Orthodox do distinguish between mortal and venial sins

Concerning Mortal Sins, Pardonable Sins, and Sins of Omission
Part I, Chapter 3 from the Exomologetarion (A Manual of Confession)
by St. Nikodemos the Hagiorite

"Mortal sins are those voluntary sins which either corrupt the love for God alone, or the love for neighbor and for God, and which render again the one committing them an enemy of God and liable to the eternal death of hell. "

"Pardonable sins are those voluntary sins which do not corrupt the love for God or the love for neighbor, nor do they render the person an enemy of God and liable to eternal death, to which transgressions even the Saints are susceptible, according to the words of the Brother of God."

Manuel Ureña Pastor, Eucharistic Theology in the Reformation and the Council of Trent

Eucharistic Theology in the Reformation and the Council of Trent
Manuel Ureña Pastor
Bishop of Cartagena, Spain
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Reflection: 'Year of the Eucharist'
The Eucharist is the central mystery of the faith. The whole of the Christian mystery is born from the Eucharist consists of the Eucharist.

As the sacramental actualization Christ's Pasch through the ordained priesthood and under the species bread and wine, the Eucharist is a fruit of the Church.

At the same time, however, the Church draws her life from the Eucharist by which she also lives, since this great gift is the perpetual and inexhaustible source of all of her spiritual good. Shining out across the world, the Eucharist purifies, renews and reunites the world with God.

This is what the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II explained in his Encyclical Letter Ecclesia de Eucharistia. The Instruction Redemptionis Sacramentum, published by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, completes it by treating matters connected with the discipline of this Sacrament.

Even in her calm and peaceful possession of the Eucharist, the Church constitutively assisted by the Holy Spirit, has also experienced periods in history in which this Sacrament, the source a summit of all Christian life, became the object of fierce theological controversy.

Let us remember the Reformation. It was through the Magisterium of the Council of Trent that the Church dealt with the difficult circumstances that threatened the true way of understanding the Eucharist and endangered its very existence.

Eucharistic theology of the Reformation

In the early Middle Ages, nominalism and other theological currents that developed from it prepared the ground for the reformers' approach to Eucharistic faith, which focused on points of particular interest: the understanding of the Real Presence of Christ in this Sacrament; the two forms of Eucharistic Communion; and the sacrificial character of Mass. Let us consider these points.

Understanding of Real Presence

Reacting to the abuses of a determined exteriorization and to every form of vulgar physical realism and also to the doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council, which asserted that the identity of the consecrated gifts and the Body and Blood of Christ were the same by virtue of "transubstantiation" (DH 802),1 Zwingli, Luther and Calvin, despite their considerable theological differences, shared the belief that the Catholic faith in the Real Presence was erroneous.

Zwingli said that after the Ascension, the body of Jesus was to be found in Heaven and thus could not be really present in earthly bread. He claimed that the so-called "consecrated" bread was not the Body of Jesus but only a symbol of it.

Accordingly, the "est" that we read in the words of the "Institution" of the Eucharist was to be understood only in a figurative sense; and eating the Eucharistic Body meant merely believing in the sacrificed Body of Christ on the Cross.

Distancing himself from Zwingli, Martin Luther accepted the Real Presence but only as a sort of extension of the Incarnation, a precise presence pro nobis, a presence bringing grace for the forgiveness of sins. In this way, as compared with what Zwingli hypothesized, the prince of the reformers interpreted the "est" of the Eucharistic Institution as a real identification.

For Luther, in fact, the glorified body of Christ is inseparably united to the divinity in whose omnipresence it shares by virtue of the communication of the properties that exist in the two natures, divine and human, of the incarnate and glorified Word.

Consequently, in the Eucharistic Sacrament, Christ unites his Body with the bread and wine (doctrine of "consubstantiation"), thereby making his omnipresence perceptible to us and salvific for us (doctrine of ubiquitarianism).

Therefore, considering the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist from the perspective of his two natures, Luther maintained that after the consecration, the bread and wine retain their own properties, but united with the Body and Blood of the Lord they constitute a true sacramental unity.

Thus, Luther categorically denied the ontological mutation of the species of the bread and wine through "transubstantiation".

Furthermore, in line with his own definition of sacrament, which he understood only as "actio" and "usus", he affirmed that the duration of the Real Presence of Christ pro nobis in the Eucharist lasts from the "take and eat" to the "sumptio" of the tiny particles of it that have been left over.

For this reason, he considered as imperative the obligation to avoid the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament, and he in no way accepted its adoration.

Calvin, lastly, not only denied the transubstantiation of the Eucharistic gifts but also any form of real "physical" presence, in the sense of eating Christ in, with and under the tangible forms of bread and wine. He differs in this from Luther who, while he made no reference to it, nonetheless accepted the doctrine of consubstantiation.

Moreover, Calvin, as opposed to Zwingli, upheld real participation in the Body and Blood of Christ in Heaven through the Sacrament of the Eucharist. For Calvin, however, the Sacrament was not an empty symbol nor a means or path of grace, but merely a "notification" of God's activity in the sacramental sign through the Holy Spirit.

Calvin claimed, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is the only "vinculum communicationis" between the communicant and Christ. Calvin maintained that the Spirit did not bring about the present of Christ in the Eucharist but that the Eucharist was only the visible reality through which the Spirit reached the faithful in order to unite them with the heavenly Christ. This made Christ's presence in the Sacrament an abstraction.

In fact, Calvin was seeking to build bridge between the Eucharistic theologies of Zwingli and Luther. In each case, it is certain that the reformers were unable to reach any agreement on the positive content of the Eucharistic gifts. This was the stumbling block to the unity of the Reformation.

Administering Eucharistic species

The two forms of Eucharistic Communion (Communion under two species or Communion under one species only) do not in themselves constitute a dogmatic problem. Even if Communion under two species (with the Body and the Blood) is an indispensable part of the integrity of the sacramental sign and corresponds to Christ's mandate in the Institution (cf. Mt 26:26-29; Mk 14:22-25; Lk 22:19 ff.; I Cor 11:24 ff.), there are other New Testament texts in which Communion under a single species is also defined as true (cf. Jn 6:51; 6:57-58).

Hence, the Church accepted from the start the validity of Eucharistic Communion under the one form or the other.

Although this never in itself posed a dogmatic problem but was merely a disciplinary issue, it became a problem of faith in 1414 when Jacobo da Mies began to preach in Prague that Communion under both species was indispensable to salvation. Da Mies based his argument on Jn 6:53-56; he maintained that this form of Communion derived from a divine mandate (cf. Mt 26:27; Lk 22:17 ff.) and violently attacked the Church for withdrawing this inalienable right from the faithful.

So it was that the Council of Constance, in its 13th Session on 15 Jun 1415, totally rejected the need to reintroduce the practice of giving the chalice as well as the bread to the laity (Communion under both species), and prohibited it, not so much because was invalid in itself, but rather, because of the erroneous assumptions with which Jacobo da Mies was seeking to justify it (cf. DH 1198-1200).

The theologians of the Reformation adopted the error of Jacobo da Mies, going beyond the intentions of the preacher of Prague, whose sole aspiration at the outset had been to rekindle Eucharistic devotion. With their assertion that the practice of the "chalice for the laity" was obligatory, not only did they manifest their desire to remain faithful to the Institution of the Eucharist and to claim the royal priesthood of all the baptized, but also, as Johannes Betz correctly notes, their intention to find theological justification for the suppression of the hierarchical structure the Church.2

Sacrificial character of Holy Mass

Nonetheless, the differences between the reformers in establishing the positive content of the Eucharistic gifts did not occur in the evaluation of Mass.

Reformation theologians, constituting as it were a single opposition front, not only denounced the trivialization and irregularity of the celebration of the Eucharist, but also contested the Catholic way of understanding Mass and its sacrificial nature in particular. In their opinion, the Eucharist was a gift of God to men, a testament. In no way was the Eucharist to be considered a gift of men to God nor, consequently, a sacrifice.

Making the Mass a sacrifice would have meant making it a "work", an idolatrous act.

Faith and thanksgiving in relation to the Eucharist do, of course, come into it but are understood only as a spiritual sacrifice and separate from the Sacrament.

The assumption that underlies this concept is no more than the fundamental principle of Reformation theology: the principle of the "solus Deus" and the "sola gratia", an axiom that was be rigorously maintained in everything that had to do with salvation. This principle was not only applied to Eucharistic theology but also to Christology.

Not even the unique and unrepeatable sacrifice of the Cross, therefore, received its value from Jesus as a man; it was seen solely as the work and testimony of the mercy that God showed to us poor, condemned sinners.

The Catholic "offerimus" consequently wreaks diabolical havoc not on only the inaccessible majesty of God's very being, but also on the fundamental structure of the Crucifixion, whose essence must not be interpreted as Jesus' sacrifice of himself, but rather as the gift that the Father makes of Jesus.

Hence, the "offerimus", especially if it is understood as an expiatory sacrifice, represents a new attempt at expiation or a presumed complement to the superabundant sacrifice of the Cross: in other words, a work.

By making these assumptions, Luther, Calvin and Zwingli totally rejected the sacrificial character of Mass, the Roman Canon, the so-called "Private Mass" and the application of Masses for the living and the dead.

The Magisterium on the Eucharist of the Council of Trent fits into this theological context.

Trent's doctrine of the Eucharist

The Council of Trent, which was deeply concerned with the discourse of the Reformation on Eucharistic theology, immediately made this Sacrament one of the most important items on its agenda. It focused first of all on the sacrificial character of Mass and reflected on the Real Presence and the two forms in which Communion can be received. I do not intend, however, to treat these three aspects together, but one by one.

For various reasons that Hubert Jedin3 studied attentively, the Council, at the 13th Session on 11 October 1551 (cf. DH 1635-1661), began by ratifying the Real Presence with the Decree on the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

The topics of the "two species under which Eucharistic Communion can be administered" and "the administration of Communion to children" were resolved at the 21st Session on 16 July 1562 (cf. DH 1725-1734).

However, since the question of the concession of the chalice to lay people had not been resolved on that day, the problem was subjected to further study.

The Synod Fathers finally declined to provide an explanation and, at the 22nd Session on 17 September that same year, approved the Decree on the administration of the chalice. The ultimate decision was entrusted to the Pontiff (cf. DH 1760).

Finally, the doctrine on the Sacrifice of Mass, the thorniest Eucharistic topic in those historical circumstances, also saw the light at the 22nd Session of the Council (cf. DH 1738-1759).

The Real Presence

The "Decree on the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist", in which the Council of Trent dealt with the Real Presence, contains eight chapters and 11 canons.

The Decree intends to affirm the Real Presence from the start: "In the august Sacrament of the Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and true man, is truly, really and substantially contained under the species of those sensible things..." (Chap. I).

From this follows the denial of the Reformation thesis which claimed that Christ is present in the Eucharist only as in a sign or symbol of his power (cf. can. 1).

The conciliar text then explains the reasons for the institution of this Sacrament, the real and visible expression of the unfathomable riches that God granted to man in Christ as the spiritual food and nourishment of souls; and as an antidote to sin, the first fruits of eternal life and an effective sign of fraternal communion (cf. Chap. II).

Then, the Decree establishes the difference between the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the presence of Christ in other sacraments.

The Sacrament of the Altar, like the other sacraments, is "a visible form of an invisible grace". However, whereas in other sacramental signs the invisible grace is brought about for the first time precisely at the moment when one uses them, in the Eucharist the Author of grace himself is present even before the administration of the Sacrament. The whole of Christ is present, with his Body and Blood, his soul and divinity, under the species of the bread and the wine; just as the whole Christ is also contained under each of the species (by virtue of their natural connection and concomitancy) and under each and every part of the species, after their separation (cf. Chap. III and can. 3).

Moreover, once the unique characteristic of the Real Presence has been established, its causes explained and its difference in comparison with the Lord's presence in the other effective signs of grace noted, the Decree states the necessary logical and ontological presupposition of the Real Presence. This presupposition is the conversion of the whole substance of bread into the Body of Christ and of the whole substance of wine into the Blood of Christ.

From this presupposition derives, as an obvious consequence, the Council's affirmation of the permanence of the species of the bread and wine and the non-permanence of their substance.

Moreover, to explain the presupposition of the conversion of the bread and wine, the Council used the term "transubstantiation", henceforth, a traditional and particularly apt classification for identifying this presupposition (cf. Chap. IV and can.2).

In such a way, the Council denied with the concept of "transubstantiation" the doctrine of "consubstantiation", in other words, that the substance of the bread and wine remains in the species (can. 2), which Luther accepted; the Council defined solely the event of the conversion and avoided going into the question of how this conversion was brought about from a natural and philosophical viewpoint.

The Council's priority was to fix the boundaries between faith and error.

Consequently, the Council's use of the term "transubstantiation" to designate the phenomenon of conversion does not mean, as Melchior Cano pointed out in the Council Hall, that this concept is part of the content of faith; nor does it mean, as Karl Rahner says, that the truth of faith expressed by the term "transubstantiation" is jeopardized by the Aristotelian acceptation with which the Council Fathers very probably used the term.4

In any case, one thing is certain: despite the fact that the concept of "transubstantiation" derives from a concrete philosophical universe, the Aristotelian universe so debated by modern thought, this concept is a truer expression of faith than the concepts of either "transfinalization" or "transignification", which some people about 10 years ago desired acritically to use instead.

As Paul VI vigorously emphasized in his Encyclical Letter Mysterium Fidei, the concept of "transubstantiation" — which means neither: "transignification" nor, even less, "transfinalization" — is at the root of the new meaning and purpose that the Eucharistic species acquire once "transubstantiation" has occurred.5 In turn, the raison d'être and ultimate foundation of "transubstantiation" are found in relation to the new goal and new meaning of the species of the bread and wine (O. Semmelroth).

Yet these concepts ("transignification" and "transfinalization") cannot claim to replace the concept of "transubstantiation", since they do not fully express the reality of this word's meaning.

Indeed, although they designate the new goal and the new meaning of the species of bread and wine, already consecrated, they in no way indicate the new constituent and constitutive being of these species one they have been consecrated. This new being of the species — the Body and Blood of Christ — is necessarily inalienable because without it there can be no true Eucharist.

Lastly, in the remaining chapters and canons, the Council draws consequences from the Real Presence: the eating of Christ in Holy Communion not only spiritually but also sacramentally and really (cf. can. 8); the permanence of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist also "extra usum" (cf. can. 4); the legitimacy of adoration of Blessed Sacrament with cultus latriae (cf. Chap. V and can. 6); the legitimacy of preserving and reserving the consecrated Eucharistic species, and the possibility of administering it to the sick (cf. Chap. VI and can. 7); the need to prepare oneself to receive the Eucharist fittingly by recourse to the Sacrament of Penance, if one is aware of being mortal sin (cf. Chap. VII and can.11); the legitimacy, for the priest celebrant, of receiving Communion himself (cf. can. 10); the obligation to receive Communion at least once a year on reaching the age of discretion (cf. can.9); and the non-reduction of the principal fruit of the Most Holy Eucharist to remission of sins (cf. can. 5).

Administering the Sacrament

The conciliar Document of the 21st Session expounded this doctrine in four, chapters and as many canons.

Coming to grips with the sensitive topic of Communion under two Eucharistic species or of the "lay chalice", the two forms of Communion that Reformation theologians considered obligatory for all believers, the Council asserted that there is no divine precept concerning the obligation of said form of Communion and that consequently, it is not necessary for salvation (cf. Chap. I and can. 1). Communion under one species suffices.

However, if Communion under one species suffices, it is not only because there is no binding divine mandate on the concrete form of Communion, but also because Jesus Christ, whole and entire, is truly present in each one of the species, in the bread and in the wine. For this reason it should be said that the whole Christ may be received even under only one Eucharistic species (cf. Chap. III and can. 3).

Moreover, since the issue of the two forms in which Communion may be received (under the one or under two species) is not a matter of divine law, it is the duty of the Church, to which Christ gave the power to regulate the discipline of the sacraments but always with respect for what is essential in them, to determine the best way to administer Communion in the form most convenient to those who receive it, and for the veneration that is due to this Sacrament itself (cf. Chap. II and can. 2).

The Council also taught that Eucharistic Communion is not necessary for newborn infants (cf. Chap. IV and can. 4).

The Mass as Sacrifice

The Document in which the doctrine and canons on the Sacrifice of Mass are expounded resulted from the 22nd Session of the Council. It is divided into nine chapters and as many canons.

The Council teaches that given the constitutive inadequacy of the Levitical priesthood in offering God a sacrifice that could redeem men and women and bring them to perfection, in the fullness of time and out of love the Father ordained that another priest should rise, Our Lord Jesus Christ, who, in offering himself once and for all on the altar the Cross, would bring about the redemption of the human race with his bloody death.

However, in order that his priesthood might not end with his death, and mindful of the requirements of human nature, during the Last Supper, "on the night when he was betrayed" (I Cor 11:23), Christ bequeathed to his beloved Bride, the Church, a visible sacrifice through which might be represented his bloody sacrifice which he was to make the following day, once and for all, on the Cross of Calvary; this was also and in order that the memorial of his passion and of his bloody death might endure for eternity and that the salvific efficacy of the passion and death of Christ Our Lord might be applied to the forgiveness of those sins committed every day.

To institute this visible sacrifice, a sacramental anticipation of his bloody sacrifice, Jesus offered on the same night as the Last Supper his Body and his Blood to God the Father under species of bread and wine, and under the symbols of these things themselves he offered them to the Apostles so they might receive them; hence, in that very act, he ordained them priests.

He ordered the Apostles and successors in the priesthood to these things with these words: "Do this in memory of me" (Lk 22:19; I Cor 11:24; cf. Chap. I and cann. 1, 2).

Therefore, the Holy Sacrifice of Mass contains an actualization of Last Supper until the Lord's coming, and Christ, who offered himself once and for all on the altar of the Cross in a bloody way, is here sacrificed in an unbloody way.

The Council thus established that in itself the sacrifice of the Cross, anticipated during the Last Supper, is one and the same as the Sacrifice of the Mass, since the victim is, of course, one and the same.

The One who offers himself in the Mass by the priestly ministry is the same as the One who once offered himself on the altar of the Cross. The only difference is in the manner of the offering: then, the bloody oblation without any mediation; now, the bloodless and sacramental oblation, that is, through the mediation of priests and of the same species as at the Last Supper.

Consequently, taking into account this intrinsic unity that exists between the two sacrifices, the fruits of the bloody sacrifice of Christ are obtained in abundance through the unbloody sacrifice that is fulfilled during the Mass, but this in no way diminishes the value of the bloody sacrifice.

The Church, therefore, rightly offers the Holy Sacrifice of Mass not only for sins, pains, satisfactions and various other necessities of the living faithful, but also for the deceased members of the faithful who have not yet fully atoned for their sins (cf. Chap. II and cann. 3, 4).

In the ensuing chapters and canons that we are unable to analyze here, the Council illustrates the significance of Masses celebrated in honor of saints (cf. Chap. III and can. 5); the existence and significance of the Canon of the Mass (cf. Chap. IV and can. 6); the significance of the ceremonies in the celebration of the Sacrifice of the Mass (cf. Chap. V and cann. 7 and 9); and the triple significance of the water that is to be mixed with the wine during the Eucharistic celebration (cf. Chap. VII and can. 9).

With regard to the last two chapters, Chapter VIII comes down heavily on the request to celebrate Mass normally in the vernacular and urges pastors of souls to explain the meaning of the Eucharistic mystery during the celebration (cf. also can. 9). Certain preliminary observations on the significance of the canons concerning the Sacrifice of Mass are the object of Chapter IX that concludes the doctrinal content of the Document.

Although it is obvious that the Tridentine teaching on the Eucharist was prompted by the anxiety to confront the Eucharistic theology of the Reformation, it definitively established the essential content of the truth of this Sacrament.

The Second Vatican Council, which confronted other signs of the times four centuries later, was to have the task, consistent with Tridentine faith, of making the most of those aspects of the Eucharist which had not been explicitly and systematically addressed during that Council. These included for example, the specific participation of lay people and non-ordained Religious in the Sacrifice of Mass by virtue of their real, baptismal priesthood; this does not mean that the Tridentine Fathers were unaware of the existence, meaning and need for this participation.

In fact, in her constant exodus towards the Promised Land of Heaven, the Church never, at any specific moment on her pilgrimage, makes exhaustive pronouncements on the content or multiple implications of an article of faith, but, open to the promptings of the Holy Spirit who tells her at every moment what to say, finds in the "Depositum fidei" that she has diligently preserved in accordance with God's will the necessary truth to forge ahead without ever losing her way, which her Lord and Master points out to her.


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Notes

1 Cf. H. Denzinger - P. Hünermann, Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum. Bilingual version of the 37th edition, EDB, Bologna (2004). I cite this work to justify the DH abbreviation.
2 Cf. J. Betz, La Eucharistía, Misterio Central, in Mysterium Salutis, Ed. Cristiandad, Madrid (1975), v. IV/2, p. 247.
3 Cf. H. Jedin, Historia del Concilio de Trento, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona (1975), v. III, pp. 59-86; 403-436.
4 Cf. K. Rahner, La presencia de Cristo en el sacramento de la cena del Segnor, in Escritos de Teologia, Taurus Ediciones, Madrid (1964), t. IV, pp. 367-396.
5 Cf, Paul Vi, Encyclical Letter Mysterium Fidei, nn. 11, 46.

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Taken from:
L'Osservatore Romano
Weekly Edition in English
28 September 2005, page 6

source

José A. Sayes, The Eucharist in the Council of Trent

The Eucharist in the Council of Trent
José A. Sayes
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Reflection: Year of the Eucharist

Luther said that he recognized the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist as explicit in Christ's words at the Institution; but he did not accept the term "transubstantiation", which he perceived as an interference by philosophy and human reason. Luther's "allergy" to reason is well known.

Consequently, he also rejected the sacrificial character of the Eucharist, recalling that the sacrifice that Christ offered on the Cross is unique and cannot be repeated.

Theology today

There is no doubt that contemporary theology has recovered the biblical concept of memorial. It had been neglected after the Council of Trent, for in the anxiety to respond to Protestantism, Post-Tridentine theology developed a definition of sacrifice as applied to the Eucharist, which it interpreted as being a sacrifice independent of the sacrifice of the Cross.
As stated, the notion of "memorial" made it possible to recover in the Letter to the Hebrews the assertion that Christ's sacrifice was one and definitive, and to explain that this same sacrifice becomes present on the altar.

The term "transubstantiation", however, presents greater difficulties and has given rise to much perplexity at the level of faith. Does not the concept of substance correspond to a philosophy, by now superseded? So why not use more personal and relational concepts?
The truth, on the contrary, is that the new theories, developed with this end in view, were not only unconvincing but were rejected, especially by Paul VI.

It does not suffice to state that there has been a change of meaning or of relations, saying that all that remains is still only natural food. And according to this new theory, the non-believer who understands only the natural meaning of food would be eating and drinking no more than bread and wine.

But the Church has always maintained that non-believers also eat the Body and Blood of Christ since there is no other objective reality in it than that of the Body and Blood of Christ, in such a way that only the species of the bread and wine endure.

The elegance of Trent

Contrary to current tendencies in the interpretation of Trent, an objective study of the Acts immediately shows that Trent maintained sobriety and fine elegance in the exposition of its doctrine. Yet very few have studied these proceedings.

The Council's abstention, for example, from the use of the term accidentes when speaking of transubstantiation deserves attention because it did not consider its doctrine to be scholastic. It preferred, instead, to use the term species.

And if the Council used the term substantia, it did so for two reasons: a) because it is present in the tradition of St Ambrose and Faustus of Riez, passing through Councils such as the Fourth Lateran; b) because it was therefore used, well before the advent of hylomorphism in the scholastics.

Throughout the discussion of the Eucharistic sacrifice, the majority of the Fathers accepted the sacrificial character of the Eucharist. The fact remains that the Council did not espouse the theories that explained this by following hypotheses such as that of representation or of virtual immolation.

Although Tapper, Chancellor of the University of Louvain, did not formulate his proposition at Trent, it was he who initiated a post-conciliar current that explained the sacrificial nature of the Eucharist, not to make the sacrifice of the Cross present but to affirm a new definition of sacrifice: in the Eucharist Christ attains a new way of being, such that he remains caught at the very moment in which he offers himself.

Thus, the Eucharist is a sacrifice independent of the sacrifice on the Cross.

Trent did not take this route. Theologians of the intellectual level of Cajetan had already maintained the continuity of the sacrifice of the Cross with the Eucharist, and people of the stature of Laínez and Carranza defended this same principle at Trent.

Furthermore, when the time came for the decision, the Fathers were not unanimous in their opinions. But the Council did have at its disposal a tradition concerning the theme that unified the opinion of all and obviously, it opted for this.

The Church's tradition was the following: the Eucharist is the memorial of the sacrifice of the Cross, which it makes present among us; the Eucharist makes present Christ's sacrifice on the Cross and the memory of him lives on among us (Denz., 1739-41).

The concept of repraesentatio should therefore be combined with that of memorial. The Catechism of Trent (1566) says "instauratur", "makes himself present once again".

The role of theology

The role of theology should consist only of clarifying faith. But the contemporary theologian, through ignorance of the importance of Scripture and Tradition, often prefers to satisfy the modern mindset. There are other cultural and social pressures, moreover, which induce the theologian to do so.

I have often met theologians who ask me: what is this substance?

Today, it is understood as meaning solely material reality, its physical dimensions and the sense that human beings attribute to it.

Substance, however, is not the ultimate physical basis of things but rather the ontological subsistence that God has infused in them through creation. By virtue of this they are distinct from God and are not set against anything.

This substance can be perceived in all the things that surround me. From the pencil I am holding I perceive, through my mind, that it is something (aliquid, a being, a substance) and, since it possesses specific physical traits, I call it a pencil. Otherwise, if I were not aware that things existed I would neither be able to talk about them nor to give them a name.
The first fact about them that I can understand is that they are something, a being or substance: this is the key to realistic knowledge. Animals, through their senses, perceive the physical dimension alone, but they do not properly know that things exist.

Besides, if there is a concept in our philosophy that we cannot overlook, it is that of substance, not only since we believe in creation that enables things to subsist, but because we have a common awareness of it.

Transubstantiation is due to the fact that God intervenes in the Eucharist with his creative power. We do not consider this a miracle, because a miracle requires the working of a tangible sign.

However, Christ intervenes here with the same creative force that he used in working his miracles. St John, who places the multiplication of the loaves in chapter six of his Gospel, says of Eucharistic doctrine: the One who works the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves is the One who says he gives his body to be eaten.

With reference to the Eucharistic sacrifice, the concept of memorial is crucial. But not even this is a magic or irrational concept. The key to everything is to be found in the Letter to the Hebrews, which presents Christ's sacrifice as unique, definitive and eternal.

Christ offers himself to the Father on the Cross and the Father accepts him and raises him. Thus, Christ enters the heavenly shrine with his Body and his Blood, where he continues his offering for us before the Father as victim and eternal priest.

What occurs in the Eucharist is that Christ, the heavenly and glorious victim, becomes present on the altar under the appearances [of bread and wine]. And Christ, the eternal priest, makes the celebrant partake in his offering.

Consequently, we have on the altar the same victim and the same priest who offered themselves [sic] on the Cross, and who are eternally perpetuated in heaven. The Eucharist is possible thanks to the Resurrection.

The true Temple of Christ

Before concluding, I would like to mention another aspect of the Eucharist that seems to me to be fundamental.

Yahweh's temple in Jerusalem is no longer standing: it was destroyed by the Romans. On its site, the Arabs have built two mosques. If the Jews wanted to rebuild it, there would be a world war.

We Christians, however, know that the temple is no longer there but in the Eucharist. Indeed, when Christ said that he would destroy the temple and rebuild it in three days, he was referring, as St John says (cf. Jn 2:21), to the shrine of his risen Body present in the Eucharist.

This presence is not the same as Christ's presence in the other sacraments in which he makes himself present through his grace or, in other words, his love. Here in the Eucharist he is present with his body, soul and divinity, as the Council of Trent recalls (cf. Denz., 1654).

Yet there is something more: the Christ present in the Eucharist is the risen Christ who gives us his Spirit. Let us not forget that in Palestine Christ had not yet bestowed his Spirit, for he had not yet risen (cf. Jn 7:39). Nevertheless, his presence is far more effective in the Eucharist than it was in Palestine.

On the day when, starting with the theologians and priests, we all begin to pray by ourselves before the tabernacle, the Church and the world will change.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Taken from:
L'Osservatore Romano
Weekly Edition in English
23 February 2005, page 5

source

G.C. DILSAVER, Karol Wojtyla and the Patriarchal Hierarchy of the Family

Karol Wojtyla and the Patriarchal Hierarchy of the Family

His Exegetical Comment on Ephesians 5:21-33 and Genesis 3:16

Wojtyla's "mutual submission" in orthodox context
To construe the interpretative concept of "mutual submission" as a development of doctrine (that is, as an integral growth from, and harmonious with, previous Church teachings and exegesis) requires an expanded understanding of the word "submission." It is true that a husband, in a certain sense, submits himself to his wife by giving his life for her; though this broadening of the term has never been employed by the Church in her exegesis of the Ephesians 5 or her teaching on marriage. By broadening the term "submission," the term acquires an analogous meaning. It cannot be applied exactly the same to both husband and wife, but only in a somewhat similar manner. This analogous broadening of the term is necessary to keep intact the previously understood meaning, i.e., that of a hierarchical order. If, on the other hand, Wojtyla's statement that a husband submits to his wife "just as" she submits to him, is construed to mean that this submission is identical, then the understanding of the term "submission" would not be analogous but rather univocal. But such an univocal understanding would necessarily contradict a hierarchical order as enunciated in previous magisterial pronouncements, and thus bar it from being incorporated into the corpus of authentic Church teachings. An orthodox construal, then, requires that Wojtyla’s "mutual submission of the spouses" be seen as an analogous submission, where the man paradoxically submits himself to a life of authority that entails both headship and sacrificial service.

Elsewhere in this exegesis of Ephesians 5, Wojtyla asserts that by the passage "'wives, be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord'... the author does not intend to say that the husband is the 'lord' of the wife...." For this statement to be construed as harmonious with previous Church teachings on the subject, "lord" must be understood in a strictly pejorative sense; that is, as a "lording over" abuse of authority or, as Wojtyla says in the same passage, an understanding of a husband's lordly position as "a one-sided domination."(4) But the other meaning of 'lord,' the positive meaning, must not thereby by seen as discarded, for the husband as "lord of the wife" is not only intrinsic to the Church’s teachings on familial hierarchy, but also in accord with the most fundamental principle of biblical exegesis. This first exegetical principle is to interpret scriptural passages in light of other similar writings of the day, most especially companion scriptural writings. In the epistle of St. Peter, Christian wives are exhorted to imitate the "holy women of the past..., like Sarah, who was obedient to Abraham, and called him her lord." [1 Peter 3:5-6] (N.B. Emphasis is that of the text.) So too, the rest of the Pauline letters continually stress patriarchal hierarchy.(5)

It is the clause "give way to one another in the Lord" at the beginning of the Ephesians' passage that Wojtyla uses as the cornerstone of his novel exegesis of Ephesians 5. Yet to construe "give way to one another in the Lord" as a universal prescription of mutual, univocal submission would, in effect, do away with all hierarchical order, including that of the parents and children, magisterium and faithful, and government and citizens. Instead, a reading of the entire passage in accord with simple grammatical logic clearly shows that "give way to one another in the Lord" indicates both the source of legitimate authority and the spirit of dutiful submission. The author of Ephesians goes on to delineate some specific domestic relationships of authority and submission that find their source and spirit in the Lord, beginning with that which is the model for the rest, the relation of man and wife. If Wojtyla's use of the term "mutual submission" were to be taken in a univocal sense, and hence isolated from previous Church exegesis of the passage, then it would follow that not only is a man to submit to his wife, but, as Ephesians goes on to delineate domestic relations, parents are to submit to their children as well.

If the term "submission" is construed in an implicit, secondary manner that includes a man's—or a parent's—giving of his life in sacrificial service of those under his authority, then the explicit, primary meaning which entails a hierarchical structure remains intact. Wojtyla's exegesis must be viewed as an implicit, secondary development of the passage in order to position it in the light of previous magisterial teachings and exegesis. The primary, explicit meaning, the meaning previously asserted by the Church, is that which is derived from a simple reading of the passage.

Dicourse of Pope Paul VI on occasion of the 7th centenary

of the passage of Saint Bonaventure to Eternal Glory

DISCORSO DEL SANTO PADRE PAOLO VI IN OCCASIONE DEL VII CENTENARIO DEL TRANSITO DI SAN BONAVENTURA ALLA GLORIA ETERNA

Giovedì, 2 agosto 1974



Dilectis filiis
Constantino Koser
Ministro Generali Ordinis Fratrum Minorum
Vitali Bonmarco
Ministro Generali Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Conventualium
Paschali Rywalski
Ministro Generali Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum

Dilecti filii, salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem.

Scientia et virtute praeclarissimus, hodieque refulget Sanctus Bonaventura, qui Doctor Seraphicus solet cognominari cuiusque ab obitu septimum saeculum expletum hoc anno celebratur.

Qui quidem annus consimili memoria anniversaria Sancti Thomae Aquinatis est insignis, ita ut socia laude praedicentur hi duo viri, ornamenta Ecclesiae, in cuius ministerio eximio exsequendo mortem oppetiverunt: alter enim vita functus est, dum ad Concilium Oecumenicum Lugdunense II, Summi Pontificis iussu, se conferebat, alter, id est Sanctus Bonaventura, dum hoc ad exitum vergebat, die nempe xv mensis Iulii anno MCCLXXIV.

Hic ipse Caeles et aetatem nostram valet illuminare, qua in re verba libet iterare Sancti Pii X, Decessoris Nostri: «Etenim Bonaventuram, utpote non suo dumtaxat saeculo, sed omni posteritati, quemadmodum ceteros summos Ecclesiae Doctores, datum divinitus, egregie prodesse huic etiam aetati posse arbitramur» (Epist. Doctoris Seraphici sapientiam, 11 Apr. 1904: Pii X Pont. Max. Acta, I, p. 235). Nunc vero, ut notum est, id agitur, ut orbis catholicus ad sui renovationem nitatur, quatenus doctrina et normae salutares, a Concilio Vaticano II statutae, fideliter et incunctanter ad effectum deducantur, et sic in Ecclesia et per eam in mundo viva vox; Evangelii possit resonare (Cfr. Dei Verbum, 8). Quae renovatio etiam magis urgetur, universali Iubilaeo iam per Nos indicto, cui propositum est singulorum ad Deum conversionem promovere, quae cunctorum pariat reconciliationem. Omnes ergo Christifideles ad impensam vocantur navitatem, cuius Bonaventura praeco exstitit et magister et effector, ut in omnibus aedificetur fides, honorificetur Deus, componantur mores (Cfr. S. BONAV. De reduct. art. ad theol., 26: Opera omnia, Ad Claras Aquas, V, p. 325).

Seraphicus Doctor suo quidem modo officium implevit, quo ceterum quivis Ecclesiae fìlius astringitur quodque in eo positum est, ut «secundum propria dona et munera per viam fidei vivae, quae spem excitat et per caritatem operatur», incedat (Cfr. Lumen Gentium, 41). Theologicae vero inquisitioni, cui assidue studioseque incumbebat, ipse hunc constituit ordinem, «ut inchoetur a stabilitate fidei, et procedatur per serenitatem rationis, ut perveniatur ad suavitatem contemplationis» (De rebus theologicis, Serm. 4, 15: Opera orma, V, p. 571). Cum autem auctor fidei et consummator sit Iesus (Cfr. Hebr. 12, 2), «in quo summi Dei tota revelatio consummatur» (Dei Verbum, 7), illum potissimum aspexit ut «fundamentum totius fidei christianae . . . . totius doctrinae authenticae» )De rebus theologicis, Serm. 4, 5: Opera omnia, V, p. 568). Supremo enim sub magistro Filio Dei et hominis Filio, multa, quae soli rationi sunt impossibilia, possibilia fiunt rationi divinitus adiutae; quae ideo capax redditur «ad participanda bona divina, quae humanae mentis intelligentiam omnino superant» (Dei Filius, cap. 2: DENZ-SCHÖN. 3005), ac de iisdem etiam omnimodam certitudinem assequi valet. Nam licet intellectus humanus intrinsece, ut aiunt, arctioribus finibus sit circumscriptus, et falli possit, tamen ipsius Dei infallibilitate et immutabilitate quodam modo perfunditur.

Minime vero putandum est nos umquam irrationabiliter credere, «quia gratia et lux desuper infusa potius rationem dirigit, quam pervertat» (S. BQNAV. Quaest. disput. de mysterio Trinitatis, q. 1, a. 2, n. 3: Opera omnia, V, p. 57). Qua ro p pter, nedum in quodam fideismo, ut appellant, acquiescamus, ad ulterius inquirendum impellimur, ipsa etiam exempla atque vocabula usurpantes, quae ad omne genus doctrinae pertinent, cum fides nos doceat in quavis re, quae sentitur vel cognoscitur, interius latere ipsum Deum (Cfr. ID. De reduct. art. ad theol., 26: Opera omnia, V, p. 325).

Neque praepedienda est theologica inquisitio propter deceptiones, quae forte exinde oriantur et a quibus «vix aliquis tractator catholicus immunis fuit» (ID. In II Sent., dist. 15, dub. 3: Opera omnia, II, p. 390), dummodo omnes investigatores desiderio ducantur veritati serviendi eiusque vim, transcendentem qualiacumque sua ipsorum iudicia, agnoscant. Tota enim de Deo veritas vel ab eo proveniens voluntas, nulla humana comparatur industria, sed a Patre luminum descendit, qui «voluntarie genuit nos verbo veritatis, ut simus initium aliquod creaturae eius» (Iac. 1, 18). Hanc igitur veritatem numquam licet aspernari, sive certum proponendo ut dubium, sive dubium ut certum asserendo.

Quaevis igitur circa divina terminalis seu definitiva sententia ad magisterium spectat a Christo institutum, eo quod quandam cum ipso verbo Dei habet connaturalitatem, quam dicunt, scilicet ad Ecclesiae magisterium, cui uni munus authentice interpretandi est concreditum (Cfr. Dei Verbum, 10). Quo fit, ut nemo fidelis discipulus esse possit Salvatoris Iesu, nisi illi magisterio, quod ipsius nomine in Ecclesia exercetur, fidele praestet obsequium. Utraque autem fidelitas singularem tribuit theologicae inquisitioni praestantiam et efficit, ut eadem cum munere salvifico eiusdem Ecclesiae arcte coniungatur, quatenus per ipsam supernaturalis hominum vocatio et profundius cognoscitur et suasive adiuvatur (Cfr. S. BONAV. In I Sent., Prooem., q. 3, concl.: Opera omnia, I, p. 13).
Quemadmodum Christus, principalis magister noster (Cfr. ID. De rebus theologicis, Serm. 4, 20: Opera omnia, V, p. 572), docuit, oportet a nobis in omnibus honorificetur Deus.

Est autem honorandus Deus imprimis in natura sua, quae, utpote humanam prorsus absoluteque transcendens, postulat, ut illi plane simus obnoxii: tunc enim «Deus regnat in nobis, quando nos sumus omnino ei subiecti» (ID. In Evang. Luc., c. 11, 12: Opera omnia, VII, p. 280). Etsi Dei dominium et nostra subiectio in fine tantum temporum perficietur, tamen discipuli Domini ad utrumque debent cotidie sedulo attendere.

Praeterea Deo honor est adhibendus operanti per ministros suos (Cfr. ID. Quaest. disp. de perfect. evang., q. 4, a. 1, 9: Opera omnia, V, p. 182), maxime quidem per ministros, i n quibus «adest in medio credentium Dominus Iesu Christus» (Lumen Gentium, 21). Peculiari modo honorandi sunt Ecclesiae «Pastores, quos qui audit, Christum audit, qui vero spernit, Christum spernit et Eum qui Christum misit» (Ibid. 20). Quamvis enim et ipsi idem habeant caput Christum, nihilominus ut medii interpretes inter ceteros fideles ac Deum sunt constituti, «ut eis referant divina responsa», quae verbo Dei exprimuntur quaeque omnia complectuntur ad salutem hominis necessaria: quid credendum, quid exspectandum, quid operandum (Cfr. S. BONAV. Sermones de B. Virgine Maria, De Annunt. Serm. 4, 2: Opera omnia, IX, p. 674 b: In Exaëm., Coll. 11, 13: Opera omnia, V, p. 338).

Quoniam vero inter sacros Pastores in ministerio salutis primum obtinet locum Summus Pontifex, honorem Deo denegat, qui reverentiam et oboedientiam eidem Romano Pontifici debitam recusat. Quare Sanctus Bonaventura, vir pius et miserens, haec gravia verba proferre non dubitavit: «Non potest ergo intra unitatem ecclesiasticam esse qui ab oboedientia recedit illius qui sedet in Cathedra Petri» (ID. Quaest. dìsp. de perfect. evang., q. 4, a. 3, 14: Opera omnia, V, p. 191).
Deus denique honorificetur oportet in imagine sua, nempe in homine, quia, in Verbo aeterno homine facto, divinam quodam mod assecutus est dignitatem. Quoniam Christus, ut ait Sanctus Bonaventura, «simul est proximus et Deus, simul frater et dominus, simul etiam rex et amicus» (ID. Itiner. ment. in Deum, c. 4, 5: Opera omnia, VIII, p. 307), postulatur, ut amor noster in universos feratur homines, neque ullis eorum peculiaribus contineatur condicionibus. Nam, cum caritas nostra a Christo originem trahat atque finem accipiat, eandem universalitatem habeat oportet ac dilectio, qua Christus dilexit nos (Cfr. Io. 15, 9).

Pariter ergo honorandi sunt varii in Ecclesia status, nam «humani generis Recreator diversa largitur charismatum dona, diversa dat graduum et praelationum officia, diversa tandem praebet exempla» (S. BONAV. Apologia pauperum, c. 6, 4: Opera omnia, VIII, p. 267).

Quodsi peccata defectionesque hic illic reperiuntur, tamen germina bonitatis, in quemvis hominem a Deo immissa, nedum penitus exstinguantur, talem efficaciam servant, ut, divina gratia adiuvante, ex malo etiam bonum valeant excitare. Nullus ergo, tot inter difficultates, quibus fit, ut humana vita interdum nec cum fide concordet nec cum honore Deo debito componatur, est desperandi locus: est enim maior misericordia Dei quam miseria nostra possumusque nos ad Deum trahere ipso pondere beneficiorum eius (Cfr. ID. In Ioan., Coll. XXVIII, 5: Opera omnia, VI, p. 567). Cum vero summum beneficium, hominum generi impertitum, sit ipsius Dei Incarnatio, per Christum et in Christo iidem homines consecuti sunt facultatem, qua, per bona temporalia transeuntes, non omittant aeterna. Propter hanc supremam divini amoris effusionem, tota creatura, licet ei inesse pergat periculum ne a Deo avertat, data Incarnatione, excellentiore modo ad Deum conducere valet.

Est autem creatura ipsa quasi liber legendus luce afIulgente sacrarum Scripturarum, quae ad Deum cognoscendum, laudandum, amandum alliciunt. Quoniam autem nemo ad plenum intellectum earundem divinarum Litterarum possit pervenire, nisi per crucem Christi, qui omnem Scripturam implevit fundendo Dei veritatem (Cfr. ID. In Exaem., Coll. XIII, 12: Opera omnia, V, p. 390; In Evang. Luc., c. 4, 45 et c. 16, 33: Opera omnia, VII, pp. 99 e t 4 1 5 ; Sermones de tempore, Fer. VI in Parasc., Serm. 2: Opera omnia, IX, p. 28 b.), Christum crucihxum omnes imitentur oportet, quippe qui venerit, ut hominem ab amore terrenorum revocaret et ad amorem Dei provocaret (Cfr. S. BONAV. Sermones de tempore, Domin. I Advent., Serm. 3: Opera omnia, IX, p. 28 b), atque pro nobis sit passus, nobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamur vestigia eius (Cfr. 1 Petr. 2, 21).

Haec igitur sequela Christi ad continuam impellit reformationem eamque in rectam convertit animi propensionem, quae in eo est posita, ut per Verbum incarnatum, quatenus est humani generis reformativum, cuncta ad primigeniam reducantur formam, quam a Verbo increato acceperunt (Cfr. S. BONAV. Breviloqu., p. 6, C. 13: Opera omnia, V, p. 279 b.). Christus enim, utpote «simul perfectus viator et comprehensor» (ID. De rebus theologicis, Serm. 4, 19: Opera omnia, V, p. 572), dum omnium terrestre iter comitatur, omnes simul ad se, in caelestibus constitutum, invitat. Unde efficitur, ut vita hominis in terris ipsa natura sua sit peregrinatio eschatologica, videlicet itinerarium seu reditus cum Christo ad Christum «a quo procedimus, per quem vivimus, ad quem tendimus» (Lumen Gentium, 3).

Huiusmodi itinerarii exemplum Sanctum Bonaventura in patre suo Francisco laudibus praedicat, qui, in monte Alvernae Christo truci affixo singularem in modum conformis effectus, cum Domino «pascha» celebravit, transitum ad Deum quasi consummans. Quo exemplo fulgente, ad eundem transitum cuncti homines invitantur (Cfr. S. BONAV. Itinerar. menf. in Deum, c. 7, 2-2: Opera omnia, V, p. 312).

Quod quidem itinerarium mentis in Deum componens, Sanctus Bonaventura, maxime ardua speculationis culmina supergrediens, de mystica theologia ita exponit, ut in ea «habeatur facile princeps» (Cfr. LEONE XIII Alloc. ad professores Collegii S. Antonii de Urbe abita 11 Nov. 1890: Acta Ord. Min. 1890, p. 177).

Ipse sane arbitratur contemplationem Dei cuilibet viro iusto esse quaerendam et ad bonum infinitum esse pertingendum, quo anima, quamvis capacitatem habeat finitam, compleatur (Cfr. S. BONAV. In II Sent., dist. 23, 2, a. q. 3, 6: Opera omnia, II, p. 546 a; In I Sent., dist. 1, a. 3, q. 2, 2: Opera omnia, I, p. 41 b.).

Simul vero persuasum sibi habet eos reprehensibiles esse «qui, dum volunt arcem contemplationis ascendere, volunt quiescere et ad laborem actionis recusant descendere» (Cfr. S. BONAV. In Evang. Luc., c. 1, 62: Opera omnia, VII, p. 236). Cum enim perfectio ad caritatem ducat, homo, quo magis Deo adhaeret, eo magis Regni Dei incremento incumbat oportet.

Utrumque autem vivendi modum, ad beatitudinem promerendam necessarium, Sanctus Bonaventura ipse coluit, contemplationem in actionem quodammodo transfundens. Siquidem ministerium Moderatoris Generalis sui Ordinis ita implevit, ut in commisso sibi grege meritum virtutis accresceret, clauderetur via vitiis et daretur moribus disciplina (Cfr. ID. Epistolae Officiales, II, 1: Opera omnia, III, p. 712). Ad patris cardinalis dignitatem evectus, exspectationi Summi Pontificis ita respondit, ut cum eodem divinis obsequiis et universalis Ecclesiae servitiis vacaret (Cfr. GREGORII I Epist. Fr. Bonaventurae Ord. Min. Gen. Min., in Bullarium Franciscanum, III, p. 206 a.).

Idem prorsus sensit Angelicus Doctor, illud opus vitae activae extollens, «quod ex plenitudine contemplationis derivatur» (S. TH. Summa theol., II-IIæ, q. 188, a. 6); ideoque cum eo sociatur Bonaventura, sicut ad trahendum iugum Domini Dominica est iunctus Franciscus (Cfr. S. BONAV. Sermones de Sanctis, De Sancto Dominico: Opera omnia, IX, p. 565 b.).a Quam ob rem haec duo Ecclesiae lumina ad tempora usque nostra tamquam «sacrae theologiae principes» (PII XII Litt. Enc. Sacra virginitas: AAS 46, 1954, p. 165), quasi geminato fulgore in cuncto splendescunt Populo sancta Dei.

His, quae attigimus, Sancti Bonaventurae cogitatis et hortamentis manifesto comprobatur hunc ipsum doctrinae vitaeque magistrum adhuc loqui, quamvis abhinc septem saecula mortuum. Cui adhuc loquenti Nos vocem addimus Nostram, omnes Ecclesiae filios monentes, ut eum, qui ita ambulavit, observant (Cfr. Phil. 3, 17). Ad Deum autem iuvat orationem dirigere, quae in Seraphici Doctoris memoria recolenda rite adhibetur, ut «ipsius profìciamus eruditione praeclara et caritatis ardorem iugiter aemulemur» (Missale Romanum, Typ. Polygl. Vat. 1970, p. 578).

Quae vota Benedictio Apostolica confirmet, quam vobis, dilecti filii, et universis, quibus praeestis, Familiis Franciscalibus, ex animo impertimus.

Datum Romae, apud Sanctum Petrum, die xv mensis Iulii, anno MCMLXXIV, Pontificatus Nostri duodecimo.

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: St. Bonaventure
The Internet Guide to St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Saint Bonaventure (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
St. Bonaventure University

Ontogeny and Human Life conference

source

Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum
Master in Scienza e Fede
STOQ’07 – THE STOQ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Ontogeny and Human Life
Pontifical Athenaeum ´Regina Apostolorum´
In collaboration with the
Pontifical Academy for Life
Rome, Italy
November 15-17, 2007

PRESENTATION

The STOQ’07 Conference will be focused on the topic of the ontogeny and development of human life.

It is well known that in the last decades this topic, and in particular the question of the identity and status of the human embryo, has stirred hot and endless bioethical debates, with notable repercussions on the social and political life of many countries.

Obviously, such an item must be tackled from various and variously intermingling viewpoints, from biology to law, or from medicine to anthropology, dealing with questions like: is human ontogenesis a continuous process, or is it marked by biological and ontological discontinuities? If so, when and where to place such discontinuities, and what ethical and juridical conclusions to draw? Is there a clear cut between embryos and pseudo-embryos, or there is a continuum between perfect normality and total abnormality? How to deal with situations challenging the concepts of individual and organism, as with conjoined twins or developmental chimaeras?
In a more general framework, the concept of ontogenesis also reminds us of a bio-philosophical theme that seems today largely underestimated, that is biological genesis, from epigenesis to the origin of life, or from genetics to phylogeny.

Thus, the next STOQ Conference will provide a unique opportunity to rigorously deal with, and serenely discuss, the numerous aspects of human development and ontogenesis, in the context of a high-level academic board and in the beautiful setting of the town of Rome.
The Conference will be accordingly divided in four Sections: a) Biological Aspectsb) Biomedical Aspectsc) Philosophical and Theological Aspectsd) Bioethical and Juridical Aspects
Concluding each day of the Conference, Panel Sessions will give all the participants an opportunity to intervene in open debate on these topics.

PROGRAM (pdf)

Per informazioni:Guido Traversatel 06 66527872 - convegnontogenesi@libero.it
Luigi Sammarco tel 06 66527854 - mastersf@upra.org
Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum
Via degli Aldobrandeschi, 19000163 Roma - Tel 06 66527800
www.upra.org - www.stoqnet.org
e-mail: mastersf@upra.org

Sandro Magister, Liturgy and Ecumenism

Liturgy and Ecumenism: How to Apply Vatican Council II.

Jefferson Davis on states' rights

The papers of Jefferson Davis (at Rice U.)

To Lowndes County Citizens, November 22, 1850 --spells out his Constitutional view of state rights

Jefferson Davis to Lowndes County, Miss., Citizens

Steamboat "Gen. Scott," November 22, 1850.

Gentlemen:--I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your very gratifying letter of the 11, inst., in which, as friends "to the Union and Constitution," you approve of my course in the United States Senate, and invite me to a public dinner at such time as may be compatible with my other engagements.

When your letter was handed to me, I was on my way to Washington City, and the obligation to be present at the commencement of the session of Congress (I thought,) required me to proceed without delay. The shortness between the last and the coming session of Congress and the exigent demand for some attention to my private affairs, permitted me to visit but a small portion of my constituents. Had I consulted my own gratification in the selection of the places to which I should go, you will not fail to preceive the many inducements which Lowndes and adjoining counties offered to me, who owe to their people such debts as to any one it would give pride and pleasure personally to acknowledge. Suffice it to say, that I was governed by other considerations than the wish to visit those from whom I might expect the most flattering reception, and now far the pleasure of meeting you, must look forward to the ensuing summer, when I hope and expect to be with you.

For your expressions of confidence and estimation, accept assurances of my deepest gratitude, increased, if it be possible, by the consciousness that they are the result of your kindness, not of my service, and are all unmerited save for the unwavering devotion I have felt and feel to the State of Mississippi, the rights the interests, and the honor of my constituents.

The fears which you express of alienation of the people from the yet revered Union of our fathers, and the perversion of the Constitution from its intent and spirit, as consequences of the late action of Congress were the convictions of my mind when the measures to which you refer, were under consideration in the Senate & nerved me in the long opposition I offered to their enactment. It may be said; and from the annals of Congress, demonstrated, that but for sectional rivalry and distortion of the grants of the Constitution from their true purposes, those laws would not have been enacted. The source of the measures will, I think, be increased by their operations. The alienation of the people and the perversion of the Constitution bear to them the double relation of cause and effect.--Yet ingenious demagogues seek to deceive the people of the South, by throwing the responsibility of their present position on those who struggled most to defeat the means by which they have been injured and are required to answer the question, will you resist, or submit to unjust and humilating discrimination against you? A wrong has been inflicted on the South; those who aided in the infliction would now draw the censure they may have anticipated, by crying aloud against all who assert your rights and claim redress for past and security against future aggression. There could not be a more dangerous heresy than that which concedes to the majority of Congress, the right to use all grants as in their discretion they may choose, and acknowledges the right of the States to interpose against their federal agent only when the forms of the government are violated; in other words, for a palpable violation of the letter of the Constitution. The federal government is a creature of grants; its powers are not limited by prohibition, but are only co-extensive with the authority conferred. If the right of the States to interpose begins only on the palpable infraction of the letter of the Constitution, then they have no power to guard their reserved powers, none to confine the agent in the use of the grant to the purpose for which it was granted, and it would be difficult to conceive of a case such as is contemplated by the phrase, palpable violation of the Constitution, in which the Supreme Court of the United States would not furnish an adequate remedy. It is exactly in the case where the rights of the States and of the people thereof are withheld by evasion, or invaded by fraud, which deprive them of redress by appeal to the Supreme Court as the Constitutional arbiter, that the States have a right, which may become a duty, to interpose. Such is the refusal to give protection to slave property in the territories held by the federal government as the common property of the States. Such was the admission of California as a State, in order that slaves might be excluded from the whole territory acquired on the Pacific coast, not merely as effectually but more effectually than could have been done by the "Wilmot Proviso," and such was the partition of Texas. The violation of the guarantee of the Constitution against the citizens of private property, as presented in the bill to abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia, is one for which we might look to the Supreme Court for a remedy, and I cannot believe the court would sustain a law which declared a forfeiture of property, because the owner brings it into the district ceded to the States for their common use, intending at some future time and at some other place to sell that property. Yet there are those who speak of others as "ultra," and who declare that a violation of the letter of the Constitution justifies, if it does not demand, a dissolution of the Union. On the other hand, we, the so-called "ultras," contend that it is only where Constitutional remedies fail, and after all other means have been tried in vain, that State interposition should be invoked and the last alternative be resorted to. It is then because we will not shut our eyes to the fact that this last alternative may be forced upon us, that the attempt is made fraudulently to conceal the true issue and substitute that of Union or Disunion as one which we had presented? Is it because a self-sustaining, sectional anti-slavery majority in violation of justice, of State equality and the spirit of the Constitution, have denied us the protection and tranquility the Union was designed to secure? and have reduced us to a permanent minority in both Houses of Congress, and in the electoral Colleges of the United States, that we are called on to join in the triumphal song as the execrated tyrant of Rome fiddled over the conflagration of that city?--The approval or disapproval of the measures of the last session of Congress in relation to slave property, and the territory acquired by the United States from Mexico, is one question.-- The resistance or acquiescence of the South, is another and a very different question. The first closely concerns your Representatives, and I am willing to stand or fall as your judgement may be made up from the Congressional record. The last is a matter for the decision of the people, and in which I am involved only as every other citizen of Mississippi, whose fortunes are identified with the State, and whose ideas of allegiance require him to abide by that decision, whatever it may be. I trust the decision will be made calmly and deliberately upon principle, by reason, and equally uninfluenced by headlong passion, or unmanly fear. The history of the South has been one of steady adherence to the Constitution, of willing sacrifice to the Union, and I doubt not in both, the present generation will emulate the conduct of their siers. To do so, and truly to preserve the fame we have inherited, it is necessary that we should show our attachment to principles, not to forms; and that at whatever hazard we should maintain the institutions and the equality which was bequeathed to us. If for this it be necessary to assert our soverign rights even to the extent of disunion, the responsibility of a catastrophe we will sincerely deplore, will rest, not on our heads, but upon those who regardless of social and political obligations, have undermined the foundation on which our Union was erected. On which it might have securely stood when cotemporary governments which were supported by force alone, were buried in the waves of revolution. The consent and affection of the people was the cement in which our government was laid: to destroy the strength of the one is to ensure the fall of the other. We would more surely effect this than to perpetrate wrongs upon a section and claim submission because it was so done as to afford no remedy?

When California was admitted, I did not deny the constitutional power of Congress to admit new States; nor the right of a people in forming a State Constitution to determine what their domestic institutions should be. It was contended rather that Congress should, in exercising the conceded power, look to the purpose for which it was given; that there should be inhabitants and territories occupied by them, ready to form a State; a people competent to take upon themselves the responsibility and to discharge all the obligations of a State of the Union. Or that there should exist before any action of Congress, a State ready as such to enter our confederacy, such as the case of Texas presented.

There was not sufficient evidence that California filled the requirements of either supposition; the best information induced the belief that the resources of the country were not adequate to support a State government, and the unsettled condition of the population called for territorial rather than State organization.--That the latter was adopted instead of the former mode is to be ascribed to the determination of the majority in Congress to prevent the introduction of slavery into that country, and the prohibition of slavery contained in the Constitution of California is propbably to be assigned to the same cause. They had certainly full oportunity to know the sentiment of Congress, and could not have hoped to be admitted as a State with a Constitution which recognized and protected slave property.

Claiming then, that the grants of the Constitution should be exercised in subordination to the purposes for which each was made, and that the power to admit new States has been used as a means by which to assail the interests of a section of the Union, the conclusion is, that under the forms of the Constitution its spirit was violated by that act. It is needless to notice the argument that being admitted the States cannot be reduced to a territorial condition. No such proposition has been contemplated, and the argument does not meet the issue which is the bad conduct of the agent, the violation of the trust to the injury of a part of those from whom the trust is held.

Another illustration of the sectional feeling which controls the government is found in the Texas boundary act. Though the limits of Texas were held to be so sacred as to justify a foreign war, which cost us thousands of lives, and millions of money, when they came in conflict with the aggrandizing wishes of the anti-slavery party, they became so undefined and unsubstantal, that the Executive of the United States threatened to use the military power of the government against the State of Texas, if she attempted to take possession of territory which she had claimed when an independent republic, to which she asserted her title when annexed to the United States, and in defence of which our government went to war with Mexico. It is true a proposition was made to Texas, offering ten millions of dollars for territorial and other claims, if she accepted a proposed boundary; but if not, was her old boundary to be recognized? Not at all, this would have been to leave her free to choose between selling or keeping her territory. Instead of this, she was to make her option between receiving the money, or encountering the military power of the federal government. Now, the question occurs by what authority did the federal government assume to dispute the boundary of Texas, and to purchase a part of her territory. For specific objects the federal government may obtain territory within the limits of a State, but this purchase from Texas was not from any of those objects. But the resolution of annexation, the republic of Texas conferred on the government of the United States; power to negociate with foreign governments, in relation to any deposition about her boundary. That is to say intrusted the question between herself and Mexico about the limits of Texas to treaty making power of the United States government. All who know the different composition of the two houses of Congress, and that to ratify a treaty requires two-thirds of the Senate, whilst to enact a law requires but a majority of the two houses, will have no difficulty in perceiving how much the interest of a Southern State might suffer by transfer of a grant made to the treaty making power, from that to the legislative power of the government. It was not then from the treaty of annexation that the Congress could derive power to change the boundary of Texas, and otherwise that body had no more power to deny or abridge the limits of Texas than those of Massachusetts or Virginia. The pretence that there was conflict of claims between New Mexico and Texas is too puerile to deserve an argument in reply. The treaty of acquisition destroyed the existence of the province of New Mexico as a body politic, and transferred that like other territory required, as area to be aggregated or subdivided as the acquiring power might select.

In this, and in the whole series of measures, there is to be traced the ruling, directing power of hostility to the slave institutions of the South. The Southern men were permitted to pass the fugitive slave bill, which being a law to enforce in the north compliance with a provision of the constitution, should, as far as was necessary, have been tendered and sustained by Northern members. Thus it might have borne to their constituents a respect which it has not received. Whilst by the side of this measure stands the law, in relation to the slave trade in the District of Columbia, offensively discriminating against a particular species of property, placed by the Constitution on at least an equal footing with other property; and which was equally protected by the government, in the earliest days of the Republic; when the equality of the States and the equal privileges of the citizens were rights practically enjoyed. That was the day of fraternity, in contradistinction to sectional strife; before the pseudo philanthropy of British teachers had been entered like a wedge to rend our Union asunder; when no American statesman would have argued for a general law, on the ground that it was demanded by foreign or sectional sentiment; when patrotism would have rebuked into silence the man who for such constitutions would have offended the sensibilities, arraigned the institutions, or invaded the property rights of any portion of our fellow citizens.

If then, and I think it too apparent to admit of an honest doubt, the section which has the controling power in the Government, is hostile to that species of property on which our commercial prosperity depends, and the disturbance of which would involve us in total ruin; and if with the increase of power there is a growing tendency to disregard the checks of the constitution; the time has arrived when all who love the Union or the Constitution should unite to throw an adequate shield over the minority; before it is driven to seek in the arms that protection against an aggressive majority which the existing forms of our government fail to afford.

The South needs, and has asked for nothing more than the principles of the Constitution; the rights and immunities the compact was formed to make stable and secure; this much all who recognize this as an Union of equals, with powers conferred for the common benefit and general tranquility are bound to accord, or stand convicted of a wish to change the nature of our government, and binds us to an Union which is not the Union. The flippent patrizan, and the satelite of power may denounce all who claim sufficent guarantees for the constitutional rights of the South, as impracticable. disorganizing, treasonable, disunionists. Impracticable it is, not if the majority love the Union and the principles from which arose more than the aggrandizement of sectional power. Treasonable it is not, if to be true to one's country, be patriotism, and if it be a duty to maintain, at what ever cost the principles on which our liberty rest, the immovable foundations of truth and justice which will remain to uphold the cause we advocate when we and all of our's are dust.

Our Union was not formed by men who suppliant bent the knee to power; and loved a government only as it was powerful and glorious; nor did they leave us institutions which would be practicable in the hands of men forgetful or careless of the principles on which they were founded. They are the true friends of the Union who resist by all means every invasion on the Constitution, and seek to strengthen every barrier which is found insufficient for the use to which it was appropriated. In the struggle for right against aggressive power, the South will not be alone if she meet the conflict as becomes her cause. The resistance of the colonies made Chatham eloquent in the defence, how much more will every noble spirit be aroused among our Northern brethren, when it shall be attempted to sustain federal usurpation by force, or conquer sovereign States of the Union, and reduce them to territorial subserviency. Those who can contemplate such an event may well point to the sons of a State, thus under the ban, and say "'tis treason to love her, 'tis death to defend."

I look forward with confidence to the action of Mississippi, and hope it will be sustained by general action in the South; upon which hangs another hope, that the union of the South, will produce a reaction in the public feeling of the North, and that our constitutional union may be preserved, a monument more lasting than brass to our revolutionary fathers; and a temple of true liberty for posterity through countless ages. But if this fondly cherished hope cannot be realized, the union of the South will enable us to preserve the principles on which our federal Union was based, and to transmit to posterity with all the glorious memories of the Union, the principles from which its glory sprung, and to leave the laurels gathered in common toil and danger, unstained by the blood of civil war.

Led on from point to point, I have extended this letter to an unusual length, and must postpone many things which it would be desirable to me to say until we meet. Again permit me to offer my thanks for your kind appreciation, and to assure you that your cheering voice will animate and encourage me in the scenes I expect to encounter; that it will always be heard above the roar of the Northern majority, and be remembered as the reward, one of the poorest capacity may gain by devotion to duty, and the maintenance of the rights entrusted to his care. I am very respectfully, your friend and fellow citizen.

Jeff. Davis






From The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 4, pp. 138-46. Transcribed from the Jackson Mississippian, January 3, 1851. The addressees were William Barksdale, James Blair, William H. D. Carrington, Beverly Matthews, and T[homas?]. Sharp.

American Virtues

University of Kansas Press page

American Virtues
Thomas Jefferson on the Character of a Free People
Jean M. Yarbrough
280 pages
American Political Thought
Cloth ISBN 978-0-7006-0906-2, $35.00

Since the early days of the republic, Americans have recognized Thomas Jefferson's distinctive role in helping to shape the American national character. As Founder and statesman, Jefferson thought broadly about the virtues Americans would need to cultivate in order to preserve and perfect their experiment in republican self-government. Now in an age preoccupied with rights and divided over questons of character in public and private life, Jefferson can help us to think more clearly about our most urgent concerns.

American Virtues is the first comprehensive analysis of Jefferson's moral and political philosophy in over twenty years and the first ever to focus exclusively on the full range of moral, civic, and intellectual virtues that together form the American character. It asks what kind of character Americans as a people must cultivate to ensure their freedom and happiness and how we as a free society can nurture moral and intellectual excellence in our citizens and statesmen.

Beginning with the Declaration of Independence, Jean Yarbrough explores how Jefferson's conception of rights helps to form the American character. In subsequent chapters, she examines the moral sense virtues of justice and benevolence; the "agrarian" virtues of industry, moderation, patience, self-reliance, and independence; patriotism and modern republicanism; slavery and agrarian vice; the effect of commerce on character; the virtues connected with private property; the civic virtues of vigilance and spirited participation; the meaning of virtue and happiness for women; the virtues of republican statesmen; the place of the Epicurean virtues of wisdom and friendship in liberal republicanism; and piety and the secularized virtues of charity, toleration, and hope.

In broadening the examination of virtue to include not only civic or republican virtue but the whole range of moral and intellectual excellences that perfect the individual character, American Virtues moves beyond the liberal-republican debates and makes a fresh contribution to the Jeffersonian literature.

"At a time when all of us have opinions about Thomas Jefferson's character, Jean Yarbrough is the first to understand that his ideas about our character are far more interesting. Yarbrough deftly probes the interweaving of concern with both private and public virtue that marked Jefferson's thinking, giving praise where it is due and criticism where it is deserved. The result is a morally engaged and thoughtful inquiry into the fundamental character of democratic citizenship from a leading student of early American political theory."--Jack Rakove, author of Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution

"Jean Yarbrough has produced a searching revaluation of America's philosopher-statesman, Jefferson-a man too philosophic to be a statesman, too political to excel as philosopher. Yarbrough shows him absorbed in the work of uniting rights and virtue, enabling a free people to govern itself and to live together competently in self-reliance. True to the man and his time, yet profoundly useful today, her distinguished book presents this American hero as he was so that we can learn from him."--Harvey Mansfield, author of Machiavelli's Virtue and Taming the Prince

JEAN M. YARBROUGH is professor of government and legal studies at Bowdoin College and has published numerous articles on American political thought.

her faculty page
American Historical Review review
Between Principle and Necessity by Jean M. Yarbrough
Why the Founding is Back in Fashion Jean M. Yarbrough, Richard E. Morgan

Jean M. Yarbrough, Bowdoin College: "Rewriting the Founding: Theodore Roosevelt as Historian" - November 15, 2006

Stuff by Cardinal Kasper at BC website

available here


Welcoming Remarks at the May 2001 meeting of the International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee
"Dominus Iesus"
"Spiritual and Ethical Commitment in Jewish-Christian Dialogue"
"The Jewish-Christian Dialogue: Foundations, Progress, Difficulties and Perspectives"
"The Theology of the Covenant as a Central Issue in the Jewish-Christian Dialogue"
"Achievements and Further Challenges in the Jewish-Christian Dialogue."
"The Thirty-Seventh Anniversary of Nostra Aetate."
"The Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews: A Crucial Endeavor of the Catholic Church"

W. Luckey, The Intellectual Origins of Modern Catholic Social Teaching

THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON ...

Critique if I have time.

and
Globalization and the Insights of Catholic Social Teaching
pdf

Father Cantalamessa on Jesus

Father Cantalamessa on Jesus
"Between History and … History"



ROME, JULY 14, 2007 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of a talk given in Rome by the Pontifical Household preacher, Capuchin Father Raniero Cantalamessa, on historical research concerning Jesus.

* * *

JESUS OF NAZARETH
BETWEEN HISTORY AND THEOLOGY
Talk given at a public debate held in Rome
12 May 2007

1. Jesus, between history and … history

It seems to me that, more basic than the alternative expressed in the title, "Jesus, between history and theology," is the alternative, "Jesus, between history and history." The notion of a rectilinear, univocal form of historical research concerning Jesus, leading progressively to a clear and complete picture of him is a myth which no serious historian of our day would claim to validate.

Leaving aside the diachronic variations -- that is to say, the historical reconstructions of Jesus that have come, one after the other, during the last two centuries -- let me look for a moment at the synchronic views, that is, those that have arisen simultaneously in one epoch, our own.

In the new introduction to her work: "From Jesus to Christ. The origins of the images of Jesus in the New Testament," Paula Fredriksen, Professor at Boston University, writes: "Paperbacks proliferate as the range of portraits of Jesus broadens. In recent scholarship, Jesus has been imagined and presented as a type of first-century shaman figure; as a Cynic-sort of wandering wise man; as a visionary radical and social reformer preaching egalitarian ethics to the destitute; as a Galilean regionalist alienated from the elitism of Judean religious conventions (like Temple and Torah); as a champion of national liberation and, on the contrary, as its opponent and critic -- on and on. All these figures are presented with rigorous academic argument and methodology; all are defended with appeals to the ancient data. Debate continues at a roiling pitch, and consensus -- even on issues so basic as what constitutes evidence and how to construe it -- seems a distant hope."[1]

Appeal is often made to recent discoveries that are supposed at last to have given historical research an advantage over the past, to wit the scrolls of Qumran, the library of Nag Hammadi, archaeological excavations, sociological research. Yet how variable the conclusions can be that are drawn from these new historical sources is clear from the fact that they have given rise to two images of Christ, one irreconcilably opposed to the other. On the one hand we have a Jesus "wholly and in all things Hebrew," and on the other, Jesus son of the hellenised Galilee of his time, imbued with a cynical philosophy.
Researches in sociology too tend to lead to diametrically opposed results, as E. P. Sanders, the great specialist on Jesus and Judaism has noted: For some, "Jesus' world faced a severe social and economic crisis, one that grew worse day by day. Palestine's small landholders were in a tightening noose of institutionalized injustices such as double taxation, heavy indebtedness, and loss of land. Peasant families fell ever more heavily into debt under the steady economic pressures of double taxation. The wealthy lent them money that they could not repay, charged very high rates of interest, and then foreclosed on the property… There was rising indebtedness and a declining peasantry, the social-economic infrastructure was in decline and poverty worsening." For others, on the contrary, "Galilee was urbanized, cosmopolitan and prosperous… in fact an epitome of Hellenistic culture… Jesus and his hearers spoke Greek."[2]
It is not surprising, then, that in the post-modern thinking a radical scepticism has developed. Here the alternative is no longer between history and theology, nor between one history and another, but between history and interpretation or literary criticism. The text is read without any regard for foregoing objective data; all turns upon the reader's direct confrontation with the text and the outcome is all subjective and relative.

The most recent, monumental (and in my view genuinely innovative) monograph on the historical Jesus, written by James Dunn of Durham University, England, ends off a review of the opinions with this assessment: "The loss of confidence in historical method in post-modern circles is thus complete. And so far as the quest of the historical Jesus is concerned, its results, particularly when the various Jesuses of the neo-Liberal quest are included, simply confirm the failure of traditional historical methodology. The simple and rather devastating fact has been that Gospels researchers and questers of the historical Jesus have failed to produce agreed results"[3].

What conclusion are we to draw from all this? That we might as well abandon research into the historical Jesus? Certainly not that. The author just quoted gives an example, devoting his monumental work to this very research. I believe that we can apply to historical research what the proverb says about God, that "he writes straight on crooked lines." It does in fact advance our knowledge of history, opening new horizons and formulating new hypotheses, some of which prove to be productive and enlightening. The very failure to find a commonly accepted alternative to the Gospel narrative is in itself an important historical acquisition.

The requisite in approaching research into the historical Jesus is above all a greater humility and an awareness of our own intrinsic limitations. Historical criticism has caused orthodox theology to be more humble and aware of the problematics, but historical criticism itself needs perhaps to accept its own limits, whether arising from the sources, or from the object of its investigations which -- hypothetically at least -- extends beyond the limits of history. The approach to the problematics, the pro and the con and the awareness of limits, is what in fact distinguishes the great scientific monographs on the Jesus of history from the works of writers in search of sensationalism whose works are triumphal processions marching to conclusions already obvious from the outset. Among the serious monographs, the most recent has been that of Gerd Theissen and Annette Metz, although it is questionable on many points.[4]

A mistaken methodology, against which the serious researchers are always on guard, is that of taking something "historically not demonstrable" simply "as historically false." Concerning many of the events related in the Gospels, history can only conclude that they cannot be supported on the basis of historical argument, yet this does not justify the conclusion that the narrative is therefore false.

It is particularly necessary to abandon the illusion that believers start with a preconceived idea when writing about Jesus, but unbelievers, unprejudiced, do not. John Meier, author of a major study on the historical Jesus, writes: "Whether we call it a bias, a tendenz, a worldview, or a faith stance, everyone who writes on the historical Jesus writes from some ideological vantage point; no critic is exempt. The solution to this dilemma is neither to pretend to an absolute objectivity that is not to be had nor to wallow in total relativism. The solution is to admit honestly one's own standpoint, to try to exclude its influence in making scholarly judgments by adhering to certain commonly held criteria, and to invite the correction of other scholars when one's vigilance inevitably slips."[5]

2. Jesus, Hebrew believer or cynic philosopher?

Speaking of the limits of historical research, I would like to highlight one that seems to me to be decisive. It concerns the possibility of an historical research on Jesus that not only prescinds from, but from the outset excludes any faith in God; in other words, the plausibility of what has at times been called "the Jesus of the atheists." I'm not now speaking of faith in Christ, in his divinity, but of faith in God, faith in the most commonly accepted sense of the term.

Far be from me the idea that non-believers have no right to concern themselves with Jesus. I am convinced that Jesus is "the patrimony of humankind" and that no one, and of course neither the Church, holds a monopoly on him. What I want to make clear are the consequences of keeping to that point of departure, and that the "preconceptions" of a researcher who does not believe have no less influence on research than those of one who does.

I am convinced that, if one prescinds from faith in God, one eliminates not only the divinity, that is the so-called Christ of faith, but also the historical Jesus "tout court"; nothing is left, not even Jesus the man. It is simply not possible to contest on historical grounds that the Jesus of the Gospels lived and worked relating to and aware of the heavenly Father, that he prayed and taught others to pray, that he based everything on faith in God. If this dimension is eliminated from the Jesus of the Gospels, his whole personality disintegrates and becomes incomprehensible.

But if we assume that God does not exist, Jesus is simply another one of the deluded many who prayed, adored, spoke with his own shadow or the projection of his own essence, to use Feuerbach's terms. And how would it be possible to explain the fact that this man's life, as they readily admit, "changed the world"? It would be tantamount to saying that truth or reason had nothing to do with the change in the world, but only illusion and irrationality. How then explain that this man continues, at a remove of two thousand years, to appeal to humankind as no other?

There is only one way out of this dilemma, and we need to recognise the consistency shown by those who in recent years have made it their own. The way out is the one mapped out in the ambit of the "Jesus Seminar" based in Berkeley, California. Jesus was not a Hebrew believer; he was basically a philosopher in the mode of the cynics[6]; he did not preach a kingdom of God, nor an approaching end of the world; all he did was pronounce words of profound wisdom in the style of a Zen master. His purpose was to reawaken in people a self-awareness, to convince them that they had no need of him or of any other god, because they themselves carried within themselves a spark of the divine[7]. Strange enough -- rather not surprising at all -- these are the things that New Age has been preaching for some decades!

How can this new image of Jesus be justified historically? Simply by taking as absolute the "Q" source (the collection of the sayings of Jesus based on the use Mark and Matthew made of them in their Gospels) and regarding it as the only document having any tenable link with a Jesus who really existed. But this is not good enough, because among the sayings of Jesus listed in that collection, there are some that are incompatible with that image of him. Thus the distinction is made between three successive layers in that document (itself hypothetical!), of which the oldest, called "Q3," alone authentic, could be taken as a nucleus of esoteric sayings approximating in kind those we find in the Coptic Gospel of Thomas. I studied classical philology and textual criticism during my university years, and know that on such premises there is no possibility whatsoever of hitting the mark. That approach leaves the data open to endless manipulation.

Before any of them, Nietzsche saw the dilemma clearly and resolved it in a way much more coherent than today's -- making of Jesus not a philosopher in the cast of Greek rationality, but its irreducible opposite.

3. Continuity or complete break? The "Jesus of Nazareth" of Benedict XVI

Let us move now to the alternative mentioned in the title of this paper, "Jesus of Nazareth between history and 'theology.'" After all of the immense effort that has been expended, from Reimarus to today, to free the historical Jesus from the Christ of ecclesiastical dogma, it will perhaps serve some purpose again to take into consideration the viewpoint of tradition and church dogma now that they have become more humble and more aware of their own limits, thanks precisely to historical criticism.

This, I believe, is what Pope Benedict XVI set out to do in his book "Jesus of Nazareth." Someone has accused him of bypassing in that way all the problems and doubts to which modern historical criticism has given rise. But I ask myself: what was the pope supposed to have done -- write yet another historical reconstruction in which to confront and discuss all objections? We heard, above, how long the list is of writers, believers and non-believers, who have done just that, and I cannot see how yet another such work, even if written by a pope, would have made any difference.

What the pope chose to do was to present in a positive light the figure and the teaching of Jesus as understood by the Church, starting from the conviction that the Christ of faith is also, rigorously, the Jesus of history. Since the pope has left everyone the liberty to criticise his book, I too permit myself a small reservation. I think that the continuity between the Christ of the kerygma and of dogma, for all that it is real, is not quite as rectilinear as is made to appear in the summary introduction to the book.

On this point, I think we can share the opinion of Theissen and Merz: "Christians, after Easter, spoke of Jesus more affirmatively (that is to say, they said greater and more important things) than the historical Jesus would have said about himself. This 'value plus' of post-Paschal Christology in respect of Jesus' pre-Paschal self-awareness, whether on the historical or on the objective level, is based on the actual event of Easter"[8].

Theissen and Merz saw that the two phases -- before Easter, and after -- relate to each other in the same way as implicit and explicit Christology do. Among the elements of implicit Christology that they find in the Gospels, not a few correspond with those on which Benedict XVI bases his argument in his book: the expression "Amen" in the particular way Jesus uses it; the self-confidence with which Jesus counterposes the authority of the Torah and of Moses with his "But I say to you …"; his particular way of relating to the Father and above all the distinction between "My Father" and "your father"; his forgiving sins; the superiority Jesus claims over the Baptist whom he defines as "the greatest of the prophets."[9]

It would be most ungenerous to fail to recognise the theological and spiritual richness of Benedict XVI's book on Jesus, and gauge it only against the measure of the historical Jesus. It is of course a book written by a believer for believers and for those who take an interest in knowing the Christ of tradition and of the Church. He himself declares that he does not want to enter into the debates that are proper to historico-critical research, but assuming them, to go beyond, seeking in wonderment a genuinely theological interpretation."[10]

The pope bases himself explicitly on canonical exegesis, that is, on that type of exegesis that presupposes the belief that God has not just one way of revealing himself to the world, the way of history; he has many other ways, among which the most important is biblical inspiration. This conviction allows not only the reading of "the fragment in the whole" (that is, a text within its context) as the moderns use to do, but also "the whole within the fragment" (that is, the entire Bible reflected within each of its parts) as the Fathers have done and on which the Church's spiritual reading of Scripture down through the ages is based. In a magisterial work, Henri de Lubac has demonstrated how coherent and fruitful this way of reading the Scripture has been[11].

It is very significant that the decision of the pope to keep to the Jesus of the Gospels is, on certain counts, confirmed in the monograph of James Dunn to which we referred above. In that work, after a lengthy and sharp analysis of the results of the research on the historical Jesus over the last three centuries, the writer comes to the conclusion that there has been no break between Jesus the preacher and the Jesus preached, and hence between the historical Jesus and the Jesus of faith. The Jesus of faith was not born after Easter, but was there in the first encounters with the disciples, who became disciples precisely because they believed in the Rabbi of Nazareth.

The difficulty in making the link between the Jesus of the synoptic Gospels and the real Jesus arises for the most part from the failure to take into account the laws that govern the transmission of the founding traditions of a community still without a written culture, as happened when accounts of Jesus were first formulated and circulated among groups of people. The study of these laws (even now verifiable among peoples of pre-literate cultures) shows that an event or a teaching held to be important for the history and for the life of the community can be transmitted with acute accuracy as to its essential elements, though in the particulars showing variations in each narration, to meet the requirements of the moment.

Historical criticism ("Formgeschichte," or history of form) has tacitly projected on the epoch of the New Testament the process which leads today to the final edition of a book: successive revisions, layers as it were, based one upon the other, adding to or subtracting from it some part. This has given rise to the illusion that one can work back from a layer to the one before, eventually to arrive at a hypothetical, original nucleus -- which almost always turns out to be a close reflection of the point at which the scholar concerned aimed at the outset.

What do we actually discover by taking this approach? Not -- at least directly -- the "hidden interiority" of Christ, what he thought of himself, but the "Jesus as remembered"; "remembered" however -- and this is where the difference lies -- not at a distance in time, after Easter, by disciples and communities that re-interpreted the events and the teachings as extraneous interests moved them to do, but by those who straight away began to tell, in story form, of what they themselves experienced and heard.

Read in this way, the scholar says, "the synoptic Gospels are examples of a model and technique of oral transmission that have guaranteed a stability and continuity in the tradition of Jesus greater than any of those ever imagined in the past."

4. Easter -- a watershed

For many historians, Easter does not represent a qualitative leap in Christology, but an absolute beginning. But the more historical research stresses this new beginning, the greater the difficulties with it become. Once we abandon the thesis of Reimarus, that the resurrection of Christ was a conscious fraud of the disciples, how can we explain such an absolute beginning? All the subsequent development of faith in Christ it is said to be based on the Resurrection, but then, when closely examined, it appears to have no basis at all, because the Resurrection itself is a matter of faith, therefore something subjective, not real. Christianity appears to be a massive upside-down pyramid, its point resting on the void.

This is not the place to call for yet another in the unending series of debates on the resurrection. I'll confine myself to citing an affirmation made by the English scholar, Charles H. Dodd, with which I wholly agree: "The assumption that the whole great course of Christian history is a massive pyramid balanced upon the apex of some trivial occurrence, is surely a less probable one than that the whole event, the occurrence plus the meaning inherent in it, did actually occupy a place in history at least comparable with that which the New Testament assigns to it."[12]

The resurrection, some say, is a metaphor; that is true, but the meaning of the metaphor, as Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, is not to give expression to something other than reality, but to say, of reality itself, something that cannot be said in any other way. The resurrection in itself is something positioned at the limits, or more properly, outside the limits of time and space and hence too of history, yet there is something that took place within time and space and that the historian must therefore set out to explain.

Two facts are offered for the historian's consideration, and it is these that permit him to speak of the resurrection: the first is the unanticipated and inexplicable faith of the disciples, a faith so tenacious as to stand firm even against the test of martyrdom; and the second is the explanation of such faith that the disciples left of it. The observation made by Martin Dibelius will always remain pertinent: "When the decisive moment arrived, and Jesus was taken, scourged and sentenced, the disciples cherished no expectation of a resurrection. They fled, and considered the cause of Jesus over and done with. What was needed, therefore, was something that in a very short time would not only bring about a radical change in their state of mind, but would move them to an entirely new kind of activity and to founding the Church. This 'something' is the historical kernel of faith in the resurrection."[13] There has been an endless number of attempts to find alternative explanations for this "something," but so far none has lasted much longer than its author.

5. The veneration of Jesus Christ

Where then, and when, did what we call 'Christianity' begin? If by 'Christianity' we correctly intend the veneration of Jesus of Nazareth as Lord, and as Divine, it began at Easter and Pentecost. Larry W. Hurtado, professor of New Testament Language, Literature and Theology at the university of Edinburgh, has taken up again the study of the origins of the cult of Jesus undertaken by W. Bousset at the beginning of the previous century, now on a new basis, in the light of what has come to be recognised as the Judaic, non-Hellenistic matrix of primitive Christianity. And the conclusion at which he arrives is that the veneration of Jesus as a divine figure burst out suddenly and unexpectedly, not little by little and later on, among circles of followers in the first century. More precisely, its origins are found among the circles of Jewish Christians of the very earliest years. It is only an idealistic way of thinking that continues to attribute the veneration of Jesus as a divine figure to the decisive influence of pagan religions and to the influx of gentile converts, holding it to have come about at a later stage and more gradually. The veneration of Jesus as 'Lord', that found adequate expression in cultic worship and in total obedience, was however widespread, not at all confined or attributable to particular circles, as for example the 'hellenists', or gentile Christians of a hypothetical 'Syriac Christ-cult'. Through all the diversity of primitive Christianity, faith in the divine condition of Jesus was incredibly widespread, common to all. Very nearly all of the 'heresies' of primitive Christianity postulated the idea of the divinity of Jesus. This was not in discussion. The problematical issue, rather, was whether there was room to consider him authentically human[14].

Clearly, if we compare the Jesus of the Gospels with the Christ of Nicea and Constantinople, the difference at first glance seems abyssal. So too, if we compare the scanned image of a human embryo in the womb with the child born and grown into adulthood, there seems to be an unbridgeable gap between the two, even though all that the grown man is, was seminally within the embryo. Didn't Jesus compare the kingdom he preached with the smallest of seeds, destined to grow and to become a great tree ? (Matthew 13:32).

According to the faith of the Church, this development, all the undeniable facts of history aside, is driven by one, inner and hidden force: the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the one factor notably absent from all the historical research concerning Jesus. On hearing even mention of the name, the historian does an about-turn, growling that that belongs in another genre; it would be doing theology. But is it possible for the researchers into the history of Jesus to ignore something to which Jesus himself, in texts of inarguable authenticity, attributes his own ability to drive out demons and perform miracles? It has become the custom, today, to speak of Jesus and the first disciples as "itinerant charismatics," but what remains of a charismatic if the experience of the Holy Spirit is left out of consideration?

Paul and the Acts of the Apostles show that after Easter the community again and again had the experience of being guided by the Holy Spirit. John gives explicit expression to this awareness, linking it back to a promise made by Jesus: "I still have many things to say to you but they would be too much for you now. But when the Spirit of truth comes he will lead you to the complete truth, since he will not be speaking as from himself but will say only what he has learnt; and he will tell you of things to come" (John 16:12-13). A 'prophecy' after the event, one might say; true, but even in this case the event still remains to be explained!

The Holy Spirit is outside of the field of history, but his effects are historical and so deserve to be taken into consideration. This could be one of the areas where history and theology ought to work together, each one in its own way. This is what James Dunn, author of "Christianity in the Making," has done in his work, "Jesus and the Spirit. A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament."[15]

6. One Christianity or many?

I still need to come to the issue raised by those who say that in the beginning there was not one Christianity, but many, that is to say, many different interpretations of Christ's message, gradually eliminated one by one by the growing weight of the orthodoxy imposed by the church of Rome. It is possible -- why not? -- to speak of different Christianities, but then of course we need to say the same of nearly every institution and of the great novelties of history. In that sense there was not one Jewish religion but many Jewish religions, nor one Renaissance but many Renaissances, nor one French Revolution but many French Revolutions, and so on, because each of these realities were the result of the processes of the interaction and refining of various factors and tendencies. Sociologists teach us that that is what usually comes about in a movement's development from its nascent status to the establishment that is its final result.

The idea put forward in some quarters, to begin again from the beginning, putting all of those possibilities into one bag -- that is, bringing all the old no-longer-held modalities into play again -- in order to bring to life a new, unedited form of Christianity, makes me think of the project to develop a new Esperanto, and of its demise.

We should rather accord to the orthodoxy of the origins the merit of having fought its battle with books and decrees, without having sent anyone, neither Marcion nor Valentinus nor Montanus, to the bonfire. Some will say orthodoxy didn't have the power to do that: true enough, but the fact remains that it was not done, and that at least in the early centuries of its history, orthodoxy did not impose its way by force and conquest but by argument and example of life. Its beginnings are clean; they are still worth examining, and they can still inspire us.

The notion of an orthodoxy that emerged victorious by eliminating its competitors under the powerful guidance of Rome is a pure legend. Orthodoxy was not established in its origins by way of a movement from the centre to the periphery, but on the contrary, by movement from the periphery towards the centre. The struggles against ebionite beliefs, docetism, and encratism did not move outwards from Rome, but all arrived in Rome from Antioch in Syria, from Asia Minor, from Alexandria in Egypt, from Carthage and from Lyon in France. Rome in the first two centuries and a half of Christian history was more the arbiter between the parties than a leading force in the struggles against heresy. Even in the Council of Nicea, the influence of Rome and of the West in general was minimal. Attributing to Rome the triumph of orthodoxy is, to a large extent, the consequence of a backward projection of later situations, if not of the present state of affairs!

It would be interesting to review the various forms of so-called alternative Christianities, in order to see which of them, if still in existence, would be accepted by those who lament their passing. Encratism surely not, because of its rejection of marriage and material possessions; certainly not Marcionism because of its radical anti-Jewish stance; nor I believe would the various forms of gnosticism or docetism find acceptance, rejecting as they do the material world and the real humanity of Jesus. As to the famous prophets and itinerant charismatics, so dear to modern researchers into the Jesus of history, we note a curious point: in our day a movement similar in many of its aspects has reappeared in spectacular fashion in Christian churches, yet there are students of the historical Jesus who look on this with irony and hold it to be nothing more than the fruit of fundamentalism, irrationality and religious enthusiasm. (I know something of this because, at times, I too am placed in this category!).

There is, it is true, a stream that finds favour today among many scholars, ebionism, that is, the form of Christianity that remains in practice within the matrix of Judaism, holding Jesus to be a man and keeping to the observances of the Torah. This is something of which we know very little, apart from the fact that they were isolated communities living in the east of the Jordan. There was no war against them, no bonfire of books. Paradoxically, orthodoxy has not suppressed their memory, as some say, but in fact preserved it. If it were not for the fact that certain of their writings are quoted by authors of orthodox Christianity, we would know nothing whatever about them. Concerned as they were with countering the much more belligerent Gnosticism, the orthodox writers gave them only passing attention.

Orthodoxy, however, did not content itself with fighting these alternative forms of Christianity, but made them its own after freeing them of any "sectarian" and heretical element. The instance of encratism survives in the Church in the life-states of virginity and monasticism; the instances of gnosis are taken up by the Alexandrines, Clement and Origen; the way of the itinerant prophets, after the initial crisis arising from Montanist excesses, was to emerge again in the Church in the mendicant movements of the Middle Ages.

7. Conclusion

I cannot end my analysis without drawing attention to a contradiction. All of the spasmodic research into the historical Jesus, when those who undertake it distance themselves from the Christ of the Church, becomes by definition a radical refutation of history itself. The history to which Jesus gave rise, that he created by his life, is not only not taken into consideration, but some make every effort to obliterate it in favour of a starting-point detached from it and in contrast to it.

In this there is no application of the hermeneutic principle of "the history of effects" ("Wirkungsgeschichte"), which takes into account not only the influences undergone but also the effects produced and the influences exercised. The interpreter, says H.-G. Gadamer, can not impose his own view on the tradition of the past that he is studying, but can begin to understand it adequately only thanks to that very tradition and to the extent that he shares in it. I don't believe this means that only those with an inward adherence to Christianity can understand anything about it, but it surely should put us on our guard against believing that only those who stand outside of it can say anything objective about it.

It is through the Church and by the Church that Jesus changed the world. Without "that error called Christianity," as someone has defined it[16], we would not be here to speak about him. Jesus would be, today, an obscure Galilean rabbi whose name we would find only if we were to read a note on the writings of Tacitus or Flavius Josephus. There would have been no Augustine, no Francis of Assisi, no Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Pascal; there would have been no Gothic cathedrals or Romanesque churches, no Dante, no paintings of the Renaissance schools, no Michelangelo or Sistine Chapel, Bach or his Passions, Mozart and his Masses. There would, above all, have been none of the innumerable crowds of men and women who, in the name of the Christ they knew through the Church, dedicated themselves utterly to the care of suffering humanity.

Can we be sure that our world would be a better place without all that? The history of Christianity has not been merely a matter of crusades, inquisitions and religious wars, even though, sadly, it has been that too.

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[1] P. Fredriksen, "From Jesus to Christ. The Origins of the New Testament images of Jesus," 2nd edition, Yale University Press, 2000.
[2] Cf. E. P. Sanders, "Jesus in Historical Context" [http://theologytoday.ptsem.edu/oct1993/v50-3-article8.htm]
[3] J. Dunn, "Christianity in the Making," I, Grand Rapids, Mich. 2003, p. 97.

[4] G. Theissen and A. Merz, "Der historische Jesus: ein Lehrbuch," Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1999.
[5] J. Meier, "A Marginal Jew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus," Doubleday, New York 1991, p. 5-6.
[6] On the theory of Jesus as cynic, cf. B. Griffin, "Was Jesus a philosophical Cynic?" [http://www-oxford.op.org/allen/html/acts.htm].

[7] Cf. Harold Bloom, “Whoever discovers the interpretation of these sayings…”, published in an appendix to the Marvin Meyer edition of the Coptic "The Gospel of Thomas. The Hidden Sayings of Jesus," Harper Collins Publishers, San Francisco 1992.
[8] Op. cit. p. 624.
[9] Ib. pp. 636-646.

[10] Joseph Ratzinger - Benedict XVI, "Gesù di Nazaret," Rizzoli, Milano 2007, p. 409.
[11] Cf. H. de Lubac, "Exégèse médiévale. Les quatre sens de l’Ecriture," 4 voll., Aubier, Paris 1959-1964.
[12] C. H. Dodd, "History and Gospel," London 1952, p. 109.

[13] M. Dibelius, Iesus, Berlin 1966, p. 117.
[14] Cfr. L. Hurtado, "Lord Jesus Christ. Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity," Grand Rapids, Mich. 2003.
[15] J. Dunn, "Jesus and the Spirit. A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament," SCM Press, London 1975.
[16] P. Hollenbach, "The Historical Jesus Question," in BTB 19 (1989), p. 20.