St. Francis de Sales, on the natural love of God

See his Treatise on the Love of God


CHAPTER XVI. THAT WE HAVE A NATURAL INCLINATION TO LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS.

CHAPTER XVII. THAT WE HAVE NOT NATURALLY THE POWER TO LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS.

CHAPTER XVIII. THAT THE NATURAL INCLINATION WHICH WE HAVE TO LOVE GOD IS NOT USELESS.

Cicero, the cardinal virtues?

again, from the De Officiis

{15} V.

You see here, Marcus, my son, the very form and as it were the face of Moral Goodness; "and if," as Plato says, "it could be seen with the physical eye, it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom." But all that is morally right rises from some one of four sources: it is concerned either (1) with the full perception and intelligent development of the true; or (2) with the conservation of organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness and moderation of everything that is said and done, wherein consist temperance and self-control. Although these four are connected and interwoven, still it is in each one considered singly that certain definite kinds of moral duties have their origin: in that category, for instance, which was designated first in our division and in which we place wisdom and prudence, belong the search after truth and its discovery; and this is the peculiar {16} province of that virtue. For the more clearly anyone observes the most essential truth in any given case and the more quickly and accurately he can see and explain the reasons for it, the more understanding and wise he is generally esteemed, and justly so. So, then, it is truth that is, as it were, the stuff with which this virtue has to deal and on which it employs itself.

{17} Before the three remaining virtues, on the other hand, is set the task of providing and maintaining those things on which the practical business of life depends so that the relations of man to man in human society may be conserved, and that largeness and nobility of soul may be revealed not only in increasing one's resources and acquiring advantages for one's self and one's family but far more in rising superior to these very things. But orderly behaviour and consistency of demeanor and self-control and the like have their sphere in that department of things in which a certain amount of physical exertion, and not mental activity merely, is required. For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and order into the transactions of daily life, we shall be conserving moral rectitude and moral dignity.

{18} VI.

Now, of the four divisions which we have made of the essential idea of moral goodness, the first, consisting in the knowledge of truth, touches human nature most closely. For we are all attracted and drawn to a zeal for learning and knowing; and we think it glorious to excel therein, while we count it base and immoral to fall into error, to wander from the truth, to be ignorant, to be led astray. In this pursuit, which is both natural and morally right, two errors are to be avoided: first, we must not treat the unknown as known and too readily accept it; and he who wishes to avoid this error (as all should do) will devote both time and attention

{19} to the weighing of evidence. The other error is that some people devote too much industry and too deep study to matters that are obscure and difficult and useless as well. If these errors are successfully avoided, all the labour and pains expended upon problems that are morally right and worth the solving will be fully rewarded. Such a worker in the field of astronomy, for example, was Gaius Sulpicius, of whom we have heard; in mathematics, Sextus Pompey, whom I have known personally; in dialectics, many; in civil law, still more. All these professions are occupied with the search after truth; but to be drawn by study away from active life is contrary to moral duty. For the whole glory of virtue is in activity; activity, however, may often be interrupted, and many opportunities for returning to study are opened. Besides, the working of the mind, which is never at rest, can keep us busy in the pursuit of knowledge even without conscious effort on our part. Moreover, all our thought and mental activity will be devoted either to planning for things that are morally right and that conduce to a good and happy life, or to the pursuits of science and learning. With this we close the discussion of the first source of duty.

{20} VII.

Of the three remaining divisions, the most extensive in its application is the principle by which society and what we may call its "common bonds" are maintained. Of this again there are two divisions — justice, in which is the crowning glory of the virtues and on the basis of which men are called "good men"; and, close akin to justice, charity, which may also be called kindness or generosity. The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property for their own.

{21} There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory) or through conquest (is in the case of those who took it in war) or by due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human society.

{22} But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man.

{23} The foundation of justice, moreover, is good_faith; — that is, truth and fidelity to promises and agreements. And therefore we may follow the Stoics, who diligently investigate the etymology of words; and we may accept their statement that "good faith" is so called because what is promised is "made good," although some may find this derivation/a rather farfetched. There are, on the other hand, two kinds of injustice — the one, on the part of those who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those who, when they can, do not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being inflicted. For he who, under the influence of anger or some other passion, wrongfully assaults another seems, as it were, to be laying violent hands upon a comrade; but he who does not prevent or oppose wrong, if he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he deserted his parents or his friends or his country.

{24} Then, too, those very wrongs which people try to inflict on purpose to injure are often the result of fear: that is, he who premeditates injuring another is afraid that, if he does not do so, he may himself be made to suffer some hurt. But, for the most part, people are led to wrong-doing in order to secure some personal end; in this vice, avarice is generally the controlling motive.

Cicero, ius naturale?

De Officiis,
source

{11} IV.

First of all, Nature has endowed every species of living creature with the instinct of self-preservation, of avoiding what seems likely to cause injury to life or limb, and of procuring and providing everything needful for life — food, shelter, and the like. A common property of all creatures is also the reproductive instinct (the purpose of which is the propagation of the species) and also a certain amount of concern for their offspring. But the most marked difference between man and beast is this: the beast, just as far as it is moved by the senses and with very little perception of past or future, adapts itself to that alone which is present at the moment; while man — because he is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends the chain of consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, and connects and associates the present and the future — easily surveys the course of his whole life and makes the necessary preparations for its conduct strangely tender love for his offspring. She also prompts men to meet in companies, to form public assemblies and to take part in them themselves; and she further dictates, as a consequence of this, the effort on man's part to provide a store of things that minister to his comforts and wants — and not for himself alone, but for his wife and children and the others whom he holds dear and for whom he ought to provide; and this responsibility also stimulates his courage and makes it stronger for the active duties of life. {13} Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are peculiar to man. And so, when we have leisure from the demands of business cares, we are eager to see, to hear, to learn something new, and we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders of creation as indispensable to a happy life. Thus we come to understand that what is true, simple, and genuine appeals most strongly to a man's nature. To this passion for discovering truth there is added a hungering, as it were, for independence, so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is unwilling to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of conduct or is a teacher of truth or who, for the general good, rules according to justice and law. From this attitude come greatness_of_soul and a sense of superiority to worldly conditions.

{14} And it is no mean manifestation of Nature and Reason that man is the only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for moderation in word and deed. And so no other animal has a sense of beauty, loveliness, harmony in the visible world; and Nature and Reason, extending the analogy of this from the world of sense to the world of spirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more to be maintained in thought and deed, and the same Nature and Reason are careful to do nothing in an improper or unmanly fashion, and in every thought and deed to do or think nothing capriciously. It is from these elements that is forged and fashioned that moral goodness which is the subject of this inquiry — something that, even though it be not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour;^[2] and by its own nature, we correctly maintain, it merits praise even though it be praised by none.

Sarah Byers article

on how Descartes gets Aristotle wrong on the definition of life

see Review of Metaphysics

Fr. Giertych on Thomistic contemplation

here

verify with Summa Theologiae?

Analysis of the Moral Act by Antonio Pardo

index

see ST I II 18, 10-11
Steven J. Jensen, "Do Circumstances Give Species?" The Thomist (Jan. 2006)

TOB Institute

main page

Retranslating the Theology of the Body: Pt 1, 2

Dr. Chris Burgwald interviews Dr. Waldstein

A response to the conciliarists

Or to the Orthodox who would use the Council of Constance as an argument against papal authority, for that matter...

Either [a] one of the claimants was the pope and he resigned for the good of the Church, or [b] there was no legitimate pope to begin with.

The pope could resign on his own initiative, seeing that it was practically impossible to adjudicate between the competing claims. This does not mean that the council itself was responsible for deposing the pope, or that it has a greater authority than that of the pope. The council would be taking credit for something that was not due.

Peter Simpson on the U.S. Constitution

video/lecture; ppt

Magna Moralia

Not Aristotle's, but St. Gregory the Great's commentary on the Book of Job... sigh. Will it ever be available in English translation online or in print? There's this, but as you can see, it is not complete. Someone should reprint the Patrologia with acid-free/library-suitable paper; I wonder how much that would cost... it's unlikely I would be able to get the complete set.

Documenti e studi

special topic: ethics
published by SISMEL

via Thomistica.net

(also, RSPT website)

20% off new releases from CUA Press

For a limited time: refer to discount code PHB when placing your order.
CUA Press

The following titles are included in the sale:
The Soul of the Person, Adrian J. Reimers
The Person and the Polis, ed. Craig Steven Titus
Human Nature in its Wholeness, ed. Daniel Robinson, Gladys Sweeney, and Richard Gill, L.C.
The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy, S.J. McGrath
The Religion of Reality, Didier Maleuvre
Praeambula Fidei, Ralph McInerny
God and Evolution, Jozef Zycinski
Christian Faith and Human Understanding, Robert Sokolowski
Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude, Craig Steven Titus
The Augustinian Person, Peter Burnell
Cusanus, ed. Peter J. Casarella
In Search of Schopenhauer's Cat, Raymond B. Marcin
From the Nature of the Mind to Personal Dignity, Juan Franck
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 1 and 2, Jean-Pierre Torrell
A Short History of Thomism, Romanus Cessario
Ethica Thomistica, Ralph McInerny
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition
Commentaries on Aristotle's On Sense and What is Sensed and On Memory and Recollection
Personalist Papers, John F. Crosby
The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer
Truth Matters, ed. John Trapani, Jr.
Form and Being, Lawrence Dewan
The Texture of Being, Kenneth L. Schmitz
Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II, John Wippel

Theopoiesis vs. Theosis

Via Pontifications

Peter Leithart on Theopoiesis.

Carl Mosser of Eastern College gave a superb presentation on deification at the ETS meeting. A large part of the presentation was a study of terminology. He noted that the Greek work THEOS (often thought to be equivalent to "God") had a broader meaning, referring to powers that were immortal, incorruptible, and glorious - the very words that Paul uses in 1 Corinthians 15 to describe the resurrected body. For the early fathers, this is what is meant by "deification," and they frequently link the doctrine to adoption via Psalm 82. Deification is not a capitulation to Hellenism (as Harnack argued) but grew out of biblical exegesis and the patristic understanding of salvation. (Interestingly, Mosser said that 2 Peter 1:4 plays little role in the earliest fathers.)

Gregory of Nazianzus was the first to use the word "theosis" to describe this, and he used it very infrequently. The doctrine and terminology of theosis kicks into gear with Pseudo-Dionysus, the hesychast controversy, Palamas and Maximus the confessor. It is thus linguistically anachronistic to claim that the early fathers have a doctrine of "theosis." With the hesychast controversy, not only the terminology but the doctrine changes. Instead of a strongly soteriological understanding of deification, theosis develops in a mystical context, and is worked out by Palamas and others through the distinction between the essence and energies of God, a distinction that has no place in the earliest doctrine of deification.

The confusion of theosis and the broader doctrine of deification creates significant ecumenical problems. Deification is an ecumenical doctrine, taught in some form by everyone from Irenaeus to Wesley and beyond, but theosis is a distinctly Orthodox development. When the two are confused, deification appears to be a distinctly Orthodox teaching as well. Treating the two as synonymous also leads ecumenically minded Western theologians to downplay the distinctiveness of mystical theosis; Eastern apologists, meanwhile, claim that a true doctrine of deification must take the uniquely Eastern form - complete with the essence/energies distinction - and when the West is found to lack such a teaching, Eastern apologists can claim that the West lacks a doctrine of deification as such.

Mosser ended with some consideration of the best way to describe the reality of deification. The term raises problems, since it implies that men become deities; divinization is hardly better. Mosser suggested that "theopoiesis" is the best way to describe the general, ecumenical view of the church, of which theosis is a uniquely Orthodox variation.

Discussion at Sacramentum Vitae.

Religious Liberty Has Public Dimension, Says Pope

Religious Liberty Has Public Dimension, Says Pope

During New Italian President's First Official Visit to Vatican

VATICAN CITY, NOV. 20, 2006 (Zenit.org).- During Italian President Giorgio Napolitano's first official visit to the Vatican, Benedict XVI stressed that authentic religious freedom is not simply the absence of violence against believers.

The Pope explained to his guest, who arrived to the Vatican accompanied by his wife and a group of high-level governmental officials, that the religious dimension also has a public dimension which must be guaranteed.

"The Church and the state, though fully different, are both called, according to their respective missions and with their own ends and means, to serve man who is at once the end and participant of the salvific mission of the Church and citizen of the state, and they collaborate in promoting his integral good," the Holy Father said.

At the same time, "man appears before the state with his religious dimension, which consists before all else in those internal, voluntary and free acts whereby man sets the course of his life directly toward God," the Pontiff said, quoting from the Second Vatican Council declaration "Dignitatis Humanae," No. 3.

"No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of this kind," Benedict XVI added.

The Pope said it is an error "to consider that the right to religious freedom is sufficiently guaranteed when personal convictions suffer no violence or interference, or when we limit ourselves to respecting the expression of faith within the confines of a place of worship."

Social nature

"It cannot, in fact, be forgotten that the social nature of man itself requires that he should give external expression to his internal acts of religion; that he should share with others in matters religious; that he should profess his religion in community," the Holy Father stated.

"Religious freedom is, then, not just of individuals, but also of families, of religious groups and of the Church herself," he indicated, in an address that was broadcast on public television channel RAI 1.

Benedict XVI continued: "An adequate respect of the right to religious freedom implies, then, the commitment of civil authorities in helping to create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to exercise their religious rights and to fulfill their religious duties, and also in order that society itself may profit by the moral qualities of justice and peace which have their origin in men's faithfulness to God and to his holy will.

"The freedom that the Church and Christians claim does not prejudice the interests of the state or of other social groups, and does not seek an authoritative supremacy over them. Rather, it is a condition enabling the fulfillment of the vital service that the Church offers to Italy, and to all other countries in which she is present."

Professor Heck's most recent critique of the PGR

Richard G. Heck's webpage

his recent critique of the PGR (his original critique, written about 4 years ago)

More things for me to look up

Revival Preachers and Politics in 13th-Century Italy; The Cult of Remembrance and the Black Death; & Death and Ritual in Renaissance Florence

(Includes a review of Fr. Thompson's, O.P. first book, Revival Preachers and Politics in Thirteenth-Century Italy (1992).)

Go to BC for this:
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/catholic_historical_review/v092/92.2kselman.html
pdf

(Should contain a review of Cities of God.)

The Mendicant Orders and Sanctity in the Thirteenth Century: A Bibliography

Remember Kenneth Pennington

The Philosophical Gourmet Report

Dr. Pakaluk's original post
Resonse by Keith DeRose. (Scroll down for update.)
Dr. Pakaluk's response to Dr. DeRose.

PGR on ancient philosophy

On medieval philosophy
The evaluators: Jeff Brower, Brian Leftow, Scott MacDonald, Calvin Normore, Eleonore Stump.

Come on, the majority of whom are known analytics? And their judgments of analytic-dominated historical programs might not be biased? (Look at which programs are ranked high and which are not.)

R. Cessario, "The Sacred, Religion, and Morality"

access from BC?

Cessario, Romanus "The Sacred, Religion, and Morality"Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture - Volume 9, Number 4, Fall 2006, pp. 16-32 Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture

BMCR of Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship

here

See Action and contemplation : studies in the moral and political thought of Aristotle / Robert C. Bartlett, Susan D. Collins, editors.

5. The Natural Foundations of Right and Aristotelian Philosophy / Richard Bodeus and Kent Enns

L'exemple du dieu dans le discours aristotélicien
RICHARD BODEUS

His faculty listing.


Clifford A. Bates' website; Aristotle on Founders

Obedience, Transgression, and Conquest: Aristotle on the Rule of Law

Fr. Ashley, Dei Verbum and Christian Morals

Catholic Dossier article