Dr. Garcia on virtue-based moral theory

Dr. Garcia gave an outline of virtue-based moral theory, harnessing the opinions of others and engaging them through dialectic to present his own account.

(1) He maintains that it is a fundamental characteristic of a virtue ethics (or, a virtues-based moral theory, which he prefers) that the virtues are basic. All other moral claims are justified and explained on the basis of the virtues.

(2) Now, there are different versions of virtue ethics. Dr. Garcia's version is role-centered, in that role-relationships are fundamental in defining the moral life, and explaining the rest of moral claims.

(3) Also, in his virtues-based moral theory, moral reasoning is patient-focused. That is, it is focused on the needs of the other upon whom I act, not mine. There si an objective element to evaluation; it is not purely subjective.

(4) In addition, in examining action we can look at the output (the outcome or effect) and also the input--the desires, intentions that feed into the action. Consequentialism focuses on outputs; VBMT also looks at the intentions.

Now, with respect to moral vocaulary, there are three families of terms.
1. Concepts or claims about what is desirable/valuable (prominent in consequentialism/teleological ethics)
2. Concepts about what is obligatory/forbidden--deontic value notions (prominent in deontological ethics)
3. Concepts about virtuous good-making and vices

In a VBMT, the virtues are fundamental. What is desirable or right/wrong is understood in terms of the virtues.

What is the right thing to do? --> What is virtuous.

Virtue ethics is usually presented as an alternative to deontological and teleological theories. Still, the nature of virtue ethics is unclea and disputed--it seems that any adequate moral theory will have some account of the virtues.

There are two possibilities.
(1) virtues are autonomous/independent from what is desirable or right
(2) virtues are fundamental--that is to say, everything else is understood in terms of the virtues

(contrast with Richard Brandt, and utilitarian virtue ethics)

Virtues are foundational
(1) Focus of the moral agen'ts attention
(2) Focus of the theorist's attention

Dr. Garcia wishes to focus on (2).

One version makes use of value theory -- claims about intrinsic value--what is suitable/appropriate to choose, consent to, endorse, want, favor, etc.

(value theory: Garcia's reference to Scheler, Brentano[SEP], and Winan(?); my links: what is phenomenology; the philosophy of value in the 21st century )

In a virtues ethic, character/being is central, while doing is peripheral. Rules are crude maps, not precise guides or standards.

Then he responded to various ethical theorists (mostly analytics?), including Christine Korsgaaard [publications, interview], Henry Richardson, Judith Thompson, Rosalind Hursthouse [on virtue ethics], Michael Slote.

Virtues/virtuous acts help roles, bring about the good in which the role consists. Virtues make us good, but not in a causal sense; it is not an effect that virtue brings about, but it counts towards it. To be a good friend, for example, is to be trustworthy. It is constitutive, not causal.

One judges actions to be wrong by linking them to the voices or to moral inputs. Even if actions are judged to be right or wrong in terms of the moral laws or rules, laws are a crude way of talking about what is vicious.

Talk of acting from virtue is ambiguous--is one talking about from character or virtuous motivation?
Is a virtuous action would be virtuously motivated? Or generally or likely to be virtuously motivated?

A familiar case/counter-example: certain actions are virtuous, others are vicious. One doesn't need to refer to anything else in the agent's motiviation to make an evaluation.

An example from Judith Thompson, whom Dr. Garcia considers to be an ally rather than an adversary on this point--if someone is drwoning, their life is in danger. If one is passing by and sees a life preserver handy, it is right to toss it to the drowning person. The external action has certain objective characteristics.

Still, one needs to look also at the motivation or intention to evaluate.
M. Slote: right act expresses a virtuous motive (it is what a virtuous agent would do)
R. Hursthouse: right action is what a virtuous agent would do if fully informed (knowledge of circumstances)
(later view: what a virtuous agent would characteristically do)

One does need to look at the concrete aspect of situation--rightness is dependent upon what is actual, not hypothetical features of a situation. Utilitarians also look at counterfactuals; deliberation seems to be about action that has not yet come to be.

I spoke with Dr. Garcia afterwards; he said that if he were to include a discussion of community, it would fall under role-relationships--how the individual relates to the community, etc. He did not have a definition of the common good ready.

Some reflections
It seems that much of what Dr. Garcia is writing can be reconciled with Aristotle and Aquinas, though he is not sure if one needs a robust account of nature and teleology (such as found in Aristotle) to make virtue-based ethics work--but he suspects that it is the case and inevitable.
Aristotle's ethics, after all, is eudaimonistic, and it seems to go against popular understanding of human action and motivation (even if its only implicit and must be drawn out through questioning) to exclude considerations of happiness from ethics.

The focus on input is the same as the Thomistic understanding of the importance of the intention for the evaluation of the morality of human action. It does not suffice for an action to be virtuous if the external act is good--one must look also at the intention. It is virtuous if it is done out of virtue.

On the other hand, the emphasis on the patient reminds of the Thomistic teaching on the morality of the external act--one does not evaluate human action based on intention alone, but must look at the goodness (or lack thereof) intrinsic to the external act. This applies not only to justice, but to all the other virtues which order our relations to others.

One can also agree that rules, being general in nature, can take one only so far in moral reasoning; ultimately one must develop the virtue of prudence to determine what action to take.

It may seem to academics (and Dr. Garcia holds this opinion) that Aristotle and Aquinas do not talk much about roles. (Though Dr. Garcia does recognize that Aristotle wants to say that the virtues will differ among people as their function differs.) I think Aristotle and Aquinas can be read in light of "common-sense" undestandings of role differentiation. Aquinas after all distinguishes between particular justice and the potential parts of justice, and the order of charity--how we are obligated to different people in different ways, based on how they are related to us.

While one can reconcile value with the classical moral tradition's conception of the good (if one is willing to postpone the discussion of the "epistemology" that underlies and justifies the use of the word value--it would seem that there is a divide between phenomenology and Aristotelian or moderate realism on this point), I would not be so quick as to say that virtue is always prior to all notiosn of the "good." I think that some notions of "good" are prior to virtue, as the New Natural Law theorists make explicit in their writings. Which good? Not good as it is predicated of an action, but of an end. Virtues, and the actions which flow from them, are desirable for their own sake, but also for the sake of the end to which they are ordered, and these ends are prior, as final causes.

Finally...
The following is not directed to Dr. Garcia in particular, but to academic philosophers, especially those of a certain school. It is not clear to me why virtue ethicists are trying to reinvent the wheel, rather than submittingto a tradition. For Catholics, Aeterni Patris can be interpreted in this light, to call Catholic philosophers to immerse themselves in the Thomistic tradition, to making it living so as to be able to engage "modern questions" but more importantly, their contemporaries. Perhaps the overt religious character of the medieval tradition is an obstacle; that's too bad. Certainly those who are turned away from the medievals must read Aristotle as if no one read him in the two millenia who separates him from the moderns.

There is a need among many philosophers to be "original", to discover things on one's own -- is this attributable to a malaise called modernity? Or just to pride? If one is still an inquirer and a learner, what can one pass on to students? The art of thinking? But there is more to philosophy than logic--do we discard what has been left for us by our predecessors? One would expect a teacher to be a little bit more advanced on the road to knowledge and wisdom. Perhaps academic philosophers think they are more advanced, but if they do, many are rather deluded.

If we do not understand what they are saying, then should we not be silent instead of passing judgment? On the other hand, if we disagree with what they are saying, do we have a solid foundation for our own opinions? Now some may recognize that there is a value to studying previous texts, but often they read these texts in light of their philosophical preconceptions, or they are merely looking for proof texts for their own positions, either as a (secondary) argument from authority or to show that others are agreeing with what they are saying. (Or to show that those ancients were not that wrong after all, though still a bit wrong...)

Kenneth R. Miller

According to the flyer:

"Prof. Behe is eager to exchange ideas with students and faculty on his harsh assessment of orthodox Darwinian theory. He plans to make pointed reference to Prof. Ken Miller's recent attempts to discredit his research."

Dr. Ken Miller's homepage
(evolution resources)

He has two articles responding to ID:
"The Flagellum Unspun - The Collapse of Irreducible Complexity."
"Answering the Biochemical Argument from Design"

Dr. Miller appears to be a theistic neo-Darwinian evolutionist. He is also a Catholic, according to wikipedia. In his reactions (1, 2) to Cardinal Schönborn he fails to recognize that what he calls science is actually a set of presuppositions (that are not self-evident) coupled with a certain method of reasoning (which is susceptible to critique according to the canons of logic).

Hans Hoppe

Democracy: The God that Failed (archive at LRC, mises.org)
Introduction to Democracy, The God That Failed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe

His website. wiki.

Google Books: Democracy the God that Failed: The Economics ...
The Economics and Ethics of Private Property ...
A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism ...

Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe: Theory and History


An Interview With Hans-Herman Hoppe

More links:
Hans-Hermann Hoppe: Defying Leviathan Samizdata.net
HANS-HERMANN HOPPE ON WAR, TERRORISM, AND THE WORLD STATE

Edit. Interview with Hans-Hermann Hoppe

Does anything follow from a contradiction?

I suspect that logically, this does not hold, and only works because of a certain definition of implication within modern/symbolic logic is adopted. If we set up the accepted truth table for material implication:

p q p-->q
T T T
T F F
F F T
F T T

(for more on material implication)

we see that in the case of a & ~a --> b, while a & ~a is F, regardless of whether b is T or F, the implication is T.

(This is already covered in Paedo Socrates' post, but I'm typing out the justification for my own reflection and to keep it simple for the reader.)

Now if this statement is taken rather to be a predicator of human behavior or "psychology," perhaps there is some truth to it. That is to say, if someone consciously rejects the principle of non-contradiction and "reasons" accordingly, then it he will accept as true whatever he wants to accept as true, because he is no longer guided by logic. Truth is arbitrarily determined by the subject, and has no relation to reality.

So the next question would then be: is material implication "strong" enough to explain both logical and real necessity? Or is it merely a devised rule of "calculating" or "reasoning" which does not help us think logically but impedes us from doing so?

Giovanni Reale

author of The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle
(another book taking on the developmental view of Aristotle's Metaphysics)

info page

bio and links (in Italian)
Academia Verlag
Italian wiki

Deuteros Plous

A review of his Toward a New Interpretation of Plato

Janet Smith's review of his volume on Plato and Aristotle

Christopher Gill's report on a colloquium on the dialogues of Plato

Behe speaking on Thursday, 21 September

I received this email today:

On THURSDAY
September 21at 7pm
in the Robsham Theatre

MICHAEL BEHE Prof. of biochemistry at Lehigh University and best-selling author of DARWIN'S BLACK BOX will lecture and lead a discussion on THE CASE AGAINST DARWIN (a plea for Freethinking in Biology). All faculty and students--especially true believers in the orthodox Darwinian paradigm--are urged to attend and join in an open, free discussion (the sort of discussion that rarely takes place on this topic). Hoping to see you there.

Ronald K Tacelli sj
Boston College Philosophy Association

I was thinking it would be later in the semester, my copy of his revised edition of Darwin's Black Box has not arrived yet. Ah well, maybe he'll be willing to sign a "book plate." Hrm, I suppose on Wednesday I can print out some objections and read them over.

In the meantime, questions to keep in mind:
(1) Is it possible to show that something has no function? One can show that it does not have a certain function (for example, if a protein "normally" catalyzes a certain reaction, but one alters the protein and the reaction is no longer catalyzed, one would suspect that the protein no longer is able to carry out that function). But can one show that it has no function whatsoever? Perhaps, if one knows the structure and constituents of the protein.

(2) On the other hand, even if it can be shown that a protein missing certain amino acids has some sort of function what is the effect of this protein on that of which it is a part? Does the whole still thrive like it did before?

(3) Then there is the developmental question--if we are talking about complex living things and not simple living things (comprised of a single cell), what is the impact of such a change on the living thing as a whole? And how does a change in protein lead to a macroscopic change? (What is the development pathway?)

I should ask him about structuralism...

Holy Work by Aidan Nichols, O.P.

Aidan Nichols, Holy Work

Fr. Nichols responds to Adriano Tilgher, an Italian cultural historian.

What, however, interests the New Testament writers is not everyday human work such as Jesus may have done in Joseph's workshop but rather the unique redeeming work of Christ, and although they are conscious of a range of virtues needing to be brought into play in Christian living and a variety of good works (roughly speaking, the corporal and spiritual works of mercy of later catechesis) that give flesh to the new life of grace, the main human work in which they are interested is the proclamation of the Good News about the Word incarnate and him crucified and risen, redeeming and reconciling, to the rest of the world. St Paul thought it important that an apostle should give good example by not being an economical parasite if he could possibly help it - which is why, so he tells us, he chose to keep up his trade.

Again, the Church of the Word incarnate, as we see her fully formed, with the main lines of her life set forth, in the writings of the Fathers of the post-apostolic age, happened to be, at least in the East, mainly an urban phenomenon (that is why, despite 'East Anglia' and 'Argyll and the Isles', it is so unusual to find bishops named after regions not cities). But like Dorchester in Thomas Hardy's The Mayor of Casterbridge, the Church's strongholds were towns that were not only surrounded by the countryside but positively permeated by it through a network of not only close economic ties but actual green spaces for tilling and husbandry, what the Romans called rus in urbe, the 'country in the city'. The Church's liturgical celebration of the great saving events of the Word incarnate's life, death and Resurrection followed a pattern which readily blended with the rhythm of rural work - the cycle of the seasons, and the cycle of the day, from Lauds when the farmer goes out at first light, to Vespers when the lamps are lit for dusk as he returns.
...
The question then arises, Taking as given the fact that this literature (the books of the biblical Canon) and the particular human community they brought into being in the sub-apostolic period (the Church) are pre-modern in their assumptions about work (as about everything else on which modernity has or had a view of its own), is this fact in and of itself of doctrinal importance? In other words, is this assumption about traditional styles of work of any intrinsic importance for the understanding of Christian revelation and the life which should flow from that understanding for ourselves who as Catholic Christians are privileged to be its recipients?

There could of course be an argument which had it that the linking of biblical revelation and its continuation in Christian tradition to agricultural work and handcrafts is a providential dispensation. That is, I take it, the view of the Christian sect called the Amish who, for precisely this reason, maintain exclusively rural communities of believers. But I think we can say with assurance that Catholics have only ever drawn on such considerations in a prudential way, not a doctrinal one. One can perfectly well maintain that living close to cosmic nature and working collaboratively with that nature through crop-growing, animal husbandry and the like, is a way of life which should be adopted by far more people than presently do so, since it would greatly reduce the stress and sense of artificiality many people find in the distinctively modern workplace, with its severe time-constraints and such physical inconveniences as gazing all day long at a computer screen. One can also perfectly well propose that craftsmen working with their hands in a fashion which requires skill, that is practical reason in the mode adapted to making things, and doing so by inheriting and perpetuating a tradition of fine work, possess a peculiarly paradeigmatic quality as exemplars of what it is to be a worker. But one does not for all that have to 'buy' the argument that there is something innately rebarbative to the Judaeo-Christian revelation and its ethos in forms of work that do not fall under either of these descriptions. As St Thomas, speaking as a philosopher, makes plain, when we talk of the 'matter' with which the labourer co-operates so as to educe from it a form - whether on his or her own, as with the potter or sculptor, or in collaboration with nature as with the market gardener or the grower of grain - we are not using a univocal expression, a word that has only one meaning. We are, rather, using an analogical notion, a word that has a variety of related meanings. What 'matter' means, and, so far as that goes, what 'form' means too is very much context-dependent. A nurse's 'matter' is her patient; a lawyer's is human behaviour; a playwright's is human life itself, and so on. There is no reason why this range of examples cannot be extended so as to take in every legitimate type of human labour.

In his brilliant study The Theology of Work, Father Richard O'Connor points out that there is no philosophical reason why the matter on which the worker works cannot be so extended and every theological reason why it should be. Such clues as we have from the Fathers of the Church, the principal sources, with Scripture, of an evangelical and catholic theology, betray no evidence of Tilgher's assumption that the only work valued in the Christian tradition was manual work in the strict sense. St John Chrysostom, for example, speaks of the value to be found in the complementarity of human skills. Origen remarks that God created man with various needs so that we might exercise our intelligence in providing for them. For St Augustine, through work man co-operates with God in completing the creation. For St Maximus the Confessor, man is a 'living workshop' since through his labour he synthesizes matter with spirit.

It is true that the ascetic tradition, as represented in, for example, the Rule of St Benedict, or the Sayings of the Desert Fathers, concentrates on hard manual toil, but this is, after all, in the context of specifically monastic life, where a rather different set of criteria from the usual may be thought to apply.

In reality, there is nothing in the nature of Christian doctrine which could make us treat as inevitable the development described by Tilgher (assuming it to be correctly described) whereby Renaissance and post-Renaissance forms of work led ineluctably to the desacralisation of the cosmos and the secularisation of the European mind.

So far he is only talking about types of work and attitudes towards work, and now the moral questions of the distribution of property, social justice, and such. The next part I copy with all of the emphases of the original.

The question then arises, If that is so, what needs to be done? How can we put in place new imaginative patterns which allow people and indeed invite them to experience their work, when it is genuinely human - humane - work, work fit for man, in the same way as once was done in the best agrarian commonwealths known to the Church in the past or the present? I add the rider 'when it is genuinely human - humane - work, work fit for man' because that has been, of course, a preoccupation of the moral magisterium of the Papacy in the last hundred and more years. I am not concerned with those ethical aspects of work which need to be attended to for work to be deemed fit for human beings in the first place, but rather with the doctrinal in the sense of dogmatic interpretation of authentically human work in a modern mode. How can we proceed in trying to suggest for non-traditional kinds of work the sort of imaginative theological space in which traditional work modes have been deployed in Christendom?

Following - in large part - O'Connor's analysis: we can say that such traditional ways of work have been given theological sense in three ways. First, they were regarded as enjoying a relation to the divine creative activity. Second, they had a bearing on the divine redemptive activity. And thirdly, they carried implications for the divine transfiguring or consummating activity at the end of time. However their theological meaning was construed, whether on the basis of the original creation, or on that of the act of Incarnation and its redemptive consequences, or on that of the ultimate glorious Parousia, what was in question was some kind of analogy between divine and human working.

St Thomas has no treatise on labour (the issue was not for him the problem it was to become later). Nevertheless, human work, considered as the activity of what he called, after Aristotle, the 'practical intellect', was for him our principal analogue for God's activity in regard to the world. God's understanding, the divine mind, is engaged in action which both makes things and transforms them. That is why Thomas can use the model of artisanal labour to expound the divine mysteries of both creation and salvation. This is for him a true analogy, and not just a metaphor, which means that when we speak of human beings 'making' things or 'salvaging' or 'transforming' them by their labour we should be aware that the principal maker, salvager and transformer - the 'prime analogate' as the Scholastics say of our language in these respects - is God himself. And what that means for us is that our work - whether it be making, repairing or transforming by acting in any of these ways on 'matter' variously understood, is nothing less than a sign of the divine activity itself, the divine action in creation and redemption, Incarnation and salvation.

Fr. Nichols maintains that production is a work imitative of God's own work of creation, and hence is a form of participation in the Divine activity: "Production, in the sense in which we use that word when discussing human work, is a sign of the Trinitarian causal action in making the world."He acknowledges that "Of course no human work is absolutely creative in the way that God?s is. God creates from nothing; that means, his creative activity has no other principle than itself. When we are creative, whether in humble ways by making a plum pudding or grandiose ways like producing a development plan for a third world country or writing an opera, we are only relatively creative, since we depend for our action on many factors beyond ourselves.".

It is also, I suggested, a sign of the mystery of the Incarnation. As we have seen, 'crafting' things in matter is an analogous reality which can be carried out in many ways. As Eric Gill liked to say, every man is a special kind of artist. [13] But in every case a craftsman wants to embody his ideas, to let his idea take on flesh. In work something goes out from us to what is outside us, just as in God, the archteype of human working, the Word took on flesh through union with human nature, which was infinitely 'outside' it, in our Lady's womb. And just as, in the humanity assumed from Mary, the Word had at his disposal an instrument perfectly suited for his purpose in becoming incarnate, so the worker has at the service of his own 'incarnations' extensions of his own powers in the shape of tools which now range from rudimentary implements still in use like brushes and saws, to mechanical instruments that extend the arm, visio instruments like microscopes that extend the eye, audio instruments like transmitters that extend the ear, and finally instruments which extend the brain - computers - and have within them the power to devise more sophisticated computers still. Some would ask whether technology remains an instrument when it reaches this level of independence, but in the Incarnation the fully human mind and will of Christ, as defined at the Councils of Chalcedon and Constantinople III respectively, were what guaranteed the perfect suitability of his humanity for the task given it by the Word. That does not mean that all advanced technology of an innovatory kind must be embraced simply because it exists: for the question always remains open, Does this or that new tool allow us to devote greater time and energy to our spiritual, intellectual, family, social lives without damage to the fabric either of human community or the natural environment in which our lives are set? The human mind and will of the Word worked to realise the Father's plan of love - so how things fit with the total context here can hardly be irrelevant.

A theology of work. Perhaps one that Opus Dei would endorse. While that is all good, I wonder if the question of social justice is not a greater one and whether it is enough to be able to justify some sort of work theologically without a reference to the concrete common good. Is all work really creative? (With form being imposed on matter?) Should this be used to justify modern bureaucratic techniques, centralization, and the economic [and political] dominance of corporations? What can be said of work that dehumanizes? Is acting as a cog in an assembly line really that satisfying? I don't think Fr. Nichols would say so. But is his treatment sufficiently nuanced to prevent it from being exploited by Henry Ford, for example, to defend his economic and production practices? The problem is, given the way the economy is structured, what forms of work are really free from being criticized when the "larger picture" is taken into account? What work does not perpetuate somewhere else further exploitation and degradation, whether it be of human beings or of the environment? Only those who strive to be economically free might be able to defend themselves from this criticism, but they are few, I suspect, since many at the very least are still dependent upon the consumption of fossil fuels and the like for electricity, and so on. Should charity and the host of virtues be exercised in the workplace, and one's labors raised up through prayer? Undoubtedly. But whether much of the work [of modern industrialized societies] itself can be said to participate that much in God's own good creative act, that is what I question. Looking at the natural being of the act from thew viewpoint of metaphysics or theology is not enough--one must also look at the moral component and the activity's consequences to give a full assessment.

A Theology of Work: Work and the New Creation (Paternoster Theological Monographs) (Paperback)
Working Your Way into Heaven: How to Make Work, Stress, and Drudgery a Means to Your Sanctity by Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski
The Theology of Work: An Exploration by M.D. Chenu
On the Theology of Work: Aspects of the Teaching of the Founder of Opus Dei
by Michael Adams (Translator), Josbe Luis Illanes (Author), Jose L. Illanes (Author)
Sanctification of work

Chinese Text Project

homepage

Thanks to ephilosopher.

Jorge Garcia to speak on Monday, September 18

"Moral Virtues and the Moral Law," presented by Prof. Jorge Garcia, Philosophy Department, on Monday, September 18, at 4:30 p.m., in Higgins 310. Comments by Prof. Arthur Madigan, Philosophy Department. Reception to follow. Sponsored by the Philosophy Department. 617-552-3847.

see also the department of philosophy's official announcements page

I'm planning to be in attendance; I'll write some comments afterwards, and I'll see if I can get a copy of the paper and response.

Fr. Most on Predestination

The discussion over at Pontifications continues: see "Reprobating Predestination"

Fr. Most's Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions is still in print, I believe--it's published by Christendom Press. It's also available online here.

(Distribution is now handled through ISI. No more work study positions for Christendom Students at the Press?)

A quick glance at the ISI Books catalog confirms that it is still in print. However his other books are not. Maybe I should get another copy.

I don't have any formal theological training, but my opinion, for what it is worth--I find Fr. Most's book to be very clear (and concise) and an example of good theological method. Perhaps a book dealing with fundamental/dogmatic/positive theology can be more "literary," but there is something to be said for a certain style being appropriate to speculative or systematic theology.

From his preface to the Latin original edition:

But, in view of the great difficulty of the matter, it seemed good, before publication, to seek the critical judgment of many theologians. I therefore sent nearly 500 privately lithographed copies to many theologians whom I happened to know, both in Europe and in the United States, and in other lands as well. About a hundred replied. Many of them liked my position substantially; many did not. These excellent scholars who replied were a great help—some because they by their approval gave needed encouragement, others because they gave positive suggestions for improvement, still others because they raised objections.

By the goodness of Divine Providence, those who replied belonged to many and diverse schools of theology. That is, replies came from Thomists, Molinists, Scotists, Syncretists, and others. Among them were dogmatic theologians, exegetes, and patrologists. Perhaps the reader may wonder which schools liked, and which disliked my position. Actually, the division did not follow school lines. Instead, there were both Thomists and Molinists among those who liked it; and, conversely, both Thomists and Molinists among those who did not like it. However, one principle of division appeared in many, though not all cases: those who did not like it seemed to want to solve the entire problem by metaphysics; those who liked it seemed to want to start with the sources of revelation and the Magisterium, and only after that to add metaphysical considerations.

Speculative theology is not natural theology or metaphysics dressed up with citations from Scripture or the Fathers or the Magisterium--it takes as its starting point divinely revealed data, and this supernatural origin must be respected. (Even if certain polemicists wish to characterize Latin theology as nothing more than philosophy in disguise.)

The MOST Theological Collection at CatholicCulture.org

Note: ISI Books offers a 20% discount for internet customers.

While ISI Books are available at fine bookstores everywhere, www.isibooks.org offers an easy, secure, and cost-effective means by which to order our titles directly. ISI Books is pleased to offer its customers a 20% across-the-board discount on ISI Books' titles purchased through the Internet.

Michael Behe coming to B.C.

First lecture for the philosophy undergraduate majors, organized by Fr. Tacelli, S.J.

Should be interesting--I'll try to attend and read up on the responses to Dr. Behe. (And if I have his book, of course I'll ask him to sign it.)

ARN authors page
Lehigh University faculty page
Discovery Institute page

"Misology and Truth".

Michael Pakaluk reports on Raphael Woolf's BACAP paper, "Misology and Truth".

It calls to my mind an essay on misology in the Aquinas Review.

Pontifications' latest: predestination revisited

This is it. The answer, whatever it may be, will certainly require heavy-duty metaphysics?

On the other hand, Fr. Most writes:

The chief reason the debates proved futile was that all parties normally ignored scriptural context. In addition, they tried to solve many things by metaphysics. Metaphysics is very good, but we must not ask it to do what it can never do, to determine an answer in whicha free decision of God or man is a factor.

Wehrle on Aristotelian scholarship

Walter Wehrle writes in his The Myth of Aristotle's Development and the Betrayal of Metaphysics:

One of the most objectionable tendencies I find in developmentalism is the sheer audacity on the part of commentators who shamelessly think nothing of correcting, at every turn, what they (erroneously) perceive as Aristotle's failures. Having painted themselves into their hemeneutical corners by assuming what Aristotle must be doing, any textual anomalies or even outright contradictions to their prescribed views can only be dismissed as some sort of mistakes on Aristotle's part, whether those mistakes be the result of mere absentmindedness or, more seriously, the result of confusion in Aristotle's mind. Accordingly, while these commentators cannot physically change the confounded text, they must resort to wholesale revision of Aristotle, along the lines of their predigested views. It is not surprising that the revised Aristotle looks more like something out of the twentieth century than a philosopher in his own element, the ancient world. For example, a developmentalist might be quite certain, on the grounds of a few texts, that Aristotle must be (in his mature theory at least) a materialist monist, and seeing that materialist monism represents his real views, can only shake his head at the numerous textual anomalies that he is likely to encounter. No matter, says the developmentalist, we know better than Aristotle did about his real intentions. Here is what Aristotle should have said. How often in these revised accounts do we encounter remarks such as "Aristotle does not really want to say this, because his commitment to materialist monism will not allow it" or "Surely Aristotle cannot have meant this; we shall just ignore this passge since it is obviously a _____" (fill in the blank with 'mistake,' 'oversight,' 'faulty text,' or whatever).

Of course what Aristotelian scholar has not had at some time or other the impulse to improve upon Aristotle's own words, or perhaps found himself wishing that the text were closer to his own interpretations? Moreover, have we not at one time or another run into those betes noires, passages that are so truculently contradictory to our prized interpretation that they might just as well be saying to us, 'Do what you will, you will not fit me into your interpretation"? But when we have run out of acceptable textual emendations that might make the offending passage at least palatable, or when we cannot write it off as a forgery, or we cannot identify it as the intrusive marginalia of some overzealous scribe, or when tradition has more or less corroborated its right to be there in all its brazen defiance of our own pet interpretations, then it seems that we are stuck with this anomaly and should treat it as such. But developmentalism gives rise to a reckless tendency to dismiss anything that would seem to be an anomaly (i.e., anomalous to their developmentalist interpretations), and so, armed with developmental theories, they become no longer interpreters but revisers, rather like scientists who would fudge or ignore altogether the flagrantly contradictory empirical evidence that fits ill with their a priori theorizing. An archaeologist may well wish that certain artifacts appear in Troy V instead of Troy VII, but clearly qua scientist, he must persevere with the evidence as it is given, even if he must seriously revise his pet theory or perhaps even chuck it altogether.

My complaint with developmentalism on this score is twofold. First, developmentalism itself is just one more tool by which scholars can dismiss these anomalous texts by consigning them to some early period (or even, as the evolutionary-minded Thomas Case would suggest, to the 'missing link' period when 'early' and 'later' will no longer suffice). If scholars in previous times used to cite textual authority (or lack thereof) as a basis for such dismissal, now we have an even better tool to get rid of unfriendly passages. And if the anomalies present themselves too prominently and frequently, we can always resort to the last-ditch remedy, namely, the comforting thought that Aristotle, in changing his mind, simply could not keep track of all the views he has held in his lifetime. Yes, developmentalism amounts to almost a blank check for those who would rewrite Aristotle along lines more suitable to themselves.

Second, if it were merely a matter of suggesting ways that Aristotle might have improved his philosophy, it would be one thing, for that, too, is a natural tendency in Aristotelian scholars. But it does not stop there. The revised view actually becomes the tail that wags the dog, by guiding the interpretation fo the actual text. One may well wish that Aristotle had been more like us, a positivist, say, or a materalist, but when one allows that desideratum to become the arbiter of what we are supposed to read into the disputed texts, I begin to wonder if one has not once again abandoned the role of interpreter and taken on the prescriptivist role of the dogmatizer. (1-3)

Apparently Wehlre approves of Robert Bolton's interpretation of Aristotle. I'll try to read more Bolton, but I certainly don't have high expectations for Anglo-American scholarship on Aristotle.

Now it is not out of the ordinary for the grad student preparing for M.A. comprehensive exams (which one must pass to qualify to teach, and to confirm that one's training has some sort of historical breadth) to rely upon some sort of history of philosophy, such as that of Fr. Copleston, S.J. I remember one Ph.D. student in particular who was discussing Aristotle's Metaphysics--she gave a presented Aristotle's teachings in contemporary terms (which are tied to contemporary philosophical accounts), and a "meta"-description of what he is doing, without grapplying with his arguments and relating them to reality. So, for example, "Aristotle's metaphysics is heavily influenced by his biology." (Now I know that something like this can be found in Majorie Grene's introduction to Aristotle, but I'll give her a pass for now, given her work on Aristotle and Descartes). But the student went on to claim that Aristotle's "empiricism" conflicted with his "Platonism" and this tension could be seen in the text of the Metaphysics.

There are plenty of other examples of "meta"-descriptions that gloss over the actual arguments and evidence in attempting to give a short and sweet summary of some "idea" or "teaching" and to draw as many connections between that thinker and other thinkers throughout history as possible. (Another weakness of a historical approach.)

Lloyd P. Gerson, What is Platonism

Critique of consequence

For further reflection, whether it is true that anything follows from a contradiction?

PaedoSocrates (Kevin) discusses with Lukas Novak the truth of this at the Yahoo! group thomism:

message 1980:

The Notion of Consequence

jamesmiguez scripsit:

> COMMENTS:
> This is not, in the least, a literally intuitive reconstruction.
> Klima is, by habit and training, using a modern logician's
> procedure, sometimes properly employed in branch chain dialectic. I
> remember quitting a modern symbolic Logic course, when this kind of
> procedure was introduced with the pious ejaculation that, quote:-
> Anything "follows-from" a contradiction.

While it is not my intention to make any comments on Klima's analysis of the Anselm's argument (although I indeed have an opinion), I would like to react to James's criticism of the standard notion of consequence.

"Followin-from" or logical consequence is defined thus: A conclusion follows from the premises iff it is impossible that all the premises be true and the conclusion false.

I hope it is clear to everyone that given this definition, it is indeed true that anything follows from a contradiction, since given that it is impossible that a contradiction be true, it is also impossible that the contradictory premises were true and the conclusion false, therefore, the definition is satisfied in case of any conclusion whatsoever.

Now the only objection against this can be that this notion of logical consequence is somehow wrong, useless or whatever.

Do decide whether it is, we must ask, whether the notion serves its purpose. What is the purpose of the notion of consequence? The relation of consequence is introduced as a "truth preserving" relation: as a relation that will guarantee to you that you can never arrive at a falsity when you start from truth. Since this is what logic is about: it is an instrument by means of which we are able to derive safely new propositions from known ones, and can be sure that IF the latter are true, then the former are as well.

The notion of consequence is just a precised expression of this requirement. Therefore, IF one wishes a universal truth-preserving relation, then the notion of consequence as defined above is THE relation wanted. Refusing to accept the notion of consequence as useful equals to refusing to accepting the notion of preserving truth in inferences as useful. Of course, noone is obliged to favour truth over falsity.

Rather than to object against this very central notion of logic (logic is nothing else than the theory of consequence), James perhaps meant to object agains the notion of material implication in modern logic, which admittedly does not express well the actual meaning of the natural-language phrase if-then (which fact, however, is no objection against using this logical constant; it is just objection against passing it for an adequate and exhaustive analysis of the menaing of "if-then) ?

Lukas

message 2093:

In a message dated 06/06/06 3:49:01 PM Mountain Daylight Time, lukas.novak@... writes:

> PaedoSocrates@... scripsit:
>
> In a message dated 05/06/06 12:35:46 AM Mountain Daylight Time, lukas.novak@... writes:
>
> LUKAS:
> "But in our homeland, where we will see his essence, it will be for us much more self-evident that God is, than it is now for us self-evident that affirmation and negation are not both true."
>
> Lukas
>
>
> KEVIN:
> REPLY:
> Thank-you, Lukas, for the prompt translation. Are you sure that St. Thomas meant "homeland" rather than "But in The Father (Patria) etc.?



LUKAS:

> Yes. "Patria" is Homeland, "Pater" is "Father". What is meant is Heaven, of course.
>
> Lukas



UNANSWERED PART OF PREVIOUS POST:

KEVIN (formerly):

WHOOPS! Dumb question!!!

Probably it is "homeland" for The Father would be "Pater"/father, rather than "patria" (father's homeland?). So that seems straightened out.

What do you think of the phrase, requote, "...than it is now for us self-evident that affirmation and negation are not both TRUE.", given "p" & "not-p" and the alleged principle of LOGIC that "anything-follows-from-a-contradiction".

After all affirmation and negation are just another grammatical way of saying "contradiction" for affirmations contradict negations AND negations contradict affirmations. I'll return to your original post on consequence shortly.

Good to hear from you Lukas and Thank-you for the translation. Also thanks for the "heads-up" on De Veritate. Obviously that treatise must have some insights by Aquinas into Major or material logic, as distinct from your expertise in formal logic.

Kevin

PRESENT COMMENTS:
I attended at our local Catholic University library, with the frustrating result of No "De Veritate" nor "Disputed Questions" by St. Thomas Aquinas. The Summa and Summa Contra Gentiles were there, but not-"ON TRUTH" by Aquinas.

So I picked up a different translation of De Ente & Essentia (very clear; compared to two other translations I have read---still, even with the better translation, Aquinas was still quite young when he wrote that work. In Aristotle's phraseology, he "lisps" a bit. How come nobody translates that title as Of Entities and Essences? That is what the title suggests to me.), of St. Thomas's Commentary on The Book of Causes (He was mature then; no "lisping" there; The Book of Causes seems to be an Arabic regurgitation of some of Proclus's Elements of Theology) and Gilson's Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Good books all, but not what I was looking for!!! How could a Catholic University not have ON TRUTH by St. Thomas? But they did have John Stewart Mill's entire works! How bizarre. Rant ended. From "the net" I learned that one can buy the De Veritate of St. Thomas, in 3 volumes, for around 150 dollars. 3 Volumes?!!! Holy Smokes.

As to the questions, above recited, there was NO REPLY. Conclusion:- Lukas likes "to correct" (previously-corrected errors), but not "to answer" questions. So, back to Lukas's notion of consequence:-

LUKAS:
"Followin-from" or logical consequence is defined thus:

[DEFINITION:]
A conclusion follows from the premises iff it is impossible that all the premises be true and the conclusion false.

COMMENT:
The term IFF (2 "f"s; no misspelling) apparently refers to the biconditional-hypothesis meaning "IF and only-IF" all the premises of an argument are true (THEN) it is impossible for the conclusion of a VALID argument to be false.

LUKAS:
I hope it is clear to everyone that given this definition, it is indeed true that anything follows from a contradiction, since given that it is impossible that a contradiction be true, it is also impossible that the contradictory premises were true and the conclusion false, therefore, the definition is satisfied in case of any conclusion whatsoever.

COMMENT and QUESTION:
It is not clear to me, Lukas. What do you mean by a contradiction???

ADDITIONAL COMMENT:
Contradictions are two propositions. They are not "a" thing, but, rather, "two" things, to wit, two propositions, with identical subjects and logically-opposed predicates.

LUKAS:
Now the only objection against this can be that this notion of logical consequence is somehow wrong, useless or whatever.

REPLY:
How about the notion of:- "a contradiction"? That is what I object to. I do not think that logical consequence is somehow wrong, useless or whatever. Your point depends on the consequence of A contradiction or "from" A contradiction

LUKAS:
Do (ie. TO) decide whether it is, we must ask, whether the notion serves its purpose. What is the purpose of the notion of consequence?

REPLY:
Rather, what is the puropse of the notion of "a contradiction", when contradictory propositions are 2 logically-opposed "notions" [affirmation vs. negation of the same predicate attributed to or denied of (not attributed to) a subject or substance].

LUKAS:
The relation of consequence is introduced as a "truth preserving" relation: as a relation that will guarantee to you that you can never arrive at a falsity when you start from truth. Since this is what logic is about: it is an instrument by means of which we are able to derive safely new propositions from known ones, and can be sure that IF the latter are true, then the former are as well.

QUESTION & COMMENT:
But if you start from a true proposition and its contrardiction which is a false proposition, how do you preserve truth, as a consequence of 1 true proposition and 1 false proposition?

True and false propositions are contrary, according to Aquinas, and contradictory when single subjects and logically opposed predicates are evident. No mention of contradiction or contradictory propositions or "notions" here.

LUKAS:
The notion of consequence is just a precised expression of this requirement. Therefore, IF one wishes a universal truth-preserving relation, then the notion of consequence as defined above is THE relation wanted.

REPLY:
Prescinding from the obvious fact that you mention nothing of contradictions in your argument concerning consequence, let us examine the alleged precision of your definitions. What's so precise about a biconditional hypothesis, called, by you, a definition? Aren't biconditionals close to circular arguments, while also being close to convertibly predicable attributes---otherwise known as properties?

COMMENTS:
1. Some people know that false biconditional antecedent-consequent/consequent-antecedent propositions yield a true biconditional hypothesis, as also does a true antecedent proposition followed by a true consequent proposition and vice versa.

2. But, where 1 proposition of a biconditional hypotheses is true and the other is false the biconditional hypothesis, itself, is altogether false. It doesn't matter where the false and true biconditional propositions are placed in sequence, as long as the pairs of propositions disagree in truth value. (= 2 falsehoods in both directions)

3. Hmmm...Seems to be more falsity than truth in/with biconditionals.

LUKAS:
Refusing to accept the notion of consequence as useful equals to refusing to accepting the notion of preserving truth in inferences as useful.

REPLY:
I don't refuse to accept the notion of consequence as useful. I just refuse to believe that "Anything logically follows from a contradiction.", for if that notion is TRUE, then you probably have to accept that arguments which contain contradictory sets of propositions are VALID. YES or NO, Lukas?

LUKAS:
Of course, noone is obliged to favour truth over falsity.

REPLY:
Tell that to either Christ, at your final judgment, or the Judge at your local courthouse. eg. "I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, sir, but I am not obliged to tell the truth!" The judge may reply that you are obliged to tell the truth. The law "says so", but no one is obliged to obey the law, although the judge is obliged to jail people for perjury, otherwise known as giving, making or asserting contradictory propositions under oath.

Jail "follows-from" legally-proved contradictory-propositions, at court, unless you can find a "modern logician" seated upon "the Bench" of your local courthouse. And they're not too hard to find, since all modern lawyers were "educated" by modern philosophers and modern logicians, while modern lawyers are appointed to various "Benches", by, guess who---modern lawyers, who are so honest, just like their clients are so honest---and, "therefore"...(the farmer hauled another load away).

LUKAS:
Rather than to object against this very central notion of logic (logic is nothing else than the theory of consequence), James (ie. Kevin) perhaps meant to object agains the notion of material implication in modern logic, which admittedly does not express well the actual meaning of the natural-language phrase if-then (which fact, however, is no objection against using this logical constant; it is just objection against passing it for an adequate and exhaustive analysis of the menaing of "if-then) ?

Lukas

REPLY:
No, I didn't mean to do that. But you probably did. The modern notion of "p" as antecdent in a TEST situation and "not-P" as the non-antecedent in an existential CONTROL situation, is a wonderful way of proving EFFICIENT and MATERIAL causation in modern scientific experiments, using existential hypotheses as MAJOR premises. But "p and not-p" as a single ASSUMPTION is non-sense.

P and not-P are contradictory so-called "assumptions" (pleural)---NOT "an" assumption and NOT "a" contradiction, but rather 2 contradictory propositions.

I do think that the only thing that "logically follows from a contradiction"---in TRUTH meaning TWO contradictory propositions---is that someone, who contradicts him/her-self is a a liar OR plain ignorant, or, alternatively, anyone who contradicts "being", whether or not we think about, or speak about, "being" is also a liar OR, once again, both ignorant and forgetful about his or her previous assertions.

It is TRUE that modern symbolic logicians do object against the, requote "material implication (ie. TRUTH) in modern logic, which admittedly does not express well the actual meaning of the natural-language phrase if-then." (NOVAK).

But I am not a modern symbolic logician and am perfectly happy with affirming the antecedents of hypotheses OR denying the consequents of hypotheses to reach VALID conclusions about either the antecedents or the consequents of hypotheses.

But I would never call an hypothesis either true or false, being convinced by Aristotle's Metaphysics and his Posterior Analytics that mere hypotheses are NOT PRINCIPLES. But I can prove that at least one modern symbolic logician mentions the dissatisfaction of either people or symbolic logicians with calling hypotheses "truth functional", quote:

BONEVAC:
"People use modal logic to evaluate and justify reasoning about possibility and necessity. Aristotle and medieval logicians tended to think of possibility, actuality and necessity as modes of truth, that is, as ways in which sentences could be true or false. The study of the modes of truth became known as modal logic.

"Contemporary interest in modal logic stems partly from unhappiness with treating conditional sentences in terms of truth functions. [Very telling. Modern logicians are unhappy with truth functions!!!] Within the framework of truth- functional sentential logic, we can symbolize sentences of the form "IF A, THEN B.", only as formulas having the structure "A ----> B". As our definition of the conditional truth function indicates, these formulas are TRUE, whenever A is FALSE or B is TRUE."

COMMENT:
What Bonevac probably means is what I said above:- Denying consequents WARRANTS denying antecedents in conjunction with a HYPOTHETICAL MAJOR premise [Thus "whenever A is false"; But experimental scientists don't think that way---ie. in terms of A being FALSE---but rather in terms of A being non-existent as an EFFICIENT CAUSE, which necessarily precedes its EFFECT in both necessity and in time In short, NO EFFECT (not-B), then NO CAUSE (not-A)].

As to Bonevac's other expression "OR whenever B is TRUE", he arguably means that given an hypothesis of the form IF A, THEN B; a.k.a., A ----> B; [which is, once again, actually two propositions; (1) antecedent and (2) consequent propositions (pleural)], which he calls, once again, A SENTENCE (but any scientist knows that an hypothesis is 2 sentences referring to at least 2 existential OBJECTS called CAUSES and EFFECTS, in general), B is TRUE, whenever A causes B. In other words, when there is an actually CAUSAL RELATION between A and B, when A exists then B existentially follows from A. (ie. "Whenever B is TRUE" the hypothesis "If A, then B" is a "true" hypothesis; although no scientist considers hypotheses to be either true or false---just antecedents and consequents to be experimentally tested).

Of course, being a modern symbolic logician, perhaps Bonevac doesn't want to take such arguable CAUSAL relations seriously!


WATCH Bonevac try to make such CAUSAL RELATIONS appear "puzzling"!


BONEVAC (continues):-
But taking a truth-functional rendering of IF seriously, gives rise to a variety of puzzles. [COMMENT:- How "unsurprizing" when Bonevac fails to mention taking THEN to be equally as "serious" (or even as "frivolous") as IF. But he "explains"; or at least attempts to "explain" such puzzles, next paragraph. KB].

BONEVAC:
First a truth functional analysis leads to the "paradoxes of material implication." [COMMENT:- His "scare-quotes" indicate that he may not take such "paradoxes" very seriously. But he doesn't seem to take THEN into consideration at all! He is also regurgitating Lukas or Lukas him because they have the same teachers.]

BONEVAC (continues):
These "paradoxes" though not really contradictions in a logical sense, show that our definition of the conditional can lead us to count some bizarre arguments as valid. Both these argument forms are VALID in classical sentential logic.
(1) a.

p
Therefore q -----> p


(1)b.

not-p
Therefore p ----> q


COMMENT:
Bonevac has a strange take on "classical sentential logic", which has nothing to do with hypotheses which relate to classical modal logic. But even with actual respect to classical modal logic, this "stuff" above is almost BACKWARDS compared with and contrasted to classical modal logic, which looks like this:
(1) a. (revisited)

q -----> p (IF q, THEN p.)
p (Affirms consequent)
"THEREFORE?" Nothing! [Fallacy:- Affirming the consequent]
eg. If quadruplets, then parents.
parents
Therefore quadruplets?
(Hardly! Singles, twins, triplets or "quints" equally imply parents
even when there are no "quadruplets")

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND:-
q -----> p (IF q, THEN p.)
q (Affirms the antecedent)
Therefore p (VALID Affirms consequent.)


eg. If quadruplets, then parents.
quadruplets
Therefore, parents
[VALID and SOUND]

As to Bonevac's "b." scenario, we have, according to classical modal logic
p ----> q
[eg. If penicillan, then quashed infection of non-penicillan-resistant "bug".]
not-p
[eg. no available penicillan]
"THEREFORE?" [Nothing follows; Invalid denial of antecedent.]
(A bug could also be quashed by another antibiotic
or by an infected person's own immune system---or NOT!)

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND:-
p ----> q
[eg. If penicillan, then quashed infection of non-penicillan-resistant "bug".]
not-q
[Nothing quashed a penicillan sensitive "bug"]
THEREFORE, not-p
[No one administered penicillan.
Either No antibiotic at all or they administered a wrong antibiotic to which
the "bug" was resistant. VALID and SOUND]


We continue with Bonevac's "puzzles" for his readership, quote, given his two examples of "truth functional" hypotheses, quote

BONEVAC:
However, arguments according to them sound strange [I hope my arguments didn't sound so "strange" as those Bonevac proceeds to use as "examples". KB]

BONEVAC:
(2) a.

The Colorado river is good for white-water canoeing (p)
Therefore IF a nuclear bomb just exploded over the rockies (q)
THEN the colorado river is good for white-water canoeing (p)
[COMMENT:- This is a serious hypothesis/argument? OH PLEASE!!!]


ANALOGY:-

IF a nuclear bomb just exploded over the rockies THEN the Colorodo
river may be 30 feet higher from excessive snow melt OR
non-existent if rock-slides DAM the river OR divert the river
in which POSSIBLE cases there will be NO "white water" at all.
SILLY example. UNSERIOUS example of a VALID argument.


It is still a VALID argument, but in this way:

Hypo:- IF a nuclear bomb just exploded over the rockies
THEN the Colorodo River is good for white-water-canoeing
for the next 15 minutes or awhile longer
Minor: A nuke just exploded (affirms antecedent)
Conclusion- Therefore the river is good for white-water-canoeing
for the next 15 minutes or awhile longer.
[VALID and SOUND; But POSSIBLY-not within a few hours!
In truth, it is just a hypothesis.).

Bonevac's second example:

b. NOT many Americans eat Thai food. (not-p)
Therefore IF many Americans eat Thai food (p),
THEN sales of antacids will soar (q)


NON-REBUTTAL:

IF many Americans eat spicey Thai food (p), THEN sales of antacids will soar (q).
Sales of antacids will not soar. (not-q)
Therefore NOT many Americans will eat spicey Thai food (not-p)
[VALID and SOUND; although only POSSIBLE, not necessary.]

Who knows the future or the effects of Thai food on American tummies? I don't. And do Thai people consume many antacids because of their spicey diets? Probably not. But Americans do---probably CAUSED by listening to silly arguments OR by eating TOO MUCH FOOD, at all hours, whether or not it's "spicey-food".

BONEVAC (contiunes):
Neither argument seems VALID (Bonevac's conclusion).

REBUTTAL::
But they are valid arguments---just not very serious arguments. In TRUTH, Bonevac only seriously looks at EITHER (2. a.) the consequent of his first examplary hypotheses, ALONE (Colorado "whte water canoeing"; but NOT at any possible effects of "nuking-the-Rocky-mountains"), OR at (2. b.) the antecedent of his second examplary hypothesis ALONE (The eating non-habits of Americans.).

And no American needs a symbolic logic course to know about "white-water-rafting" on the Colorodo river or about his own countrymen's eating habits. But, at least we know what Bonevac takes seriously from his examples of "seemingly INVALID" hypothetical arguments---(1) American recreational pastimes (when he is not further corrupting the minds of his students) and (2) American eating habits (between classes, involving the corruption of the minds of his S-L students with frivolous examples of "seemingly INVALID", but actually VALID, though silly, hypotheses).

Bonevac provides his students with further examples of silly HYPOTHETICAL arguments which are actually VALID according to both classical modal logic and what he calls "classical sentential logic", which has nothing to do with hypotheses and everything to do with CONTRARY and CONTRADICTORY propositions.

But then Bonevac says something interesting with respect to Novak's definition of consequence and Novak's "following" argument for "anything follows from a contradiction" being a, requote, very central notion of logic, although what Novak really means is that CONSEQUENCE is a central notion of logic, which has nothing to do with justifying "Anything follows from a contradiction." At least Lukas hasn't rationally explained what "anything" follows from a contradiction, nor has he explained WHY "anything logically-follows from a contradiction" (meaning two propositions which contradict each other.)

Consequence is a very central notion of logic. But that "Anything logically follows from a contradiction.", usually expressed as "Anything follows from a contradiction." is what I have characterized as an unproveable "pious ejaculation" which has much more to do with TRUTH and FALSITY than consequence or validity.

But here is what I find interesting by Bonevac:

BONEVAC:
The English connectives IF and only IF aren't truth functional, therefore, although the truth-functional CONDITIONAL (ie. an hypothesis) approximates them closely within a wide range of cases.

COMMENT:
This fella even writes sentences in the same style as his "p", therefore "If q, then p" hypothetical examples. What he seems to be saying above is:-

Biconditional hypotheses are not truth functional. But, truth-functional hypotheses approximate (are like?) biconditionals.
OR (perhaps)
Maybe he meant that biconditionals are like truth functional hypotheses in a wide range of cases, even though they aren't truth functional.


How "therefore" fits into the above quoted sentence of Bonevac is entirely "beyond" me. It sounds like he means:- Although biconditional hypotheses are not truth functional, biconditional hypotheses are like truth-functional conditional hypotheses (approximate them) in a wide range of cases.

What I say in response to that "revelation" and to parody that revelation, is that trure propositions are an awful lot like false propositions in a wide range of cases too. Take for example the simple proposition that, quote:-


Lukas Novak is inhaling some Czechoslovakian air.


Lukas is inhaling, therefore the proposition is TRUE! Whoops, now he is exhaling some Czechoslovakian air, therefore the proposition above cited is FALSE. Whoops, now it is TRUE (Lukas inhales.), then FALSE (Lukas exhales), then TRUE (Lukas is inhaling Czech air.), then FALSE (Lukas is exhaling; not-inhaling; Czech air.), etc., etc. And this is not any Bonovakian "case" of a biconditional non-truth-functional double-hypothesis approximating any truth-functional single hypothesis! No sirree, Bob.

It is, instead, a "case" of an IDENTICAL-proposition alternating between TRUE and FALSE about every 10-30 seconds, depending upon Mr. Novak's living metabolism, his physical condition and his present air requirements which depends upon what he is actually doing at present. eg. Running a marathon OR sleeping soundfully and peacefully in his bed.

SO HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION:
IF Daniel Bonevac is an actually competent logician and biconditionals are NOT "truth functional" THEN why does Lukas Novak employ non-truth-functional BICONDITIONALS for his so-called definitions???

Biconditionals are TRUE just so long as their antecedent and consequent propositions AGREE in truth value. In other words a FALSE antecedent and a FALSE consequent AND "vice versa" (switch antecedent and consequent around) make for a TRUE biconditional hypothesis---but not for very good definitions, which, when good, are always TRUE and convertibly-predicable.

But, of course, biconditionals composed of EQUALLY-FALSE propositions are TRUE biconditionals because FALSE propositions have been contradicting TRUE propositions since the garden of Eden AND if you have a FALSE antecedent you're going to get a FALSE consequent everytime. That's the TRUTH.

But St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle before him, take care of Bonevac's frivoulous examples with the simple assertion that, quote

AQUINAS:
"In the same way, the being of the thing, NOT its truth, is the CAUSE of truth in our intellect. Hence the philosopher says that an opinion or statement is TRUE FROM (consequent upon) the fact that a thing IS, not from the fact that a thing is true (Aristotle; The Categories; Ch. 5., 4b line 8).

[Summa I; Q. 15. Article 16. Reply Obj. 3.]


That is why the same proposition (forget biconditional "definitions", involving 2 propositions in a reciprocating antecedent-consequent || consequent-antecedent relationship) may be TRUE (Lukas is inhaling) for only a short time, then FALSE (Lukas is inhaling? No he is not inhaling because he is exhaling!) within a few seconds of time. Thus Aristotle's definition of the basic axiom of thought (Law of Contradiction) is that:- The same attribute (inhaling) cannot at the same time belong (to Lukas) and not belong (to Lukas) to the same subject (Lukas) in the same respect (in respect of the breathing of Lukas Novak).

And that definition of the Law of Thought involves no hypothesis at all, because it is the basic AXIOM of all thought.

WHAT, therefore, logically-follows from a contradiction?

Lukas Novak is inhaling (TRUE)
Lukas Novak is not inhaling (FALSE)
Therefore...

REPEAT:

What logically follows from the above contradiction?
(I won't hold my breath waiting for any answers.)


Kevin

2095

Message 2100(response to 2098):

Re. The Notion of Consequence

In a message dated 21/06/06 11:47:18 AM Mountain Daylight Time, lukas.novak@... writes:


> OK: so if you favour truth over falsity, you should be interested
> in the truth-preserving relation of consequence as defined.
>
> I apologise, I must end here, no time.
>
> Lukas



O.K. I do like your definition of consequence:- TRUE premises NEVER yield FALSE conclusions is fine. But that definition (however poorly I have rephrased it) does not explain, nor justify (IMMLTHO) the proposition:-

Anything follows from (consequence) A CONTRADICTION. (True? False?)

But Thank-you for your time, Lukas. To review:-

POINTS MADE & COMMENTS (since I have time):


Kevin's QUESTION & COMMENT (previously):
But if you start from a true proposition and its contradiction which is a false proposition, how do you preserve truth, as a consequence of 1 true proposition and 1 false proposition?

LUKAS:
In this case, you don't have anything to preserve. But it nevertheless holds that IF the premises were true (which is impossible) THEN the consequence would have to be true as well.

REPLY:
O.K. When premises are true, so are the conclusions of valid arguments. But Consequence (validity) and truth (soundness) are different "ideas". And, of course, one does "have something to preserve", in cases of true vs. false contradictory propositions, to wit, the truth of the true proposition which contradicts the falsehood of the false proposition! The true proposition is worth preserving and that is what I am interested in, while logicians are mostly interested in consequence (validity).

Novak's hypothesis about consequence is fine, but he still doesn't tell me how anything follows from a contradiction. However, when Lukas actually said, requote

LUKAS:
"In this case, you don't have anything to preserve.",

(Q.) wasn't he really saying that NOTHING follows from that kind of contradiction (ie. 1 true proposition vs. 1 false proposition)???

After all Lukas defined/described a contradiction as a proposition which is necessarily false, per, requote:

COMMENT and QUESTION (previous):
It is not clear (that Anything follows from a contradiction; True? or False?) to me, Lukas. What do you mean by a contradiction???

LUKAS:
A proposition that is necessarily false.

HMMM!!! So much for other "pious ejaculations" related to truth preserving, since a contradiction is a proposition that is necessarily false. [What necessitates the falseness of a proposition? Non-being.]. However I don't believe that propositions are necessarily true or necessarily false or necessarily contradictory, unless there are two propositions which, in truth, are contradictory-propositionS (pleural).

PROPOSITION (Oxford Concise):
n. (noun) Statement, assertion, as ~ too plain to need argument, especially (logic) form of words consisting of predicate & subject; (mathematics, abbreviated prop) formal statement of theorem or problem, often including the demonstration, as Euclid Bk. I ~ 5; proposal, scheme proposed; (slang) task, job, problem, objective, occupation, trade, opponent, prospect, etc. Hence ~al adjective [Medieval English, from Old French or Latin propositio (as following, see -ION)].

ARISTOTLE (on propositions):
Every sentence has meaning, not as being the natural means by which a faculty is realized, but, as we have said, by convention [The limitation "by convention" was introduced because nothing is, by nature, a noun or name---it is only so when it becomes a symbol ; inarticulate sounds, such as those brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these (inarticulate sounds of non-human animals) constitutes a noun.]. Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions which have truth or falsity in them. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false. (Aristotle's "Scheffer stroke"?)

Let us, therefore, dismiss all other types of sentences but the proposition, for this last (type of sentence) concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.

Ch. 5.
The first class of simple propositions is the simple affirmation, the next, the simple denial; all others are only one by conjunction.--(snip)--We call those propositions single which indicate a single fact, or the conjunction of the parts of which results in unity; those propositions, on the other hand, are separate and many in number, which indicate many facts, or whose parts have no conjunction...

...To return:- of propositions one kind is simple, ie. that which asserts or denies something of something, the other composite, ie. that which is compounded of simple propositions. A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject OR its absence, in the present, past or future, according to the divisions of time.

CH. 6.
An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, a denial a negative assertion.

Now it is possible BOTH to affirm and to deny the presence of something which is present or of something which is not (present), and since these same affirmations and denials are possible with reference to those times which lie outside the present, it would be possible to contradict any affirmation or denial.

Thus it is plain that Every affirmation has an opposite denial and, similarly, Every denial an opposite afffirmation.

We will call such a PAIR of PROPOSITIONS a pair of contradictories.


Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and predicate must not be 'equivocal'. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.

[Aristotle; On Interpretation; Ch. 4. through Ch. 6.; 17a lines 1 to 37]

COMMENT:
Aristotle thinks that contradictories are pairs of propositions. In contrast, Lukas affirms that a contradiction is a necessarily-false-proposition. Both men are logicians. Aristotle is ancient. Novak is modern. Whom should we believe? Let us examine Novak, together, to see if what he says is true, because (formerly)...

ADDITIONAL COMMENT (previously):
Contradictions are two propositions. They are not "a" thing, but, rather, "two" things, to wit, two propositions, with identical subjects and logically-opposed predicates.

NOVAK:
This is just one kind of contradiction.

REPLY:
Thank-you. I happen to think that contradictory propositions (pleural) are important "kinds" of contradictions (pleural), and the second important "kind" of logically opposed propositions (pleural) are pairs of contrary propositions.

We'll see what other kinds there are...

NOVAK:
Furthermore, in order that it be a contradiction, it must indeed be a _one_ composite proposition.

REPLY:
WHY? A composite proposition may be two or more simple PROPOSITIONS (or 3, 4, 5, 6 etc.), according to Aristotle. Lukas continues to refer to "it" and "a contradiction", but his words do not make 2, or more, propositions (pleural) into "one" proposition (single/simple) at all. See Aristotle above.

LUKAS:
Either (re. COMPOSITE-PROPOSTION KB) (1) one where of subject a conjunction of contradictory predicates (note "pleural" predicates KB) is said (S a (P&~P)),---[ie. 2 propositions, 1. S a P, &, 2. S a ~P; Still 2 propositions KB] or a sentential conjunction of two kategorial propositions ((SaP)&(Sa~P)), [Still 2 propositions KB] or any other proposition [Back to 1 proposition (singular) KB] that cannot be true.

COMMENT:- "...that cannot be true."!!! So much for truth preserving. And Lukas clearly indicates 2 propositions with both of his "composite-proposition", no matter how hard he tries to write of a single proposition/contradiction or an "it".

(1) He writes of contradictory predicates (pleural) in his first "kind" of contradiction (Single predicates? No! Two predicates = 2 propositions.) and of (2) two kategorial (categorical) propositions (pleural) in his 2nd "other-kind" of contradiction (One categorical proposition? No! Two categorical propostions.).

Kevin (previously):
Your point (ie. Anything follows from a contradiction.) depends on the consequence of A contradiction or "from" A contradiction

LUKAS:
See above (for) the definition of a contradiction.

REPLY:
I have Aristotle's definition of contradictory propositions (pleural). Why is Novak's definition better (or even different upon close scrutiny), for definitions always relate to questions of sameness and difference, according to Aristotle. To show a difference is enough to overthrow one "definition" with a better definition. Lukas's definition of a contradiction is a proposition that is necessarily false.

Aristotle's definition of a contradiction, by contrast, is two propositions with the same subject and the same predicate, where the identical predicate is affirmed of an identical subject in one case and the identical predicate is denied of the identical subject in the opposite or contradictory case.

Aristotle says nothing of truth or falsehood in defining contradictory propositions, although he clearly says that propositions are the only kinds of sentences with either truth or falsity in them. As to contradictory-propositions, as contradictories (whether true or false) he simply says that every affirmative proposition has a contradictory negative proposition as its logical opposite and that every negative proposition has a contradictory affirmative proposition as its logical opposite.

That is a difference between Novak and Aristotle, although, upon close examination, Lukas seems to be indicating 2 propositions, despite his insistence on 1 contradictory proposition. So Aristotle and Novak arppear the same, as logicians, upon close examination. But they are definitely different, for nowhere does Aristotle ever say that a contradiction is necessarily-FALSE.

Aristotle clearly asserts, along with St. Thomas, that true propositions have necessarily-false propositions as their contradictions and, conversely, that false propositions have necessarily-true propositions as their contradictions. That seems to be a big difference between Novak and Aristotle, whereas their notions of consequence seem to be the same, when Novak's allegedly single propositions are closely examined, thereby indicating 2 propositions.

But to show sameness is not enough to establish a definition, for a standing-philosopher, like Socrates (when standing), is the same as a standing-stooge, like Meletus (when standing), as standers. But a stooge is not a philosopher no matter the same arrangement of each man's limbs.

Kevin (formerly): I don't refuse to accept the notion of consequence as useful. I just refuse to believe that "Anything logically follows from a contradiction.", for if that notion is TRUE,

LUKAS:
This is not a notion but a statement.

ARGUMENT:
Lukas interrupts or contradicts my antecedent as a "notion". So, "Anything logically follows from a contradiction. is not a notion, but a statement. (O.K. for the sake of argument.) It is a true statement, according to Lukas.

BUT:
NOTION (Oxford Concise):
noun 1. General concept under which particular thing may be classed (in phil. first, second ~ = first, second INTENTION) 2. Idea, conception, (The notion of my doing it is absurd ; What he means I have not the haziest notion); view, opinion, theory, vaguely held or insecurely based (has a notion that ; such is the common notion). 3. Faculty, capability, or intention of (has no notion of obeying, obedience, discipline, letting himself be made a fool of) 4. Something in the way of miscellaneous wares, esp. cheap useful ingenious article. pl. || (not American) Traditional special vocabulary of Winchester College.

[From Latin notio (NOTICE, -ION)]

NOTIONAL (Oxford Concise):
adjective (Of knowledge etc.) speculative, not based on experiment or demonstration, whence notionalist(2) noun; notionally 2. adverb; (of things, relations, etc.) existing only in thought, imaginary; (of persons) fanciful.

[from medieval Latin notionalis (NOTICE, -AL)]


THUS:
Notion and Notional don't sound like very strong terms above, given phrases like "vaguely held or insecurely based" theories or opinions and "not based on experiment or demonstration" (adjective notional), especially when LOGIC is demonstrative, given true and primary premises.

So to rephrase my hypothesis with Lukas's correction:

I just refuse to believe that "Anything logically follows from a contradiction.", for if that statement is TRUE, then you probably have to accept that arguments which contain contradictory sets of propositions are VALID.

LUKAS:
Yes. A deduction of the kind "If 2+2=5, then I am the Pope" is valid.

CRITICISM:
"IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas is the Pope" is neither a deduction, nor valid, nor a contradiction, so far as I can see. It is, I think, a hypothesis and a sequence, otherwise known as a conditional proposition, where one proposition depends upon another proposition in a sequence. But is it a consequence or a contradiction?

And, since when, is a hypothesis either a deduction or valid/invalid reasoning?

eg. HYPOTHESIS (Oxford Concise):
Supposition made as a basis for reasoning, without assumption of its truth or as a starting point for investigation; groundless assumption. So hypothetical(al) a.a. hypothetically adv. [From Late Latin, from Greek hupotheke]

QUESTIONS:
1. Can "groundless assumptions" or "suppositions as bases for reasoning" be either deductions or valid (deductions)? [I doubt it.]

2. Can a mathematical sum, whether correctly or incorrectly calculated, contradict or confirm whether Lukas Novak is, or is not, the pope? [I don't see how.]

3. IF "Anything follows from a contradiction" is a FALSE statement THEN what follows or does not follow (since it is only a statement and not a notion)??? What is the consequence if it is a TRUE statement (since it is only a statement and not a notion)? So, let us examine together certain falsehoods and consequences, followed by certain truths and consequences, according to Lukas's hypothesis which he describes as a valid deduction.

CLASSICAL MODAL LOGIC

1.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: 2+2 is not equal to 5 [denying antecedent] (True; Categorical)
Conclusion: Therefore Lukas Novak is not the Pope (True; Categorical)

[INVALID!!! Fallacy; denial of antecedent]
---on the other hand---

2.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: Novak is not the Pope [denying consequent] (True; Categorical)
Conclusion: Therefore 2+2 is not equal to 5 (True; Categorical)

[VALID!!! No fallacy; denial of consequent]
---on the third hand---

3.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: 2+2 =5 [affirms antecedent] (False; Categorical)
Conclusion: Lukas Novak is the Pope (False; Categorical)

[VALID!!! No fallacy; affirmed antecedent]
---on the fourth hand---

4.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: Novak is the Pope [affirms consequent] (False; Categorical)
Conclusion: Therefore 2+2 is equal to 5 (False; Categorical)

[INVALID!!! Fallacy; affirms consequent]

ARGUMENT:
Supposing that everyone knows that 2+2=5 is false and 2+2=not-5 (ie. 4) is true AND also that Lukas is the Pope is false and Lukas is not the Pope is true, what about the truth preserving function of consequence from the 4 arguments above

1. The invalid/fallacious "consequence" results in a true conclusion.
2. The valid consequence establishes a true conclusion from false premises.
3. The valid consequence preserves a false premise and a false conclusion.
4. The invalid/fallacious "consequence" preserves a false premise and conclusion.

According to Lukas Novak's definition of a contradiction being necessarily-FALSE, all 4 arguments involved necessarily-false propositions = contradictions. But the valid consequences preserved both true and false conclusions as did the invalid bogus "non-consequences". So what does consequence have to do with preserving truth? What does contradiction have to do with preserving truth, on Lukas's view of contradiction involving necessarily false propositions? Contradiction cannot preserve truth on Lukas's view of necessarily-false propositions. Let's see...

Validity (consequence) and Soundness (truth) seem to be different things. And contradiction seems to be a different thing from validity and soundness. So what is really "truth preserving", if anything? Is it really consequence that preserves truth?

Once again, let us examine an assertion of Lukas to see if it is true:


According to Lukas, requote (original post):

NOVAK:- "...we must ask, whether the notion serves its purpose. What is the purpose of the notion of consequence? The relation of consequence is introduced as a "truth preserving" relation: as a relation that will guarantee to you that you can never arrive at a falsity when you start from truth.

ANALYSIS:
The above indicates that you can never arrive at falsity when starting from the truth, since the relation of consequence is truth preserving when employed correctly. So, since I think I employed the notion of consequence corrrectly in two of Lukas's hypothetical examples and incorrectly for two of the same examples, let us reexamine those two examples where the notion of consequence was employed correctly, with respect to the alleged truth preserving function of consequence.

But don't forget. These exampls all begin with doubly-false antecedent-consequent propositions (pleural) in one hypothesis.

2.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: Novak is not the Pope [denying consequent] (True; Categorical)
Conclusion: Therefore 2+2 is not equal to 5 (True; Categorical)

[VALID!!! No fallacy; denial of consequent]

Here we begin with a false antecedent and a false consequent in an initial hypothesis. By validly contradicting a false consequent (in Aristotle's sense of contradictions involving affirmative and negative propositions), with the minor premise, we arrive at a true conclusion with respect to the antecedent. Thus we validly deny a false antecedent proposition. We have validly moved from falsity to truth as the CONSEQUENCE of contradicting a falsehood.


Second VALID example:

3.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: 2+2 =5 [affirms antecedent] (False; Categorical)
Conclusion: Lukas Novak is the Pope (False; Categorical)

[VALID!!! No fallacy; affirmed antecedent]


In this example, where no Aristotelian style of contradiction was employed, we validly affirmed a false antecedent and, hence, validly affirmed a false consequent, employing a VALID sequence and a logically warranted consequence. In this case, without an Aristotlelian style of contradiction, we preserved falsity with a warranted CONSEQUENCE---an allegedly "truth-preserving" function. But, to the contrary, we preserved a known falsehood as a VALID consequence.

In sum, a valid CONSEQUENCE seems to preserve falsehoods (eg. 3), when simple falsehoods are not contradicted. By contrast, the valid CONSEQUENCE is to refute falsehoods (eg. 2) when simple falsehoods are contradicted, according to Aristotle's description of contradictory propositions.

What about the invalid non-CONSEQUENCES mentioned?


The first invalid non-CONSEQUENCE (non-sequitur) was, requote:-
1.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: 2+2 is not equal to 5 [denying antecedent] (True; Categorical)
Conclusion: Therefore Lukas Novak is not the Pope (True; Categorical)

[INVALID!!! Fallacy; denial of antecedent]


By invalidly contradicting a known-false antecedent, we bogusly arrive at a true conclusion, employing an Aristotelian-style contradiction of a false statement, as a known non-Sequitur (illogical non-consequence).


And the final example:-

4.
Hypothetical Major: IF 2+2=5, THEN Lukas Novak is the Pope. (Hypothesis)
Categorical Minor: Novak is the Pope [affirms consequent] (False; Categorical)
Conclusion: Therefore 2+2 is equal to 5 (False; Categorical)

[INVALID!!! Fallacy; affirms consequent]

Here we invalidly affirm a known false statement and do not contradict it, according to Aristotle's definition of contradictions and invalidly conclude a known false statement as a bogus non-CONSEQUENCE.

So, in sum, for these 2 fallacious non-examples of "CONSEQUENCE", the contradiction of a known false statement (eg. 1) invalidly (inconsequentially according to logical doctrine) "results" in a known-true conclusion. But, invalidly and fallaciously affirming a false proposition (eg. 4) results in a known-false conclusion, when we do not fallaciously, or otherwise (validly) contradict known falsehoods.

Preliminary Conclusion

It seems clear that contradicting known false statements is the key to "preserving-truth", no matter whether or not we employ the logical notion of CONSEQUENCE correctly or incorrectly. But recall, we began with BOTH a known-false antecedent and a known-false consequent set of propositions in our original hypothesis and Lukas tells us that the NOTION OF CONSEQUENCE is a "truth preserving" function.

So, we should also examine a similar hypothesis, where we, according to Aristotle's thesis concerning contradictions, contradict both known-falsehoods, so that we begin with truth and attempt to preserve the truth with only the notion of correct consequence, employing Lukas's basic example. However, we'll have to change the name and the arithmetical sum to begin with truth and to attempt to preserve the truth with correct logical (albeit hypothetical) consequences.


IF 2+2=4, THEN Benedict/Ratzinger is the pope (Hypothesis)
2+2=4 (Minr; Affirms antedent; TRUE)
Hence, Benedict/Ratzinger is the pope. (TRUE)
[Conclusion:- Valid-consequence preserves truth affirmatively]

-On The Other Hand-

IF 2+2=4, THEN Benedict/Ratzinger is the pope (Hypothesis)
Benedict/Ratzinger is NOT the pope.
(Minor; Validly denies consequent; with FALSE contradiction)
Hence, 2+2 = not-4
[Conclusion:- Valid-consequence destroys truth negatively]


NOVAK (requote): The relation of consequence is introduced as a "truth preserving" relation: as a relation that will guarantee to you that you can never arrive at a falsity when you start from truth.

Above we arrived at a falsity, by starting with the truth, employing the notion of CONSEQUENCE validly, but by contradictiong the truth with a false premise, which had to be necessarily false given Lukas's definition of a contradiction. The notion of CONSEQUENCE logically validated arriving at a falsity when starting from truth.


It shouldn't be necessary to go over the INVALID-non-CONSEQUENCE examples of invalidly affirming the consequent (Benedict is Pope) to bogusly arrive at the truth with a non-sequitur (2+2=4) OR invalidly contradict a true antecedent (2+2=4) with a false denial (2+2=not-4) to fallaciously arrive at a false statement (Benedict is not the pope.) as a bogus conclusion and inconsequentially-FALSE result.

In all cases, it is the CONTRADICTION of true propositions by false propositions which, primarily, causes falsehoods and the CONTRADICTION of false propositions by true propositions which, primarily, "preserves truth", in accordance with Aristotle's notion of contradictory propositions (pleural; affirmation vs. negation).

Lukas's Notion of Consequence, on the other hand, preserves falsity, just as well as it preserves TRUTH, given any false and uncontradicted proposition in a properly sequenced argument.

So the CONSEQUENCE of an uncontradicted false proposition in any logical argument is the "preservation of falsity", but the logical CONSEQUENCE of a contradicted false proposition in any logical argument "refutes falsity" and CONSEQUENTIALLY "reestablishes the truth" by controverting a falsehood.


FINALLY, with respect to Novak's "notion of consequence" we have these two propositions to examine, again, with respect to allegedly preserving truth, requote:

NOVAK:-
Anything follows from a contradiction. (TRUE?)
A contradiction is 1 necessarily-false proposition. (TRUE?)
Therefore...

If a contradiction is 1 necessarily false proposition, then a necessarily false conclusion seems to be the logical CONSEQUENCE of employing that necessarily false proposition in any logical argument, unless it is contradicted. But, according to Lukas, a contradiction is necessarily false. [Gridlock?]

Of course, on Aristotle's and Aquinas's view of contradiction, a contradictory pair of propositions involve one TRUE proposition, logically opposed to one FALSE proposition, by logical-necessity. Hence contradictories are necessarily opposed as TRUE vs. FALSE propositions. In sum a contradiction is not necessarily false, nor is a contradiction a single proposition, except by conjunction. And who conjoins true and false propositions to arrive at the truth???

The two contradictory propositions are neither necessarily true nor necessarily false, just necessarily opposed in "truth value", which suggests another "notion" than consequence to determine which is which. That notion is the self-evident proposition, which is the basic notion of material or major logic. Major logic has truth, rather than consequence (formal logic's basic notion) as its basic notion and induction (in contrast to deduction) as its fundamental principle.

I wish Jacques Maritain had been given the time or the grace to actually write his promised treatise on Major Logic. It would have been interesting, although arguably not up to St. Thomas's standards of truth. Otherwise he probably would have been given both the grace and the time. I guess it wasn't necessary. Aristotle's formulation of contradiction is probably still the basic standard.


Kevin

Plus:
1975:

In a message dated 09/05/06 10:57:04 PM Mountain Daylight Time, uncljoedoc@... writes:


> In a message dated 5/8/2006 10:15:58 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, jamesmiguez@... forwards from Kevin:
>
>> That "pious ejaculation" entails an egregious perversion of the logical meaning of the expression "It follows..."!!! The only thing which logically "follows" a contradiction is that 1 proposition, of a pair of contradictory-propositions, is false & the other true, when the propositions are existential.



Hi,



You suggest that what follows from a contradiction is of rather limited value to analytic cognition.


Hi again Joe:
No! I asserted that nothing logical "follows from" an existential contradiction save one true premise and one false premise. But I suppose if you think egregious perversions are of limited value to analytic cognition, you may be right.

Just kidding.

Existential "contradictions" (metaphorically-speaking), on the other hand from analytic cognition (whatever that is), are the basics of the scientific method. Such metaphorical existential "contradictions" are the crux of the experimental science "game"! Let me explain...

Take, for example, the contradictory conjunction "P & not-P", from Daniel Bonevac's example of an indirect proof. Can you construct an analytic cognitive truth table for that conjunction, Joe, using your analytic cognitive skills or, alternatively, your symbolic logic habit, if you have been trained in that art or acquired habit?

"Not" is what symbolic logicians call a truth functional connective, in SL, according to our friend Bonevac. The letter P is a formula in the SL "metalanguage", corresponding to some proposition in English, which is called a "natural language" to symbolic logicians (even though all languages are conventional).

So whether an SL proposition is "P" or "not-P", I think that they are actually talking about one and the same sentence in speaking of "P" and of "not-P"! By contrast in so-called "classical" logic, "P" vs. "not-P" would be two distinct and contradictory propositions, using the same subject and, THEN, the same predicate in logical opposition. In short two contradictory propositions.

So, with "NOT", however symbolized, being called a truth functional CONNECTIVE, they must (I suppose) be talking about connecting propositions to real states of affairs or being. Maybe. Maybe not. I dunno. But it sounds suspiciously like what the SL "guys" may be talking about---connecting propositions with being/reality.

Unlike classical logic, certain SL symbols stand for entire sentences, whereas in classical logic their symbols (when not using "natural language"; but only mere letter symbols) stand for subject and predicate. I gave an example of Algazali using such "classical" symbolic notation when he wrote to his muslim friends

If every a is b, then some b is a!
eg. If every man is an animal then (conversely) some animal is a man.
['Ghazali's example from "natural language"]

I think that SL people may come from the so-called "coherence theory of truth" school of modern philosophers, as distinct from the so-called correspondence and pragmatic "theories" of truth schools. An analog of coherence with respect to truth, is consistency in so-called "sets" of sentences or propositions.

So the SL "guys" seem to be more interested in how sets of propositions "agree" or "disagree" with each other, in either consistency or coherence, than in how human beings connect or disconnect subjects with predicates. They seem to be working off of Uncle Bertie Russell's "set theory", from mathematics and his theory of "signs".

However, no classical logician ever "thought" that the truth was any sort of theory, in the modern sense of theories. With classical logicians the truth is axiomatic, as opposed to "hypothetical", where modern theories are considered to be repetitively confirmable or verifiable hypotheses.

By contrast:- Theoria in the ancient sense meant the kind of knowledge and truth that Theos/God had of things---immutable, eternal, unchangeable---sorts of knowledge. Thus we have Aristotle saying in the Metaphysics that if "the divine" is anywhere in human things, it must be in the study of abstract mathematics, physics or theology---for in those subjects we apprehend so much of "the divine" which is possible for human beings to grasp. Or in Aquinas, you have the entirely "cocky" (according to modern "truth-theoreticians"!) assurance that THE CONTRARY of Scripture's truth can never be demonstrated, since Scripture rests upon infallible truth and the contrary of infallible-truth can never be demonstrated.

Truth, according to Aquinas's definition, isn't "correspondence with reality" (way too general; reality being the sum of all real things), but, instead the "conformity of an intellect with a thing." In other words one "thing" at a time, or one step at a time. No one is going to know or understand "reality", or have a mind which "corresponds with reality", at one time, or even with much of "reality", in any amount of time.

"Reality" is just TOO MUCH and TOO BIG.


But "P" and "not-P" are neither too much nor too big to handle. They're simple.

The SL "p" and "not-P" stuff probably comes out of logical positivism, and its descent from Hume. Positivists were not going to take courses in BARBARA-CELARENT logic from a bunch of "obsolete/irrelevant" monks in Catholic institutions. That "logic" was passe. And since Hume posed as a sort of "Newton-of-Philosophy", while guys like Jeremy Bentham were also posing as Newton-Clones and "thinking-up" things like the "Felicifical-Calculus" (I love the British because they pretend to be staid and serious---when, in truth, they have more WILD 'N CRAAAZY GUYS than even Steve Martin could "dream-up"), Hume's descendants just, naturally, had to "dream-up" some wild calculus symbols for what any ancient scholastic could do with MNEMONICS like Barbara-Celarent-Darii, etc.

Of course, it was also the "new age" of experimental science. So "chuck" those outmoded categorical syllogisms and TURN EVERYTHING into HYPOTHESES because that's what the "scientists" do. So that's what positivists tried to do. But it didn't work because those SCIENTISTS were not "reasoning" according to the rules. The illogical clowns were apparently "reasoning" by AFFIRMING THE CONSEQUENTS of their hypotheses---which is irrational. However they were getting results, like dynamite as well as anti-septic-surgery.

So they must be doing something INDUCTIVE with their experiments. Inductive sounds more logical than Irrational any day of a logical positivist's week. So the positivists started "throwiing around expressions" such as inductively valid, but deductively invalid and confusing themselves along with all their former students who DROPPED LOGIC and went into "science/math". At the same time, people were looking for an equivalent set of RULES OF INDUCTION to go along with their RULES OF DEDUCTION, but never found such expected "rules".

But what the scientific guys were actually DOING was taking any old garden variety hypothesis such as----IF "P" THEN "?" and also doing the same hypothesis with--- IF "not-P" THEN "?" In other words they were DOING "P" and "not-P" in an existential mode, which is illogical to DO in a mental mode.

Scientists do not misreason (as a general rule; although any individual scientist can be as "cracked" as the next guy) from AFFIRMED CONSEQUENT to AFFIRMED ANTECEDENT (contrary to logic's rules) but from AFFIRMED ANTECEDENT & not-AFFIRMED ANTECEDENT to "?"-CONSEQUENT, normally called TEST vs. CONTROL in a modern scientific experiment.

In short, scientists can existentially do, validly, what logicians are forbidden to mentally do in terms of logic. However, nothing succeeds like "success", so, apparently without understanding the WHY of the scientific method's success, logicians started to come up with "goofy sayings" such as "anything follows from a contradiction" in order to "justify" a logical imitation of the scientific method, such as the INDIRECT PROOF method with "assumptions" such as "P & not-P".

That "stuff" perfectly imitates the TEST vs. CONTROL "system" of experimental science. But logicians know that it is, at best, an "iffy" logical procedure, as Bonevac frankly confessed with his "flying pigs" example. So they only use indirect proofs when all their other actually-LOGICAL rules leave them "dead-ended".

And, of course, since many of the SL guys are actually LOGICAL, they have to put their little boxes around everything and make sure they cancel their "shows" and rub-out their intentionally introduced contradictions, in mathematically calculated ORDER and precision, so that one ERROR cancels-out a balancing-ERROR.

Unfortunately, no one can put "little boxes" around existential errors and cancel out one existential error with a counter-balancing existential error, then ERASE the whole intermediate MESS, while being SATISFIED with a final correct answer. Reality doesn't work that way. Stick one ERROR into an existential system and the whole system begins to react, in various unpredictable ways, to that error and NONE of the unpredictable reactions are either BOXED or ERASIBLE. eg. Ignoring the 95 theses of an Augustinian monk, by calling the "95" a monkish "quibble". Oh! That's where Apolonio may have gotten the term "quibble" from. I wondered about that...

At any rate, Joe, that's the gist of the "P" & "not-P" thesis in science. Let P stand for Pasteurization.

If P, then kids don't die from drinking bad milk
"P" in every "civilized" country of the world
ERGO kids don't die from drinking bad milk.


That is called AFFIRMING the antecedent, which is perfectly logical to do. The observations, and work by Louis Pasteur, which led to that sort of actual logic and actual science did have some apparently illogical (to positivists) steps. For example, poor Louis had to take tons of illogical criticism from "positivists" after basically pioneering sterilization and antisepsis, despite irrational opposition. But finally the "successes" convinced even the most hardened sceptics.

However when Louis began to inject supposedly "infectious matter" (which Louis had carefully rendered "inert" by sterilizing/pasteurizing the formerly infectious stuff) into patients another furor and scandal erupted, because what he was doing (immunization) went against "sterile" medical procedures and practices. However, curing rabies soon silenced more irrational critics, who failed to distinguish sterilization from immunization. What a guy! Even the atheists and positivists had to pay him homage.

PASTEUR:
The more I learn and understand the more my Faith becomes that of a Breton peasant. If I continue to learn more and understand more, perhaps I may gain the Faith of a Breton peasant's wife.

Atta Boy, logically-scientific-Louis!!!

Kevin

The Notions of validity in Anselm, Aquinas, and Novak:
1986, 1987, 1988, 2038, 2049, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2056, 2059, 2062