish of embryonic stem cells” the answer is: none, for stem cells, like other somatic cells, are not human beings.

When Silver asserts next, “If there are a million cells in the dish, and you separate all the cells, then you have a million human beings,” this is simply incorrect. You must do much more than merely separate stem cells in order to generate embryos. Separating them will merely spread them apart. Like a somatic cell, a stem cell must be fused with something else that will transform it from a part into a whole in order to produce an embryo.

But suppose that a lab were successfully to produce a million clones from human embryonic stem cells. How many nascent human beings would you have? The answer is: a million. Of course, no one, to date, has managed to demonstrate success in cloning even a single human embryo, using the methods that succeeded (with much labor) in other mammals. The scenario Silver proposes (which involves producing a million clones in a short time) is not possible today, and perhaps will never be possible. It certainly cannot be “easily done.” Moreover, if tetraploid complementation were successfully performed on human stem cells, only one human organism would be generated from several stem cells, not one embryo per stem cell.

Conspiracy Theories
Silver’s errors in dealing with embryological science are nothing by comparison to the extraordinary charges he makes when he turns his attention to political matters. Silver claims to have uncovered an extremist right-wing conspiracy among academics and politicians. He asserts that there is a highly organized effort by “fundamentalists” to gain control over portions of our government and schools, in order to impose a narrow religion on all.

For example, Nigel Cameron is a Christian who claims to present pro-life arguments that can appeal to all people, whether religious or not. Silver first exposes Cameron’s Christianity, quoting from an article Cameron wrote extolling the merits of a theological understanding of medicine. Silver then says that Cameron is using “code words” to convey religious messages to Christians, codes that are not recognized as religious by unsuspecting seculars. He adds: “Cameron’s tactics are taken from the playbook of clever fundamentalists who feel impelled to instill their beliefs as soon as possible, not just in their own children, but in everyone else’s children as well” (p. 102). Again, Silver refers to pro-life intellectuals, including Robert George, as advocates of an ideology who put forth “scientific-sounding arguments to advance their case” (p. 112). He warns of the craftiness of fundamentalists who might lure scientists into arguing with each other: “And so fundamentalists often succeed in transforming a religious debate into a dispute among scientists”(p. 118). One must especially be careful to resist their secular-sounding slogans, which (again) are codes that usually only fundamentalists understand the true meaning of: “Theological terms and ideas are translated into secular-sounding code words and phrases. Sanctity is converted into dignity, the soul becomes life, and the biblical version of morality is presented as a secular bioethics” (p. 118).

Here Silver veers from bad science and even worse philosophy into sheer paranoia. He seems incapable of understanding that the issues about which he is writing are complex and difficult matters on which reasonable people can reasonably disagree. Instead, he assumes that anyone who does not share his opinions is a “fundamentalist” (or dupe of the “fundamentalists”) and is part of a sinister conspiracy to impose a theocracy.

Speaking of Robert George, Silver writes: “Almost certainly, George knows that his so-called ‘scientific evidence’ finds no acceptance among any secular, molecular, or modern developmental biology professor at any major research university” (p. 108). Yet a glance at any of the standard embryology textbooks rebuts this claim. See, for example, Bruce Carlson, Human Embryology and Developmental Biology (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 2004); William J. Larsen, Human Embryology, 3rd ed. (2001); Keith Moore and T.V.N. Persaud, The Developing Human, Clinically Oriented Embryology, 7th ed. (2003); and Ronan O’Rahilly and Fabiola Mueller, Human Embryology and Teratology, 3rd edition (2000).)

According to Silver, one should also be wary of conservative think tanks, since they are actually hot-beds of conspiracy: “Evangelical think tanks and lobbying groups proliferate with innocent-sounding names like the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, which is directed by the fundamentalist Nigel Cameron” (p. 118). (It would probably be useless to point out to Silver that Dr. Cameron is no fundamentalist, and does not direct the center in question.) Indeed, according to Silver, “The subterfuge is more subtle, but no less potent, in the academic realm. One particular secular-sounding word — natural — frequently infuses the arguments of diverse opponents of biotechnology” (p. 119). Here the entire philosophical tradition of “natural law” reasoning on ethics, whose roots predate Christianity by at least three centuries in the works of Aristotle, becomes a mere façade for the “fundamentalist” conspiracy.

In the end, Silver’s manner of arguing degenerates into a form of McCarthyism. He relentlessly uncovers the Christianity of various lawyers, political figures, writers, physicians, and academics, describing them as “stealthy servants of God.” On his list of Christian “fundamentalists” and individuals collaborating with them (some of whom are Jews) to impose Christian theological dogmas on the entire nation are: Johns Hopkins Medical School surgeon and President’s Council on Bioethics member Benjamin Carson, Oxford University legal philosopher John Finnis, Harvard Law School professor Mary Ann Glendon, Stanford University consulting professor and President’s Council on Bioethics member William Hurlbut, former President’s Council on Bioethics executive director Yuval Levin, and Johns Hopkins Medical School psychiatry professor and President’s Council on Bioethics member Paul McHugh. We wouldn’t be surprised to learn that Silver has a list of 205 card-carrying fundamentalists and their fellow-travelers. Perhaps he will ask others, “Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Christian religion?”

Losing It Completely
Going from the ridiculous to the bizarre, Silver extends his conspiracy theory to his fellow scientists. As we have observed, he insists that human embryonic stem cells are the equivalent of embryos because they are (he supposes) capable of developing into human babies. Why hasn’t the public been made aware of this remarkable “fact”? Because, he says, scientists have deliberately kept the public in ignorance: “stem cell scientists know this fact, but they have succeeded in hiding it from the public at-large.” Oh, those stealthy servants of science! There they are, in full knowledge of a key fact about embryonic stem cells, but deliberately covering it up lest the unenlightened masses become alarmed and start slapping new restrictions on legitimate research.

One can be forgiven for savoring the irony here. If, as Silver claims, stem cell scientists have deliberately concealed what they believe to be the truth about embryonic stem cells — namely, that they are equivalent to embryos — then he has established that embryonic stem cell scientists cannot be trusted to be honest with their fellow citizens about facts that might be politically inconvenient. If, on the other hand, what Silver alleges about his fellow scientists is false, then his own credibility collapses.

Silver’s real problem is that the proposition that the human embryo from the zygote stage forward is a distinct, complete (though immature) human being, identical with the child or adolescent which later everyone will recognize as possessing basic rights — that this proposition is fully supported by arguments open to people of all faiths, or of no faith at all. He resorts to name calling (“fundamentalists”), ad hominem abuse, and McCarthyite tactics to distract attention from the scientific facts and their logical implications. Those implications are inescapable once we accept the moral principle that all human beings are entitled to equal concern and respect.

Contrary to what Silver imagines, the great threat to embryo-destructive research is not that “fundamentalists” will take control of the United States government; it is that citizens of every faith, or of none at all, will acquaint themselves with what modern embryology has revealed about human embryogenesis and development.

— Patrick Lee is professor of bioethics at the Franciscan University of Steubenville. . Robert P. George is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and director of the James Madison Program at Princeton University.

E. T. Oakes, Reason and Pop Atheism

Reason and Pop Atheism
By Edward T. Oakes, S.J.

The publishing world, it seems, is just as prone to the fickleness of trends and fashions as is, well, the fashion industry. A few years ago, a whole spate of books came out on Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust, most of them flogging (surely not by coincidence) the same dead horse of papal perfidy. More recently, several books arguing for atheism have cropped up on the bestseller lists. I’ve looked at a few, and none of them struck me as even trying to get beyond that old dorm-room chestnut: “If God made the universe, who made God?” Gosh, thanks for bringing that up, Professor Bright. I had never really thought of that before—and now, horribile dictu, I’ve lost my faith!

Needless to say, our recent atheists, without exception, have to drag Darwin into the business. But—also without exception—they end up taking the implications of Darwinian biology so far that their arguments become self-consuming. I am thinking especially of the notion that cultural ideas are only “memes,” that is, self-replicating trends that catch on and take over a culture the way viruses do in the human body. One favorite example would be teenagers who wear baseball caps backwards: An impish adolescent somewhere gets the idea to wear his cap backwards, and soon every boy in the land is following suit.

The next step then is to claim that religion, too, is a meme, and a mighty destructive one at that, the Ebola virus of human civilization. The trouble is, if all ideas are but memes, then so is natural selection, whose cultural influence has its own bloody history to account for. On that, I recommend the reader get a hold of Richard Weikart’s From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany, which carefully traces Darwin’s influence on a host of prominent intellectuals in Germany from 1860 to 1939, a genealogy of “memetic contagion” that made Nazi ideology so plausible to so many. (For a fuller review of this truly brilliant book, see my article “Darwin’s Graveyards” in the December 2006 issue of Books & Culture.”)

Tedious and self-consuming as these arguments are, their popularity—if one is to judge by the bestseller lists—did get me to thinking about atheism as a cultural phenomenon. As I always ask my class when I teach contemporary theology: If God exists, why are there atheists? Or rather, and to put more strongly: Since God exists, what makes atheism conceptually possible?

I let my students crack their noggins on that question for a while to prepare them to take up one of the texts in the course, The Discovery of God by the renowned French Jesuit Henri de Lubac, which deals directly with this issue of atheism as made possible by God.

Part of the problem is psychological: even the most knock-down arguments in mathematics fade in the brain after a while, like sand castles on the beach. For example, I would never presume to raise objections against Euclid’s plane geometry, but I’d be hard pressed to reproduce what I learned in sophomore high-school geometry after all these years.

But the problem goes much deeper than the vagaries of human memory. St. Anselm thought he had his own knock-down argument for the existence of God, which later went by the name of the Ontological Argument (which Thomas Aquinas held to be invalid). But however much Anselm was convinced of the argument, he never went so far as to place moral blame on those who rejected it, because for him there was a deeper reality behind the phenomenon of atheism. As he said in the Proslogion (the best translation is De Veritate):

Why this, O Lord, why this? Is the eye darkened by its own weakness, or blinded by your light?—Without doubt it is darkened in itself and blinded by you, obscured by its own littleness and overwhelmed by your immensity, contracted by its own narrowness and overcome by your greatness.

As I presume most people reading this site know, the First Vatican Council declared de fide that the existence of God can be proved by reason. At first glance, this seems paradoxical. For if God can be proved through rational demonstration, one would expect the council to adduce this marvelous proof and let it be judged on its own merits. And because of de Lubac’s critique of the “manual Thomism” of the Roman universities in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (which placed heavy emphasis on rational proofs for God’s existence), one might also think that de Lubac would dismiss the sterile rationalism that some theologians claim lurks behind Vatican I.

But that is not his position at all. De Lubac quite openly asserts that “behind the apparent variations, the skeleton of the proof always remains the same. The proof is solid and eternal, as hard as steel. It is something more than one of reason’s inventions: it is reason itself.”

What happens then is that, once this proof is formulated in words, the learned make adaptations and modifications as they encounter objections. But these modifications are for de Lubac in no way part of the incontrovertible proof that he holds to be the common patrimony of mankind: the use of reason itself. Hence de Lubac’s confident conclusion:

All the objections brought against the various proofs for the existence of God are in vain; criticism can never invalidate them, for it can never get its teeth into the principle common to them all. On the contrary, that principle emerges more clearly as the elements with which the proofs are constructed are rearranged. . . . It forms part of the substance of the mind. It is not a path which the mind can be discouraged from pursuing to the end, or one from which it can turn away, afraid of having taken the wrong road. Path and mind are merged together. The mind itself is a moving path (de Lubac’s emphasis).

At first glance, de Lubac might seem to be elevating the place of reason here to such a height that he ends up conceding reason’s right to judge the things of God—the very procedure he found so objectionable in Descartes and Kant. That, however, is not his intent, which is why he so stresses the dynamism of reason. Augustine defined sin as “the heart turned in on itself,” the corollary of which for de Lubac would be: The Enlightenment (at least in its French and German versions) is reason turned in on itself.

What has always struck readers of the Continental Rationalists from Descartes to Kant is how all these Rationalists divide reason from desire (usually called by them, tellingly, the passions, meaning feelings that overwhelm us rather than longings that express our inmost nature). De Lubac, on the contrary, sees reason and desire as parts of the same whole, subsumed under the wider image of “heart,” encompassing them both. And because desire is inherently outward in its aim, thereby testifying to a deficiency in the self, the same holds true of reason. Precisely because we never start off in possession of the truth, we must go out in search of it, always desiring it on the way. And that dynamism aims, however unawares, at God. This is why Thomas Aquinas can say in De Veritate: “All knowing beings implicitly know God in everything they know.”

In other words, what all proofs are really reaching for is this common fund of inchoate awareness of the necessity of God already present whenever reason exercises its rational faculties. In one of his many footnotes, de Lubac quotes Maurice Blondel, who makes just this point: Proofs for the existence of God, Blondel says, “are not so much an invention as an inventory, not so much a revelation as an elucidation, a purification and a justification of the fundamental beliefs of humanity.”

That said, de Lubac refuses to countenance faulty reasoning just because an invalid argument is aiming for the same conclusion as do valid proofs. Believers’ faith might well be strong enough to slough off bad arguments for God’s existence, but that should be no excuse for sloth in reasoning: “Where belief in God is concerned, I cannot rest content with a doubtful argument, and an inconclusive proof is as repugnant to my moral sense as it is offensive to my intelligence.” And further: “Even in the most essential matters a sinner may reason better than a saint.” Rigor in reasoning is no sin; rightly realized, it testifies to faith’s underlying rationality.

But even in cases where, say, a Thomas Aquinas trumps a David Hume in the field of argument, the believer feels vaguely dissatisfied:

Why is it that the mind which has found God still retains, or constantly reverts to, the feeling of not having found him? … The temptation is to succumb to this scandal and to despair in proportion as one has formerly thought to have found him: a temptation to deny the light because the veil becomes opaque once again…. The temptation in this case is to underestimate the obstacles, to imagine that serenity is easily acquired, and to confuse the faint clarity of being with the divine light.

Just think what would happen, de Lubac asks, if rational proofs really did lead to certainty: Then we would mistake the proof for God; and, in the manner of the French “enlightened” philosophes, we would in effect end up building a temple, not to God, but to reason. But that is the very definition of reason’s sin, turning inward. We would then make reason the object of our worship, rather than God. (In the midst of the maelstrom of the French Revolution, some Jacobins actually built a “Temple to Reason.”)

But when we turn to God via our rational faculties, we simultaneously recognize both the underlying rationality of our faith in God and yet also reason’s insufficiency to grant us what we really long for: light itself in a dark world. That light, however, only comes from God, not reason. We are pilgrims, and reason is our viaticum —but it is only viaticum. The nourishment this food for the journey provides is salubrious (when the reasoning is correct), but it is not life itself, only the provisions for life, which only God can provide.

Edward T. Oakes, S.J., teaches theology at the University of St. Mary of the Lake.

BC Spring 2007 Philosophy Lecture Series

The Spring 2007 Philosophy Lecture Series is as follows:

** January 29, 5:00pm, Higgins 300: Our own colleague, Mary Troxell (Boston
College): "The Role of the Ideas in Schopenhauer's Metaphysics", with a
commentary by Prof. John Sallis (Boston College)

** February 9, 4:30pm, Higgins 300: Robert Bernasconi (Vanderbilt):
"The Policing of Race Mixing: When Racism Came under the Sway of Biopower."

** Feb 23, 4:30pm, Higgins 300: Claudia Barachi (New School
University): "On Friendship and the Polis"

** March 22, 7:00pm, Cushing 001 (note the change): Dr, Edmund Pelligrino,
(Chairperson Presidential Bioethics Commission): Annual LaBrecque Medical
Ethics Lecture: "Bioethics and Catholic Conscience"
-- followed by Seminar & luncheon, 12:00noon, March 23

** March 30, 4:30pm, Higgins 300: John Caputo (Syracuse University):
" Marion's Line: Overcoming Phenomenology's Neoplatonic Captivity"

** I Also Call Your Attention to: Our 8th Annual Graduate Student
Conference, "On Hegel,"
See website for information: http://fmwww.bc.edu/pl/grad/GradConf/Gradconf07/BC-PhilGrad.html

Medieval Philosophy and Theology

website

Aristotle's Hylomorphism

From Dr. Pakaluk:

Call for Abstracts

The University of Alaska Anchorage has funded a conference on Aristotle and Life occurring August 7-10, 2007. The conference is only open to 8 invited participants and will be a workshop style conference. Participants are expected to bring a draft of an unpublished paper to the conference. Every participant will also serve as commentator for another participant. Each paper will receive several hours of discussion and feedback. The final versions of the papers will be published as an anthology or as a special issue of a journal (conditional, of course, on editorial review).

The focus of the conference is on the application of Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis to living things with a particular interest in human persons. The goal of the conference is to bring Aristotle’s analysis into the contemporary debate as a viable non-reductive materialist approach to persons and living things.

Those accepted to participate will be reimbursed for $500 of travel expenses. Participants can stay in University apartments (single bedroom units are reserved, doubles are available for an additional cost) from 8/6-8/12 for $50 per night. Lunches and snacks will be provided on the days that the conference convenes.

Additional recreational opportunities will be available for those who wish to join in the fun.

Deadline for submission is 2/28/07. Accepted applicants will be notified before 3/31/07.

Applicants should submit a 300-500 word abstract and CV to John Mouracade: afjmm2@uaa.alaska.edu.

Earlier today, when I was looking for more information about the workshop, I found Dr. Mouracade's page by doing a search for "University of Alaska Hylomorphism." I should have guessed that he is the one organizing this.

Francis Hutcheson, A Sytem of Morals

e-book through BC

See his definition of rights in Book II, Chapter 3.
Book III, Chapter 4: the motives to constitute civil government

(civil government necessary because of men's imperfection or depravity or both)

see also Johannes Althusius, Politica

Thomas Smith article

Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the Common Good

Interview with Paolo Carozza

Benedict XVI on the Path to Peace (Part 1)

Paolo Carozza Comments on Pontiff's Message

SOUTH BEND, Indiana, JAN. 9, 2007 (Zenit.org).- On the World Day of Peace, Benedict XVI warned that the path to peace will be uncertain and wayward if it is not paved with a "true integral humanism."

According to Paolo Carozza, the words of Benedict XVI reaffirm what Pope John Paul II had said about peace being the fruit of relationships of justice and solidarity.

Carozza, a law professor at the University of Notre Dame and a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, shared with ZENIT how Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace highlighted the role of principles such as the dignity of life, religious freedom and equality among all persons in working toward peace.

Part 2 of this interview will appear Wednesday.

Q: The title of Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace, "The Human Person, the Heart of Peace," addresses the rights and dignity of the human person as the path to peace. In what ways does this confront the conventional wisdom of the international diplomatic community?

Carozza: There certainly is a sharp difference between this vision and an approach to peace based merely on the diplomatic, economic, and military relations between sovereign states that some approaches to international peace and security would emphasize. Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which Benedict XVI's point is not new, but in fact picks up and strengthens an understanding of the path to peace that has been present to a significant degree in global affairs at least since World War II.

The architects of the post-1945 international order were highly conscious of the relationship between outrages to the dignity of the human person and the tragedy of war, and that link can already be seen clearly in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the Pope himself recognizes in the message.

In fact, I would say that in much of the world the strong connection between peace and the rights and dignity of the person is now accepted as self-evident. One can see it in the way that the language and politics of human rights has permeated everything from international trade to post-conflict institution building to environmental protection.

Where Benedict XVI goes much further than the prevailing mentality is in his insistence that it is not enough to simply assert -- however correctly -- the link between peace and human dignity. To make that connection real and concrete, not just an abstract ideal or intuition of the truth, one needs to cultivate an adequate and objective understanding of what the human person is, and what human dignity requires.

Benedict XVI thus takes us back to what Mary Ann Glendon has referred to as the "unfinished business" of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the question of its foundations. For 60 years the international community has largely proceeded to try to develop and realize human rights though positive law while prescinding from any sustained effort to reach common understandings of their underlying source and scope.

In short, the difference between the vision in Benedict XVI's message and the conventional wisdom of international affairs is not so much in the affirmation that the dignity and rights of the human person are the path to peace, but rather in the Pope's warning that that path will be uncertain, unstable and wayward without a "true integral humanism" that embraces the whole human person as a concrete, given reality -- without reduction, without manipulation, and without ideology.

Q: Natural law is a central theme in the Pope's message, and he sees it as a point of convergence among the various cultures and civilizations, rather than a peculiarly Western idea. Why is natural law an important component for peace?

Carozza: Perhaps the most eloquent answer to this question is not in the words of the Pope's message or in any explanation of it that we could give, but in the witness of his presence in Turkey and the way that in great simplicity he was able to bridge what seems to many an unfathomable chasm in human understanding. He did so by a profound appreciation for and firm focus on what is common to every human heart.

In that recognition of our common humanity lies the only path to a peace that is more than merely the absence of violent conflict. As John Paul II often emphasized and Benedict XVI reaffirms in this message, peace is the fruit of relationships of justice and solidarity, a mutual and genuine commitment to the good of one another. And that commitment only arises out of the mutual recognition of what we share -- the original needs and desires of every human heart.

Thus Benedict XVI stresses that the personal commitment that is required of us to renew the world in peace and justice can only be realized on the basis of "respect for the 'grammar' written on human hearts by the Creator."

Recognition of the natural law is essential not in the first instance as a set of moral rules or restraints, but simply as an acknowledgment of certain truths about every human being and of what is conducive to human flourishing because of the way that we have all been created.

Or to see it from the contrary perspective, one cannot build peace -- in the thick sense of relationships of justice and solidarity -- on the basis of false or weak and uncertain notions of what constitutes the fulfillment of the human heart. On the contrary, as the Pope points out, such relativism invites the victory of power over truth and freedom.

Q: It seems implicit that Benedict XVI's exhortations to reconsider and take seriously the role of reason require a major engagement with the natural law. Because the dialogue of cultures hinges on the acceptance of reason, how can the Church help other cultures, religions and societies engage the natural law tradition of inquiry?

Carozza: The Pope has written in his first encyclical, "Deus Caritas Est," that it is not the role of the Church to bring about justice in the world, but rather to help purify reason by fostering an openness of mind and will, and to liberate reason from its blind spots and self-limitation so that in seeking justice we are able to act more fully in accord with the nature of every human being.

This means first that the task of the Church is to present with clarity and reasonableness the wealth of her teaching, and to propose to the world the insights she has gained from her experience of humanity.

Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace is itself a lucid example of this: It does not pretend to provide solutions -- let alone detailed blueprints -- about how to achieve peace and justice, but educates us by reminding us of the central importance of such principles as the gift of life, freedom of religion, the natural equality of all persons, the destiny of the created world, and so on.

It is up to us to be the bearers of these truths in our work and to generate thereby a culture of "authentic integral humanism" that is capable of transcending cultural divides.

The most important locus for engaging the natural law tradition and fostering a radical openness of reason, therefore, is above all in ourselves. Only if we are attentive first to the education of our own hearts and the purification of our own reason, can we act in the world with the clarity and certainty necessary to engage every person and every culture in a genuine dialogue about what is good for human persons.

Without that affection for the truth of one's own life, even the natural law can easily be reduced from the ground of cross-cultural understanding to a meaningless formalism or an imposition.

Q: The Pope stated: "Peace requires the establishment of a clear boundary between what is at man's disposal and what is not." Can you explain in more detail what he means by this? How can that boundary be established?

Carozza: In several places in this text Benedict XVI shows an acute concern that has consistently marked his thought and teaching more generally, both as Cardinal Ratzinger and since becoming Pope: If nothing is beyond the bounds of human possession and instrumentalization, then there is ultimately no possibility of safeguarding human dignity and freedom.

The phrase quoted in the question raises this preoccupation in the particular context of a discussion of "gift" and "life." Recognizing that our life is given, and not created by us to use as we will, is the first indispensable step toward protecting all human rights with consistency.

The boundary between what is ours to use and what is not, and thus the boundary between inviolable human rights and merely conventional norms, begins with the protection of human life in all the contexts where it is most vulnerable to being reduced to the measure of its material usefulness and disposed of at the will of the more powerful.

The Holy Father mentions, in particular, victims of armed conflict, terrorism and other forms of violence, as well as the "silent deaths" caused by hunger, abortion, euthanasia and experimentation on human embryos.

It is worth highlighting, too, that Benedict XVI explains the fundamental importance of religious freedom along the same lines. By existing beyond the boundaries of what is ours to possess and use, the relationship between the human person and a transcendent "other" is a keystone holding up the edifice of all other human rights.

[Wednesday: Building an Integral Humanism]

Benedict XVI on the Path to Peace (Part 2)

Paolo Carozza on Building an Integral Humanism

SOUTH BEND, Indiana, JAN. 10, 2007 (Zenit.org).- Benedict XVI's exhortation on the World Day of Peace to strengthen and clarify our reason, and not settle for weak or diluted anthropological visions, is essential to the challenge of building an integral humanism.

So says Paolo Carozza, a law professor at the University of Notre Dame and a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

He shared with ZENIT how Benedict XVI's message for the World Day of Peace stresses the dignity of the human person, the common good, true advocacy of human rights and the use of transcendent principles in developing international law.

Part 1 of this interview appeared Tuesday.

Q: The heart of the Pope's message seems to be that the path to peace is grounded in a proper anthropology of the human person, in which man is understood as having inherent dignity by virtue of being created in the "imago Dei," as well as a transcendent end. But are there forums in the international community where this "integral humanism" is taken seriously?

Carozza: By its own nature the ideal of integral humanism is one that always demands renewed personal commitment and deeper understanding about the good of human persons in new and different historical and cultural circumstances -- so in a certain sense it is never fully realized but always only in progress.

At the same time, all international fora and institutions were in some way created in response to real, tangible human needs -- for example, as responses to crises or out of a growing awareness of human interdependence and the necessity of coordinating activity for the common good.

Thus, at some level, they all contain within them an important degree of inherent concern for authentic human goods, even if it is always only imperfectly realized. It is important, therefore, always to seek and strengthen those good and constructive elements, while clearly working to resist or "prune" whatever is contrary to them.

This is often a difficult judgment to make because it requires us to steer a course that avoids both an uncritical acceptance of internationalism for its own sake and also an unreflective rejection of international institutions and processes in response to the fact that some of them are very unhealthy.

This is exactly why Benedict XVI's exhortation to strengthen and clarify our reason and not settle for weak or diluted anthropological visions is so essential to the challenge.

Ultimately, a consistent concern for integral humanism in international fora will only be present to the extent that there are individuals there who give it voice and take action consistently with it.

I am happy to say that in my experience of working in international law and institutions there are such persons, and it is always an encouragement and inspiration to encounter them, sometimes in most unexpected ways and places. But there is no doubt that the need is even greater, by far.

First, the world of global affairs desperately needs more people, especially young professionals whose reason and hearts are educated to appreciate the breadth and depth of the dignity of human persons, to dedicate themselves to constructing peace and justice in the world. Secondly, there is a great need for strengthened unity among the disparate individuals already present in these institutions, a unity of conscience and judgment.

In building up that integral humanism, we should not forget that it is not only intergovernmental institutions that are the relevant actors. There is enormous potential today for civil society organizations to contribute, or to undermine, the ideal.

For example, two of the international nongovernmental associations that I am most familiar with that do tremendous good in promoting true humanism today are the World Youth Alliance and the Association of Volunteers in International Service.

Q: In what ways does the vision of human rights advocated by Benedict XVI diverge from the conception of human rights espoused by many international organizations that the Pope says actually divests them of their authority as advocates for the rights of persons?

Carozza: The Pope's use of the word "authority" here is very interesting. Obviously he does not mean authority merely in the sense of the fact of being able to exercise power, or even in the technical juridical sense of having the legal warrant to make decisions and take action.

He refers to the moral authority that ultimately grounds and justifies those actions and exercises of power. And that kind of authority is founded in the common good, which is the total set of conditions allowing for individual persons and groups to reach their fulfillment more easily.

Where international institutions are in fact undermining the common good, they do not have the authority, in the fullest sense, to act or to expect our cooperation even though they might have the factual power and positive legal license to do so. This happens in the world today any time that organizations fail to respect and safeguard the basic rights of persons, to promote social well-being and development, or to foster the stability and security of a just order.

Although Benedict XVI does not say so directly, he knows well that there is one specific issue in particular that threatens to compromise the authority of a wide array of international organizations, and that is abortion.

It is no secret that there has been for some time a very intense and sustained effort on the part of powerful interests to advance access to abortion globally through the influence of international institutions, and that must be one of the prime examples of what Benedict XVI is implicitly referring to, especially in light of his prior, beautiful reminder that "life is a gift which is not completely at the disposal of the subject."

Q: The Pope's message included an exhortation to apply the principles of international law to new forms of conflict and violence, including terrorism. How might this be done? What contributions can the Church make to such a conversation?

Carozza: When existing international law no longer is completely adequate to address new realities and global concerns -- whether it is forms of conflict and violence, new technologies affecting human dignity, new ecological threats, or other problems -- the most reasonable response is not to discard international law, which is an essential tool for the realization of the universal common good generally, but to provoke its development and adaptation to those new circumstances.

One of the critical ways to do so is to recall and insist on the underlying fundamental principles that gave the law its direction and meaning, so that any new rules and practices still adhere to and respect the basic human goods that animated the prior legal order. That consistent insistence on transcendent principles is a tremendously important contribution that the Church makes to global debate.

With regard to the problems posed by contemporary forms of violence, for instance, Benedict XVI rightly points out certain requirements that must be maintained in any evolution of the rules of armed conflict and humanitarian law: that noncombatants be protected and not targeted; and that there must be clear ethical limits on methods of guaranteeing internal security -- such as, presumably, the prohibition on torture.

When these principles and similar ones are maintained with sufficient conviction and resolve, the freedom of international law to change in response to the demands of the common good is enhanced, not diminished.

Q: Significantly, the Pope makes reference to the growing competition for energy sources and its potential for international conflict and war. In what ways can an anthropology of integral humanism and Catholic social doctrine address this problem?

Carozza: The problem, of course, is generated by the multiplicity of interests in possessing and controlling scarce resources. While it is played out through highly complex dynamics in diplomatic, economic and military arenas, it is most fundamentally a problem of the human heart and its relationship to the goods of creation.

Without the growth of the virtue of solidarity, without an increased consciousness of the common destiny of all human persons, and without an education to the meaning and purpose of the things we possess and use, any resolution in the struggle to acquire energy resources or other scarce goods will be no more than a temporary truce, or the partial victory of one power or interest over another.

To generate a lasting solution, therefore, we must start with an adequate appreciation of the person, and of the common stewardship of mankind over the goods of creation, for the benefit of all. Catholic social doctrine is nothing other than this -- a distillation of "what is in accord with the nature of every human being" (as the Pope wrote in "Deus Caritas Est"), and thus an aid to the attainment of justice and peace.

Mark Murphy's latest book

Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (published by Cambridge University Press)

his CV

Edited: a review of the book
I probably won't buy the book ($60+!), but I may have to check it out for the sake of being thorough.

See also:
V. Bradley Lewis
Can a Christian be a Democrat? or The Common Good and the Modern State
The Common Good in Classical Political Philosophy

Michael Waldstein: The Common Good in St. Thomas and John Paul II

SEP Natural Law Tradition in Ethics

Justice and righteousness

Are justice and righteousness synonyms?

righteousness is certainly linked to rectus (straight); and justice is the straightness of the will, with respect to others

How is righteousness understood within a scriptural context, or within Christian theology or the Tradition itself? What is its definition? And is Aquinas' conception of justice, particularly general or legal justice, really that alien to "righteousness"? (How are religion and general justice the same, and how are they different?)

What is the etymology of ius? Is the Greek dike closer to righteousness than iustitia, and if so, why? What is the etymology of justice or iustitia?

What about holiness and righteousness? Holiness and sacred? Is a contrast between sacred and profane necessary? Does the definition of sacred necessarily involve the notion of the profane? It would seem so. Something is sacred it if is set apart for God; it is used only for functions related to the divine.

But this is not the same contrast as between holy and sinfulness? If there is only one end, then one is either holy or one isn't. One is either holy or one is in the state of sin. (What is the actual opposite of holiness? Sinfulness? Or something else?) One who is holy is set upon God as the ultimate end, and orders everything towards Him; but is holiness therefore a synonym of righteousness?

Markets and Morality

Markets and Morality

Debating the Role of Self-Interest

By Father John Flynn

ROME, JAN. 8, 2006 (Zenit.org).- Economic issues figured prominently among the end-of-year summaries offered by the media and commentators. The Christmas frenzy always brings with it concerns over excessive consumerism, added to which were reflections about inequality and the need for greater opportunities for developing nations.

Among the many analyses of these issues a couple of recent books are of interest. The first is "The Moral Ecology of Markets: Assessing Claims about Markets and Justice," by economist and theologian Daniel Finn.

The market economy is criticized for many shortcomings, but amid this debate most economists prefer to concentrate on empirical analysis, leaving aside questions of moral judgments. Nevertheless, Finn observes, morality forms an ineluctable part of our daily lives.

One problem when it comes to debating the morality of economic issues is the great variety of positions. The starting points and assumptions vary widely, according to what part of the political spectrum people occupy. Finn hopes to achieve in his book a common framework in which to examine key issues related to the market economy.

He starts by arguing that an adequate analysis of markets, whether it be from a supportive or critical perspective, must include a consideration of the moral underpinnings. The most obvious starting point for this is to look at the concept of self-interest.

Defenders of markets, Finn explained, follow in the footsteps of Adam Smith, and claim that good results can arise from complex systems of human interaction even when the individuals are not intending to generate those good outcomes. Egoism and greed no doubt exist, but through the mediation of markets, self-interest can work for the good.

Saints or sinners?

The concept of self-interest is not without its critics, continues Finn. For example, a theory that makes no distinction between a Mother Teresa and a thief -- positing that both are acting to further their respective self-interests -- is deficient. A description of the world that cannot distinguish between vice and virtue, saint or sinner, martyr or murderer, is seriously lacking in the ability to describe life's realities.

Other critics of self-interest point to problems such as large inequalities in wealth, and insufficient protection for the weak as evidence of the limitations of a system based on the pursuit of self-interest. Critics respond, Finn observes, by arguing that it is wrong to blame the market for all the evils in our society, which can stem from a variety of causes and cultural factors.

But defenders of the market face greater difficulties in responding to the accusation that a system based on self-interest foments greed. Defenders of the market point to its role in promoting virtues such as hard work, initiative and creativity, but critics point out that the utilitarian habit of basing actions on self-interest tends to spread into all areas of life, eventually undermining the moral standards on which the market itself depends.

When it comes to economic tasks such as the allocation and distribution of resources the free market does indeed have many advantages, concludes Finn. But economic production is just part of our lives and the application of behavior based on self-interest in other areas can create problems.

Even within the economic realm, acting solely on self-interest can sometimes not be enough. Finn cites the case of a consumer faced with the option of choosing between two products, one cheaper than the other because it is produced in a sweatshop. Self-interest would lead the consumer to opt for the cheaper product, but if the producer has success in selling these goods, it could reinforce the existence of exploitative work conditions.

This leads Finn to conclude that it is wrong to automatically suppose that it is either always morally wrong or right to act out of self-interest. The moral evaluation of any action in the market depends on a series of factors related to the context and the results.

Similarly, when it comes to a judgment of the market itself, Finn points out that it is not a simple choice between a free market or a centralized planning system. In practice, markets exist within a complex system of boundaries, or "fences" as he terms them, regarding their operation. The decision as to where these fences should be placed varies widely from situation to situation. In addition, markets exist within a social, political and cultural context that cannot be ignored.

Economic theology

Another recently published book on the subject of markets is "Adam's Fallacy: A Guide to Economic Theology," by Duncan Foley, economics professor at the New School for Social Research.

Like Finn, this author examines in detail the concept of self-interest in relation to markets, albeit in a more historical and less rigorously analytical way. The Adam referred to by Foley is Adam Smith, author of the classic economic text, "The Wealth of Nations."

The fallacy, according to Foley, "lies in the idea that it is possible to separate an economic sphere of life, in which the pursuit of self-interest is guided by objective laws to a socially beneficent outcome, from the rest of social life, in which the pursuit of self-interest is morally problematic and has to be weighed against other ends."

In his analysis of how markets work, Foley admits that the concept of pursuing self-interest proposed by Smith has a lot of sense and realism, but to describe it as a positive good is another question, he argues. The bulk of the book is then devoted to a synthesis of economic ideas put forward by a number of economic thinkers in the last couple of centuries.

In concluding, Foley comments that Smith himself realized better than many subsequent economic thinkers the limits of self-interest and the market. In addition to defending the advantages of a market system, Smith also recognized the need for political institutions to channel and control the operations of capital.

Contemporary capitalism is a successful system for the creation of wealth, but, Foley maintains, it is not some sort of automatic process inherent in human nature. Economic institutions are fragile and contingent and need to be shaped and guided. In addition, understanding how an economy works does not mean we should subsume our moral judgment to the logic of the market. Economic development brings with it many changes for society and culture, but the mistake would be to accept all these changes as something inevitable.

Charity

In the spirit of looking to complement and shape the operation of a market system, the Catholic Church proposes the virtue of charity. Benedict XVI, in his encyclical "Deus Caritas Est," explained that: "Building a just social and civil order, wherein each person receives what is his or her due, is an essential task which every generation must take up anew" (No. 28).

This is essentially a political task, in which the Church does not play a direct role, the Pope said. Yet the Church can contribute to this effort. "She has to play her part through rational argument and she has to reawaken the spiritual energy without which justice, which always demands sacrifice, cannot prevail and prosper."

One of arguments put forward by the Church concerns the role of love. "There is no ordering of the state so just that it can eliminate the need for a service of love," stated the Pontiff. "Whoever wants to eliminate love is preparing to eliminate man as such." This is worth keeping in mind when looking at how markets work.

Music and order

Music as a type of making.

In music, order is imposed onto matter (progression of notes or sounds). This is not a form of naturalism--one is not replicating within the musical composition some order within nature. Still, can one chord be said to be better than another? Or is a tonal system better than an atonal system? Can there be order within an atonal system? Or is atonality an arbitrary restriction imposed by the mind, which goes against something else that is more proper to beauty?

How do notes amplify one another? Work with or harmonize?

What about rhythm? Do some combinations sound more pleasant than others? For a reason? What of harmony and dissonance? Tones and pitches? Can quantity be used to discover "natural" relationships between tones and values?

SCU Dept. of Philosophy News

here

Robert Audi coming to SCU... I don't think SCU will switch away from analytic philosophy back towards the Catholic intellectual tradition any time soon...

Professor Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, will be giving a series entitled, "Emotion and Motivation, Obligation and Virtue," on Tuesdays, Jan. 9th, 16th, 23rd, and 30th, 4-5 pm, Bannan Engineering, Room 325. Co-sponsored by the Dept. of Philosophy & the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics. Supported in part by the Fagothey Fund. Questions: Contact Janis Davis, jldavis@scu.edu, or David DeCosse, ddecosse @scu.edu.

Paul Hurley, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Claremont McKenna College, will be the Austin J. Fagothey Professor in Spring quarter 2007. Professor Hurley was in the Dept. of Philosophy at Pomona College from 1988 until 2006. He is a three-time teaching award recipient. His specialties are Ethics, Political Philosophy, and Philosophy of Law.

Aimee Milburn on Habermas

"Jurgen Habermas: A Secular Atheist Changes His Mind on Religion in the Public Sphere"

Stuff for Jensen paper

Against criminal armed with weapon is one obligated to use only a effective long-distance taser, a weapon that could fire some sort of electric bolt? What if the use of this weapon increases the likelihood of resistance by the assailant and hence the chance that one might be killed?

If armed assailant is coming to kill me and the only way to stop him is to let go of a heavy weight that would fall on him and kill him, is one allowed to use this, even though death is certain? It seems so.

Older article against creationism by Dermott Mullan

HOW OLD IS THE EARTH?
Fundamentalists Inside The Catholic Church

April 2003By Dermott J. Mullan

Dermott J. Mullan is a professor of astrophysics at the University of Delaware, and the father of 10 children.

Since 1988, the book Catholicism and Fundamentalism by Karl Keating has helped prevent Catholics from being lured out of the Church by Fundamentalists. Where Fundamentalists attack the Church from outside, that book provides important and useful service.

But what if there are Fundamentalists inside the Church? How is the Church to respond to such a situation?

I submit that Fundamentalism is now beginning to infect the thinking of certain Catholics who are loyal members of the Church. The clearest symptom of infection is the belief that the Earth is young, no more than a few thousand years old. This calls for a change of plan from what has worked so far if Catholics are to be defended against Fundamentalism.

Is Fundamentalism Creeping Into the Lives of American Catholics?

Fundamentalists trace their roots to a series of books called The Fundamentals, published by certain Protestants between 1909 and 1915. These books contained (among other topics) accounts of "heresies" (including Catholicism) and "critiques of scientific theories." To be sure, no one should object to criticisms of scientific work as long as the criticisms are based on sound reasoning. But the critiques that are associated with Fundamentalism at times involve what is in essence a rejection of rational thinking.

Three events indicate to me that American Catholics are now being exposed to Fundamentalist ideas from within the Church.

First, in the process of home-schooling some of our children about five years ago, my wife and I encountered a serious dilemma in connection with certain science textbooks. We did not want our children to be swept along by the erroneous ideas about Darwinian evolution that permeate much of American culture. We therefore selected biology textbooks that reject Darwin's ideas about evolution. In this regard, the textbooks met our needs admirably. However, we were startled to find that the textbooks also contained the following claim: The Earth is only a few thousand years old. One textbook was Protestant, the other Catholic.

Second, in 1999 one of the leading American publishers of orthodox Catholic books released a book entitled Creation Rediscovered by G.J. Keane. This book contains not only a well-written criticism of Darwinian evolution, but also an extended attack (60 pages long) on the results of modern astrophysics concerning the age of the Universe. The book suggests that astrophysicists have misinterpreted the evidence because of their belief in evolution. The book states that the evidence actually points to an Earth and a Universe no more than a few thousand years old.

Third, in 2001 a meeting that advertised itself as the "First International Catholic Family Conference on Creation" was held in Manassas, Virginia. In the first talk at the meeting (entitled "The Catholic Doctrine on Creation"), the speaker argued for a literal interpretation of the six days of creation, implying that the Earth is young. The written version of this talk includes the claim that "contrary to modern theory, the Earth is the center point of the Universe." In another talk at the meeting, a speaker discussed 15 points of evidence from physical science which (he concluded) prove that the Earth is only a few thousand years old. (These talks are available on tape.) However, a critical examination of the 15 points shows that in each case the physical processes at work by no means force one to the young-Earth conclusion.

An Astronomer's Viewpoint

Why do I find the young-Earth development troubling? Because it flies in the face of reason.

In my profession as an astronomer, I am familiar with abundant evidence from the physical world indicating that the Earth and the Sun and the Universe have ages that are measured in billions of years.

The evidence for these ages comes from at least five distinct and independent areas of research in astrophysics: expansion of the universe, stellar structure, isotope dating, white dwarf cooling, and properties of the cosmic microwave radiation. The concordance of these five methods is impressive because they rely on completely distinct types of observations, and different laws of physics, to arrive at their conclusions.

It is beyond the bounds of reason to suppose that, if the Universe were actually no older than a few thousand years (as the young-Earth proponents claim), many hundreds of researchers from diverse countries and all religious backgrounds would discover five completely different methods which all yield multi-billion-year ages.

Dilemma for a Catholic

In school, the Christian Brothers taught me the maxim: "The Church has nothing to fear from the truth." It should not matter by what means the truth about the world is discovered: Catholics should be willing to look it squarely in the face. But the message of the Fundamentalists is very different. They claim that when science establishes certain truths about the age of the world, Christians should reject those truths.

What is a Catholic home-schooler to think about statements in otherwise acceptable textbooks that the Earth is young? What is an orthodox Catholic to think when his favorite publishing company says that the Earth is young? What is a Catholic parent to think when a Catholic Family Conference teaches that modern physicists are misleading the public in a multitude of ways?

In particular, has the Church taught doctrinally on this issue?

In order to answer these questions, it is worthwhile first to be clear about how the claim for a young age for the Earth arises.

Claims for a Young Earth

The origin of the young-Earth theory is easy to identify. It emerges from a strict calculation when one adds up the ages of all the patriarchs who are named in the book of Genesis, and then adds six days to the result. (In the writings of the Fathers of the early Church, one can find indications that many of them also believed that the Earth was created in six literal days.)

The young-Earth theory results from one particular interpretation of the text of Genesis. However, this interpretation overlooks the fact that the Church has some significant teaching about the way in which Catholics are to approach the reading of Scripture.

How Does the Magisterium Approach the Early Chapters of Genesis?

Young-Earth proponents approach the precise numerical values of ages that appear in Genesis as if the contents of Scripture were exactly equivalent to a modern history book or a modern science textbook. This is one way to approach the Bible.

But it is not the way that the Magisterium of the Catholic Church teaches us to approach the question of historical matters in Scripture. Pope Pius XII addressed this key point in his encyclical Humani Generis in 1950. He wrote: "It has been clearly laid down...that the first eleven chapters of Genesis do pertain to history in the true sense. However, it is not right to judge them by modern standards of historical composition.... In what exact sense Genesis 1-11 comes under the heading of history is for the further labors of exegetes to determine."

Obviously, Pope Pius's approach to Genesis is quite different from that of young-Earth believers. The question is: Do Catholics have to believe the Pope's teaching on how to read Genesis 1-11? Or can they adopt a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude to this teaching?

Clear answers to these questions can be found in Humani Generis itself: "What is expounded in encyclical letters of itself demands consent, since in writing such Letters, the Popes exercise the ordinary teaching authority, of which it is true to apply Christ's words ‘He who hears you, hears Me' (Lk. 10:16)." The fact that Catholics should follow the "mind and will" of the Pope has been repeated by Vatican II in no uncertain terms (see Lumen Gentium, No. 25).

Church Fathers & Church Teaching: Is There a Difference?

But what about those saintly and wise Fathers of the Church who wrote about the "young Earth"? What are we to make of their claims? To answer this, we note that the Fathers wrote many centuries before Pope Pius XII set forth the above teaching about how Catholics should approach Genesis 1-11. Now, it is true that Catholics rightfully pay respect to the writings of the Fathers of the Church. However, those writings are not in themselves infallible.

Just because a certain Father calculated the age of the Earth by adding up the ages in Genesis, does not mean that the Church teaches that age as part of her doctrine. In fact, Pope Leo XIII addressed this explicitly in his 1893 encyclical Providentissimus Deus: "The unshrinking defense of the Holy Scripture does not require that we should equally uphold all the opinions which each of the Fathers have put forth in explaining it. For it may be that, in commenting on matters where physical matters occur, they have sometimes expressed their ideas of their own times, and have thus made statements which in these days have been abandoned as incorrect" (Denzinger, 1948).

Magisterial Teaching on Creation

When it comes to a question of formal Church teaching about the age of the Earth, one point is clear: No official magisterial document from either Pope or Council has ever taught that the Earth is a certain number of years old.

This is not to say that the Church has taught nothing about creation. Far from it. The Magisterium taught formally about creation at the fourth Lateran Council in the year 1215. Lateran IV made it official Church teaching that the world (and all of creation) had a beginning in time. In other words, the world has not been in existence forever. This was a huge break from ideas that dated back to Aristotle.

Subsequently, when the first Vatican Council met in 1869-1870, the Council fathers were confronting some of the new ideas of modern science, including Darwin's theory of evolution. On the topic of the creation of the world, Vatican I repeated word for word the teaching of Lateran IV (see Denzinger, 1783): "From the very beginning of time [Latin: ab initio temporis], God has created both orders of creatures (the spiritual or angelic world, and the corporeal or visible universe) in the same way out of nothing. And afterwards [Latin: deinde], He formed the creature man, who in a way belongs to both orders, as he is composed of spirit and body."

Note the phrases that are used by both Lateran IV and Vatican I: "FROM (Latin: ab) the very beginning of time." The formal teaching does not include the phrase "AT (Latin: in) the beginning of time." A Catholic is not required to believe that everything was created in the same instant, at the very beginning. This nontrivial distinction allows a Catholic to believe in good conscience that God's creative work has been in process ever since time began.

Note also that neither Lateran IV nor Vatican I makes any mention here of a specific time at which creation occurred. Nor is there a mention of how much time elapsed between the beginning of time and the creation of man: The Councils merely use the generic term "afterwards" (Latin: deinde). There is no mention of a certain number of days.

Moreover, Vatican I also teaches (see Denzinger, 1805): "If anyone does not admit that the world and everything in it, both spiritual and material, have been produced in their entire substance by God out of nothing, let him be anathema." Two features of this teaching are noteworthy. First, there is (once again) no mention of a particular time at which God created spiritual and material things. Second, the term "entire substance," also used by the Church in her teaching on the Eucharist (Denzinger, 877), is a technical term that stands in distinction to the "accidents" (i.e., the outward appearances). Vatican I does not say that the accidents of everything in the world were produced by God out of nothing. In fact, although the creation of each man's soul certainly involves a direct creation by God out of nothing (indicating ongoing creation to this very day), this is not true of man's body. Each of us received a body from our parents. And even the body of Adam himself, as God reveals (Gen. 2:7), was created using pre-existing material ("dust of the ground").

God Made the World Rationally -- Therefore Science Is Possible

One of the triumphs of the work of St. Thomas Aquinas was to point out that God (who is a rational Being) created the world in such a way that man (a rational creature, made in the image and likeness of God) could understand the world. God did not create the world capriciously, giving different properties to different particles of the same type. Instead, God created an orderly world based on particular quantities of "number, weight, and measure" (Wisd. 11:20). The ability to use the gift of reason in order to discover the wonders of God's world is as much a talent as any of His other gifts to us. And we will one day render an account of how we used that talent.

It is precisely because God made a rational world according to "number, weight, and measure" that scientists have a chance of discovering some specific truths about the material world. If truth were inaccessible to human reasoning, then science would make no sense.

As it is, science does provide access to certain truths about the world. When scientists use their reason to discover something about the material world, it is as if God allows them a glimpse of part of the blueprint He used when He, in His capacity as divine Architect (St. Augustine's phrase: De Civitate Dei, ii, 3), created the world.

The Church & Human Reason

The young-Earth theory brings to a sharp focus an important question to which all Catholics should give some thought. Namely, can faith and reason contradict each other?

Surprising as it may seem, there have actually been certain people in the world who believe that the answer to this question is yes. For example, in the Middle Ages, the Muslim philosopher Averroes taught that something that is true in religion is not necessarily also true in philosophy. Averroes believed that a religious truth might be a philosophical falsehood. Averroes was apparently not concerned by this violation of the principle of non-contradiction. So troubling did Thomas Aquinas find this assault on human reasoning that he wrote an entire treatise specifically to demonstrate that Averroes was wrong about this. Thomas established that once an element of truth is discovered, it makes no difference whether it was faith or human reason (including science) that discovered it.

At the time of Vatican I, materialism was firmly entrenched as the order of the day in scientific circles. Moreover, Darwin's theory of evolution had burst on the world only a few years prior to the Council. So the fathers of Vatican I perceived a need to give a clear teaching on the relationship between faith and science.

To achieve this, they essentially elevated Thomas's ideas about faith and reason to the level of magisterial teaching. This teaching of Vatican I is quoted verbatim in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (No. 159): "there can never be any real discrepancy between faith and reason. Since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, God cannot deny Himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth."

The Church paid a great compliment to human reason at Vatican I, when it taught that unaided human reason could arrive at an item of information that has also been revealed by faith -- i.e., the fact that God exists (Denzinger, 1806).

Shortly after Vatican I, in the year 1893, Pope Leo XIII extended Vatican I's compliment concerning human reason to scientists in particular. In his encyclical Providentissimus Deus, Pope Leo acknowledged that certain truths about the material world can be established by scientists with "irrefutable evidence" (Latin: veracibus documentis) (Denzinger, 1947). So much respect did Pope Leo have for scientific truth that he insisted that the Church must be careful in her teachings not to contradict any truths that are based on "irrefutable evidence."

Clearly, Pope Leo was not referring here to arcane scientific truths such as the theory of atomic structure. The latter theory is certainly based on irrefutable evidence, but it has no overlap with Church teaching, and cannot possibly be relevant to Pope Leo. Instead, the Pope was obviously referring to scientific truths that are pertinent in one way or another to the contents of Genesis 1-11. It has become evident in recent decades that modern astronomy is an area in which Pope Leo's words are highly relevant. And Pope Leo put his money where his mouth was: He expanded the Vatican Observatory so that the Church would not be left behind by the discoveries of modern astronomy.

Where did Pope Leo obtain his respect for scientific truths? The answer is clearly stated in Providentissimus Deus: The Pope simply followed some reasonable guidelines that had been laid down many centuries previously in the writings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. For example, in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas addressed the question of the Genesis account of creation as follows (Question 68, Reply 1): "In discussing questions of this kind, two rules are to be observed, as Augustine teaches. First, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. Second, since Holy Scripture can be explained in a number of ways, no specific explanation should be held so rigidly that one would presume to maintain this explanation if it can be proved with certainty to be false. Otherwise, Holy Scripture would be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and this would block the unbelievers' way to belief."

The possibility of ridicule from unbelievers was of serious concern to Augustine and Thomas, and also to Pope Leo. It is undoubtedly a matter of concern for American Catholics in our day as well.

By including the guidelines of Augustine and Thomas in an encyclical, Pope Leo raised those guidelines to the level of magisterial teaching. As a result, since 1893, Catholics have had an obligation to honor the truths that are established by means of science, provided that the evidence is irrefutable.

But What About Faulty Science?

It goes without saying that scientists are not infallible. Scientists can and do make mistakes. Indeed, large groups of them may at times espouse ideas that are incorrect. For example, during the 18th century, the French Academy of Sciences denied the evidence that meteorites are objects that fall from the sky.

Closer to our own time, Darwinian evolution is a case in point. There is a widespread belief among biological scientists in the English-speaking world that Darwinian evolution (i.e., the theory that numerous slight successive modifications occurring at random can cause a new species to appear from an older one) embodies the absolute truth about living things. In fact, it can be plausibly argued that, since the "monkey trial" in Tennessee in the 1920s, Darwinian evolution has become the best-known scientific theory in America. Interestingly, in other parts of the world (such as China and France), Darwin's ideas are not treated with the sort of quasi-dogmatic reverence that is found in our Anglo-Saxon culture.

And yet, there is an increasing body of scientific evidence to suggest that Darwinian evolution is incorrect. Processes that are truly random are simply not capable of creating the high level of information content that is present in living things. Certain biological systems cannot simply be assembled by numerous slight successive modifications occurring at random. For example, Michael Behe, in his book Darwin's Black Box, describes details of the blood-clotting system and of the "propeller" in certain bacteria that could not have been assembled in the way Darwin proposed.

Distinctions Between Physics & Biology

Now that evidence against Darwinian theory is growing, there is a danger that people may begin to regard all science as suspect. This would be unfortunate.

Just because science does not have access to the charism of infallibility does not mean that science is incapable of determining certain pieces of the truth. Pope Leo appreciated this point explicitly. But this raises an obvious question: How are we to decide whether a scientific theory is true or not? The answer is that we need to rely on probability. The probability that the theory is correct can be increased by performing experiments to test certain predictions of the theory. The more specific the prediction, the more valuable the test. And as more and more tests are performed, with a successful outcome for each, the theory is regarded as progressively more likely to be true. At some point, rational people agree that the theory provides a reliable description of certain aspects of the world. To be sure, this is not infallibility, but it does provide a credible basis for the criterion enunciated by Pope Leo: "irrefutable evidence."

Newton's laws of motion, for example, which were proposed in the 1600s, have been subjected to a great number of tests. So reliable are these laws that NASA has put them to superb use in its exploration of our solar system. For example, when one of the Voyager spacecraft was launched in 1977, it required 12 years to reach Neptune. At the end of that 12-year journey, Voyager arrived at Neptune within a minute of the time that had been predicted by Newton's laws. As a result, even though Newton was not infallible, Newton's laws qualify as a theory that is based on "irrefutable evidence."

As pointed out by Behe and others, Darwinism fails to satisfy the criterion of "irrefutable evidence." The difficulty with Darwin's ideas is that biological systems are extremely complex in their organization, and nothing whatsoever was known about the molecular structure of cells in Darwin's time. As a result, it is not surprising that, in devising a theory concerning living organisms, some of Darwin's ideas turned out later to be incorrect.

On the other hand, physics deals with material bodies in the simplest possible terms. As a result, it is much easier for physicists to perform detailed and extensive tests of their theories. Newton's laws of motion are an example. As a second example, we note that after Einstein developed his Special and General Theories of Relativity, there were at least a dozen specific experiments that suggested themselves as ways to test the theories. The predictions that were made for each experiment were quite specific. Many decades were to go by before the technical difficulties of testing the various predictions could be overcome. But overcome they were, one by one, and by the mid-1980s, 11 tests had been performed by various groups of scientists around the world. (The 12th is to be tested by means of a special satellite still in development.) All 11 of Einstein's predictions that have been tested to date have been confirmed by experiment.

This is an astounding tribute to the genius of Einstein. Surely Einstein glimpsed a true image of a piece of God's blueprint for the physical universe. There is simply no comparison between Einstein's theory and Darwin's theory: The former has been tested in multiple ways, and has passed each test with flying colors, whereas Darwin's principal prediction (concerning macro-evolution) has still not been observed to happen.

In view of the extensive evidence in favor of Einstein's theory, it is reasonable to conclude that the evidence for the Theory of Relativity deserves Pope Leo's adjective "irrefutable." And according to this theory, the Universe is between 10 and 20 billion years old.

There are other theories in physics that are also based on equally solid evidence. For example, calculations of stellar structure are based on the laws of conservation of momentum and energy. These have been widely tested over the past few centuries, and have been found to be accurate descriptions of the physical world. As a result, when calculations of stellar structure indicate that the oldest stars have ages between 10 and 20 billion years, these results are reliable. Other theories that have been used by physicists in arriving at similar estimates for the age of the Universe are also based on thoroughly tested evidence.

What Does Pope Leo's Teaching Mean for a Catholic?

Does Pope Leo's teaching make any difference for a Catholic when it comes to the young-Earth/old-Earth controversy? I submit that the answer is yes: It makes a lot of difference.

As mentioned above, evidence from five distinct fields of physics point to a universe with a multi-billion-year age. Because five completely independent methods all point to essentially the same age, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this evidence deserves the label "irrefutable" in Pope Leo's sense.

Based on this, it is inconceivable that the Church could teach that the Earth is young.

If the Church were to proclaim the young-Earth theory as an item of Church teaching, in the words of Thomas Aquinas, "Holy Scripture would be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and this would block the unbelievers' way to belief."

Does the Old-Earth Theory Favor the Theory of Evolution?

Almost everyone who discusses evolution and the age of the Earth can be classified into one of two categories: (1) Evolution occurs, and the Earth is old, or (2) evolution does not occur, and the Earth is young. I have never met an evolutionist who believes in a young Earth. Nor have I met a young-Earther who believes in evolution. The question is: Are these the only two groups that people can be classified in? No. I suggest that there is a third possibility: (3) The Earth is old, but evolution did not occur (at least not the way Darwin suggested).

In other words, I make the following claim: Just because the Earth is old does not mean that Darwin's ideas must necessarily be true.

My reasons for making this claim are based on the fact that evidence for an old Earth comes from the laws of physics, pure and simple. These claims have nothing whatsoever to do with biology. In particular, they have nothing to do with the theory of Darwinian evolution.

Unfortunately, some Fundamentalists suspect that physicists are in collusion with evolutionists. Thus, when physicists announce ages of 10 to 20 billion years for the Universe, the Fundamentalists claim that the physicists are actually misinterpreting data so as to (secretly) provide support for the theory of evolution. (This approach is evident in G.J. Keane's book Creation Rediscovered.)

To counteract this suspicion, opponents of evolution sometimes choose to fight against evolution by opting for the young-Earth theory. The argument goes roughly as follows: If we limit the Earth's age to no more than a few thousand years, then evolution will not have had enough time to do its work.

However, in making this argument, the opponents of evolution are surrendering unnecessarily to the Darwinians. In fact, the claim of the Darwinians is erroneous. Even if 10 billion years have elapsed since the Earth began, this is not enough time for even the first living cell to appear as a result of chance. Nowhere near enough time.

The phrase "billions and billions of years" (that was made famous by the late Carl Sagan) sounds like a long time to us because it is much longer than a human life. But "long" is a relative term. The relevant scientific question as far as evolution is concerned is: How "long" would it require for random encounters between amino acid molecules in the primordial Earth to create even a single living protein? Even if we choose the smallest known protein, consisting of a chain of 50 amino acids arranged in a specific pattern, then it is easy to show from probability theory that 5 or 10 billion years is not nearly enough time to create this protein by chance.

If not even a single protein can be created by randomness, the possibility of creating by chance even one cell (which requires many different proteins to function) is astronomically small even if the Earth is 5 or 10 billion years old. The first cell could not have come into existence by chance: It requires the intervention of an Intelligent Designer. Even if the Earth were a billion times a billion years old, the first cell could not have occurred by chance. Scientists who claim that mere access to "billions and billions of years" guarantees the success of random evolution are misleading the uninitiated public.

Thus, admitting that the Earth is 5 billion years old does not mean that the evolutionists have "won." There is still a strict and unavoidable need for God to create life in an old Earth.

Despite this, our culture continues to give a lot of credence to the power of random events. An oft-cited example of the success of random changes is contained in the phrase: "if you put a billion monkeys in front of a billion typewriters for a few billion years, they would type out the entire works of Shakespeare." This claim has been made so persistently and so confidently over the years that it has taken on the nature of dogma in some peoples' minds. And yet this claim is demonstrably false. To see this, note that, if each monkey pecks once a second randomly at a 27-letter keyboard (including a "space" as a letter), it will take on average a year for a meaningful string of a dozen letters to appear on even one of the typewriters. After a year, one of the monkeys will have by chance typed the sequence "MARY HAD A." And it will take 10 billion years, the entire lifetime of the Universe, before one of the monkeys will type out the full line: "MARY HAD A LITTLE LAMB." This is a far cry from the works of Shakespeare.

Does God 'Test Our Faith' With Scientific Evidence?

When Fundamentalists are presented with scientific evidence that suggests the Earth is old, they sometimes respond with the following argument: God can do anything; therefore, He can (if He chooses) make fossils look much older than they actually are. Or He can place the stars at a million light years' distance, but start their light traveling toward us at an initial distance of only a thousand light years, so that the light can reach us today even though the Earth is only a few thousand years old.

In other words, they say, the world has the appearance of certain properties, although in actuality, God created the world with very different properties. In this way, the Fundamentalists claim, God is testing our faith in His ability to do anything.

Fundamentalists claim that support for God's ability to create the appearance of age (e.g., in fossils) comes from the following thought experiment. Suppose someone met Adam and Eve the day after they were created. Presumably, since God created them as adults, they would have the appearance of being, say, 25 or 30 years old. And yet they were actually only a day old. In view of this, the Fundamentalists claim, appearances of age can be deceiving.

On these grounds, they suggest that scientists have been deceived by the appearances of great age in the fossil evidence, and in the astrophysical evidence.

However, such arguments are subject to serious doubt. For example, when Adam and Eve were created, God's original plan for them did not include death. It was only if they chose to disobey Him that death would enter the picture ("in that day, you shall die"). Before sin was committed, God's plan was for Adam and Eve to live in the Garden for a time, and then go to be with God in Heaven. In such a situation, the absence of death would have meant that the processes of bodily decay associated with aging would not have occurred while they lived in the Garden. Therefore, the questions "What age is this man? What age is this woman?" would have had very different meanings in the Garden from those that we ascribe to them in our day. Before the Fall, the aging process (whatever it was) must have been very different from the process with which all of us are familiar in everyday life. Adam and Eve might have lived in the Garden for a hundred years and still not have "aged" (according to our standards). However, once Original Sin occurred, death entered into the lives of Adam and Eve. From that point on, they were driven from the Garden into the world that we live in now. And in our world, an aging process began in earnest for Adam and Eve in preparation for the separation of body and soul in death.

Moreover, why would God trick us by setting up an elaborate system of multiple physical clues that point consistently to a Universe that has an age between 10 and 20 billion years? What would God achieve by deceiving us on such a massive scale? Such activity seems entirely out of character for Someone who (according to the standard theological definition) can neither deceive nor be deceived. It also seems entirely out of character for Christ, who proclaimed Himself to be "the Truth," to engage in worldwide trickery with scientists who are honestly and earnestly seeking the truth about the world.

The Claim for a Young Earth: What Is a Catholic to Believe?

What am I to tell my home-schooled children about the claim that the Earth is young? How should they regard such a claim? Should they interpret Genesis in a literal sense?

It seems to me that I have an obligation to teach my children that literalism is not the way the Church approaches the interpretation of Genesis. In this regard, Catholics are guided by the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XII. Catholics certainly need to "hold the truth of Scripture without wavering" (as Aquinas said). The difficult part is to determine what exactly is the "truth of Scripture."

Pope Leo XIII established the Pontifical Biblical Commission (PBC) in 1902. The PBC was an official organ of the Magisterium until 1971, when it was made an advisory commission of scholars enjoying the confidence of the Church's teaching office. In the early 1900s, the PBC was asked if it is permissible to interpret the Hebrew word yom ("day") in the first chapter of Genesis in two distinct ways: either in its strict sense (as the natural day) or in a less strict sense as signifying a certain space of time. The PBC answered on June 30, 1909: "In the affirmative." In other words, the "truth of Scripture" does not mean that Catholics must regard the "days" of Genesis 1 as identical to intervals of 24 hours, as we experience time. Catholics in good standing may interpret the "days" of Genesis as spanning periods of time other than 24 of our hours.

Moreover, in 1993, on the 100th anniversary of Pope Leo's encyclical, the PBC issued a document entitled Biblical Interpretation in the Church. This document included a long introduction by Pope John Paul II. The 1993 PBC document pointed out that a Fundamentalist approach to the Bible is not adequate as far as the Catholic Church is concerned.

Why is a Fundamentalist approach inadequate? Pope John Paul spells out the reason in his Introduction. He points out that although God certainly uses human language inerrantly (as Pope Pius XII reiterated in no uncertain terms in his 1943 encyclical), God also uses the language in ways that are flexible. God is not locked in to using human language in one and only one way. Because of this flexibility, the words of Scripture are sometimes hard to understand. This is not a new teaching by the current Pope; in fact, the very first Pope made the identical point in one of his inspired writings (2 Pet. 3:16). In order to find the "truth of Scripture," the words of Scripture need to be interpreted properly. In most cases, the interpretation is obvious. But there are certain cases where the interpretation is in dispute. In such cases, it is the task of the Magisterium to provide the correct interpretation. An individual's interpretation, even if supported by the Fathers of the Church, may be in error.

In short, the interpretation of genealogies in Genesis in such a way as to arrive at an age of only a few thousand years for the Earth is not part of magisterial teaching.

Therefore, when I teach my children that the Earth is between 4 and 5 billion years old, I am not contradicting any currently defined doctrine of the Catholic Church. Nor am I giving credence to Darwinian evolution. On the contrary, I am teaching my children to respect what Pope Leo said in 1893: Scientists really do have access to truths about the world that God created.