Monday, July 23, 2007

St. Paul Center links on covenant

Covenant and Divine Economy
Plus, from Fr. Most: Our Father's Plan: God's Arrangements and Our Response, and...

A Biblical Theology of Redemption in a Covenant Framework

Current biblical theologies of redemption seem to leave room for further work. For if one asks, why did God want the death of Christ for our redemption, and how did his death bring about redemption, the answers given are not completely satisfying. We do say that Christ is our head, that He is the way, that He is the suffering servant ..., but these explanations, while quite true, do not go far enough in answering the why and the how.

It is possible to approach the redemption through several avenues. In choosing to follow up one of these avenues, we do not mean to exclude the others, nor do we claim to be considering all aspects of the redemption. We wish, however, to follow up one approach that has been rather little used, namely, through the covenant. The reason why it has been little used is the fact that there have been and still are so many debates about the nature of both the old and the new covenant and of the relations between them.

The Problem of Sinai

We must obviously begin with the Sinai covenant. Immediately we are in the midst of the debates on its nature: Was it unilateral,1 or bilateral?2

At the outset it is important to clarify what we mean by a bilateral covenant, for there has been much confusion on this point. A good example is provided by Bonsirven: "Jewish thought apparently tends more and more to the idea of a reciprocal choice, which is a distortion of the biblical concept of election. Despite appearances, including that of the Hebrew word berith, the covenant is not a bilateral contract.... God took the initiative ... he did not leave his people free to refuse the alliance that was offered. God's only commitment was to protect and reward his people if they were faithful to their promises and kept the commandment."3

Bonsirven apparently has not noticed that there are at least three distinct questions: 1) Why did God decide to make a covenant? 2) Why did He choose Israel as the partner in it? 3) Having made the covenant, why did He keep His part in it?

As to the first, Bonsirven simply says that "God took the initiative." He does not attempt to say why God made a covenant at all. As to the second, Bonsirven notes that Jewish thought tended to the notion that Israel's merits led to her choice.4 He rightly rejected such a notion as "a distortion of the biblical concept of election."5 As to the third question, why God kept His commitment under the covenant, Bonsirven says: "God's only commitment was to protect and to reward His people if they were faithful...." Now this latter statement clearly admits bilaterality in the sense that God had made a commitment, on the condition of the fidelity of His people. And yet, Bonsirven had said flatly a few lines earlier, "the covenant is not a bilateral contract."

We believe that the three questions must be kept carefully distinct. The bilaterality we wish to examine would be merely this: Was not only Israel, but also God under a commitment, so that both assumed an obligation?

Many have hoped for light from a study of the literary form of the Sinai pact, and have thought that covenant must be unilateral since the Hittite vassal treaties, which it has been said to follow, are considered unilateral. Today we cannot so readily accept that means of solution: first, because recent studies, especially those of McCarthy,6 have shown that it is at least strongly probable that Sinai does not follow the Hittite pattern;7 secondly, because even if it did, at least some of the vassal treaties do show at least some bilaterality.8

It is best to approach the problem of the Sinai covenant by strictly exegetical means. Before beginning, it is good to put ourselves on guard against the use of aprioristic considerations. For such considerations, unfortunately, seem at least to have entered this debate. One gets the impression, for example, that some interpreters have excluded in advance any bilaterality because they reject all human conditions or cooperation in divine works,9 or because they fear bilaterality would mean that God would owe10 something to His creatures, which is, we grant, impossible. Still more common is the fear that any bilaterality would contradict St. Paul.11 Now of course, we do not intend to accept any interpretation that would really contradict St. Paul. Yet, sound method requires us not to prejudge the solution by what we think St. Paul means. For perhaps new light on St. Paul will be found through a more careful study of the Sinai covenant.

The first aprioristic difficulty is easily handled, for it really applies only to Protestant, not to Catholic interpreters. As to the second: It is true God cannot, strictly, owe anything to a creature. But He can owe something to Himself if He chooses freely to make a covenant pledge. He can owe it to Himself to keep His word. That, in practice, produces substantially the same result.

We will return to the problem about St. Paul later. But first, sound procedure urges that we try to find the interpretation of Sinai by strictly exegetical means.

We notice at the outset what at least appears to be a bilateral statement in Ex 19,5-6: "Therefore if you hearken to my voice and keep my covenant, you shall be my special possession, dearer to me than all other people...." In these words God seems to commit Himself to showing special favor, if His people observe the terms of the covenant which He delivers to Moses in the decalog. But before making a judgment on the matter, it is better to see how other parts of the OT understand this relationship.

Much light can be gleaned from a study of the uses of hesed in the Psalms, especially where it is used in parallelism.

First of all, we find a direct appeal to the covenant in Ps 74,20: "Look to your covenant, for the hiding places in the land and the plains are full of violence."

There are likewise appeals to the covenant bond, hesed: "Return, O Yahweh, save my life, rescue me because of your hesed."12

But we also find appeals to God's sedaqa: "In you, O Yahweh, I take refuge, let me never be put to shame, in your sedaqa rescue me and deliver me."13 And again: "Behold I long for your precepts; in your sedaqa give me life."14 We note that these appeals to sedaqa at least seem parallel to the appeals to the covenant, and so begin to suspect that for Yahweh to fulfill hesed is a matter of sedaqa.

This suspicion finds support in the many Psalm verses in which hesed is put into parallelism with sedaqa: "Keep up your hesed towards your friends; your sedaqa to the upright of heart."15 And similarly: "For your name's sake, O Yahweh, preserve me, in your sedaqa free me from distress; and in your hesed destroy my enemies, bring to naught all my foes, for I am your servant."16 In view of the parallelism in these verses, it would seem that God's exercise of hesed is considered also as an exercise of sedaqa. That is, for him to keep his part under the covenant, is a matter of moral righteousness. Hence, he must have bound himself.

We find a similar parallelism of 'emuna, fidelity to the covenant, with sedaqa. For example: "O Yahweh, hear my prayer, listen to my supplication in your 'emuna, answer me in your sedaqa."17 Again, God has bound himself.

Is our conclusion that the writers of these Psalms considered that Yahweh had bound himself vitiated by the fact that on the one hand, hesed is some times used loosely of mere mercy, rather than of the precise covenant bond, and on the other hand sedaqa in later times18 could be used also in a more vague sense? It seems not, and for several reasons:

1) We note that a condition is required, in our citations, for the exercise of hesed: "All the ways of the Lord are hesed and 'emet towards those who keep His covenant and His decrees."19 Now if a condition is required for hesed, then hesed cannot be mere mercy in the exact sense of that word, for mercy as such is gratuitous, and so does not require a condition. But here it is required that the human partner keep the covenant. Similarly: "The hesed of Yahweh is from eternity to eternity toward those who fear him; and his sedaqa toward children's children, among those who keep his covenant and remember to fulfill his precepts."20 Again, the presence of a condition, for the carrying out of hesed-sedaqa by Yahweh is not promised to all, but "toward those who fear him" and "among those who keep his covenant." Similar conditions are contained in the verses cited above: Pss 36,11 and 143,11-12.21 We note too the citation given above from Ps 25,10: "All the ways of the Lord are hesed and 'emet toward those who keep his covenant...." The coupling of hesed with 'emet shows that hesed is not a matter of mere mercy, for this exercise of hesed is a matter of 'emet, fidelity-that is, fidelity to the covenant. But fidelity to a covenant is not mere gratuitous mercy, it is the carrying out of a pledge.

2) Not a few texts put Yahweh and Israel in parallel positions. In remarkably bold language, Dt 26,17-18 asserts: "You have caused Yahweh today to say he will be a God to you ... and Yahweh has caused you today to say you will be to him a people, a special possession." Similarly, Ex 24,8 says: "Behold the blood of the covenant which Yahweh has cut with you." We note it does not say "for you," but "with you." Hence Ps 62,13 says flatly: "And you, Adonai, have hesed, for you will pay a man according to his work." In other words, a reason is given why the Lord can be said to have hesed: the reason is that he pays a man according to that man's work. So that is what hesed involves. Similarly, Dt 7,12 plainly tells the people of Israel: "As your reward for heeding these decrees and observing them carefully, Yahweh your God will keep for you the covenant and the hesed which he promised...."

3) The imagery of the marriage22 between Yahweh and his people plainly conveys the same sort of mutual bond. As Father Stuhlmueller has so well observed: "Marriage is a mutual contract, a two way agreement; what is true for one party, is true for the other. God dares to oblige himself by such an agreement."23

4) We might add too that the LXX at times renders hesed by dikaiosyne, the Greek word for justice, thereby reflecting the idea that God had bound himself. For example, in Ex 34,6-7 God describes himself as "continuing hesed [dikaiosyne] for a thousand generations." And the victory hymn of Ex 15,13 sings: "In your hesed [dikaiosyne] you led the people you redeemed."24

5) Finally, St. Paul definitely seems to consider Sinai to be bilateral, for it is that very fact that raises a difficult problem in his thought in Gal 3,16-18,25 where he tries to explain how it can be that the Sinai covenant, being conditioned on human response, did not conflict with the unconditioned promises to Abraham.

The conclusion seems to emerge that Sinai was bilateral, so that both Yahweh and His people undertook obligations, with him promising to make them his favored people on condition of their obedience. But someone may wonder if this is not rather cold legalism, and if it can fit with the gratuity of God's love. We return, therefore, to the three questions raised earlier, namely: 1) Why did God want any covenant? 2) Why did He choose Israel as the partner? 3) Why does he observe his part in it?

It is only the third question which we seem to have answered thus far, and even that only partially. The answer we have reached is that part of the reason why God keeps his part in the covenant is that he bound himself to do so. But to understand the remaining, and more basic part of the answer to this third question, we must take up the first two questions.

In regard to why God wanted any covenant: Of course, it was not to gain anything for himself: "Can a man be profitable to God ... ? Is it of advantage to the Almighty if you are just? Or is it a gain to him if you make your ways perfect?"26 Since he could not want a covenant for gain to himself, it must be that He made it out of spontaneous, unmerited, generous love. But we may still ask why that love decided to use a covenant form. At least two reasons seem obvious: 1) Human beings in general are apt to mistrust God, saying: His ways are above ours as the heavens are above the earth: Who can understand them? Israel in particular came from a milieu in which the gods were the object of mistrust.27 A covenant could be a device of love to make men know where they stand, to reassure them that at least under specified conditions they may have confidence. 2) His spontaneous love wants to give favors to men. But it is necessary, as a minimum, that men should not make themselves indisposed, so as to be incapable of receiving. The covenant could be a device to lead men to be properly disposed, so that his love could give. For love to bind itself is a testimony to its intensity, just as a man who makes a vow at least supposedly does so out of intense love, wishing to assure his own perseverance in a good course. God, of course, could not doubt his own perseverance, but he knew that men could. So again, to prove his love and thereby to move them to respond is an obvious reason for a covenant regime. Sifre on Numbers says well: "God's ways are not like those of 'flesh and blood.' For a man acquires slaves that they may look after and sustain him, but God acquires slaves that he may look after and sustain them."28

Why was Israel chosen? Of course not because after the Torah was translated into seventy languages, all but Israel refused it.29 The real reason is given in Dt 7,7: "It was not because you are the largest of all nations that the Lord set His heart on you, and chose you.... It was because the Lord loved you...." And if we press further and ask why he made that particular choice out of love, we may not unreasonably conjecture that Israel, being a stiff-necked people, needed special help and care, more so than other nations.30 A good Father gives more care to a child who needs it.

If we return now to the third question, why God kept his part of the covenant, we can easily see that the most basic reason was simply his generous, unmerited love. That love led him to make a covenant; the same love led him to observe it. The obedience, such as it was, of his people, would then be only an added and secondary reason, not the basic reason, for his giving favors under the covenant.

Jeremiah and the New Covenant

Before turning to the NT itself, we must consider the prophecy of Jer 31,31-34: "I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah. It will not be like the covenant I made with their fathers ... for they broke my covenant, and I had to show myself their master31.... But this is the covenant.... I will place my law within them and write it on their hearts: I will be their God, and they shall be my people." Although the immediate reference32 of this prophecy seems to be the time of the return from exile, yet, following Vatican II,33 we can see that its vision was not limited to that time, but embraced also the Christian dispensation. For, 1) The new covenant is to be made with all of God's people, with "the house of Israel and the house of Judah." But, in the merely literal and genealogical sense, only Judah, not also Israel, returned from exile. So it is best to make the full reference to Israel in the Pauline sense of spiritual descendants. Father Vawter is quite right in saying: "Anyone whose view is limited to the Old Testament's account of itself would have had to say that prophecy had failed, and that Jeremiah had ... failed worst of all. Luckily ... we have been taught by One greater than the prophets to see its fulfillment in an Israel that is truly new, an Israel that is not of the flesh but of the spirit."34 2) Christ Himself in the Cenacle clearly alludes to and intends to fulfill this prophecy, in his words about the cup of the new covenant.

We note at once that the new is to be different from the old in two ways: 1) The old was broken, but the new will be eternal; 2) The old law was written on stone, but in the new, the law will be written in hearts.35

But it is equally clear that the new is parallel to the old in the essential respects First, the old covenant created a people of God: so does the new. Second, the favor of God in the old required as a condition, the obedience of his people; in the new, obedience is likewise required, even though it is not to an external law written on stone, but to an interior law written in hearts.

The Pauline View of the New Covenant

One of the aprioristic objections to a bilateral view of Sinai was that it would not fit with the spirit of St. Paul. It is true that Paul gives no synthesis in which he describes a new covenant that is parallel to Sinai. But it is not to be expected that Paul would make such a synthesis. First, because the Semitic mind is not inclined to synthetic constructions. Second, because Paul had to argue with all vigor against those who overstressed the Sinai covenant in a distorted way. With our modern ecumenical approach, we would have made all possible concessions to the Judaizers, and would have made many a distinction in attempting to admit all possible truth in their stand. Not so Paul. As a true Semite, he did not indulge in distinctions, nor in concessions to adversaries. Instead, he barely admitted any good at all in their position, and attacked them with every bit of force he could muster.

Yet, in spite of all this, though we cannot look for a synthesis, we can look for the essential elements of the covenant view we are considering. We have already noted in regard to Jer 31 that there are two essential features needed if the new covenant is really parallel to a bilateral old covenant. That is: Does the new covenant 1) Make a new people of God ? 2) Require that that new people obey a law as a condition of obtaining divine favor?

Paul clearly teaches that the new covenant creates a new people of God: "You are the temple of the living God, as God says: For I will dwell among them and will walk among them, and I will be their God and they will be my people."36 In Rom 11 he envisions this new people as not entirely distinct from the old people of God, but rather as grafted into the old;37 and he applies to the new people the words of Hosea, originally written of the old people of God:38 "A people not mine I will call my people, and an unbeloved, beloved, and her who has not obtained mercy, one who has obtained mercy. And it shall be in the place where it was said to them: You are not my people, there they shall be called sons of the living God."39

Paul teaches that this new covenant was established in the Cenacle: "I myself have received from the Lord what I also delivered to you, that the Lord Jesus, on the night in which he was betrayed, took bread ... and also the cup, saying: 'This cup is the new covenant in my blood.'"40 This blood is the price, which has bought the people of acquisition: "For you have been bought at a great price,"41 and "now that we are justified by his blood, we shall be saved through him...."42 But it is not just the mere physical shedding of the blood of Christ which wrought redemption, for Paul told the Romans: "Just as by the disobedience of the one man the many were constituted sinners, so also by the obedience of the one the many will be constituted just."43 So the obedience of Christ to the will of the Father was the basic required condition on the human side of the new covenant, just as the obedience of Israel was the human condition in the old covenant.

But Paul does not confine the requirement of obedience to Christ himself: Those who belong to his body, in order to come under the covenant with him, must do all things syn Christo. They too must obey. Paul presents this requirement in the vein inaugurated by the words of Jer 31. For he tells the Romans that the spirit of Christ writes in Christians the "law of the Spirit,"44 so that they "do not walk according to the flesh."45 But Paul knows well that Christians can refuse to follow the spirit, and so he injects a condition into his assertions, "if anyone does not have the spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Christ."46 And similarly: "if by the spirit you put to death the deeds of the flesh, you will live."47 Or, "Whoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God."48 We see that those who are not led by the spirit, are not sons. Paul does not even shrink from using the imagery of slavery to describe this obedience, and does so in the very epistle in which he so splendidly extols the freedom of the sons of God: "Do you not know that to whom you offer yourselves as slaves for obedience, to him whom you obey you are the slaves, whether to sin unto death, or to obedience unto justice. But thanks be to God, that you who were the slaves of sin have now obeyed ... that form of doctrine into which you have been delivered and ... you have become the slaves of justice."49

If we add up these data, we shall see that the result is really parallel to the old covenant on the essential points.50 In both, the covenant creates a people of God, to whom God binds Himself to show favor. In both, the people receive the favor on condition of obedience. In the new covenant, that obedience is basically the obedience of Christ, by which the many are constituted just. But to come under the covenant with Christ, one must be syn Christo in the double sense of pertaining to His body, and of being like Him in obedience to the law of the spirit.

The Problem of Gratuity in St. Paul

But someone will object that we seem to have destroyed the gratuity of grace, a theme so dear to Paul. To understand the situation, we must recall that Paul, like his Master, used the Semitic style of presenting complex matters. We today would construct a synthesis with many delicately drawn distinctions. But just as Christ was capable of saying on one occasion: "when you pray ... pray to your Father in secret, and your Father, who sees in secret, will reward you,"51 and on another: "let your light shine before men, in order that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in heaven,"52 so also Paul taught by means of two series of affirmations seemingly opposed to each other. It was up to the hearer to put them together mentally if he could, or, if unable or if lacking in inclination to speculate, to simply accept in faith both series of seemingly irreconcilable teachings.

One series of Pauline texts vigorously affirms gratuity: "For we reckon that a man is justified by faith independently of the works of the Law ... to him who works, the reward is not credited as a favor, but as something due. But to him who does not work, but believes ... his faith is credited to him as justice."53 Again, Paul stresses that we are heirs since we are sons: "the spirit himself gives testimony ... that we are sons of God. But if we are sons, we are heirs also...."54 This clearly implies gratuity, for no son is said to earn his inheritance. Similarly: "... the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is life everlasting."55 Death is indeed earned, it is the wages of sin. But everlasting life is not earned, it is "the gift of God."

The apparently opposite series of Pauline statements includes chiefly those already cited on the required obedience of the new people of God. To them we might add his teaching that we are "heirs ... provided however we suffer with Him that we may also be glorified with him."56 Or, "Do we therefore through faith destroy the Law? By no means. Rather, we establish the Law."57 And again, "Circumcision does not matter, and uncircumcision does not matter, but the keeping of the commandments of God is what matters."58 And also, "For it is not they who hear the Law that are just in the sight of God; but it is they who follow the Law that will be justified."59 And Paul himself looks forward to his reward as something earned: "For the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge, will give to me in that day...."60

To find the synthesis which Paul did not express-and which he may never have worked out in his own mind-there are two lines of approach, each of which will reveal a different part of the complete picture.

One line begins with the three questions we asked in reference to Sinai. Briefly, we saw that there was a basic reason why God wanted to make a covenant and why he kept his part under it: that reason was unmerited, spontaneous, generous love. Having made it, there was the added reason that he had bound Himself. The same answers are to be given to these questions in regard to the new covenant. Therefore, one set of Pauline assertions brings out the most basic and fundamental reason, gratuitous love. The other set brings out the fact that there is an added reason why God honors his commitment, namely, that in his generosity he really did bind himself, so that he owes it to himself (though not, technically, to his creatures) to keep his pledge.

The second line of approach would distinguish two stages in the process the application of redemption to each man: 1) The initial becoming a member of Christ and heir of God, 2) the subsequent living out of this status.

The one series of Pauline assertions, those that stress gratuity, bring out the fact that no man by his own power merits to become a member of Christ. That status is given him without any merit on his part. It is Christ alone who has earned that favor for each man. Until a man becomes a member of Christ, he cannot earn anything under the covenant, for it is only as a member of Christ, not as a private individual, that he can come under the covenant and earn favor. So he must first become a member, and only after that can he earn divine favor by fulfilling the covenant terms. So that first stage, the most essential, is gratuitous.

The other series of Pauline teachings brings out the fact that once a man has, without any merit of his, been made a member of Christ and a sharer with him in the covenant, from then on that man can earn divine favor. And further, he is expected to, for as Paul says, those who do not walk according to the spirit do not belong to Christ, and so are not heirs with him.61

The Epistle to the Hebrews

The nature of the covenant concept held by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews has been questioned, partly because of alleged changes in the concept of covenant due to the use of the Greek diatheke,62 partly because of the remarks in Heb 9,15-17, in which the concept of testament is dominant, as contrasted with that of a bilateral pact.

We readily grant that Heb 9,15-17 does use the word in the sense of last will. However, we believe that the correct view is given by Mendenhall, who writes: "There is an incidental argument drawn from the Greek usage of diatheke to refer to a 'last will and testament.' There can be no doubt, however, that this is simply an apologetical argument, and cannot be taken seriously as the framework of the author's concept of the covenant, which is entirely within the OT pattern of thought."63

A closer inspection of all pertinent passages in Hebrews reveals that, with the one exception noted, the writer's covenant concept is as Mendenhall asserts. For the writer clearly teaches the essential points which we have seen above, namely: 1) The covenant creates a new people of God, to whom He binds Himself to show favor; 2) this favor is dependent on a condition, obedience.

First, the new covenant does create a new people of God. This appears clearly in the long passage of 8,6-13 in which Jer 31,31ff is quoted and applied to the new covenant. We note especially v.10: "For this is the covenant ... I will put my laws into their mind and upon their hearts I will write them, and I will be their God and they shall be my people." The fact that God binds Himself is clear in v.6 of the same passage, which speaks. Of a "superior covenant enacted on the basis of superior promises." Since God has promised, He is bound by His promise.

Secondly, there is a human condition, obedience. That this condition is really required, so that there is not just a unilateral promise is made clear in several places. First in v.10, just cited: "I will put my laws into their mind and upon their hearts I will write them." But, still more clearly, 10,36 says: "For you have need of patience, that, doing the will of God, you may receive the promise." Here it is explicitly stated that for the people to receive what is promised, they must do the will of God, must obey. So it is evident that God's promise is not unilateral: it is conditioned by men's "doing the will of God."

We saw that in the thought of Paul, the essential obedience by which the new covenant is constituted is that of Christ: the obedience of others is required but is secondary. The Epistle to the Hebrews has the same teaching: "... in coming into the world He says: 'Sacrifice and oblation you did not want, but a body you have fitted to me....' Then said I: 'Behold I come to do your will, O God.' In saying in the first place, 'Sacrifices and oblations ... you did not want' ... and then saying: 'Behold I come to do your will, O God,' He annuls the first [covenant] in order to establish the second. It is in this 'will'64 that we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all."65 So Christ, who "learned obedience from the things He suffered,"66 sanctified men, and established the second covenant by this "will," that is, by the will he proclaimed on entering into the world: "Behold I come to do your will, O God." Thus "He became to all who obey him the cause of eternal salvation."67

A confirmation of the bilaterality of the covenant appears also in the repeated assertions68 that Christ is the "mediator" or "surety" of a new covenant. In the framework of a last will concept, there is neither need nor place for a mediator. In the framework of a bilateral covenant, parallel to that of Sinai, in which Moses was the mediator, there is place for the New Moses,69 Christ. As Paul says, "there is no intermediary where there is only one"70 party. But a bilateral agreement has room for an intermediary.

Other NT Writings

Elsewhere in the NT71 we do not find the clarity of covenant thought that we saw in Paul and in Hebrews. Yet the essential notions are widespread.

First, the Synoptics all present Christ as saying in the Cenacle that the cup is the new72 covenant in his blood. In so doing he is plainly alluding to and intentionally fulfilling Jer 31,31. As Mendenhall says: "In the light of covenant forms, there seems to be no reason to doubt that this act was intended as the formal rite which established a covenant relationship."73

Again, the frequent theme that Christ is the New Moses,74 points to his making a new covenant. To that new people, he gives a new law in the Sermon on the Mount. In saying that he came not to destroy but to fulfill the old law, he makes clear the parallelism of old and new. Again in the Cenacle he is depicted as giving a new law.75 Similarly, the promises of reward for following his way reveal the similarity to the old.

There is a specially explicit mention of the new people of God in 1 Pt 2,9-10, with an obvious allusion to Ex 19,5 6: "You however are a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people.... You who in times past were not a people, but are now the people of God...." A similar allusion to Exodus is found in the new canticle of Ap 5,9-10: "Worthy are you to take the scroll and to open its seals, for you were slain and have redeemed us for God with your blood, out of every tribe and tongue and people and nation, and made them for our God a kingdom and priests...." The eternity of the covenant is depicted in Ap 21,24, in the OT bridal covenant imagery: "And I John saw the holy city Jerusalem coming down from heaven from God, prepared like a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying: Look at the dwelling of God with men, and he will dwell with them, and they will be his people, and he will be their God with them...."

Summary and Conclusions

In the Cenacle, Christ made a new covenant in his blood. This covenant was remarkably parallel to the old on all essential points. For both covenants brought into being a people of God. In both God bound himself to show favor to his people, but he bound himself on a condition, obedience. In the old, that obedience was to the covenant law, the decalog. In the new, that decalog is not destroyed but fulfilled, but the obedience that basically creates the new covenant is not merely that of men, but that of Christ. He did not sign a document, nor did he say in explicit words that he would do all that the Father commanded. Rather, he chose a symbolic or dramatized acceptance. For if a man's body is in one place, and his blood in another, that man is dead. In putting his body under the appearance of bread, his blood under that of wine, he in effect said: "Father, I know the command you have laid upon me, to die tomorrow. Here is my body, here is my blood: I accept." But for men to enter the new people of God and come under the new covenant they must be members of him who made it, that is, members of Christ. They must, further, be conformed to him, especially in his obedience to the Father.

Finally, we are far from any legalism, in spite of the many mentions of law. For not only did the Father make neither covenant in order to gain, but also he did not choose his old or new people on the basis of merits.76 We must add that in both covenants, the basic reason why he gives his gifts is not the obedience of his people, nor even the obedience of Christ. The basic reason is simply that the Father's generous love wanted to give. He chose to use the covenant framework as a device for giving. But that covenant is not the basic reason that moved the Father. The basic reason is, in both covenants, his love. The intensity of that love was such that it wanted to bind itself. It wanted to bind itself so as to reassure77 his people of his love, and thereby to move them to respond, not for his gain, but so that he might find in them the disposition needed to receive abundantly.

That is why Paul, who is so averse to legalism, can still describe himself and the other apostles as "qualified ministers of the new covenant."78




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END NOTES
1 E.g., L. Cerfaux, Le Christ dans la théologie de Saint Paul (Paris, 21954) 110: "L'initiative de la reconciliation vient de Dieu (par le Christ) et de même qu'il n'y a pas d'alliance véritable entre Dieu et l'homme mais que l'alliance s'entend plutôt d'une disposition généreuse de Dieu acceptant l'homme dans son amitié, ainsi, dans la reconciliation, Dieu seul agit ..." [italics added]; J. Bonsirven, S.J., Theology of the New Testament (tr. S. F. Tye; Westminster, 1963) 280: "The essence of the covenant, unilateral rather than bilateral, was the promises God made.... We cannot say that blood played any part in it. This is truer still of the new covenant ..."; J. Giblet, "God's Covenant with Men," The God of Israel, the God of Christians (tr. Kathryn Sullivan, R.S.C.J.; Deus Books, 1966) 27: "Of course, this Covenant was essentially a favor and is, in no sense, a bilateral contract ...", Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology (tr. D. M. G. Stalker; New York, 1962) 1,131: "... the text [of J] clearly understands the covenant ... as a unilateral protective relationship. In the Elohist's picture in Ex xxiv.3-8 ... the human partner is ... called on to make a decision and only as he declares himself ready to play his part is the covenant made." Cf. also H. B. Huffmon, "The Exodus, Sinai and the Credo," CBQ 27 (1965) 101-113; and the excellent survey by D. J. McCarthy, "Covenant in the Old Testament: The Present State of Inquiry," CBQ 27 (1965) 217-240.
2 E.g., Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament (tr. J. A. Baker; Philadelphia, 1961) I, 37: "... the use of the covenant concept in secular life argues that the religious berit too was always regarded as a bilateral relationship; for even though the burden is most unequally distributed ... this makes no difference to the fact that the relationship is still essentially two sided. The idea that in ancient Israel the berit was always and only thought of as Yahweh's pledging of himself to which human effort was required to make no kind of response (Kraetzschmar), can therefore be proved to be erroneous"; Bruce Vawter, C.M., "Our God is the God of History," Worship (April, 1958) 289: "For Amos a covenant by its very nature consists in rahamim, a term which means the spontaneous dedicated love that a mother feels for her child. The other prophets join to this the virtue of hesed, the dutiful love which results from a common bond and which conveys mutual obligations. From these two fonts have sprung the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians and the Last Supper discourse of John's Gospel" [italics added].
3 J. Bonsirven, Palestinian Judaism in the Time of Christ (tr. W. Wolf; New York, 1965) 46. [Italics added.]
4 Cf. ibid., 45: "Apart from his own people, God found no nation or land capable of receiving the Torah (R. Simeon ben Yohai, ca. A.D. 150, Sifre on Deut., 32:8). God foresaw the future merits of Israel."
5 Ibid. 46.
6 D. J. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant (Rome, 1963) 172: "... the great, original covenant of Sinai ... does not show the covenant form." We might add too that even if Sinai had much stronger resemblance than it actually does to the Hittite form, one might still observe with McCarthy (p. 58): "... it should be an axiom of form study that similar situations call forth similar responses, and thus formal similarity hardly proves a causal nexus between similar manifestations in different cultures."
7 Cyrus H. Gordon, in spite of the fact that he at times goes beyond his evidence, yet seems to have shown an at least probable existence of what could be called the Amarna culture, i.e., many common cultural features in the civilizations of Egypt, Palestine, and even Greece and some other near eastern areas during the Amarna period. He is clearly correct in saying (The Common Background of Greek and Hebrew Civilizations, New York, 1965, 96): "One of the most remarkable documents of ancient Anatolia is the Apology of Hattusili III. Though a son of King Mursili, Hattusili was not in line to succeed his father. And yet he did ... wrest the throne for himself. To justify himself he composed this Apology showing how he had been wronged and how he and the goddess Ishtar entered into a covenant, whereby she protected him and advanced his career in return for his devotion to her and for his elevation of her to the foremost place among the gods. The relationship between the king and the protecting deity is of a piece with the personal Covenant relationship between the Patriarchs and Yahweh in which human devotion is matched by divine protection. Greek heroic literature is replete with illustrations of such covenant relationships between a particular man and a particular deity." Cf. also ibid., 256-257, and H. Mattingly, Roman Imperial Civilization (New York, 1959) 262: "The usual form of prayer was the vow, the prayer accompanied by the promise to pay some tribute named when the prayer was answered."
8 Cf. the treaty of Duppi-Tessub (in ANET 204): "When I, the Sun, sought after you in accordance with your father's word and put you in your father's place, I took you in oath for the king of the Hatti land, and for my sons and grandsons. So honor the oath to the king and the king's kin! And I, the king, will be loyal toward you, Duppi-Tessub" [italics added]. Cf. also McCarthy, "Three Covenants in Genesis," CBQ 26 (1964) 188-189.
9 There is a tendency to consider that the divine favors had been given in advance of Sinai. This eliminates, or seems to eliminate, a need to return in bilaterality. Cf. Huffmon, art. cit., 108: "... Sinai ... based upon prior gracious acts of the suzerain...."
10 Cf. the comment in ThWNT 2, 477: "Nur muss man dabei festhalten, dass es immer de hesed ist, den Gott verheizen hat, den man zwar nicht beanspruchen kann, den man aber erwartet...."
11 Cf. McCarthy, "Covenant in the Old Testament...," 233.
12 Ps 6,5.
13 Ps 71,1-2.
14 Ps 119,40. Cf. Pss 116,3-6; 31,2, and Dt 32,4.
15 Ps 36,11.
16 Ps 143, 11-12. Cf. Ps 40,11.
17 Ps 143,1. Cf. also parallelisms of hesed with mishpat (often with sedaqa in the same passage): Ps 33,4-5; 36,6-7; 89,15, 119,149.
18 Cf. Bonsirven, Palestinian Judaism 19.
19 Ps 25,10.
20 Ps 103,17-18.
21 Cf. also Ps 32,10; Dt 7,9-10; Dn 9,4.
22 Hos 2,18-22; Jer 2,2; 3,1; Ez 16,8; Is 50,1; 54,5, 62,5.
23 Carroll Stuhlmueller, C.P., The Prophets and the Word of God (Notre Dame, 1964) 103.
24 Cf. Is 38,19; Gn 24,27; 32,11.
25 Paul tries to solve the problem by saying in 3,21 that if a law had been given that could give life, there would be a conflict between law and promise: but, the law cannot give life; so, there is no conflict. His interpretation is hardly meant as literal, but is rather of the Rabbinic type which can ignore the literal sense. This is shown by the fact that Paul in 3,15-16 takes sperma to refer to Christ because it is singular. This of course ignores the fact that both the Greek and the Hebrew nouns though singular in form are commonly collective in sense. Paul himself takes the same sperma as collective in Rom 9,7; 4,13.16. Further, Paul ignores the original literal object of the old promise, i.e., the land and temporal favor, which were later understood more and more of spiritual favors (S. Lyonnet, De peccato et redemptione [Romae, 1957, 1960] I,34; II,36) but in their original literal sense as seen by the first readers could not have been taken of eternal salvation, of which the first readers probably had no concept.
26 Jb 22,2-3.
27 Cf. a Mesopotamian hymn: "What is in Enlil's holy mind? What has he planned against me in his holy mind? A net he spread: that is the net of an enemy. A snare he set: that is the snare of an enemy.' Cited from Thorkild Jacobsen, "Mesopotamia," The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (Chicago, 1946) 144.
28 Sifre on Numbers, Shelah § 115,35a, cited from C. K. Barrett, The New Testament Background: Selected Documents (New York, 1961) 152.
29 Cf. Bonsirven, Palestinian Judaism 53.
30 Paul asserts that men are chosen for the people of God, not on the basis of merits (Rom 9), but that instead, "the foolish things of the world has God chosen to put to shame the wise, and the weak things of the world has God chosen to shame the strong' (1 Cor 1,26-27); Ezekiel is told (3,5-7) that he is not being sent to strange nations but to Israel who will reject him, though the nations would accept him; the book of Jonah depicts the Assyrians, the worst of all people in the Jewish mind, as readily listening to a prophet, though Israel stoned her prophets; the Gospels depict just one cured leper, a Samaritan, as returning to say thanks while nine of the chosen people did not, and again, represents officials of the chosen people passing by the wounded man on the way to Jericho, while only a Samaritan showed charity. Cf. W. Most, De gratia et praedestinatione (Romae, 1963) §§ 68-69.
31 J. Coppens ("La nouvelle alliance en Jer 31,31-34," CBQ 25 [1963] 14) translates "car eux ont violé mon alliance et, moi, j'ai dû agir envers eux en maître-époux." The CCD translation brings out better the fact that the violation of the covenant made it necessary for Yahweh to act not as a kinsman but as a master.
32 Paul indulges in a similar amplification of the words of Hosea in Rom 9,24ff.
33 De Ecclesia 2,9: "'Ecce dies veniunt, dicit Dominus, et feriam domui Israel et domui Iuda foedus novum....' Quod foedus novum Christus instituit, novum scilicet testamentum in suo sanguine, ex Iudaeis ac gentibus plebem vocans, quae non secundum carnem sed in Spiritu ad unitatem coalesceret, essetque novus Populus Dei."
34 Bruce Vawter, C.M., The Conscience of Israel (New York, 1961) 277. Cf. Rom 9,6-8.
35 W. D. Davies, Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come (JBL Monograph Series, VII; Philadelphia, 1952) 21-28, argues convincingly that the interior character of the new law does not preclude that law being simultaneously written.
36 2 Cor 6,16.
37 Rom 11,13-22.
38 S. Lyonnet, Quaestiones in Epistulam ad Romanos (Rome, 1956) II, 60-61.
39 Rom 9,25-26.
40 1 Cor 11,23-25. Cf. W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (London, 1962) 250-253, esp. 253: "It is not then as sacrificial and expiatory but as covenantal that Paul chiefly thinks of the Death of Jesus in the context of the Last Supper, although of course everything covenantal had a sacrificial basis."
41 1 Cor 6,20.
42 Rom 5,9; cf. 3,25 and Eph 1,7; 2,13; Col 1,14-20.
43 Rom 5,19. Cf. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism 265-66: "... the death of the Messiah could only have one meaning for him, it would be the expression of obedience to the demands of God.... Paul's emphasis on the category of obedience as the clue to the Death of Jesus is essentially Rabbinic."
44 Rom 8,2.
45 Rom 8,1.
46 Rom 8,9.
47 Rom 8,13.
48 Rom 8,14.
49 Rom 6,16-18. Davies (Paul and Rabbinic Judaism 148-150, 222, 223, 225-226) holds that Paul thought of Jesus as Himself the New Torah. As to the slave imagery, we note that in Col 3,23-24 Paul glides without effort between the sonship imagery ("inheritance") and slave imagery.
50 Cf. G. E. Mendenhall, s.v. "Covenant," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible (New York, 1962) 723: "... the Sinai covenant of the OT and the NT covenant in Christ's blood are one: each created a people of God out of those who were no people, demanded the complete self-surrender to God as a joyful response to the love of God which preceded. The simple stipulations of the Decalogue were summed up in the yet simpler obligation of love at Jesus' command...."
51 Mt 6,6.
52 Mt 5,16.
53 Rom 3,28; 4,4-5.
54 Rom 8,16-17.
55 Rom 6,23.
56 Rom 8,17.
57 Rom 3,31.
58 1 Cor 7,19.
59 Rom 2;13-14. Paul does not consider this as a mere speculative hypothesis, but as a reality, for he says that the Gentiles "do what the Law prescribes" and that they show "the work of the Law written in their hearts"-by the spirit, spoken of in chapter 8.
60 2 Tm 4,8. Paul's thought on merit is fully in accord with the Rabbinic thought the time and with his own Rabbinic training, as Davies shows well (Paul and Rabbinic Judaism 268-273).
61 Pauline faith is closely related to the covenant condition, obedience. For Pauline faith, being the adherence of the whole man to God, will vary according to the type of encounter. If God speaks a truth, total adherence means intellectual assent; if God makes a promise, it requires full confidence; if God gives a command, adherence means obedience. The faith of Abraham of which Paul speaks in Rom 4 is both intellectual assent and confidence. But it is, in a way, also obedience, for God ordered Abraham to believe, and Abraham did so. Yet, in view of what we said above about the need of first becoming a member of Christ and only after that being able to earn under the covenant, Abraham's response here would not earn his justification, for that justification was the OT counterpart of Christian justification in which a man first becomes a member of Christ, the prerequisite for earning anything. Cf. W. Most, op. cit., §§ 77-87.
62 As early as the 1920's exegetes began to give up the too Hellenistic interpretation of diatheke. L. G. Da Fonseca concluded an exhaustive philological study ("Diatheke -Foedus an Testamentum," Bib 9 [1928] 158) with this result: "Veterem diatheken intelligunt NT Aa qualem veteres Hagiographi concipiebant: Foedus inter Deum et homines, uno Deo auctore instituto, sed in se ipso bilaterale, iniquum (maximam partem) hypotheticum.... Novam autem diatheken modo prorsus parallelo concipiunt' [italics his]. He found no instance at all in the LXX where diatheke meant last will. The entry in ThWNT 2,137 agrees: "Form und Inhalt des Begriffes diatheke verdankt das NT dem AT. Was zwischen AT und NT liegt, ist der Schritt von der Weissagung zur Erfüllung." Moulton-Milligan, Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament (London, 1957) 148, says: "we may fairly put aside the idea that in LXX 'testament' is the invariable meaning: it takes some courage to find it there at all." Various commentators agree, e.g., the article on "Covenant" in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Bible (New York, 1963) says: "Throughout, the sacred writers of the NT appear to have kept the OT concepts; a contrary opinion is held by some who conclude that the NT writers misunderstood the OT, and intentionally or unintentionally transformed diatheke='covenant' into diatheke='testament.' But such a thing is hardly likely for writers who were born Jews.... It can hardly be doubted that Paul understands diatheke in the OT sense.... Only in Gal 3,15 ff is diatheke used in the Hellenistic sense of testament ... the writer [of Hebrews] understood diatheke in the OT sense." Cf. also the citation from Mendenhall below, at note 63. For certain, it is not possible to hold that the OT notion of covenant was forgotten by NT times. Lyonnet (Quaestiones in Epistulam ad Romanos [Roma, 21962] 89-101) has shown that it was well known. And Paul had to fight against a distortion of that covenant idea, which, however, was objectionable only in that it attributed to man's unaided power the ability to merit justification. Paul himself, as we saw above, clearly understood the old covenant as bilateral, in Gal 3,16-18, where he tried to solve a difficult problem brought on by that bilaterality. Cf. note 25 above. We also saw above that Paul has all the essential elements of the bilateral covenant in his own teaching. The Qumran community certainly had the old idea of covenant, which permeated all their writings. Cf., e.g., Hymn 5,5-19 (T. H. Gaster, The Dead Sea Scriptures [New York, 1964] 153): "... to them that seek after that truth, Thou bindest Thyself in pledge"; and the Zadokite document (Gaster, op. cit., 75) speaks of "the covenant which he made with those ancients to forgive their iniquities." (The thought that God had even bound himself to forgive perhaps reflects such passages as Mi 7,9 and Ps 51,16.) We might add that not all scriptural usage of words corresponds to the secular use; cf., e.g., `ilaskesthai in the study by Lyonnet, De peccato et redemptione (Romae, 1960) II, 67-117.
63 Art. cit., 723.
64 Thus even though Hebrews stresses sacrifice more than covenant, it does recognize obedience as the heart of sacrifice. Cf. the comment of Sifre on Numbers 28,8 in regard to the prescription of offering a second lamb at evening "as a sweet-smelling oblation to the Lord":-"This is said to teach you that it makes no difference to God whether one offers much or little. For precisely as it says 'a sweet-smelling oblation' in regard to the offering of an ox, so does it also in regard to the offering of a sheep or a goat and so also in regard to the offering of a bird. It is said to teach you that in his sight eating and drinking are nothing, but much more ... because he has said [commanded] it, and now, in the presentation of the offering, His will is done." This is clearly an echo of 1 Sm 15,22: "Obedience is better than sacrifices"; cf. Hos 6,6: "For hesed is my pleasure, and not sacrifice." That is, what counts is obedience to the covenant.
65 Heb 10,5-10.
66 Heb 5,8.
67 Heb 5,9.
68 Heb 7,22; 8,6; 9,15; 12,24.
69 Cf. Heb 3,1-6. The New Moses theme is common in the NT elsewhere too; cf., for example, Mt 2,15.20; Jn 1,17; Acts 3,22. The SBJ in a note on Dt 18,18 says: "Sur la base de ce texte du Dt, les Juifs ont attendu le Messie comme un nouveau Moïse." Cf. also Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, chapters 7-9, esp. p. 144, and H. M. Teeple, The Mosaic Eschatological Prophet (JBL Monograph Series, X; Philadelphia 1957).
70 Gal 3,20.
71 It is interesting to note also Pliny, Epistles 10,96: "Adfirmabant autem hanc fuisse summam vel culpae suae vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque Christo quasi deo dicere s cum invicem, seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent...." Mendenhall (art. cit.) thinks, rightly, that this may reflect a covenant notion.
72 The word new is lacking in the better MSS of Mt 26,28 and Mk 14,24, but is present in Lk 22,20 and in 1 Cor 11,25.
73 Mendenhall, art. cit., 722.
74 Cf. note 69 above.
75 Jn 13,34.
76 Rom 9,11-18.
77 Cf. Rom 5,8-9: "But God proves His love for us, because when we were yet sinners, Christ died for us."
78 2 Cor 3,6.

Stephen Pimental: Joseph Ratzinger's Theology of Covenant

The Master Key:
Pope Benedict XVI’s Theology of Covenant
by Stephen Pimentel


Among his many contributions to Catholic theology, one of the most important of Joseph Ratzinger—now Pope Benedict XVI—is his “theology of covenant.” Arguably as significant as John Paul II’s “theology of the body,” Ratzinger’s theology of covenant, once assimilated by the Church, promises to transform and revitalize the Church’s approach to matters ranging from Scripture study to ecumenical dialogue. The theology of covenant gives nothing less than the master key to a unified interpretation of Scripture that is centered on the person and work of Jesus Christ.

Ratzinger’s work in this area is firmly based on a fundamental principle: The theology of covenant is integral to Christian identity as given by divine revelation, especially as the latter is recorded in the New Testament. This theology cannot be primarily based on contemporary concerns, such as the perceived needs of ecumenical dialogue, however important such concerns may be.

Ratzinger’s approach to Scripture in working out the theology of covenant is noteworthy. He interprets the sacred texts with great scholarly care and learning. Yet, unlike many recent theologians, he also clearly treats them as normative for Christian doctrine. Ratzinger refuses to set aside central doctrinal statements of the New Testament or treat them as somehow “up for grabs.” The theologian, above all, must fully confront the person and work of Christ, for “Christology thus appears as a synthesis of the covenantal theology of the New Testament, which is grounded in the unity of the entire Bible.”

What Is a Covenant?
In the biblical conception, a covenant is not a contract or mutual agreement between God and man, but a unsought gift of God to man. “The covenant then is not a pact built on reciprocity, but rather a gift, a creative act of God’s love.” In their concrete historical realizations, the covenants of God take multiple forms. The Apostle Paul uses “covenants” in the plural to describe God’s dealings with Israel (cf. Rom. 9:4). Ratzinger notes, in particular, that the Old Testament distinguishes the Noahite, Abrahamic, Mosaic, and Davidic covenants.

For Paul, the most important of these covenants are the Abrahamic and the Mosaic, which relate to the new covenant in different ways. While all the covenants enter into human history, the Abrahamic and new covenants share in a divinely guaranteed permanence, in contrast to the “transitory” and “provisional” nature of the Mosaic covenant. Whereas the Abrahamic covenant is “fundamental and enduring,” the Mosaic covenant is “intervening” (Rom. 5:20). The Mosaic Law was a form of divine pedagogy designed to “fall away once the pedagogical goal has been achieved,” and the goal of the Law is none other than Christ Himself (cf. Rom. 10:4). Hence, the Mosaic covenant is a transitory “stage in the decrees of God, which has its own time. All this Paul has brought out clearly, and no Christian can revoke it.”

The New Covenant
The establishment of the new covenant is described by the words of institution spoken by Jesus over the cup during the Last Supper. In the Gospels of Mark and Matthew, Jesus says, “This is my blood of the covenant” (Mk. 14:24), which echoes the institution of the Mosaic covenant in Exodus 24:8. A covenantal ritual of this kind establishes a blood-union or kinship between its participants. Through the covenant, God establishes a “mysterious consanguinity” between Himself and man.

By declaring the cup to be the “blood of the covenant,” Jesus is stating that His blood, poured out in His Passion and made really present in the Eucharist, will reestablish the bond of kinship between God and man. In this way, “the words of Sinai are intensified to an overwhelming realism.” The Last Supper was fundamentally the “sealing of the covenant,” and the Eucharist is now “an ongoing reenactment of this covenant renewal.” The Letter to the Hebrews describes the institution of the Eucharist, in which the blood of Jesus is really offered to the Father, as “a cosmic Day of Atonement” (cf. Heb. 9:11–14, 24–26). In the Sacrament of Communion, the disciple is united both physically and spiritually with Christ (cf. 1 Cor. 6:16).

The Broken Covenant
Paul and Luke give a somewhat different version of the words that Jesus spoke over the cup. Instead of the “blood of the covenant,” the cup is described as the “new covenant in my blood” (1 Cor. 11:25). This formula alludes to Jeremiah’s prophecy of the new covenant (Jer. 31:31–34). In this prophecy, the new covenant, which is never to be broken, is expressly contrasted with the Mosaic “covenant they have broken” (Jer. 31:32). “The history of Israel repeatedly appears in the Old Testament as a history of the broken covenant. In contrast, the covenant with the patriarchs is considered eternally valid.” It is the Mosaic Law that renders the covenant conditional and subject to being broken. Moreover, the tablets of the Law, which symbolized the Mosaic covenant, have been “lost forever” with the destruction of the temple. Indeed, it has not been possible to live in accordance with the Mosaic covenant, as formulated in Deuteronomy, since that destruction. By the preaching of the prophets, “Israel knew that even though it celebrated again and again the renewal of the covenant, it could not regain the lost tablets, which God alone had the power to give and to inscribe.”

The implication of Ratzinger’s observation is crucial. It is not the New Testament, much less later Christian theology, that first declared the Mosaic covenant to have been broken. It was the prophets of the Old Testament. Thus, the neo-Deuteronomic program advanced by the Pharisees and later adopted by the rabbis is not in accordance with Scripture, even if attention is restricted to the Old Testament. Rather, the way forward lies with the new covenant given by God “in the flesh and blood of the Risen Christ.” In the final analysis, the Mosaic Law points from within itself to beyond itself, “for Moses himself is a prophet and can be understood correctly only if understood prophetically.” This is a particular application of St. Augustine’s principle, reaffirmed by the Catechism of the Catholic Church, that “the New Testament lies hidden in the Old and the Old is unveiled in the New.”

The Deuteronomic Curses
By gravely violating the Mosaic Law, Israel had incurred the curses of the Deuteronomic covenant (cf. Deut. 28:15–68; 30:1). “Jesus fulfills the Law to the point of taking upon himself the ‘curse of the Law’ incurred by the those who do not ‘abide by the things written in the book of the Law, and do them.’” In Galatians 3:10, Paul quotes Deuteronomy 27:26, the summary curse of the Deuteronomic covenant that encapsulates the longer list of conditional curses ritually imposed on Israel when the covenant was instituted (cf. Deut. 27:14–26). Because Jesus took these curses upon Himself on the Cross (cf. Gal. 3:13), his death served as “the perfect realization” of the Day of Atonement.

The transitory nature of the Mosaic Law does not imply that the new covenant lacks a law of its own, for Paul also speaks of “the Torah of Christ” (Gal. 6:2), namely, “the dual commandment of love.” Thus, the new covenant calls all who accept it to “their own faithful conduct” (cf. Heb. 3:13), for Christ “imposes duties upon us and challenges us to obedience.”

The Children of Abraham
For Paul, “the promise of Abraham guarantees from the beginning the inner continuity of salvation history, from the patriarchs of Israel to the coming of Christ and the Church of Jews and Gentiles.” Scripture presents salvation history not as dichotomy between the new covenant and those of the Old Testament, but rather as a “dynamic unity of the entire history.” Indeed, from the perspective of eternity, there is only “one covenant,” which is the “eternally valid” covenant of Abraham, now perfectly fulfilled in Christ.

The Abrahamic covenant was structured from the beginning to be fulfilled by Christ. In the very ritual establishing the Abrahamic covenant (see Gen. 15:12–21), God enacted “symbolically a conditional curse” upon Himself, offering His own life as a surety. This ritual was a “sign of the Cross of Christ, in which God vouches for the indestructibility of the covenant with the death of his Son.” Thus, the full meaning of the Abrahamic covenant is revealed only when “God binds his own existence to the creature, man, by taking human nature upon himself.”

For Paul, the children of Abraham are those in covenant with God by faith (cf. Gal. 3:6–7). God’s promise to Abraham of blessing for the Gentiles (see Gen. 12:3) is the foundation of the Gospel (cf. Gal. 3:8–9). In fact, the Gospel can be described as the proclamation that the blessing for the Gentiles is now coming to pass through Christ (cf. Eph. 3:6). Within covenantal history, the promise of blessing was given to Abraham and fulfilled by Jesus, who “opens up and fulfills the wholeness of the Law and gives it thus to the pagans, who can now accept it . . . thereby becoming children of Abraham.”

The Catechism, Ratzinger notes, presents the same teaching. The “‘full number of the nations’ now takes its ‘place in the family of the patriarchs.’” Jesus is “the promised shoot of Judah, who unites Israel and the nations in the kingdom of God.” Therefore, members of all nations enter the “People of God with Israel through adherence to the will of God and through acceptance of the Davidic Kingdom,” understood not merely as a temporal political entity, but as God’s rule on earth extended from heaven (cf. Is. 52:7). In consequence, there is only one People of God, the Body of Christ, in which both Jews and Gentiles are welcome. “The mission of Jesus is to unite Jews and pagans into a single People of God.”

Paul’s understanding of the Body of Christ as an organic “grafting” of the Gentiles into Israel was confirmed by the Second Vatican Council in Nostra Aetate 4: The Church “draws nourishment from that good olive tree onto which the wild olive branches of the Gentiles have been grafted (cf. Rom. 11:17–24).” God prunes from this tree only those branches that refuse belief in Christ (cf. Rom. 11:20). Therefore, the Old Testament remains central to faith in Christ. “There is no access to Jesus and thereby can be no entrance of the nations into the People of God without acceptance in faith of . . . the Old Testament.”

Ecumenical Dialogue
In regard to dialogue between Catholics and those outside the faith, Ratzinger insists that Jesus Christ must be seen not as a barrier but as the only doorway to the desired unity, for through Jesus, “the God of Israel has become the God of the nations.” As Paul described, Jesus has united Jew and Gentile in one Body:
For he is our peace, who has made us both one, and has broken down the dividing wall of hostility, by abolishing in his flesh the law of commandments and ordinances, that he might create in himself one new man in place of the two, so making peace, and might reconcile us both to God in one body through the cross, thereby bringing the hostility to an end. (Eph. 2:14–16)

This communion in Christ “is not empty theological rhetoric, but an empirical state of affairs,” visible wherever the Church is present.

Ratzinger qualifies the authentically Catholic approach to ecumenical dialogue with a distinction drawn from J. A. Cuttat. “To try to make mankind better and happier by bringing the religions together is one thing,” which one might call humanitarian ecumenism. “To pray ardently for the unification of all mankind in the love of the same God is something else,” which one might call Christocentric ecumenism. “And it may be that the former is Lucifer’s most subtle temptation, designed to frustrate the latter.” Ecumenical dialogue, in order to be authentically Catholic, must be firmly Christocentric, that is, centered on the new covenant established in Jesus Christ, for “the renunciation of truth and conviction does not elevate man but hands him over to the calculations of utility and robs him of his greatness.”

Stephen Pimentel is a writer and speaker on Catholic biblical theology. He is the author of several books, the most recent of which is Envoy of the Messiah: On Acts of Apostles 16–28 (Emmaus Road Publishing, 2006). Pimentel writes from Annandale, VA. Readers can visit him on the web at http://www.stephenpimentel.com/.

Scripture Catholic: Zionism

Scripture Catholic - Zionism

1. God does not owe the Jews any land or protection.

Zionism is based on the faulty assumption that God still owes the Jews the land He promised to give to Abraham’s descendants. Scripture, however, teaches that God has already fulfilled His promises to the Jews. For example, regarding the land in question, God says through Joshua:

“Thus the LORD gave to Israel all the land which he swore to give to their fathers; and having taken possession of it, they settled there” (Jos. 21:43).

God also declares through Solomon that all his promises to Israel have been fulfilled:

"Blessed be the LORD who has given rest to his people Israel, according to all that he promised; not one word has failed of all his good promise, which he uttered by Moses his servant” (1 Kings 8:56).

God further says through the prophet Nehemiah that His promise to grant the land to Abraham’s descendants has been fulfilled:

“Thou art the LORD, the God who didst choose Abram and bring him forth out of Ur of the Chalde'ans and give him the name Abraham; and thou didst find his heart faithful before thee, and didst make with him the covenant to give to his descendants the land of the Canaanite, the Hittite, the Amorite, the Per'izzite, the Jeb'usite, and the Gir'gashite; and thou hast fulfilled thy promise, for thou art righteous” (Neh. 9:7-8).

Thus, those who believe that God still owes the Jews land and protection by divine decree deny the plain meaning of Scripture and make God a liar.

In fact, the loss of Israel’s ancient holdings is a sign of God’s divine judgment against the Jews for rejecting His Son, Jesus Christ, their Messiah. God warned Israel in the Old Testament Scriptures:

“But if you turn aside from following me, you or your children, and do not keep my commandments and my statutes which I have set before you, but go and serve other gods and worship them, then I will cut off Israel from the land which I have given them; and the house which I have consecrated for my name I will cast out of my sight; and Israel will become a proverb and a byword among all peoples. And this house will become a heap of ruins; everyone passing by it will be astonished, and will hiss; and they will say, `Why has the LORD done thus to this land and to this house?' Then they will say, `Because they forsook the LORD their God who brought their fathers out of the land of Egypt, and laid hold on other gods, and worshiped them and served them; therefore the LORD has brought all this evil upon them.’” (1 Kings 9:6-9).

Scripture is clear that God owes the Jews nothing more, and suggests that the Jews are suffering the ramifications of rejecting Jesus Christ. They have been “broken off” of the root of Christ “because of their unbelief” (Rom. 11:19-20). However, Paul says that the Jews can be grafted in again, “if they do not persist in their unbelief,” for God has the power to do so (Rom. 11:23).

We should also note that the Old Covenant that God entered into with the Jews has been superseded by the New Covenant of Christ (the Church calls this doctrine “supercessionism”). This happened the moment that God tore the curtain of the Jewish Temple in two (Matt. 27:51). When we speak of the “Old Covenant,” we are referring to the “Mosaic covenant,” that is, the law that God gave the Jews through Moses (see 2 Cor. 3:14). We are not referring to the Abrahamic covenant which, because it was based on grace through faith, was incorporated into the New Covenant of Christ. This is why Paul says that Abraham is the father of the children of the New Covenant (see Rom. 4:16; 9:7; Gal. 3:29; James 2:21; see also Gal. 3:9,14,16,18).

The only place where the phrase “Old Covenant” is used in the New Testament is in Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, and Paul says that “through Christ it is taken away” (see 2 Cor. 3:14). Referring to the abrogation of the Old Covenant, Paul tells the Hebrews that “a former commandment is set aside because of its weakness and uselessness” (Heb. 7:18). The phrase “set aside” (from the Greek aphetesis) means to annul. Again, referring to the Old Covenant, Paul says “He abolishes the first in order to establish the second” (Heb. 10:9). The word “abolish” (from the Greek anaireo) means to abrogate or destroy. Paul uses very specific language to teach that the Old Covenant has been rendered null and void by the New Covenant of Jesus Christ (see also Heb. 8:7).

This means that the Jews are no longer in a saving covenant with God until they renounce Judaism and are baptized into Jesus Christ. The Catholic Church has affirmed this fact throughout her history (e.g., the Council of Florence; the Council of Trent; Second Vatican Council, Pius XII’s Mystici Corporis). Thus, even though the Second Vatican Council affirmed a person’s civil (but not moral) right to religious liberty, it taught that the Church must preach the gospel to the Jews, as she does to everyone else (Nostra Aetate, 23).

Friday, July 20, 2007

Archbishop Bertone, Magisterial Documents and Public Dissent

MAGISTERIAL DOCUMENTS AND PUBLIC DISSENT
Archbishop Tarcisio Bertone, S.D.B.
Archbishop emeritus of Vercelli
Secretary of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
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In considering some recently promulgated documents of the Magisterium such as the Encyclicals Veritatis splendor and Evangelium vitae, the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis and the Responsum ad dubium of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith regarding the doctrine of Ordinatio sacerdotalis, as well the same Congregation’s Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church regarding the reception of Holy Communion by divorced and remarried members of the faithful, one first notes that these documents have received a great deal of comment. In certain respects, the comments made in many quarters of the Church and civil society have been rather forceful.
In ecclesial and ecclesiastical circles total assent and deep appreciation has been expressed for the publication of these documents by Cardinals and Bishops as well as well as by Episcopal Conferences and many individual priests and lay faithful, who have written to the Holy Father or the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith stating their adherence and assent to the doctrine taught by the Magisterium in these documents. It should also be pointed out that the practice of first presenting papal documents (the two Encyclicals and the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis) to the presidents of the Episcopal Conferences most concerned with these issues at a meeting in the Holy See has been appreciated and has borne good fruit inasmuch as it has deepened the bond of communion between the Apostolic See and the individual Bishops and these Episcopal Conferences, and has produced even greater results for the dissemination and reception of magisterial documents.

On the other hand, discordant and dissenting voices have been raised by theologians, associations and ecclesiastical groups, which have questioned both the content and the theological basis of the teaching found in these documents, as well as their value and binding doctrinal force, disputing whether these doctrines can be considered definitive or even infallibly taught by the Magisterium. Thus it seems appropriate to reflect on the main difficulties connected with the value and degree of authority of these magisterial interventions.

I

Doctrinally, and in view of the description of the reactions and principal criticisms of these magisterial documents, special attention should be paid to several key aspects which in today's theological and ecclesial climate are a source of confusion and ambiguity, and entail negative consequences for the teaching of theology and for the behavior of some ecclesiastical circles:

1) first, we must point out the tendency to measure everything on the basis of the distinction between the "infallible Magisterium" and the "fallible Magisterium".

In this way infallibility becomes the criterion for all authority problems, to the point of actually replacing the concept of authority with that of infallibility. Furthermore, the question of the infallibility of the Magisterium is often confused with the question of the truth of a doctrine, by assuming that infallibility is the pre-qualification for the truth and irreformability of the doctrine, and by making the truth and definitive nature of the doctrine depend on whether or not it has been infallibly defined by the Magisterium. In fact, the truth and irreformability of a doctrine depends on the depositum fide), transmitted by Scripture and Tradition, while infallibility refers only to the degree of certitude of an act of magisterial teaching. In the various critical stances towards the recent documents of the Magisterium it is often forgotten that the infallible character of a teaching and the definitive and irrevocable character of the assent owed it is not a prerogative belonging solely to what has been solemnly "defined" by the Roman Pontiff or an Ecumenical Council. Whenever the Bishops dispersed in their individual Dioceses in communion with the Successor of Peter teach a truth to be held in a definitive way (cf. Lumen gentium, n. 25, 2), they enjoy the same infallibility as the Pope's ex cathedra Magisterium or that of a Council.

It must be stressed then that in the Encyclicals Veritatis splendor and Evangelium vitae and in the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis, the Roman Pontiff intended, though not in a solemn way, to confirm and reaffirm doctrines which belong to the ordinary, universal teaching of the Magisterium, and which therefore are to be held in a definitive and irrevocable way.

Moreover, it must also be kept in mind that if the authority of the Magisterium's teachings admits of varying degrees, this does not mean that the authority of a lesser degree can be considered on the same level as theological opinions or, when it is not a question of infallibility, that only the arguments count and it is impossible for the Church to have a common certitude in a given doctrinal matter.

2) Second, these considerations are highly significant regarding adherence to the teaching of Veritatis splendor and Evangelium vitae, of Ordinatio sacerdotalis and also of the and the Letter of the Congregation on the reception of Holy Communion by divorced and remarried members of the faithful: since these documents deal with teachings not proposed or confirmed by the Magisterium in the form of a definition (solemn judgement), there is a widespread idea that these teachings can be revised or reformed at a later date or perhaps in another pontificate. This idea is totally groundless and betrays a mistaken understanding of the Catholic Church's doctrine on the Magisterium.

Actually, if we consider the act of teaching, the Magisterium can teach a doctrine as definitive either by a defining act or by a non-defining act. First of all, the Magisterium can proclaim a doctrine as definitive, and thus to be believed with divine faith or to be held in a definitive way, through a solemn ex cathedra pronouncement of the Pope or an Ecumenical Council. However, the ordinary papal Magisterium can teach a doctrine as definitive because it has been constantly maintained and held by Tradition and transmitted by the ordinary, universal Magisterium. This latter exercise of the charism of infallibility does not take the form of a papal act of definition, but pertains to the ordinary, universal Magisterium which the Pope again sets forth with his formal pronouncement of confirmation and reaffirmation (generally in an Encyclical or Apostolic Letter). If we were to hold that the Pope must necessarily make an ex cathedra definition whenever he intends to declare a doctrine as definitive because it belongs to the deposit of faith, it would imply an underestimation of the ordinary, universal Magisterium, and infallibility would be limited to the solemn definitions of the Pope or a Council, in a way that differs from the teaching of Vatican I and Vatican II, which attribute an infallible character to the teachings of the ordinary, universal Magisterium.

The particular nature of a teaching of the papal Magisterium that is meant merely to confirm or repropose a certitude of faith already lived consciously by the Church or affirmed by the universal teaching of the entire Episcopate can be seen not in the teaching of the doctrine per se, but in the fact that the Roman Pontiff formally declares that this doctrine already belongs to the faith of the Church and is infallibly taught by the ordinary, universal Magisterium as divinely revealed or to be held in a definitive way.

In the light of these considerations, it seems a pseudo-problem to wonder whether this papal act of confirming a teaching of the ordinary, universal Magisterium is infallible or not. In fact, although it is not per se a dogmatic definition (like the Trinitarian dogma of Nicaea, the Christological dogma of Chalcedon or the Marian dogmas), a papal pronouncement of confirmation enjoys the same infallibility as the teaching of the ordinary, universal Magisterium, which includes the Pope not as a mere Bishop but as the Head of the Episcopal College. In this regard, it is important to make clear that when the of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on the doctrine taught in the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis mentions the infallible character of this doctrine which is already possessed by the Church, it simply meant to recall that the doctrine is not infallibly proposed only on the basis of this pontifical document, but that it confirms what has been held everywhere, always and by everyone as belonging to the deposit of faith. So it is essential to maintain the principle that a teaching can also be infallibly proposed by the ordinary, universal Magisterium by an act that does not take the solemn form of a definition.

3) In some quarters the question has been raised regarding the recognition of a doctrine taught by the ordinary, universal Magisterium as revealed or to be held definitively. It has been said, for example, that for this recognition it is necessary that the unanimous consent of the entire Episcopate be explicitly evident not only in proposing a determinate judgement, but also in declaring its absolute and definitively binding character. Hence there is a doubt as to whether these requirements have been met regarding the doctrine about the non-admission of women to priestly ordination and about certain universal norms of the natural moral law.

However, these questions and the doubts that have been raised do not seem to take into account several factors which must be briefly mentioned.

a) The ordinary, universal Magisterium consists in the unanimous proclamation of the Bishops in union with the Pope. It is expressed in the fact that all the Bishops (including the Bishop of Rome, who is the Head of the College) give a common witness. It is not a question of extraordinary statements, but of the Church's normal life, of what is preached in ordinary circumstances as universal teaching in the everyday life of the Church. "This ordinary Magisterium is thus the normal form of the Church's infallibility".' As a consequence, it is not at all necessary that everything pertaining to the faith become explicit dogma; on the contrary, it is normal for the truth to be proposed simply by its proclamation in common -which includes non only words but also facts; the particular and explicit emphasis of a dogmatic definition is, properly speaking, an extraordinary case, usually required for very precise and particular reasons.

b) Moreover, when speaking of the need to verify the actual consent of all the Bishops dispersed throughout the world or even of the whole Christian people in matters of faith and morals, it should not be forgotten that this consent cannot be understood only synchronically, but also diachronically. This means that a morally unanimous consent embraces every era of the Church, and only if this totality is heard does one remain faithful to the Apostles. "If in some quarter", the wise Cardinal Ratzinger observes, "a majority were to be formed in opposition to the faith of the Church in other times, it would not be a majority at all".2

It is also worth noting that the agreement of the universal Episcopate in communion with the Successor of Peter about the doctrinal and binding character of an assertion or an ecclesial practice in ages past is not annulled or diminished by dissent that may occur in a later era.

c) Lastly, with particular reference to the teaching about reserving priestly ordination to men alone, it must be remembered that the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis confirmed that this doctrine has been maintained by the Church's constant, universal tradition and has been firmly taught by the Magisterium in its most recent documents (n. 4). Now, everyone knows that Tradition is the hermeneutic locus where, in various ways—including that of calm conviction—the Church's self-verifying consciousness operates and is expressed. In this specific case, the Church has unanimously and consistently maintained that women cannot validly receive priestly ordination, and this same unanimity and consistency reveals not the Church's own decision, but her obedience and dependence on the will of Christ and the Apostles. Consequently, universal Tradition in this matter, marked by consistency and unanimity, contains an objective magisterial teaching that is definitive and unconditionally binding.3 The same criterion must also be applied to other doctrines regarding universal moral norms: the killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral; abortion is always gravely immoral; adultery or slander is always evil, etc. These doctrines, although not yet declared by a solemn judgement, nevertheless belong to the Church's faith and are infallibly proposed by the ordinary, universal Magisterium.

In conclusion, in order to speak of the infallible ordinary and universal Magisterium, it is necessary that the consent between the Bishops have for its object a teaching proposed as formally revealed or as certainly true and undoubted, such that it calls for the full and undeniable assent of the faithful. One can share theology's insistence on conducting careful analyses in researching the reasons for this consent or agreement. Nevertheless, there is no basis for the interpretation that the verification of an infallible teaching of the ordinary, universal Magisterium would also require a particular formality in the act of declaring the doctrine in question. Otherwise we would be dealing with a solemn definition of the Pope or of an Ecumenical Council.4

These clarifications seem necessary today, not for answering subtle and sophisticated academic questions, but for rejecting a simplistic, reductionist interpretation of the infallibility of the Magisterium, while offering at the same time correct theological principles for interpreting the value of magisterial teachings and the quality of the doctrines.

II

In addition to these considerations and clarifications of a doctrinal and theological nature, it is also appropriate to reflect on and indicate solutions to the problem of public dissent. It is impossible here to examine the breadth of the pastoral and practical repercussions involved in this question, but it is useful to define clearly some fundamental aspects which seem to lie at the base and root of this phenomenon. This is the only way to avoid proposing remedies that are merely empirical and incidental.

1) We cannot neglect the basic fact, which seems essential: the true, deep root of dissent is the crisis of faith. Efforts must thus be made to reinvigorate the life of faith as a priority dimension of the Church's pastoral work. This strengthening of the faith demands and presupposes the call to an ever greater and deeper interior conversion.

2) One of the first expressions of the spiritual crisis of faith is the crisis of the Magisterium's authority, which is a crisis in the authority of the Church founded on the divine will. An artificial opposition is created between authority and freedom, detaching them from the question of truth.

3) It seems then that the primary remedy should be sought in the commitment to serious spiritual, doctrinal and intellectual formation in conformity with the Church's teaching.

In this regard, we call attention to several important points:

a) first of all, the need for an integrated, systematic theological formation. The increasing specialization of theology tends to fragment it, to the point of making theology a collection of theologies. Theology is in danger of losing its organic unity, and although information becomes more and more detailed a basic unifying vision is missing. in the same way, we must insist on the responsibility of Bishops in catechesis and catechist formation, which must strengthen the sense of faith and of belonging to the Church.

b) the need for sound philosophical formation, which must include the study of metaphysics; one notes the disturbing lack of this study in various academic centres today.

c) the need to redress the balance between the demand for safeguarding the individual's right and the requirement of preserving and defending the right of the community and the People of God to the true faith and to the common good. I would like to draw attention to the fact that the real tension is not between defending the individual's right and that of the community, but between those who defend the right of the culturally stronger and more powerful, and the right of those who are weaker and more defenceless in the face of corrosive, anti-ecclesial tendencies.

d) the urgent need to form public opinion in the Church so that it conforms to Catholic identity and is free from subservience to secular public opinion as reflected in the mass media. Openness to the world's problems, however, must be properly understood: it is based on the missionary impulse to make Christ's revelation known to all and to lead everyone to the mystery of Christ.

4) From the disciplinary standpoint, it seems quite appropriate to recall that the Bishops are obliged to enforce the Church's normative discipline, especially when it is a question of defending the integrity of the teaching of divine truth. This is to be done in the context of a new and forceful re-presentation of the Christian message and the spiritual life for the sake of a renewed evangelization.

Moreover, it is useful to emphasize and make clear, especially at this moment in the Church's life when there seems to be a reluctance to consider canon law in the proper light, that the observance and application of ecclesiastical discipline is not an obstacle or in opposition to true freedom and obedience to the Spirit, but is an indispensable tool for effective and ordered communion in truth and charity.

The application of canon law thus provides concrete protection for believers against misrepresentations of revealed doctrine and against a watering down of the faith caused by that "spirit of the world" which seeks to present itself as the voice of the Holy Spirit.

In this context, it also seems very important to recall the Oath of Fidelity, published in 1989 when the Formula of the Profession of Faith came into force. It expresses the public commitment to exercise one's office properly in relation to the Church and to the institutions and people for whom it has been assumed.

The Oath of Fidelity, as the observance of canonical discipline in general properly expresses the organic unity of action and governance through fidelity to the profession of faith and to Christian truth. In this way, the sense of identity and of belonging to the Church are also guaranteed by law, which prevents one from thinking that he belongs to an imaginary Church of his own invention, instead of to the Church of the apostolic succession, of the Word written and handed down authoritatively, of the visible sacraments and of Catholic communion.

In conclusion, John Paul II’s address to the members of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, at the end of their 1995 plenary meeting, remain enlightening (L'Osservatore Romano English edition, 29 November 1995, p. 3). Regarding the relationship between the Magisterium and theologians, the Pope stated:

"The continual dialogue with Pastors and theologians throughout the world enables you to be attentive to the demands of understanding and reflecting more deeply on the doctrine of the faith which theology interprets, and at the same time, it informs you of the useful efforts being made to foster and strengthen the unity of the faith and the Magisterium's guiding role in understanding the truth and in building up ecclesial communion in charity.

"The unity of the faith, for the sake of which the Magisterium has authority and ultimate deliberative power in interpreting the Word of God written and handed down, is a primary value, which, if respected, does not involve the stifling of theological research, but provides it with a stable foundation. Theology, in its task of making explicit the intelligible content of the faith, expresses the intrinsic orientation of human intelligence to the truth and the believer's irrepressible need rationally to explore the revealed mystery.

"To achieve this end, theology can never be reduced to the 'private' reflection of a theologian or group of theologians. The Church is the theologian's vital environment, and in order to remain faithful to its identity, theology cannot fail to participate deeply in the fabric of the Church's life, doctrine, holiness and prayer.

"This is the context in which the conviction that theology needs the living and clarifying word of the Magisterium becomes fully understandable and perfectly consistent with the logic of the Christian faith. The meaning of the Church's Magisterium must be considered in relation to the truth of Christian doctrine. This is what your Congregation has carefully explained and spelled out in the Instruction Donum veritatis on the ecclesial vocation of the theologian".

With regard to the connection between authority and truth, between the exercise of authority and the proclamation of the saving truth, the Holy Father noted:

"The Magisterium, whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ (cf. Dei Verbum, n. 10), is an organ of service to the truth and is responsible for seeing that the truth does not cease to be faithfully handed on throughout human history".

Endnotes

1 J. Ratzinger, II nuovo popolo di Dio, Brescia 1971, p. 180.

2 J. Ratzinger, La Chiesa, Milan, p. 71.

3 In the past and until recent decades, theologians and canonists who dealt with the problem unanimously considered the exclusion of women from receiving the ministerial priesthood to be something absolute, based on divine apostolic Tradition. See, for example what P. Gasparri stated in his Tractatus canonicus de sacra ordinatione (vol. I, Paris 1893, p. 75): "Et quidem prohibetur sub poena nullitatis: ita enim traditio et communis doctorum catholicorum doctrine interpretata est legem Apostoli: et ideo Patres inter haereses recensent doctrinam qua sacerdotalis dignitas et officium mulieribus tribuitur".

4 In his commentary on the second schema on the Church proposed at the First Vatican Council, J. Kleutgen defines as doctrines of the ordinary infallible Magisterium those that "have been held or transmitted as undoubted" (tamquam indubitata tenentur vel traduntur). Cf. Mansi, LIII, 313.

Fr. Most, 4 Levels of the Church's Teaching

FOUR LEVELS OF THE CHURCH'S TEACHING

Fr. William Most

First level:

a) Solemn definition. LG 25: No special formula of words is required in
order to define. Wording should be something solemn, and should make clear
that the teaching is definitive. Councils in the past often used the form:
"Si quis dixerit. . . anathema sit." That is: "If someone shall say. . . .
let him be anathema." But sometimes they used the formula for disciplinary
matters, so that form alone does not prove. Further, they also could define
in the capitula, the chapters. Thus Pius XII, in Divino afflante Spiritu
(EB 538) spoke of such a passage of Vatican I (DS 3006 -- saying God is the
author of Scripture) as a solemn definition.

The Pope can define even without the Bishops. Of his definitions LG 25
said: "His definitions of themselves, and not from consent of the Church,
are rightly called unchangeable, for they are pronounced with the
assistance of the Holy Spirit, an assistance promised him in blessed Peter.
So they need no approval from others, nor is there room for an appeal to
any other judgment." So collegiality even in defining is not mandatory. Yet
most definitions of the Popes have been taken in collegiality, that is,
with consultation of the Bishops. Even the definitions of the Immaculate
Conception and the Assumption were such, for the Popes did poll the Bishops
by mail.

b) Second level: LG 25: "Although the individual bishops do not have the
prerogative of infallibility, they can yet teach Christ's doctrine
infallibly. This is true even when they are scattered around the world,
provided that, while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves, and
with the successor of Peter, they concur in one teaching as the one which
must be definitively held." This means: (1) The day to day teaching of the
Church throughout the world, when it gives things as definitively part of
the faith, (2) If this can be done when scattered, all the more can it be
done when assembled in Council. Thus Trent (DS 1520) after "strictly
prohibiting anyone from hereafter believing or preaching or teaching
differently than what is established and explained in the present decree,"
went on to give infallible teaching even in the capitula, outside the
canons.

To know whether the Church intends to teach infallibly on this second
level, we notice both the language -- no set form required - and the
intention, which may be seen at times from the nature of the case, at times
from the repetition of the doctrine on this second level.

c) Third Level: Pius XII, in Humani generis: "Nor must it be thought that
the things contained in Encyclical Letters do not of themselves require
assent on the plea that in them the Pontiffs do not exercise the supreme
power of their Magisterium. For these things are taught with the ordinary
Magisterium, about which it is also true to say, 'He who hears you, hears
me.' [Lk 10. 16]. . . If the Supreme Pontiffs, in their acta expressly pass
judgment on a matter debated until then, it is obvious to all that the
matter, according to the mind and will of the same Pontiffs, cannot be
considered any longer a question open for discussion among theologians."

We notice: (1) These things are protected by the promise of Christ in Lk
10. 16, and so are infallible, for His promise cannot fail. Though that
promise was first given to the 72, it is certain that the Apostles were in
the group, and as the trajectory advanced, it became clear that the full
teaching authority was only for them - the mission given to the 72 was
preliminary, and the full meaning was made clear later when the Apostles
were given the authority to bind and to loose. This was part of the broader
picture: Jesus wanted only a gradual self-revelation. Had He started by
saying: "Before Abraham was, I am", He would have been stoned on the spot.
(2) Not everything in Encyclicals, and similar documents, is on this level
- this is true only when the Popes expressly pass judgment on a previously
debated matter, (3) since the Church scattered throughout the world can
make a teaching infallible without defining - as we saw on level 2 -then of
course the Pope alone, who can speak for and reflect the faith of the whole
Church, can do the same even in an Encyclical, under the conditions
enumerated by Pius XII. Really, on any level, all that is required to make
a thing infallible is that it be given definitively. When a Pope takes a
stand on something debated in theology and publishes it in his Acta, that
suffices. The fact that as Pius XII said it is removed from debate alone
shows it is meant as definitive.

In this connection, we note that LG 12 says: "The entire body of the
faithful, anointed as they are by the Holy One, cannot err in matters of
belief." This means: If the whole Church, both people and authorities, have
ever believed (accepted as revealed) an item, then that cannot be in error,
is infallible. Of course this applies to the more basic items, not to very
technical matters of theological debate. But we note this too: If this
condition has once been fulfilled in the past, then if people in a later
age come to doubt or deny it -- that does not make noninfallible what was
once established as infallible. Many things come under this , e. g. , the
existence of angels.

This does not mean, however, that the Pope is to be only the echo of the
faithful.

d) Level 4: LG 25: "Religious submission of mind and of will must be
shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff
even when he is not defining, in such a way, namely, that the judgments
made by him are sincerely adhered to according to his manifested mind and
will, which is clear either from the nature of the documents, or from the
repeated presentation of the same doctrine, or from the manner of
speaking."

We note all the qualifications in the underlined part The key is the
intention of the Pope. He may be repeating existing definitive teaching
from Ordinary Magisterium level - then it is infallible, as on level 2. He
may be giving a decision on a previously debated point - as on level 3,
then it falls under the promise of Christ in Lk 10. 16, and so is also
infallible. Or it may be a still lesser intention - then we have a case
like that envisioned in Canon 752 of the New Code of Canon Law: "Not indeed
an assent of faith, but yet a religious submission of mind and will must be
given to the teaching which either the Supreme Pontiff, or the College of
Bishops [of course, with the Pope] pronounce on faith or on morals when
they exercise the authentic Magisterium even if they do not intend to
proclaim it by a definitive act." If they do not mean to make it
definitive, then it does not come under the virtue of faith, or the promise
of Christ,"He who hears you hears me". Rather, it is a matter of what the
Canon and LG 25 call "religious submission of mind and of will." What does
this require? Definitely, it forbids public contradiction of the teaching.
But it also requires something in the mind, as the wording indicates. This
cannot be the absolute assent which faith calls for - for since this
teaching is, by definition, not definitive, we gather that it is not
absolutely finally certain.

How can anyone give any mental assent when there is not absolute
certitude? In normal human affairs, we do it all the time. Suppose we are
at table, and someone asks if a dish of food came from a can, and if so,
was it sent to a lab to check for Botulism. It is true, routine opening of
a can would not detect that deadly poison. Yet it is too much to check
every can, and the chances are very remote, so much so that normal people
do not bother about it - yet their belief takes into account a real but
tiny possibility of a mistake. Similarly with a doctrine on this fourth
level. And further, the chances of error on this level are much smaller
than they are with a can of food. Similarly, in a criminal trial, the judge
will tell the jury they must find the evidence proves guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He does not demand that every tiny doubt be ruled out,
even though it may mean life in prison or death.

If one should make a mistake by following the fourth level of Church
teaching, when he comes before the Divine Judge, the Judge will not blame
him, rather He will praise him. But if a person errs by breaking with the
Church on the plea that he knew better - that will not be easily accepted.

Si Si No No: On the Pope's Infallible Magisterium

On the Pope's Infallible Magisterium

Clear Ideas on the Pope's Infallible Magisterium

This article quotes heavily from two essays, which have recently been jointly republished under the title, Pope or Church?, by Angelus Press.

The first essay, The Ordinary Magisterium of the Catholic Church was originally entitled, An Essay on the Authority of the Teachings of the Sovereign Pontiff, and published in July, 1956. It was written by Dom Paul Nau, OSB of the monastery of Solemes.

The second essay, The Infallibility of the Church's Ordinary Magisterium was written in 1980 by Canon Rene Berthod of the Congregation of the Great Saint Bernard. An eminent and profound theologian, after a long and brilliant career as professor, he was the Rector for many years of the Seminary of Saint Pius X in Econe, Switzerland.

CDF clarification on the status of Ordinatio Sacerdotalis

Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger Concerning Women as Priests


COVER LETTER TO BISHOPS' CONFERENCE PRESIDENTS
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger
November 8, 1995

The publication in May 1994 of the apostolic letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis was followed by a number of problematic and negative statements by certain theologians, organizations of priests and religious, as well as some associations of lay people. These reactions attempted to cast doubt on the definitive character of the letter's teaching on the inadmissibility of women to the ministerial priesthood and also questioned whether this teaching belonged to the deposit of the faith.

This congregation therefore has judged it necessary to dispel the doubts and reservations that have arisen by issuing a responsum ad dubium, which the Holy Father has approved and ordered to be published (cf. enclosure).

In asking you to bring this responsum to the attention of the bishops of your episcopal conference before its official publication, this dicastery is confident that the conference itself, as well as the individual bishops, will do everything possible to ensure its distribution and favorable reception, taking particular care that, above all on the part of theologians, pastors of souls and religious, ambiguous and contrary positions will not again be proposed.

The text of the responsum is to remain confidential until the date of its publication in L'Osservatore Romano, which is expected to be the 18th of November.

With gratitude for your assistance and with prayerful best wishes I remain,
Sincerely Yours in Christ,
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger

CONCERNING THE TEACHING CONTAINED IN ORDINATIO SACERDOTALIS RESPONSUM AD DUBIUM
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
October 28, 1995

Dubium: Whether the teaching that the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women, which is presented in the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis to be held definitively, is to be understood as belonging to the deposit of faith.

Responsum: In the affirmative.

This teaching requires definitive assent, since, founded on the written Word of God, and from the beginning constantly preserved and applied in the Tradition of the Church, it has been set forth infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium (cf. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium 25, 2). Thus, in the present circumstances, the Roman Pontiff, exercising his proper office of confirming the brethren (cf. Lk 22:32), has handed on this same teaching by a formal declaration, explicitly stating what is to be held always, everywhere, and by all, as belonging to the deposit of the faith.

The Sovereign Pontiff John Paul II, at the Audience granted to the undersigned Cardinal Prefect, approved this Reply, adopted in the ordinary session of this Congregation, and ordered it to be published.

Rome, from the offices of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, on the Feast of the Apostles SS. Simon and Jude, October 28, 1995.

Joseph Card. RatzingerPrefect
Tarcisio BertoneArchbishop Emeritus of Vercelli

Ordinatio Sacerdotalis; Pope John Paul II 22 May 1994 Priestly Ordination of Men Alone; CATHOLIC LIBRARY: Ordinatio Sacerdotalis (1994); Ordinatio Sacerdotalis

Heythrop Journal articles

Check at BC:

The Heythrop Journal
Volume 20 Issue 4 Page 380-398, October 1979
To cite this article: JOHN P. BOYLE (1979) THE ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM: TOWARDS A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT(1) The Heythrop Journal 20 (4), 380–398. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2265.1979.tb00218.x

Volume 39 Issue 1 Page 18-36, January 1998
To cite this article: Lawrence J Welch (1998) The Infallibility of the Ordinary Universal Magisterium: A Critique of Some Recent Observations The Heythrop Journal 39 (1), 18–36. doi:10.1111/1468-2265.00063

John XXIII on rights

From Pacem in Terris:

Rights

11. But first We must speak of man's rights. Man has the right to live. He has the right to bodily integrity and to the means necessary for the proper development of life, particularly food, clothing, shelter, medical care, rest, and, finally, the necessary social services. In consequence, he has the right to be looked after in the event of illhealth; disability stemming from his work; widowhood; old age; enforced unemployment; or whenever through no fault of his own he is deprived of the means of livelihood. (8)


And of course cited in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. So what does Pope John XXIII mean by rights? And who owes these things to the right-bearers?