Thomistica.net
notes that some articles have become available at
Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism, including one by Michael Pakaluk (
Aristotle, Natural Law, and the Founders) and Christopher Tollefsen (
New Natural Law Theory). The last appears to be an abridged version of
his essay for Lyceum. There is also this piece by Paul Sigmund,
Ockham to Hooker: Late Medieval Transformations of Natural Law.
Ah, the Liberal innovations in natural law... something I still need to study further.
Sigmund writes:
Hooker argues that human reason can discover the existence of God and our moral obligations to others, who are “our equals in nature.” “In those times wherein there were no civil societies,” (when Locke quotes this passage, he adds “i.e, in the state of nature”), men were bound by the natural and divine law “even as they are men.” In order to resolve the conflicts that result from self-interest and partiality, men agree to establish government, and because they are all equal this requires the consent of all. This consent, once given by the community, is binding on subsequent generations, a striking difference from the individual consent to majority rule given by the participants in the social contract in Locke’s Second Treatise. Hooker also argues that, in the English case, consent was given to an established church, an institution that Locke rejects in his Letter on Toleration (1685). Therein he argues that true religion must be based on the individual conscience rather than governmental coercion.
Does it make sense for liberal democrats to talk of consent, rather than acquiescence? If one's forefathers made the decision and one has duties to the community one is born into, as well as affection, then one shouldn't have much of a choice about the community. If a government is tyrannical but cannot be overthrown, then do those who suffer under its rule and reject it consent? Or acquiesce? Is a tyrannical government legitimate? Does it have the "right" to rule (as opposed to having power or coercive force)? Should an illegitimate government be obeyed? (Does the virtue of obedience come into play rather than prudence?)
If someone is unjustly deprived of political power or citizenship, what recourse does he have, should he nonetheless obey the government? Is his aspiration to change the government or constitution wrong in itself (as opposed to being wrong because it is against prudence)? Is respect for custom/law a sufficient reason to prevent a polity from changing from one constitution to another (as might seem justified when more and more members of succeeding generations are virtuous and deigned worthy of citizenship)?
Hooker's theory on the origin of government is echoed later by someone else -- the first name that popped up in my head was Calhoun,
but that's not quite right. Of whom am I thinking? It's actually John Finnis, and I'll have to double-check to see if this is common among liberal theorists.
There is so much more to investigate...
