John sends Pontificator 2 links:
30 Days interview with John Zizioulas
Emmanuel Clapsis, Papal Primacy
Wednesday, September 06, 2006
The Species Problem
[Originally posted at The New Beginning. The weekend symposium is now over, but there are plans for the papers to be published. See Amy Welborn for links. I didn't know Robert Spaemann was in attendance; his works that are in English translation pertain either to ethics or to the liturgy. I have not read anything by him concerning evolution or science; it would be interesting to see what his perspective is, as I do not think he is a Thomist.]
Pope Benedict XVI is holding a 3-day symposium with his former students; this year's topic? Evolution. I'll be waiting to see if any statements or interviews are published after the symposium is over. I think it would be best for nothing to be said, but undoubtedly someone will offer his perspective. "There is no conflict between religion and science." "The question of evolution is one that deserves special attention and further inquiry." etc. etc.
Amy Welborn's most recent post. Zenit article with Fr. Rafael Pascual providing some comments. Fr. Pascual is dean of philosophy at Regina Apostolorum in Rome, the Legionary university. He concedes the use of the word "science" to modern science and its method and presuppositions. I don't. Good philosophizing is not less certain than "science;" if anything, it is more certain. There are two main questions with respect to evolution -- the historical question, whether it has happened in the past, and the question of mechanism, which is proper to science and philosophy, if we accept the traditional Aristotelian account of science. What agents are involved, what is the sequence of changes and the chain of causes?
As I've stated elsewhere, the problem of species is one that needs to be resolved in a way that addresses the other fundamental questions pertaining to the essence of evolution. What is the problem of species? It is this: how is "species" to be defined within biology? Tied to this problem is the question of whether there are natural stable "kinds" or "types" of living things. One might think that since the word is used so often in theorizing about evolution, that its definition would be clear; however, rather than being clear it has become more obscure.
Eventually I will have to read through the following if I am going to write anything more substantial on the topic.
[Note to self: with respect to terminology one needs to make clear what the difference is between "part" and "structure"--there are various "levels of organization" in complex living things, and the structure of one part is the arrangement of its own component parts relative to one another. Is it necessary that such an arrangement have a useful function (as opposed to one that fulfills a purely aesthetic purpose)? Perhaps at some levels and not at others.]
Richard Blanchette
U. Laval thesis, "The Problem of Classification in Zoology" (pdf)
Thomas Reydon (homepage)
cv
his thesis: Species as Units of Generalization in Biological Science
"Why does the species problem still persist?"
"Monists, pluralists, and biologists"
"Species are individuals--or are they?"
review of David Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology
David Stamos (faculty page)
The Species Problem
Darwin and the Nature of Species
David Hull
cv
reviews The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History by Marjorie Grene and David Depew
His The Philosophy of Biology
based on Hull's work:
"David Hull's Natural Philosophy of Science"
"Ontology of Evolution: Species, Units, and Levels"
Jody Hey
faculty page
"A Reduction of 'Species' Resolves the Species Problem"
Genes, Categories, and Species
a review of his Genes, Categories, and Species
Marjorie Grene
faculty page
interview
"Aristotle and Modern Biology"
"Recent Work on Aristotelian Biology"
There is a good summary of the species problem in chapter 10 of her book (co-written by David Depew), The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History
Ernest Mayr
page at Stephen J. Gould's site (scroll down for some online texts)
page at Edge.com (bio)
excerpt on teleonomy
"What is a species, and what is not?"
"Is Biology an Autonomous Science"
news of his death
Systematics and the Origin of Species
"Ernst Mayr and the modern concept of species" (alt)
Other:
Mortimer Adler, Jacques Maritain?
Problems for Thomists: The Problem of Species (1940)
New York, Sheed & Ward
Not available online, as far as I know, but I probably need to read it just to see what Adler wrote on the subject. Maritain is listed as an author on certain webpages, but have not confirmed that this is so. Perhaps he just wrote the introduction, as "Problems for Thomists" was a series of inquiries written by Adler, in The Thomist? (I should double check and see if this book isn't a collection of articles he wrote for The Thomist.)
Matthew H. Slater, The Metaphysics of Species and Specious Metaphysics
Encyclopedia Brittanica, Philosophy of Biology
Alfred Tauber, Ecology and the Claims for a Science-Based Ethics
Intro to Nature's Purposes
KLI Theory Lab, Philosophy of Biology
Rob Wilson's syllabus; lecture handout
Review of Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change
"Different species problems and their resolution"
"Wittgenstein Solves (Posthumously) the Species Problem"
"The Species Problem" (of unknown quality)
"Antiquarian Musings"
Eric Voegelin
hmm... totally unrelated... Wilfred Sellers, Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind
Whoa, I found Christopher Mirus's thesis online: Aristotle's Teleology and Modern Mechanics
Pope Benedict XVI is holding a 3-day symposium with his former students; this year's topic? Evolution. I'll be waiting to see if any statements or interviews are published after the symposium is over. I think it would be best for nothing to be said, but undoubtedly someone will offer his perspective. "There is no conflict between religion and science." "The question of evolution is one that deserves special attention and further inquiry." etc. etc.
Amy Welborn's most recent post. Zenit article with Fr. Rafael Pascual providing some comments. Fr. Pascual is dean of philosophy at Regina Apostolorum in Rome, the Legionary university. He concedes the use of the word "science" to modern science and its method and presuppositions. I don't. Good philosophizing is not less certain than "science;" if anything, it is more certain. There are two main questions with respect to evolution -- the historical question, whether it has happened in the past, and the question of mechanism, which is proper to science and philosophy, if we accept the traditional Aristotelian account of science. What agents are involved, what is the sequence of changes and the chain of causes?
As I've stated elsewhere, the problem of species is one that needs to be resolved in a way that addresses the other fundamental questions pertaining to the essence of evolution. What is the problem of species? It is this: how is "species" to be defined within biology? Tied to this problem is the question of whether there are natural stable "kinds" or "types" of living things. One might think that since the word is used so often in theorizing about evolution, that its definition would be clear; however, rather than being clear it has become more obscure.
Eventually I will have to read through the following if I am going to write anything more substantial on the topic.
[Note to self: with respect to terminology one needs to make clear what the difference is between "part" and "structure"--there are various "levels of organization" in complex living things, and the structure of one part is the arrangement of its own component parts relative to one another. Is it necessary that such an arrangement have a useful function (as opposed to one that fulfills a purely aesthetic purpose)? Perhaps at some levels and not at others.]
Richard Blanchette
U. Laval thesis, "The Problem of Classification in Zoology" (pdf)
Thomas Reydon (homepage)
cv
his thesis: Species as Units of Generalization in Biological Science
"Why does the species problem still persist?"
"Monists, pluralists, and biologists"
"Species are individuals--or are they?"
review of David Stamos, The Species Problem: Biological Species, Ontology, and the Metaphysics of Biology
David Stamos (faculty page)
The Species Problem
Darwin and the Nature of Species
David Hull
cv
reviews The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History by Marjorie Grene and David Depew
His The Philosophy of Biology
based on Hull's work:
"David Hull's Natural Philosophy of Science"
"Ontology of Evolution: Species, Units, and Levels"
Jody Hey
faculty page
"A Reduction of 'Species' Resolves the Species Problem"
Genes, Categories, and Species
a review of his Genes, Categories, and Species
Marjorie Grene
faculty page
interview
"Aristotle and Modern Biology"
"Recent Work on Aristotelian Biology"
There is a good summary of the species problem in chapter 10 of her book (co-written by David Depew), The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History
Ernest Mayr
page at Stephen J. Gould's site (scroll down for some online texts)
page at Edge.com (bio)
excerpt on teleonomy
"What is a species, and what is not?"
"Is Biology an Autonomous Science"
news of his death
Systematics and the Origin of Species
"Ernst Mayr and the modern concept of species" (alt)
Other:
Mortimer Adler, Jacques Maritain?
Problems for Thomists: The Problem of Species (1940)
New York, Sheed & Ward
Not available online, as far as I know, but I probably need to read it just to see what Adler wrote on the subject. Maritain is listed as an author on certain webpages, but have not confirmed that this is so. Perhaps he just wrote the introduction, as "Problems for Thomists" was a series of inquiries written by Adler, in The Thomist? (I should double check and see if this book isn't a collection of articles he wrote for The Thomist.)
Matthew H. Slater, The Metaphysics of Species and Specious Metaphysics
Encyclopedia Brittanica, Philosophy of Biology
Alfred Tauber, Ecology and the Claims for a Science-Based Ethics
Intro to Nature's Purposes
KLI Theory Lab, Philosophy of Biology
Rob Wilson's syllabus; lecture handout
Review of Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change
"Different species problems and their resolution"
"Wittgenstein Solves (Posthumously) the Species Problem"
"The Species Problem" (of unknown quality)
"Antiquarian Musings"
Eric Voegelin
hmm... totally unrelated... Wilfred Sellers, Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind
Whoa, I found Christopher Mirus's thesis online: Aristotle's Teleology and Modern Mechanics
Hylomorphism
Only hylomorphism can account for substantial and accidental change; any form of materalism will turn out to be reductionistic--it's just a question of how much. Take for example the generation of water from oxygen and hydrogen. (What is normally called synthesis in chemistry.) The properties and behavior of water are very different from oxygen and hydrogen.
Knowing how oxygen and hydrogen behave will not enable you to make an a priori prediction of how water will behave. Moreover, water is quite different from a a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen gas--continguity or proximity is not the same as generation, even if generation depends on local motion and continguity. While the generation of complex substances does depend on the constituents being present (the "matter," in one sense), the substance generated is more than the constituents taken singly.
(Hence we see how materialism within chemistry has affected how chemists explain things--bonding within compounds, for example, as if water were simply hydrogen and oxygen "bonded" to one another, and the constituents plus the bond are enough to explain water.)
Today Dr. Pakaluk writes:
How do we know if two things are contraries, or opposites? Througuh opposing qualities? Or because they have opposite effects? I think Dr. Pakaluk's example works in showing how in a complex ordered system, something must bring about a blanace of opposites so that one is not dominated by another. Another example of a balance or mean might be homeostasis in an animal. Within a living thing, this is in some way initiated by the living thing itself, though not at the level of the whole organism, but at a lower level of organisation, whether it be system or cell. I would have to see what examples Aristotle employs in his presentation of the mean in his natural philosophy. Within a system of more than one substances, this balancing must be done, ultimately, by the First Mover. (In Christian terms, God through His Providence.)
(See Aquinas' argument for the existence of God from the need for an intelligence to govern substances that have no intelligence.)
The notion of balance and harmony is also found in Chinese philosophy--a sign perhaps that at a "prescientific" level, we can readily intuit that opposing contraries need to be balanced out in some way for the sake of the whole (or the cosmos).
Notes:
Through a thing's sensible qualities we come to know the nature of a thing. Through the senses we are able to observe how it interacts with other things (including with other things of the same kind). Moreover, the sensible qualities of a thing, which can enable us to come up with a nominal definition, involve causality, since our senses are acted upon by the thing in some way.
Knowing how oxygen and hydrogen behave will not enable you to make an a priori prediction of how water will behave. Moreover, water is quite different from a a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen gas--continguity or proximity is not the same as generation, even if generation depends on local motion and continguity. While the generation of complex substances does depend on the constituents being present (the "matter," in one sense), the substance generated is more than the constituents taken singly.
(Hence we see how materialism within chemistry has affected how chemists explain things--bonding within compounds, for example, as if water were simply hydrogen and oxygen "bonded" to one another, and the constituents plus the bond are enough to explain water.)
Today Dr. Pakaluk writes:
But today I wish to press another difficulty, namely, that the natural scientific doctrine of the mean (as we may call it) is evidently different from the Doctrine of the Mean as stated in the ethics. They are two different notions of an intermediate or mean (meson).It's a bit disappointing to see Aristotle's teaching on hylomorphisms dismissed just like that, solely because of the success or practical value that we have come to associate with contemporary explanations by scientists. Now what is meant by pseudoscience? Something that does not achieve the epistemic status of a real science, especially because it does not employ the scientific method (whether taken in its positivistic form or not)? But what of Aristotle's conception of science, as an explanation of a thing through its causes? And his analysis of change? Do were reject his principles of change, form, matter, and privation, in favor of a materialist account? We could easily supplement the various materialist accounts given in the first book of the physics with contemporary chemistry, and show how the physical theory present in contemporary chemistry is just as flawed, even if it is not as reductionistic as the ancient ones. (Though it depends on the chemist or the physicist--some wish to reduce chemistry to physics.)
The natural scientific doctrine of the mean, I take it, is something like the following. In a teleological system, it often happens that extremes, or opposites, need to be somehow 'neutralized', in order to make the required contribution to the good of the whole. This neutralization can take place either through a balancing (in which we imagine that the extremes continue to have their force, but in equiposition), or a mixture (in which we imagine that each extreme acts on the other to produce some resultant product that falls in between).
One might regard this doctrine as Aristotle's view about what is right in Heraclitus' view of co-dependent opposites.
Now two points about this.
First, it is not a whacky doctrine at all. Indeed, one might think that something like this must be true, simply given the nature of a teleological system. One might of course doubt that such systems exist (in which case it is 'teleology', and undoubtedly also 'hylomorphism', which one must regard as pseudoscience). But what such a system would be, is a system in which parts that otherwise would not operate together harmoniously, to some single effect, are so adapted that they now do so. This very description requires that its parts somehow be balanced or mutually opposed, so that the effects that each would otherwise produce are moderated.
It would be easy to think of examples of this. Consider for instance how electrical impulses are propagated along the membrane of a nerve cell. The movement of the charge is achieved not by the conduction of electrons within the cell (as in a copper wire), but rather by a change and transmission in potential effected by sodium and potassium ions. As this potential is propagated, the charge at each location is 'neutralized' and effected at the immediately continguous location. Thus the 'extremes' of positive and negative charges are used against each other to achieve safely an effect (the propagation of an electric signal) that might otherwise be hazardous to living tissue. Furthermore, through this neutralization the tissue immediately regenerates its capacity to propagate an impulse. (See for instance the Introduction here.)
The point is that it is natural to speak of living systems, or perhaps even natural systems generally, as 'harnassing' and 'moderating' forces that, operating on their own outside of such systems, would work to an extreme that would be incompatible with the good functioning of such systems. This I take it is what the 'natural scientific doctrine of the mean' is meant to capture.
How do we know if two things are contraries, or opposites? Througuh opposing qualities? Or because they have opposite effects? I think Dr. Pakaluk's example works in showing how in a complex ordered system, something must bring about a blanace of opposites so that one is not dominated by another. Another example of a balance or mean might be homeostasis in an animal. Within a living thing, this is in some way initiated by the living thing itself, though not at the level of the whole organism, but at a lower level of organisation, whether it be system or cell. I would have to see what examples Aristotle employs in his presentation of the mean in his natural philosophy. Within a system of more than one substances, this balancing must be done, ultimately, by the First Mover. (In Christian terms, God through His Providence.)
(See Aquinas' argument for the existence of God from the need for an intelligence to govern substances that have no intelligence.)
The notion of balance and harmony is also found in Chinese philosophy--a sign perhaps that at a "prescientific" level, we can readily intuit that opposing contraries need to be balanced out in some way for the sake of the whole (or the cosmos).
Notes:
Through a thing's sensible qualities we come to know the nature of a thing. Through the senses we are able to observe how it interacts with other things (including with other things of the same kind). Moreover, the sensible qualities of a thing, which can enable us to come up with a nominal definition, involve causality, since our senses are acted upon by the thing in some way.
Tuesday, September 05, 2006
Another link for the Dominican Guide
here
(Primary link is at Fr. Ashley's page at OP.org; Andrew Goddard's page for Fr. Ashley.)
Plus, one of Paul Kucharski' papers is available online, "Aquinas's Account of Existence and Recent Criticisms"
(Primary link is at Fr. Ashley's page at OP.org; Andrew Goddard's page for Fr. Ashley.)
Plus, one of Paul Kucharski' papers is available online, "Aquinas's Account of Existence and Recent Criticisms"
Monday, September 04, 2006
Philip L. Peterson
Syllogistic reasoning with intermediate quantifiers (pdf)
Intermediate Quantities: Logic, Linguistics, and Aristotelian Semantics
A bunch of sellers are dumping this book for $9.00. I wonder if that says something about its quality.
"On the Logic of 'Few,' 'Many,' and 'Most'"
He has another book, Fact Proposition Event
Info about the book.
Bases his work on Zeno Vendler? ucalgary
Linguistic analysis + ? (any influences from Noam Chomsky?)
Steve Bayne, "Nominalization and agent causation:Vendler/Chisholm"
The Nominalization Template
"Nominalization in Kavalan"
"Creative Discovery in the Lexical 'Validation Gap'"
"Generating Expressions Referring to Eventualities"
"Knowledge, Belief, and Category Mistakes: A Solution" (alt)
"Category Mistakes in M&E"
"Ontology in Formal Semantics and Lexical Semantics"
On the typology of state/change of state alternations
Max Kistler, Causes as events and facts
A finite-state approach to even semantics
Gerundive nominals and the role of aspect
The language of propositions and events (download the thesis)
HIST-Analytic
Intermediate Quantities: Logic, Linguistics, and Aristotelian Semantics
A bunch of sellers are dumping this book for $9.00. I wonder if that says something about its quality.
"On the Logic of 'Few,' 'Many,' and 'Most'"
He has another book, Fact Proposition Event
Info about the book.
Bases his work on Zeno Vendler? ucalgary
Linguistic analysis + ? (any influences from Noam Chomsky?)
Steve Bayne, "Nominalization and agent causation:Vendler/Chisholm"
The Nominalization Template
"Nominalization in Kavalan"
"Creative Discovery in the Lexical 'Validation Gap'"
"Generating Expressions Referring to Eventualities"
"Knowledge, Belief, and Category Mistakes: A Solution" (alt)
"Category Mistakes in M&E"
"Ontology in Formal Semantics and Lexical Semantics"
On the typology of state/change of state alternations
Max Kistler, Causes as events and facts
A finite-state approach to even semantics
Gerundive nominals and the role of aspect
The language of propositions and events (download the thesis)
HIST-Analytic
Richard John Tierney
He wrote this thesis: Essence and explanation in Aristotle's philosophy of science and philosophy of nature
info here
info here
Abstract
This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between essence and explanation in Aristotle's philosophy of science and philosophy of nature. My central theme is that Aristotle's concept of the nature of a substance ties these two areas of his philosophy together. In his philosophy of science it manifests itself in the notion of the essential nature of a kind, in his philosophy of nature it finds its expression in the essential potentialities of a substance. I argue that the explanatory dimension of Aristotle's philosophy of science lies not in his concept of scientific demonstration but in its implicit recourse to a substance's essential potentialities.
A scientific demonstration, I maintain, does not constitute an explanation, nor does it involve explanation in performing its demonstrative function. Rather, demonstration gives rise to understanding; the apprehension that something belongs in the essential nature of a kind. I call this scientific exposition, rather than scientific explanation.
In order to 'recover' the explanatory dimension of Aristotle's philosophy of science I consider, first, the structure of his essentialism, and second, his metaphysics of change in which the notions of potentiality and actuality play a central role. It is in these two aspects of his philosophy that the substantial content of Aristotle's definition of 'nature' (phusis) is located. A nature, according to Aristotle, is a principle of change belonging to a thing in itself; but what is essential to a kind consists of what belongs to the members of the kind in itself, and a potentiality is defined as a principle of change.
It is through this link that Aristotle's philosophy of science finds its underlying explanatory dimension. For when, through scientific demonstrations, we 'unpack' the essential nature of a kind, what we lay bare are the essential potentialities of each of the members of the kind, the actualizations of which constitute the various changes that those substances may undergo. That is, we lay bare what it is in the nature of things that accounts for their behavior in various diverse circumstances.
Andrea Falcon's webpage
here
Hrm, snazzy website. Haven't read her books...
From an abstract:
The study of the soul is not a part of the science of nature? I don't know if Aristotle makes this claim. What did I read recently that was making this point? Oh never mind, I think it was Fr. Brock's paper for the Thomistic Institute. He was arguing that the soul is studied both in natural philosophy and in the metaphysics, and he was citing certain texts within Aristotle's De Anima. I'll have to reread the third book.
As for the celestial world having an influence on the soul--perhaps Aristotle does not include the soul as being under the influence of the celestial world because he believes it to be spiritual (and hence free, etc.).
I'll have to see if BC has this book and see what texts she cites to make her claims.
It turns out she wrote the SEP entry on causality. (The housemate reminded me that the aitia are enumerated by Plato; he must have been talking about the Phaedo.)
From the entry:
Hrm, snazzy website. Haven't read her books...
From an abstract:
COLLOQUIA & CONFERENCES ARISTOTLE AND THE SCIENCE OF NATURE
Andrea Falcon
Department of Philosophy
Virginia Tech
February 3, 2005
Thursday, 4:00pm-6:00pm
BA (Close/Hipp) 008
In the opening lines of the Meteorology Aristotle outlines a program for the investigation of the natural world. I will focus on this program and show that Aristotle's science of nature is structured in a certain way and this structure is crucially dependent upon a particular conception of the natural world. Aristotle conceives of the natural world as a causal system in which the only direction of explanation is from the celestial to the sublunary world. A full appreciation of this conception will help the reader to understand the precise sense in which Aristotle's science of nature is a distinctly organized science. I will also argue that the opening lines of the Meteorology presuppose a strong grasp of the boundaries of the science of nature. Tellingly, the study of the soul is not mentioned in the opening lines of the Meteorology. Elsewhere Aristotle makes it abundantly clear that the study of the soul is preliminary to the study of life, but it is not a part of the science of nature. I will focus on the problematic relation between science of nature and study of the soul and the unique status of the De anima in the Aristotelian corpus.
The study of the soul is not a part of the science of nature? I don't know if Aristotle makes this claim. What did I read recently that was making this point? Oh never mind, I think it was Fr. Brock's paper for the Thomistic Institute. He was arguing that the soul is studied both in natural philosophy and in the metaphysics, and he was citing certain texts within Aristotle's De Anima. I'll have to reread the third book.
As for the celestial world having an influence on the soul--perhaps Aristotle does not include the soul as being under the influence of the celestial world because he believes it to be spiritual (and hence free, etc.).
I'll have to see if BC has this book and see what texts she cites to make her claims.
It turns out she wrote the SEP entry on causality. (The housemate reminded me that the aitia are enumerated by Plato; he must have been talking about the Phaedo.)
From the entry:
Aristotle was not the first person to engage in a causal investigation of the world around us. From the very beginning, and independently of Aristotle, the investigation of the natural world consisted in the search for the relevant causes of a variety of natural phenomena. From the Phaedo, for example, we learn that the so-called “inquiry into nature” consisted in a search for “the causes of each thing; why each thing comes into existence, why it goes out of existence, why it exists” (96 a 6-10). In this tradition of investigation, the search for causes was a search for answers to the question “why?”. Both in the Physics and in the Metaphysics Aristotle places himself in direct continuity with this tradition.
Konrad Lorenz notes
Recommended by C. Blum. I haven't had a chance to read Konrad Lorenz's books yet, but they may be prove to be useful; what are his views on evolution? Lorenz is considered to be the founder of ethology, that part of zoology which studies behavior. iirc, Dr. Blum's main reason for his endorsement was Lorenz's acceptance of teleology as a form of scientific explanation--animal behavior is purposive and his method as a naturalist -- trying to observe animals without interference or contrived experiments.
King Solomon's Ring (Routledge Classic edition)
Nobel Prize bio
autobiography
wiki entry on Lorenz, ethology, imprinting
Konrad Lorenz and imprinting
Konrad Lorenz, Classical Ethology, and Imprinting (pdf)
animalbehavioronline.com
Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen
Other links:
Konrad Lorenz Institute
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Ethology
Sympsium: "Origins of Ethology"
Look up: Max Planck Institutes
King Solomon's Ring (Routledge Classic edition)
Nobel Prize bio
autobiography
wiki entry on Lorenz, ethology, imprinting
Konrad Lorenz and imprinting
Konrad Lorenz, Classical Ethology, and Imprinting (pdf)
animalbehavioronline.com
Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen
Other links:
Konrad Lorenz Institute
Konrad Lorenz Institute for Ethology
Sympsium: "Origins of Ethology"
Look up: Max Planck Institutes
Suggestions from the Philosopher
Not Aristotle, but my housemate.
The keynote lecture at the 27th annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign this year piqued my interest. The keynote lecture was "Ethics and the Collapse of Civilization" by Jonathan Lear (John U. Nef Distinguished Service Professor, Committee on Social Thought, Department of Philosophy, the University of Chicago). (I think he is also married to Gabriel Richardson Lear.) I asked my housemate what he thought of him, but he couldn't offer anything substantive that I can recall.
The theme for this year's philosophy graduate student conference at Fordham this year was
"The Future of Philosophy." I was going to write something on the impact of peak oil on universities in general, and philosophy in particular, and the vocation of a Catholic philosopher.
Now that it is passed, looking at the conference program as a Catholic, my reaction is "Who really cares?" I don't really see anything that would be of interest to the general public, just to a small group of people with certain specialties.
Another version of "geekdom"? Perhaps.
I asked the Philosopher what would be some good classical texts discussing the nature and purpose of philosophy.
Plato's dialogues: Philebus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedrus
(To look at the arguments for the superiority of the philosophical life to all others.)
To these I would have added the practical bent of classical Confucianism.
Then I would proceed with a historical examination of the decline of the Greek schools and see if any comparisons could be drawn between their situation and the current state of universities in the United States.
Then some judgments:
(1) It would become increasingly difficult for departments of philosophy to justify their existence in universities that were oriented towards job training and other practical ends. (Unless philosophy departments made bioethics and business ethics courses a big component of their programs.)
(2) A lot of discredit that has fallen upon philosophy as an "academic discipline" is due to academic philosophers themselves.
(3) Universities themselves may be put out of business by peak oil, since the economy would not be able to sustain the existence of so many, and the job-training and skills they offered would become mostly irrelevant to economies that would have to shift towards becoming localized and less oil- and technology-dependent.
Followed perhaps by a recommendation that philosophers, if they sincerely loved truth and pursued it, should ready themselves for the upcoming economic downturn by finding a job they could handle, and offer their teaching for free, for those who were interested.
My housemate also recommended Roger Scruton's Thinkers of the New Left (plus, of course, The Meaning of Conservatism)--I don't think I would find much in Scruton that would be of interest to me, though I should note that last I heard, he will be giving lectures (on aesthetics) for the Institute for the Psychological Sciences.
I was also thinking of writing something for the American Maritain Association conference this year, but decided that it wouldn't be worth the time and expense, since I wasn't sure where I would be this semester and if I would have funds. My topic? Biological structuralism and Aristotelianism. I still hope I can finish up the paper, and submit it to a journal.
Whoopee... there's a blog for people to post info about upcoming philosophy conferences.
social decline (Jonathan Lear)
The keynote lecture at the 27th annual Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign this year piqued my interest. The keynote lecture was "Ethics and the Collapse of Civilization" by Jonathan Lear (John U. Nef Distinguished Service Professor, Committee on Social Thought, Department of Philosophy, the University of Chicago). (I think he is also married to Gabriel Richardson Lear.) I asked my housemate what he thought of him, but he couldn't offer anything substantive that I can recall.
The theme for this year's philosophy graduate student conference at Fordham this year was
"The Future of Philosophy." I was going to write something on the impact of peak oil on universities in general, and philosophy in particular, and the vocation of a Catholic philosopher.
Now that it is passed, looking at the conference program as a Catholic, my reaction is "Who really cares?" I don't really see anything that would be of interest to the general public, just to a small group of people with certain specialties.
Another version of "geekdom"? Perhaps.
I asked the Philosopher what would be some good classical texts discussing the nature and purpose of philosophy.
Plato's dialogues: Philebus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedrus
(To look at the arguments for the superiority of the philosophical life to all others.)
To these I would have added the practical bent of classical Confucianism.
Then I would proceed with a historical examination of the decline of the Greek schools and see if any comparisons could be drawn between their situation and the current state of universities in the United States.
Then some judgments:
(1) It would become increasingly difficult for departments of philosophy to justify their existence in universities that were oriented towards job training and other practical ends. (Unless philosophy departments made bioethics and business ethics courses a big component of their programs.)
(2) A lot of discredit that has fallen upon philosophy as an "academic discipline" is due to academic philosophers themselves.
(3) Universities themselves may be put out of business by peak oil, since the economy would not be able to sustain the existence of so many, and the job-training and skills they offered would become mostly irrelevant to economies that would have to shift towards becoming localized and less oil- and technology-dependent.
Followed perhaps by a recommendation that philosophers, if they sincerely loved truth and pursued it, should ready themselves for the upcoming economic downturn by finding a job they could handle, and offer their teaching for free, for those who were interested.
My housemate also recommended Roger Scruton's Thinkers of the New Left (plus, of course, The Meaning of Conservatism)--I don't think I would find much in Scruton that would be of interest to me, though I should note that last I heard, he will be giving lectures (on aesthetics) for the Institute for the Psychological Sciences.
I was also thinking of writing something for the American Maritain Association conference this year, but decided that it wouldn't be worth the time and expense, since I wasn't sure where I would be this semester and if I would have funds. My topic? Biological structuralism and Aristotelianism. I still hope I can finish up the paper, and submit it to a journal.
Whoopee... there's a blog for people to post info about upcoming philosophy conferences.
social decline (Jonathan Lear)
Some questions about corporations and property
Corporations -- were guilds defined as a corporation under civil law? What of any social body?
How is legal personhood defined? In terms of rights and powers that belong to the person. It seems then it is possible that there is no necessary connection between legal personhood and a Lockean right to property. Are the property rights of a private association different from that of a political community? Must a corporation have the same rights as its members?
Can property be defined apart from the rights? Does use (or consumption) always entail [transfer of] ownership? (Is the reception of a gift equivalent to taking ownership of it?)
Are there any problems with legal personhood that are intrinsic to the notion itself? Is it necessary that we conceive of a community as a substantial whole in order to consider it as a "person"? (I think the answer is no.)
What happens to legal justice when applied to relations between corporations? Does everything reduce to commutative justice? (Does commutative justice exist between communities?)
How is legal personhood defined? In terms of rights and powers that belong to the person. It seems then it is possible that there is no necessary connection between legal personhood and a Lockean right to property. Are the property rights of a private association different from that of a political community? Must a corporation have the same rights as its members?
Can property be defined apart from the rights? Does use (or consumption) always entail [transfer of] ownership? (Is the reception of a gift equivalent to taking ownership of it?)
Are there any problems with legal personhood that are intrinsic to the notion itself? Is it necessary that we conceive of a community as a substantial whole in order to consider it as a "person"? (I think the answer is no.)
What happens to legal justice when applied to relations between corporations? Does everything reduce to commutative justice? (Does commutative justice exist between communities?)
Subsistit vs. est
Pontificator has two posts on the use of subsistit in Lumen Gentium.
The first post summarizes an article by Karl Josef Becker, S.J. The second is from "The Ecclesiology of the Constitution of the Church, Vatican II, Lumen Gentium," by Cardinal Ratzinger and the CDF.
The first post summarizes an article by Karl Josef Becker, S.J. The second is from "The Ecclesiology of the Constitution of the Church, Vatican II, Lumen Gentium," by Cardinal Ratzinger and the CDF.
Saturday, September 02, 2006
Plato's Protagoras
available here or here
From the translation by Benjamin Jowett
In Virtue, Order, Mind: Marie I. George, Plato's Protagoras: On choosing a teacher
From the translation by Benjamin Jowett
In Virtue, Order, Mind: Marie I. George, Plato's Protagoras: On choosing a teacher
Natural Law and Natural Rights
Some preliminary definitions: (following Fr. Prummer)
a subjective passive right to x = to be owed x
a subjective active right to y = to be free to do y; the "moral faculty" or "power" to do y or the freedom to do y
to be permitted or allowed to do y -- libertas
Is the permission consequent to something else? That is, is it given through a command, or law. (Permission can be a type of command.)
Two possible positions?
1. Subjective passive rights and duties are correlative.
2. One is prior to the other. Is law the foundation of right, or is right the foundation of law?
The popular Catholic position is that rights are correlative of duties. That is to say, one has freedoms, but one should use those freedoms responsibly, or in the service of duties. But this seems to mean that freedoms have some sort of meaning apart from duty, or even right action. Does freedom, as pure undetermined potentiality, have any significance for ethics, politics, or law?
What should I receive?
What should I be permitted to do? ~or, What is law forbidden to prohibit? (or permit)
What is debitum? (Something) owed.
[From debeo, debere, debui, debitus -- owe; be indebted/responsible for/obliged/bound/destined; ought, must, should
debitum, debiti--debt/what is owed; (his) due; duty; that due/ought to occur]
What is owed? Some thing. But is it necessarily an inanimate object, something that is possessed? In everyday speech, we often refer to the thing which is owed. In common language, what we owe is a thing. But for Aquinas' account in the Summa Theologiae, what is owed is some external action that bears upon another, in accordance with equality. (And an external action is a thing, even if it is not so tangible.)
Is moral theology or moral science concerned primarily with freedom? No. It is more concerned with the right use of freedom. Freedom may separate us from the brute beasts, but it is not a sufficient guide in itself for happiness. It must be ordered to specific goods and ends, including the ultimate end, God.
As for ownership (our 'owning' ourselves), is it absolute? Or do we answer to some higher authority(-ies)?
1. ownership versus use
2. use is for the common good, even if there is some sort of 'right' to private property
Redistribution of property may be allowed, unless greater evils ensue?
Can subjective active rights curbed for the sake of the common good? Or are the absolutes or foundational to law, in order to protect "democracy" and "freedom"? My claim to own this is absolute--consequently law must respect this claim and not prevent me from exercising my claim and defending it in court.
If it is not absolute, then my possession need not be returned under certain circumstances? (For example, it is wrong to return something dangerous to someone who has become insane and will use it to harm others.)
How do we foster or contribute to the good of another, as an equal? How is equality achieved and maintained?
Is there a legitimate notion of sovereignty or dominion? As Aquinas does speak of sovereignty, the word itself is probably not problematic. What may cause problems is that with which it is associated. Does the notion of sovereignty or dominion entail some sort of account of rights?
Links (various viewpoints represented):
The Correlativity of Rights and Duties
"Human Rights and Ethics"
"Three Types of Rights"
Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists"
"The Rhetoric of Rights"
Liberty Haven philosophy section
Review of Rights and Responsibilities by Leon Trakman and Sean Gatien
Radical Academy's on natural law; booklist
James Donald's explanation
Ronald Cooney on rights; Carl P. Wellman; "Sunstein on Rights"; "Promises, Expectations, and Rights"
Haines, "The Revival of Natural Law Concepts"
David Forte, "Natural Law and the Rule of Law"
IEP on natural law, property, rights
SEP on natural law; rights; human rights; legal rights
another booklist
Fordham Natural Law Colloquium
Frank van Dun on natural law and rights (libertarian p.o.v.)
Clifford Bate's page
Nicholas Townsend, Social Infrastructure
Christopher Wolfe, "Natural Law and Liberalism"
Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts
Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists"
"Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Classical Liberalism"
"The Non-Absurdity of Natural Law"
"The Rhetoric of Rights" page
Henrik Syse, Natural Law, Religion, and Rights
Ashbrook Center's review of Zuckert's Natural Rights and the New Republicanism
Fr. James Schall, S.J.:
Homepage; Another Sort of Learning
Essays on Natural Law
The Natural Law/Natural Right Page
"Natural Law and Economics"
"Even More Rights"
"Culture is Never Neutral"
Conversations with Ken Masugi of the Claremont Institute: 2002, 2003
On Reading the Pope: Part 1, 2
Zenit Interview: Part 1, 2
Review of his book on Maritain by someone at Claremont
Articles:
Dr. Brett has this article:
'Natural right and civil community: The civil philosophy of Hugo Grotius', Historical Journal 45, 1 (2002)
The History of Rights in Western Thought, by Kenneth Pennington
Ave Maria Law Review:
The Catholic Neo-Scholastic Contribution to Human Rights: The Natural Law Foundation by Robert John Araujo, S.J.
See also the articles of vol. 3, no. 1 -- "Rethinking Rights"
See also the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller:
(very important for analytic legal theory)
Summary of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law; HLA Hart's Conception of Law by George Letsas. The Concept of Law and Law, Liberty and Morality.
Lon Fuller (IVR Encyclopedia entry); "Means and Ends"; "The Natral Law Philosophy of Lon Fuller..." (pdf); his [relevant] books include The Morality of Law, Anatomy of the Law, and The Principles of Social Order.
Robert George's "What is law? A century of arguments." (Letters to the editor in response.)
"Social Theory of Law," 3rd lecture
A Crude Tabular View of Some Selected Legal Theorists by Anthony D'Amato
Ronald M. Dworkin
Taking Rights Seriously; Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality; Law's Empire; Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution; The Philosophy of Law
Faculty homepage
Leiter Reports post on Dworkin
Various other faculty pages:
Quenin Skinner; John Finnis (Notre Dame, Oxford), Richard Tuck, Ian Shapiro, Annabel Brett, Gerard V. Bradley
No homepage for Brian Tierney.
[Tuck's and Shapiro's books were recommended by Russell Hittinger (Ethics Center page). Shapiro is supposedly a Straussian; I'm not sure if Tuck is. Both have been criticized by Tierney; Finnis disagrees with Tuck's thesis concerning the development of rights talk.]
Misc. Links:
Faculty at Sacred Heart Seminary (Detroit). Where's John Hittinger? Has he gone somewhere else?
Review of Dr. John Hittinger's Liberty, Wisdom, and Grace at Claremont.
Michael Pakaluk's page. Bartolomé De Las Casas Essay Series
(His blog.) Yes I had already posted the url earlier, but this post was started before the other one, and I don't like editing so much.
a subjective passive right to x = to be owed x
a subjective active right to y = to be free to do y; the "moral faculty" or "power" to do y or the freedom to do y
to be permitted or allowed to do y -- libertas
Is the permission consequent to something else? That is, is it given through a command, or law. (Permission can be a type of command.)
Two possible positions?
1. Subjective passive rights and duties are correlative.
2. One is prior to the other. Is law the foundation of right, or is right the foundation of law?
The popular Catholic position is that rights are correlative of duties. That is to say, one has freedoms, but one should use those freedoms responsibly, or in the service of duties. But this seems to mean that freedoms have some sort of meaning apart from duty, or even right action. Does freedom, as pure undetermined potentiality, have any significance for ethics, politics, or law?
What should I receive?
What should I be permitted to do? ~or, What is law forbidden to prohibit? (or permit)
What is debitum? (Something) owed.
[From debeo, debere, debui, debitus -- owe; be indebted/responsible for/obliged/bound/destined; ought, must, should
debitum, debiti--debt/what is owed; (his) due; duty; that due/ought to occur]
What is owed? Some thing. But is it necessarily an inanimate object, something that is possessed? In everyday speech, we often refer to the thing which is owed. In common language, what we owe is a thing. But for Aquinas' account in the Summa Theologiae, what is owed is some external action that bears upon another, in accordance with equality. (And an external action is a thing, even if it is not so tangible.)
Is moral theology or moral science concerned primarily with freedom? No. It is more concerned with the right use of freedom. Freedom may separate us from the brute beasts, but it is not a sufficient guide in itself for happiness. It must be ordered to specific goods and ends, including the ultimate end, God.
As for ownership (our 'owning' ourselves), is it absolute? Or do we answer to some higher authority(-ies)?
1. ownership versus use
2. use is for the common good, even if there is some sort of 'right' to private property
Redistribution of property may be allowed, unless greater evils ensue?
Can subjective active rights curbed for the sake of the common good? Or are the absolutes or foundational to law, in order to protect "democracy" and "freedom"? My claim to own this is absolute--consequently law must respect this claim and not prevent me from exercising my claim and defending it in court.
If it is not absolute, then my possession need not be returned under certain circumstances? (For example, it is wrong to return something dangerous to someone who has become insane and will use it to harm others.)
How do we foster or contribute to the good of another, as an equal? How is equality achieved and maintained?
Is there a legitimate notion of sovereignty or dominion? As Aquinas does speak of sovereignty, the word itself is probably not problematic. What may cause problems is that with which it is associated. Does the notion of sovereignty or dominion entail some sort of account of rights?
Links (various viewpoints represented):
The Correlativity of Rights and Duties
"Human Rights and Ethics"
"Three Types of Rights"
Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists"
"The Rhetoric of Rights"
Liberty Haven philosophy section
Review of Rights and Responsibilities by Leon Trakman and Sean Gatien
Radical Academy's on natural law; booklist
James Donald's explanation
Ronald Cooney on rights; Carl P. Wellman; "Sunstein on Rights"; "Promises, Expectations, and Rights"
Haines, "The Revival of Natural Law Concepts"
David Forte, "Natural Law and the Rule of Law"
IEP on natural law, property, rights
SEP on natural law; rights; human rights; legal rights
another booklist
Fordham Natural Law Colloquium
Frank van Dun on natural law and rights (libertarian p.o.v.)
Clifford Bate's page
Nicholas Townsend, Social Infrastructure
Christopher Wolfe, "Natural Law and Liberalism"
Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts
Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists"
"Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Classical Liberalism"
"The Non-Absurdity of Natural Law"
"The Rhetoric of Rights" page
Henrik Syse, Natural Law, Religion, and Rights
Ashbrook Center's review of Zuckert's Natural Rights and the New Republicanism
Fr. James Schall, S.J.:
Homepage; Another Sort of Learning
Essays on Natural Law
The Natural Law/Natural Right Page
"Natural Law and Economics"
"Even More Rights"
"Culture is Never Neutral"
Conversations with Ken Masugi of the Claremont Institute: 2002, 2003
On Reading the Pope: Part 1, 2
Zenit Interview: Part 1, 2
Review of his book on Maritain by someone at Claremont
Articles:
Dr. Brett has this article:
'Natural right and civil community: The civil philosophy of Hugo Grotius', Historical Journal 45, 1 (2002)
The History of Rights in Western Thought, by Kenneth Pennington
Ave Maria Law Review:
The Catholic Neo-Scholastic Contribution to Human Rights: The Natural Law Foundation by Robert John Araujo, S.J.
See also the articles of vol. 3, no. 1 -- "Rethinking Rights"
See also the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller:
(very important for analytic legal theory)
Summary of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law; HLA Hart's Conception of Law by George Letsas. The Concept of Law and Law, Liberty and Morality.
Lon Fuller (IVR Encyclopedia entry); "Means and Ends"; "The Natral Law Philosophy of Lon Fuller..." (pdf); his [relevant] books include The Morality of Law, Anatomy of the Law, and The Principles of Social Order.
Robert George's "What is law? A century of arguments." (Letters to the editor in response.)
"Social Theory of Law," 3rd lecture
A Crude Tabular View of Some Selected Legal Theorists by Anthony D'Amato
Ronald M. Dworkin
Taking Rights Seriously; Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality; Law's Empire; Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution; The Philosophy of Law
Faculty homepage
Leiter Reports post on Dworkin
Various other faculty pages:
Quenin Skinner; John Finnis (Notre Dame, Oxford), Richard Tuck, Ian Shapiro, Annabel Brett, Gerard V. Bradley
No homepage for Brian Tierney.
[Tuck's and Shapiro's books were recommended by Russell Hittinger (Ethics Center page). Shapiro is supposedly a Straussian; I'm not sure if Tuck is. Both have been criticized by Tierney; Finnis disagrees with Tuck's thesis concerning the development of rights talk.]
Misc. Links:
Faculty at Sacred Heart Seminary (Detroit). Where's John Hittinger? Has he gone somewhere else?
Review of Dr. John Hittinger's Liberty, Wisdom, and Grace at Claremont.
Michael Pakaluk's page. Bartolomé De Las Casas Essay Series
(His blog.) Yes I had already posted the url earlier, but this post was started before the other one, and I don't like editing so much.
Liber Sapientiae 7:7-30
Propter hoc optavi, et datus est mihi sensus; et invocavi, et venit in me spiritus sapientiae.
Praeposui illam regnis et sedibus et divitias nihil esse duxi in comparatione illius;
nec comparavi illi lapidem pretiosum, quoniam omne aurum in comparatione illius arena est exigua, et tamquam lutum aestimabitur argentum in conspectu illius.
Super salutem et speciem dilexi illam et proposui pro luce habere illam, quoniam inexstinguibile est lumen illius.
Venerunt autem mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, innumerabiles divitiae in manibus illius,
et laetatus sum in omnibus, quoniam sapientia antecedit ista, et ignorabam quoniam horum omnium mater est;
quam sine fictione didici et sine invidia communico; divitias illius non abscondo.
Infinitus enim thesaurus est hominibus; quem qui acquisierunt, ad amicitiam in Deum se paraverunt propter disciplinae dona commendati.
Mihi autem det Deus dicere secundum sententiam et sentire digna horum, quae mihi data sunt,
quoniam ipse sapientiae dux est et sapientium emendator;
in manu enim illius et nos et sermones nostri et omnis sapientia et operum scientia.
Ipse enim dedit mihi horum, quae sunt, scientiam veram, ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum et virtutes elementorum,
initium et consummationem et medietatem temporum, vicissitudinum permutationes et commutationes temporum,
anni cursus et stellarum dispositiones,
naturas animalium et iras bestiarum, vim spirituum et cogitationes hominum,
differentias virgultorum et virtutes radicum.
Et, quaecumque sunt absconsa et manifesta, didici; omnium enim artifex docuit me sapientia.
Est enim in illa spiritus intellegens, sanctus, unicus, multiplex, subtilis, mobilis, perspicuus, incoinquinatus, lucidus, innocens, amans bonum, acutus,
quem nihil vetat, benefaciens, humanus, benignus, stabilis, certus, securus, omnem habens virtutem, omnia prospiciens et penetrans omnes spiritus intellegibiles, mundos, subtilissimos.
Omni enim motu mobilior est sapientia; pertransit autem et penetrat omnia propter munditiam.
Halitus est enim virtutis Dei et emanatio claritatis Omnipotentis sincera; ideo nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit:
candor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei potentiae et imago bonitatis illius.
Et, cum sit una, omnia potest; et in se permanens, omnia innovat et per generationes in animas sanctas se transferens amicos Dei et prophetas constituit.
Nihil enim diligit Deus, nisi eum, qui cum sapientia inhabitat.
Est enim haec speciosior sole et super omnem dispositionem stellarum; luci comparata invenitur splendidior:
illi enim succedit nox, sapientiam autem non vincit malitia.
Praeposui illam regnis et sedibus et divitias nihil esse duxi in comparatione illius;
nec comparavi illi lapidem pretiosum, quoniam omne aurum in comparatione illius arena est exigua, et tamquam lutum aestimabitur argentum in conspectu illius.
Super salutem et speciem dilexi illam et proposui pro luce habere illam, quoniam inexstinguibile est lumen illius.
Venerunt autem mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, innumerabiles divitiae in manibus illius,
et laetatus sum in omnibus, quoniam sapientia antecedit ista, et ignorabam quoniam horum omnium mater est;
quam sine fictione didici et sine invidia communico; divitias illius non abscondo.
Infinitus enim thesaurus est hominibus; quem qui acquisierunt, ad amicitiam in Deum se paraverunt propter disciplinae dona commendati.
Mihi autem det Deus dicere secundum sententiam et sentire digna horum, quae mihi data sunt,
quoniam ipse sapientiae dux est et sapientium emendator;
in manu enim illius et nos et sermones nostri et omnis sapientia et operum scientia.
Ipse enim dedit mihi horum, quae sunt, scientiam veram, ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum et virtutes elementorum,
initium et consummationem et medietatem temporum, vicissitudinum permutationes et commutationes temporum,
anni cursus et stellarum dispositiones,
naturas animalium et iras bestiarum, vim spirituum et cogitationes hominum,
differentias virgultorum et virtutes radicum.
Et, quaecumque sunt absconsa et manifesta, didici; omnium enim artifex docuit me sapientia.
Est enim in illa spiritus intellegens, sanctus, unicus, multiplex, subtilis, mobilis, perspicuus, incoinquinatus, lucidus, innocens, amans bonum, acutus,
quem nihil vetat, benefaciens, humanus, benignus, stabilis, certus, securus, omnem habens virtutem, omnia prospiciens et penetrans omnes spiritus intellegibiles, mundos, subtilissimos.
Omni enim motu mobilior est sapientia; pertransit autem et penetrat omnia propter munditiam.
Halitus est enim virtutis Dei et emanatio claritatis Omnipotentis sincera; ideo nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit:
candor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei potentiae et imago bonitatis illius.
Et, cum sit una, omnia potest; et in se permanens, omnia innovat et per generationes in animas sanctas se transferens amicos Dei et prophetas constituit.
Nihil enim diligit Deus, nisi eum, qui cum sapientia inhabitat.
Est enim haec speciosior sole et super omnem dispositionem stellarum; luci comparata invenitur splendidior:
illi enim succedit nox, sapientiam autem non vincit malitia.
Monday, May 09, 2005
Just found out two more heroes passed away, but last year... not much was made of it in the Catholic press, but they weren't well-known... Eternal rest, grant unto them O Lord...
http://www.byzantines.net/monastery/hom04-Boniface-Memorial.htm
Archimandrite Boniface Luykx (1915 — 2004)
As Christians throughout the world were joyfully singing “Christ is risen” this Easter Sunday—in faith—Fr Boniface was singing it in the presence of the Risen One Himself. He passed from this world early Sunday morning, the feast of the Resurrection of Christ. It was fitting that he who so loved to celebrate this feast, and who preached every year that this was the day for us to “rise with Christ,” would rise with Him unto eternal life on that very day.Most of our readers know of Fr Boniface’s distinguished life of service to the Church, the many books, studies, and articles he wrote, the monasteries he founded, the countless retreats and seminars he gave, as well as all the personal hardships and sufferings he endured for the love of God. There is a bibliography and other information in the book of essays written in his honor, Following the Star from the East.
Yet when we finally stand before God at the end of our lives, it is not mainly our accomplishments that will enable us to enter His Kingdom—however much they contributed to the good of the Church—but the faith and love God finds in our hearts. As Fr Boniface often said, we take nothing with us when we die except our relationship to God. So rather than speak of his accomplishments, what I would like to do here is simply to share a few reminiscences from my own experience in the monastery, since I have lived with him for approximately the last 20 years of his life.
When I entered the monastery, Fr Boniface was in his late sixties, still full of spunk and fire (more than I have in my mid-forties!). Only a few years before, the first foundation of Mt Tabor, in Dorris, CA, burned to the ground. Undaunted, he persevered and finally found the beautiful spot where the monastery now stands. He was not one to be intimidated by any obstacle to fulfilling his calling from God.
We were extremely poor in the beginning (now we’re just relatively poor!), and the vow and virtue of monastic poverty were always important to him. He embraced poverty almost to a fault: part of what he ‘’bequeathed” to us included huge quantities of more or less useless pieces of pipe and wood, bent nails, and almost anything that could conceivably be used for something someday. Yet we learned much from him about the spirit of poverty, which we continue to live today. He showed us how, by seeking the “one thing necessary,” to live without many of the amenities that so many take for granted. A little wisdom goes a long way in learning how to live a simple life and to be faithful stewards of what God provides.
Fr Boniface was a complex personality in some ways, yet he always sought peace and simplicity, and to impart to us a love for the simplicity of the life of the Gospel. He could be funny and charming, and he could be strict and inflexible. He was uncompromising when it came to defending the teachings of the Church, opposing liturgical abuses, and speaking out against the social and moral evils of our day, yet he had a soft heart for the poor and broken who often made their way to our gate.
Two things that struck me in a lasting way about Fr Boniface were his faith and his endurance in suffering. His belief in God and his faith in His presence in the sacraments were unshakeable. He had great reverence for the holy things and he spoke about the reality of God with the utmost confidence, having experienced the presence of God in powerful ways. And he put his faith into practice. I remember once when he had been confined to a wheelchair, we invited a man with a healing ministry to come and pray for him. After he had prayed, Fr Boniface simply put his faith in the power of God and exclaimed, “Well, if I’m healed, I should get up!” He rose from his wheelchair and never returned to it.
Yet he was afflicted with many other sufferings and endured them without complaint. Once in Africa he spent a night in a morgue, having suffered such serious injuries as to be considered dead. I was often amazed at his ability to celebrate the long services when he was in pain, and to endure the hardships of fasting and other monastic penances, at an age when most men are enjoying their retirements in relative ease. He rarely complained about his sufferings, though we did have some idea of what he had to endure. I learned a lot from his patient endurance. As a very small example, once when I wanted some sandals in the summer to get some relief from the heat, he showed me the high army boots he had to wear because of certain disability with his legs and simply said, “I wear these.” OK, I thought (getting the message), I’ll just endure a little more heat and offer it up.
For Fr Boniface, the Eastern monastic tradition was the best way to fully live the Gospel, and he never tired of “selling” it to anyone who would listen. He would always say, and with good reason, that there’s no better place to celebrate Holy Week and Easter than in a Byzantine monastery. He would impart to us, through classes in the monastery and in the Sheptytsky Institute lectures, his knowledge of Eastern theology, spirituality, and liturgy. We gained much valuable knowledge and insight from his vast learning and experience. I remember on several occasions, before he had to return to his home monastery in Belgium for the last few years of his life, hearing an inner voice that said, “Learn from him,” as if he would not be around much longer. I took it to heart and tried to learn and integrate the best of what he said and of the example that he gave.
Many people loved and respected Fr Boniface. He had a way of endearing himself to people, yet sometimes his intransigence on certain issues would make him seem to some anything but endearing. I have seen people walk out of our church during certain of his homilies, when he firmly took an unpopular (but orthodox) stance on some of today’s controverted issues. Yet most would gladly come back for more, having had enough of “politically correct” preaching in other places. We do our best to continue this tradition of upholding the teachings of the Church, however unpopular they may be to those who have capitulated to the spirit of the world.
Fr Boniface presided over both the material as well as the spiritual growth of the monastery since its tender beginnings in 1972. When I first came to Mt Tabor, it was little more than a forest with a church and a little house. When he told me the plans of where the novitiate and other buildings would be, I saw only a bunch of bushes and trees on a sloping hillside, telling myself I’d believe it when I saw it. But soon I found myself standing there, ax in hand, ready to clear a suitable area to build. Fr Boniface had great respect for the land and natural resources, so we tried to nestle our buildings among the natural growth without clearing out too much of it—often to the dismay of some of those who worked with us and didn’t like bumping into tree limbs when they were putting on a roof!Age and deteriorating health began to take their toll on our founder. A certain crisis developed in the community, initiated by one who rebelled against the authority and person of Fr Boniface, and who tried to get others to do so as well. Unfortunately, Fr Boniface did not respond to the situation in the best way, and it only grew worse. As Providence would have it, however, those who were dividing the community were expelled, but it also became clear that it was time for Fr Boniface to retire and to dedicate his time to writing and prayer in a different environment. It is not easy for a captain to leave his ship, and his tenacity (and what we sometimes called his “Belgian tact”) made the transition to new leadership just a bit rough, but Fr Boniface did return to work in Europe and eventually to retire in the monastery of his profession in Belgium. There he continued his work and correspondence until the time when the decline of his physical and mental abilities made it impossible. We kept in touch through letters and prayers until he could respond no more. He died in a Catholic nursing home and was buried in the cemetery of his original monastery.
Archimandrite Boniface will always be remembered for his strength of character, his undying faith and love for Christ in the Holy Trinity, his dedication to the Gospel and to monastic life—and for the twinkle in his eye. The children loved him and sometimes mistook him for Santa Claus or even God the Father. Once a child looked at him with bulging eyes, asking, “Are you…are you…?” He replied, “No, but I know him very well!”
We who continue to live monastic life at Mt Tabor will always be grateful to him, for this monastery would not be here if it weren’t for his vision, his labors and prayers. We hope and pray that this present stage of our history will see new growth in wisdom, holiness, and fidelity to the monastic life. We are here to serve God, but we would also like to make our founder proud of us. As we pray for his soul, we ask him to pray for us as well, for he walks no longer by faith, but by sight. May his memory be eternal!
—Abbot Joseph
From Second Spring:
Obituary. The death took place on the 22 October 2004 of the theologian Louis Bouyer of the French Oratory at the age of 91. A friend of Balthasar, Ratzinger and J.R.R. Tolkien, and a co-founder of the international review Communio, Bouyer was a Lutheran who converted to Catholicism in 1939. He became a leading figure in the Catholic Biblical and Liturgical movements of the twentieth century, was an influence on the Second Vatican Council, and is best known by many for his excellent writings on the history of Christian spirituality. His passing seems to have gone relatively almost unnoticed so far, but he deserves a flood of major tributes. His books are highly recommended (for example, The Invisible Father, a history of religion published in English in 1999).
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