Alasdair MacIntyre has a couple of essays (republished in the collection Ethics and Politics) that explain how Renaissance Aristotelians, in their misinterpretation of Aristotle, caused academic moral philosophers to be discredited. Does he give conclusive evidence for his historical thesis? I don't think so, but it is some sort of evidence nonetheless.

James Chatsek, Why act is essentially transcendent (or, Act as St. Thomas uses it, UPDATED)

Michael Sullivan, Gender Equality

Ah, but what does St. Bonaventure say about the headship of the family?

James Chastek, Why framing laws in terms of obligation to some extent misses the point

The Anglo-Catholic: Introducing Father Louis Bouyer

Fordham: Orthodox Constructions of the West (via Eirenikon)

Assault and murder?

I'm re-watching Public Enemies, and early in the movie, FBI agent Melvin Purvis warns Pretty Boy Floyd to stop. Floyd continues running, firing his Tommy gun to no use, since his pursuers are out of range. Purvis takes aim with his rifle and shots Floyd, mortally wounding him. Is what Purvis did licit? Or is it a sin? It could be argued that since he was out of range and fleeing, Floyd was not a threat to the lives of Purvis and the police officers. Even if a LEO is more like a soldier and has broader powers than that of a normal citizen, and is not only able to kill in self-defense, but is allowed to kill in defense of the community, even when his own life is not threatened, is it permitted for soldiers to shoot and kill the enemy when it is in retreat? This has happened frequently during war, especially if one believes the historical studies cited by Col. Grossman, but is it right?

A defense: Purvis is allowed to shoot in order to stop and prevent Floyd from committing another crime? But Floyd was not about to commit another crime, though he might do so in the future. How about stopping Floyd in order to apprehend him? Are any means acceptable in order to catch a fugitive? Or must the fugitive's "right to life" be respected, unless he poses an immediate danger to those seeking to catch him?

Can extrajudicial capital punishment be tolerated, for the sake of justice?

James Chastek, Reasons for the claim “Morality requires God”

The most important way God and morality are connected is God being our ultimate end and the primary object of our love. No one can be completely moral unless he love God.

The Useless Tree: In Honor of D. C. Lau

More:
In Memory of D. C. Lau | China blog | ChinaGeeks
D. C. Lau, 1921-2010

D.C. Lau D.C. Lau was born in Hong Kong in 1921
short profile

Zenit: Papal Address to Social Science Academy
"Economic Life Should Properly Be Seen as an Exercise of Human Responsibility"

Friars of the Immaculate: A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ

I still haven't read The Universal Primacy of Christ. Aquinas argues from Sacred Scripture that the motive of the Incarnation was for the restoration of human nature. He does not say that it is impossible that the Word would have become incarnate even if there had been no sin, but that we have not been told that this is the case.

Why are mathematicians prone to explaining everything through math?

His official website.
Stephen Wolfram: A New Kind of Science
Wolfram Research: Mathematica, Technical and Scientific Software
Wolfram Blog



Reflections on Stephen Wolfram's 'A New Kind of Science'

Edward Feser, ID, A-T, and Duns Scotus: A further reply to Torley

James Chastek, An interpretation of “all I have written is straw compared to what I have seen”

The most well-known story of St. Thomas’s life is that he stopped writing a few months before he died, saying that “all that I have written was like straw compared to what I have seen”. The experience is difficult to judge for several reasons: the reference to “straw” commands most of the attention, but it’s not clear exactly what this means; but also- and more simply- we don’t know what he saw. It’s hard to understand something being “straw” in comparison to X without knowing what X is.

We do, however, know the modes of the things he is comparing, and this is significant. “What is written” is a certain mode of knowledge; “what is seen” is another. What is the nature of each of these modes, and what might they tell us about why the things in the mode of writing were “straw”?

Writing sets the role of making in knowledge in bold relief. Words are human artifacts, as are the letters one creates to record them, and the author himself must make the order among the words. All this making is to communicate the primordial making of the human agent intellect, which makes a concept in conjunction with the object as an exterior principle. By way of contrast, angels don’t need to make the word (or species) by which they know, since the word is simply innate to them (and thus it can’t be called a concept); and God need not make the word he knows since he simply is that word.

All this making of that which is known is opposed to pure intuition, which is most of all manifest to us in sight. The sensible object requires no cognitive act to make it sensible. This absence of making in knowledge is called intuition, and in the measure that our understanding is less the product of making it is more intuitive. Thus, the higher the intellect, the more intuitive it is, and the less it is characterized by the need to make that by which it sees. All this making of our intellect, therefore, is really just a shadow of intellectual non-making, that is, of the pure intuition of higher intellects and disembodied souls. It is this pure intuition that most deserves the name “see”; and taken in this sense, human beings see only in a very roundabout and shadowy way. What we long for is the effortless intuition of the in corporeal or disembodied intellects, which can simply see science as opposed to having to make it after a very long initiation process. This making process is most of all manifest in”writing”; and in this sense we all long to throw aside our writing and simply see. St. Thomas’s desire to stop writing, in other words, is natural and common to all of us. St. Thomas, however, had that desire fulfilled in this life, while the rest of us have to wait.

Zenit: Archbishop Speaks on Aquinas and Universities
"We Must Reaffirm the Passion for Truth That Animated St. Thomas"

The Treasonous Clerk: “See, I Am Doing Something New”: John Paul II’s Summons to Secular Being, by James Matthew Wilson

The pope’s summons proves extremely daunting: he wants a philosophy attentive to metaphysics in order to reground modern theology in a concern with reality—with objective and absolute truth. But, in 1998, he finds no one (or few) in contemporary philosophy turned toward the questions of being. Who any longer treats philosophy as founded in its sapiential dimension—that is, in its drive to explore the foundational human questions all persons need answered if they are to live fully (§81)? And who endeavors to arrive at philosophy’s “genuinely metaphysical range” (§83), its concern with being, with what is real? And so Fides et Ratio makes an intervention in philosophy in hopes of building up a population of philosophers who might, someday and in turn, help to rebuild modern theology as a discipline attentive to the foundations of reality rather than merely the phenomena of history or experience. Beyond analytic and Continental philosophy, we need, as it were, a renewal of “plain old-fashioned philosophy.”
Emblem of the Papacy

Thus, the provisional nature of this encyclical. It makes insightful arguments about the history of religions and intellectual inquiry in general; it recovers a reading or narrative of history often dismissed as the alibi of an anti-modern Church; but in doing so it primarily makes the case for others to begin a new work: the rediscovery of human life as an intellectual and spiritual pilgrimage whose terrain is always what is real (being) and whose horizons are the specific historical revelation of God’s Word and the “infinite mystery” of God Himself (§14). We are asked to rediscover that the reason of “separate philosophy” leads finally to despair of reason. If, on the contrary, we recognize that reason is preceded by faith (as we experience, for instance, in the already present desire to know the truth about ourselves) and that reason is completed by faith (reason opens onto truths that, finally, surpass it and that it can see in only fragmented fashion) (§13)—we discover something grand. Reason participates in the human being’s circular journey from the gift of being and the gift of revelation toward a theological understanding of those gifts. It is man’s natural means of searching for a truth that ultimately transcends human life and reason alike and brings all searching to an end (§73).

Fr. Benedict Ashley has written that Thomism has neglected the historical dimension of being, but it is not clear to me how this can be the case if philosophy is to attain to the Aristotelian ideal of episteme and sophia. The contingent may be helpful in helping us understand natures and causes, but there cannot be a science of the contingent as such. While Pope John Paul II is correct that we are in need of metaphysics, Fr. Ashley rightly reminds those who desire to know that we must first have an adequate physics.

Edward Feser: Dembski rolls snake eyes and the actual response.

Edward Feser, Cudworth and Fuller respond

One of the comments at WWWTW:

30. In order to maintain the unity of body and soul clearly taught in revelation, the Magisterium adopted the definition of the human soul as forma substantialis (cf. Council of Vienne and the Fifth Lateran Council). Here the Magisterium relied on Thomistic anthropology which, drawing upon the philosophy of Aristotle, understands body and soul as the material and spiritual principles of a single human being. It may be noted that this account is not incompatible with present-day scientific insights. Modern physics has demonstrated that matter in its most elementary particles is purely potential and possesses no tendency toward organization. But the level of organization in the universe, which contains highly organized forms of living and non-living entities, implies the presence of some "information." This line of reasoning suggests a partial analogy between the Aristotelian concept of substantial form and the modern scientific notion of "information." Thus, for example, the DNA of the chromosomes contains the information necessary for matter to be organized according to what is typical of a certain species or individual. Analogically, the substantial form provides to prime matter the information it needs to be organized in a particular way. This analogy should be taken with due caution because metaphysical and spiritual concepts cannot be simply compared with material, biological data.

http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040723_communion-stewardship_en.html

Which reveals two things, to a Thomist -- a Catholic theologian cannot do without adequate training in philosophy, especially physics, if he is to speak of natural things. Secondly, one must look at the causes of natural things in order to judge what others speak of them. While it may be easy for those of some intelligence to look for corresponding concepts, it is unfortunate that they do not see the problem with saying DNA is the formal cause of a human body, which can lend support to a dualistic understanding of human nature. Catholic intellectuals have lost much in the last century.

James Chastek, Notes on Thomism and ID

Wolfgang Smith has a new book out from Sophia Perennis, according to Amazon, but it is not listed on the Sophia Perennis website yet -- Science and Myth: What We Are Never Told.