Will it be possible for a sinner to deny the justice of God's judgment on the Last Day? The damned know that they have sinned and why they are damned. Even if his mind is illuminated or he is convicted by his own conscience, is it possible for him to deny that God's judgment and punishment is just, to lie to himself on these two points, to affirm that their punishment is undeserved? After all, our judgment can be distorted by a bad will.

(Aquinas does not cover this question in his discussion of the will and intellect of the damned.)

It seems that the damned know they have sinned and that they have rejected God in sinning, and that their punishment, being deprived of the beatific vision or union with God, is appropriate, since they do not want this. But what of the poena sensus? "Why doesn't God just leave me alone? Why is He so petty?" And yet the poena sensus is a just punishment for the sins themselves. Is this undeniable?

(Aquinas on the punishment of the damned)

Does God preserve those who sin in the state of ignorance so that their conscience will not convict them? That seems like wishful thinking.


A related question regarding knowledge:
Titus 3:10-11
10 A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: 11 Knowing that he, that is such an one, is subverted, and sinneth, being condemned by his own judgment.

God gives us the grace to assent to authority? Can there be obstacles to our recognition that someone holds authority within the Church, if we have been baptized and raised in the Church?

When are we justified in rejecting someone who verbally expresses rejection of God and His Church or the Church's teaching authority?

Certitude and Evidence

ML asked a question on FB about defining fact and opinion, and after posting a brief response there I see this post by James Chastek: The evident.

I wrote on FB that I'd look at self-evidence as being one criterion for distinguishing the two, along with the notion of certitude. I also added that the modern distinction between fact and opinion does not correspond to the distinction between knowledge and opinion in "realist" epistemology. I also asked whether to accept the distinction between fact and opinion is not too much of a concession to modern empiricists.

I should have added that the main problem between the distinction between fact and opinion is that it is commonly presented as a dichotomy, which is not true. Some facts (i.e. that which is observable) can be known by those who are present to observe it, but others who believe such facts to be true do not have knowledge of it, only opinion or belief (and if they rely on the testimony of someone whom they trust, it is faith).