Thom Brooks, "Retribution and Capital Punishment"

SSRN (via Mirror of Justice)

It is similar to the argument that capital punishment is to be avoided since it can't be undone, and can be considered a development of that argument, by looking at what is required by justice for the execution of human justice, in the conviction and punishment of individuals.

What is required for the possession of moral certitude on the part of the judge or jury? Is does justice necessitate that one should consider (or eliminate) the potential for error beyond this?

Reasonably Vicious

Something KK is examining in her disssertation -- Reasonably Vicious by Candace Vogler. (Her faculty page.) Last time I asked (a while ago) KK's dissertation was on the practical syllogism. There is a recommendation by Alasdair MacIntyre on the back cover...

Google Books

A review.
SEP: Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions

Something by Fr. Flannery: "Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds"

Fr. Koterski on Charlie Rose

Talking about the funeral of Pope John Paul II.

Another question about theology of the body.

Does it seem like some theology of the body enthusiasts take their direction from romance novels written for women? Is the source to be found in Love and Responsibility? We can say men should be considerate, caring, and so on to their wives, at all times in their marriage, and prior to and during mraital relations, but does this always manifest itself in the same external actions? How specific do TOB enthusiasts get in their recommendations? And how much should be left to the discretion of spouses, as they learn to appreciate each other and the differences between men and women? Some might claim that the man "taking the lead" or showing some dominance is too animalistic (perhaps because this is instinctual, but for other reasons as well), but is it possible that going to the other extreme is problematic, leading to a "disembodied sexuality" (even if it sounds oxymoronic) as it does not take into account the differences between male and female psychology. One can criticize men for being "selfish" but is it possible that a man we might characterize as being "selfish" nonetheless satisfies his wife? And if that is the case, is it really being selfish? (Or is that behavior really wrong?) Can we always judge this to be selfish behavior? Should Catholic moralists really go beyond giving concrete guidelines and proceed into the "privacy of the bedroom" and examine everything that happens there? Barring those actions that have been judged to be immoral by "traditional" moral theology, should we judge what happens between a husband and his consenting wife as not attaining to some higher, "spiritual" standard, and thus guilt them for not being good "Catholics"?

Thomistica.net: Forum for discussion created

InsideCatholic.com

Jeremiah Bannister on InsideCatholic.com's decision to delete responses by various editors of Distributist Review to the recent piece by Jeffrey Tucker.

The Scriptural Roots of St. Augustine's Spirituality by Stephen N. Filippo (via Insight Scoop)

FPJ coverage of the rule of law

Natural Law, the Rule of Law, and Liberty by Edward B. McLean 

Rule of Law: The Great Foundation of Our Constitution by Matthew Spalding 

The Common Law between England and America by Roger Scruton

Insight Scoop: Pope Benedict XVI is meeting with Fr. Joseph Fessio, S.J., and...

Eirenikon: “Orthodox Constructions of the West”: Report (4)

De Unione Ecclesiarum: Kyparissiotes: Decade 1.1

The Illusion of Freedom Separated from Moral Virtue by Raymond L. Dennehy

Ignatius Insight ( via Insight Scoop)

Ite ad Thomam: Louis Bouyer: Enemy of Traditional Theology.
:
There is much that is debatable within the quoted passage, and a discussion of the questions of method that are raised seems proper to theology. A more sustained critique of Fr. Bouyer would require his own account of what theology is and its proper method?

That this is true of “John of St Thomist” theology, {note the audacious ad hominem, a mockery of traditional Thomistic theology} right from its very beginning, is revealed by that theologian’s understanding of what, following St Thomas, he calls a “theological conclusion.”  According to him it is possible, even while adhering to a strict application of syllogistic reasoning, to have two kinds of theological conclusions—one flowing from two revealed premises, the other from one revealed and one philosophical premise.  And this latter kind by its very nature will widen the field, if not precisely of revelation as such, at least of the knowledge we can draw from it.  This may appear at first sight to be a quite innocuous and legitimate development of St Thomas’ idea of a theological conclusion.  In fact, it transforms it to the point of being unrecognizable.  The whole meaning of theological endeavor is at a stroke radically altered, and at the same time even our very conception of revelation.

For St Thomas there are not and cannot be theological conclusions which are not already comprised within revelation.  A theological conclusion is and can only be a revealed doctrinal affirmation of which one has established the logical relationship it has with other doctrinal affirmations of the same species.  The whole of theology moves within faith and so within revelation.  To suppose that it can evade it in order to increase its scope (!) is no longer to understand anything about revelation itself, {thus, pretty much all of post-Tridentine theology, which is founded on this doctrine, is unable to understand revelation} as if theology could ever flatter itself of having gone so far beyond revelation as to be able to complete it.

Can one apply human reasoning to truths about the faith? And if not, would not the truths of revelation be cut off from the truths we come to know about reality?

De un

De unione ecclesiarum: John Kyparissiotes: Preface to the Decades

Publishers of books for Catholics

Sheed & Ward has been part of Rowman & Littlefield for a while. While some "classic" texts like Jacques Maritain's introduction to philosophy are in print, its more recent titles are a mixed bag. Looking through its catalog, I found several titles by James Keenan, S.J., along with books opposing the legal prohibition of abortion and supporting stem cell research. At the "opposite" end of the spectrum are a defense of Pope Pius XII and books by Alasdair MacIntyre on the Catholic University and Edith Stein. Of course there is also a book that condemns the Vatican for its failure to prevent the Holocaust. I suppose that is what happens when the publisher and its editors do not act as judges of orthodoxy, but are interested in "promoting discussion" among those who call themselves Catholics.

Academics and other authors may not be motivated by money to write, but spreading falsehoods, dissent, and attacks on the Church  is a serious sin as they intend to communicate this to others and to influence them. And they do benefit from this by being able to pad the publications portion of their CVs. And what about associating with those responsible for allowing this to happen by directly facilitating the books' publication? Should Catholics have no interest in what sort of publishers they pick? It's just business isn't an excuse. "They may publish some bad books, but they are willing to publish good ones (like mine) as well," may sound self-serving.

If the authority of the imprimatur were restored (instead of being a rubber stamp in the many cases when it is actually sought instead of just being ignored) we could also do something to limit consumerism and the waste of resources. How's that for a social sin, by publishing bad books one contributes to the wastefulness endemic to Western political economies?

Still, there may be one or two others titles that might be of interest: Byzantine Rome and the Greek Popes.

Zenit: Adoption Isn't a "Right" for Gays or Others
Interview With Mexican Jurist, Historian

ZENIT: The result now is that law becomes an instrument of tyranny, when law theory states altogether the contrary?
 
Traslosheros: The term "tyranny of rights" should be an oxymoron as, in theory, rights exist to protect the citizen against the authoritarian tendencies of those who hold power.

However, it has been proper to the culture of Mexican politicians to create special support groups, which they later adorn with privileges in detriment to the whole of society. It is a very old Mexican experience of which, for example, the corrupt union boss is a typical example, and the reason why the health and education systems languish in mediocrity.
 
Now, by decision of the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, dominated by the Democratic Revolution Party [...], by the government of [Mexico] City and the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, a further step has been taken in deepening this pernicious tendency that has nothing to do with democracy and which has found in the so-called gender and gay ideology a significant stimulus.
 
ZENIT: They say that equity, equality and justice are being protected; that pure law is being applied. Do you believe this?
 
Traslosheros: In theory, law should create an ensemble of rights for the whole population, in order to guarantee conditions of equality, justice and liberty for any person based on two principles: that we are all equal in dignity and that the strong have the obligation to help the weak. By the same token, when someone finds himself in a vulnerable situation, special juridical conditions of equity must be created for the time necessary, even if they become permanent. Classic examples are the pregnant woman and the woman in labor, refugees, the handicapped, the sick and, especially, children.
 
The raison d'etre of this juridical culture is the person. Juridical culture centered on the person, as is easy to see, is the very opposite of one that creates privileged groups and which is proper to authoritarian regimes without distinction, no matter their color.
 
ZENIT: Isn't the centrality of the person being protected when the rights of homosexuals are protected? This is an argument often used today.
 
Traslosheros: When the centrality of the person is abandoned, then law is used to create statutes of privilege that, in turn, favor specific groups above the whole of society generating situations of injustice and, consequently, of violence. Obviously what is abandoned with this is the obligation to protect the weak, while confirmed is the law of the strongest. Such is what is now happening with the so-called right of adoption created allegedly to protect the principle of non-discrimination of homosexuals. The right of adoption, by this combination with non-discrimination, becomes an obligation to give children in adoption to homosexual couples who so request.

ZENIT: Let's return to the underlying topic, that a right is "being created" in Mexico.
 
Traslosheros: It is very important to keep in mind that the so-called right to adoption never existed in Mexico because it was well understood that children don't exist to satisfy the desires or needs of adults, no matter how legitimate or justified they might seem.
 
Because of the higher interests of the child, the adoption processes were governed by the logic that adults must be subjected to rigorous aptitude tests, where the factors of emotional, social, economic, marital or personal stability have played a very important role, among many other things.

Hence, adults have never in any way had the right to adoption. On the contrary, they have had to demonstrate in deeds that, beyond ideologies and any doubt, they are fit to take on a child with full responsibility.
 
Parenthood, as we well know, is a gift and a responsibility, it isn't a right in itself. In any case, it would be a consequence and always subject to the exercise of responsibility. As we can easily see, as the higher interest of the child demands, the right of adoption must not exist for anyone regardless of their quality, condition, religion, race, ethnic group or sexual preference. Children are not things to satisfy the needs of adults.

E Pluribus Unum

Origin and meaning of the motto. (Wiki.) Note that it dates back to 1776, before the ratification of the Constitution. Do we understand the one to be a "national" union or a "federal" union? How do we interpret this? What is the proper hemeneutics? No doubt there are many Americans today who understand it to mean the former and the latter. But we need to look at the motto's historical background to find the right definitions, and this means we need to look to those who first commissioned the motto, the Continental Congress and the American founding fathers, and understand it as they understood it.


This serves to underscore the necessity to inquire and understand how terms are used by the speaker instead of making a guess based on our assumptions. This is a very important lesson of logic, particularly when we are engaged in an  discussion with someone else, but it is also needed for the correct reading of texts. It also underscores the need for a "living tradition" with some sort of authority to explain how texts should be understood when the texts themselves do not supply definitions for the terms that it uses.


Related:
The E Pluribus Unum Project at Assumption College (which seems intent on promoting a national identity, despite a seeming openness to different answers to the questions posed on the homepage).
Bradley Project final report -- an endorsement of the proposition nation.

Courtesy of DG, De Regno (pdf).

Lee Faber critiques Matthew Levering's Participatory Biblical Exegesis

The Fourteenth-Century Metaphysical Shift

Ahappiness

James Chastek, On fact and Ahappiness. From the latter:

The front end of contemporary culture – the part of culture that establishes our ethos or ethics – is a great celebration of personal autonomy and the freedom to choose. This is the glossy, well-known, advertised face of our ethos, which is usually just taken for granted in political and ethical discussions. Like any ethos it reveals some truths and hides others, and so it deserves more than an unqualified up-or-down judgment of its value. But the back end of our ethos, or the fine print on the total autonomy contract, is something for which the contemporary world has no name but which can be called ahappiness. Contemporary persons are not happy or unhappy, they are simply ahappy. Happiness is not taken in earnest or afforded a place in any serious discussion.

One of his comments is interesting:

Full disclosure, I’ve never read a single word of MccIntyre – not even a random article, book jacket, or block quote in someone else’s writing. I just never got around to it. I don’t’ study much ethics anyway because I’m bad at it and I have a terrible tone-deafness to ethical thought. So to your question: while it is superfluous to point out that no one fugure or date will be an absolute turning point, my basic conviction is that the modern world is just shorthand for speaking about the Protestant world, and that in the judgment of history this age will be called the Protestant age (“Modern” is incoherent, since anyone who has ever lived has been modern). What we now call post – modern is is really just post protestantism, and the death of the modern world is largely a recognition that (mainline) protestantism is now just a lesbian in a miter giving a sermon to empty pews. NTTAWWT! (All) Protestantism is now capable of equally celebrating both sodomy and the papacy, which is to say that it’s deader than Nixon and it ain’t coming back. I miss a great deal about it – it was really tolerant, quite good at being a national religion, it founded my country, it promoted the classics (see the original curricula of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, etc.) it did a great deal to promote liberty and freedom, and it produced some statesmen who are safely immortal. There are some other parts about it that I am giddy to see die – its absolute division of nature and grace, its denigration of nature, its tendency to reduce everything to one order of either God or free will, either reason or revelation, etc. There is also, of course, its congenital antipathy to Scholasticism (yes yes, I know there were Protestant scholastics, and that even now ther are many better at it than I will ever be; and it goes without saying that this is not a judgment on any particular protestant). Nonetheless, the reality of ahappiness – at least in the West and especially in the English speaking world – is, IMO, going to be in large part a commentary or footnote to protestant doctrine.

The Protestant Age? Hmmm... I'll have to think about that.

How do we explain why so many are on anti-depressants? And what of those happiness surveys whose results are cited from time to time to remind us that not all is well in the United States? I think we do have a sense that happiness is tied to our actions. The problem is that happiness is too often reduced to an emotion linked to a quasi-Boethian understanding of happiness as the possession of all the goods that we want. We may have some understanding that how we get these goods is governed by a set of rules, but it is a set that has been whittled down in accordance with liberalism, social fragmentation, bad education, and other trends and in reaction to Christianity.

Was authority (and tradition) discredited by the Enlightenment? How many truly deceive themselves into thinking they are self-made men, with respect to their use of reason?