Sandro Magister, Religious Freedom. Was the Church Also Right When It Condemned It?

Benedictine theologian Basile Valuet weighs in on the dispute over Vatican Council II. Against the traditionalists Gherardini and de Mattei. But also against the "Ratzingerian" Rhonheimer

From God's Word:

Among the sedes apostolicae, there is in turn the sedes apostolica of Rome, which obviously relates to the other sedes apostolicae roughly as these do to the sees that are not directly apostolic. It thereby represents the ultimate and genuine criterion of Catholicity, sufficient in itself.

Taking everything together, we may determine that, at the moment when the theology of the successio apostolica  was first formulated as such, and when the Church first undertook to define her own nature, the "canon" of her being, in a conscious way, this theology was neither episcopal theology nor certainly papal theology; rather, it was dual, insofar as it distinguished between "episcopacy" and the sedes apostolicae--embodied, above all, in the one see of Rome. If the successio is the concrete form of the word, then that paramount--perhaps scandalous--concreteness that lies in the ultimate connection with the Roman line of succession, has been part of it from the beginning: at this point, all anonymity is abolished; the concrete name makes the inescapable demand that one take up a position; it is the most acute form of that extreme concreteness in which God set out by assuming, not just a name for men, but the flesh of man--the flesh of the Church. Must it not also be the most acute form of scandal that this "foolish" action of God provokes?

Let us return. It is clear that the duality of the earliest theology of succession afforded by the emphasis on the sedes apostolicae has nothing to do with the later concept of patriarchates, to which it may well have supplied starting points. Confusion of the original claim of the sedes apostolica with the administrative claim of the city that is a patriarchal see characterizes the tragedy of the dispute beginning between Constantinople and Rome. The concept of the patriarchate, which, especially from the Council of Chalcedon onward, was set in opposition to the Roman claim, and tried to contain it within the patriarchal way of thinking, misjudges the nature of this claim at its most profound level, since it is based on an entirely different principle. The patriarchal principle is post-Constantinian; its significance is administrative; and hence its practice is closely linked with political and geographical realities; in contrast with that, the Roman claim is understood on the basis of the originally theological theme of the sedes apostolica. To the same degree that [new Rome] which could not consider calling itself "apostolic") blurred the old idea of the sedes apostolica in favor [of] the patriarchal concept, old Rome reinforced its references to the completely different origin and character of its own authority.

This authority is in fact quite different from a primacy of honor among patriarchs, because it operates on a quite different level, independent of such administrative concepts. The concealing of the old theological idea of the sedes apostolica, which was after all from the outset a part of the Church's understanding of herself, by the idea of the five patriarchates must be regarded as the real evil in the dispute between East and West, an evil that also had its effect upon the West, inasmuch as--despite the retention fo the concept of the sedes apostolica--a largely administrative and patriarchal concept of the importance of the Roman See developed that could hardly help any outsider to have a clear grasp fo the real essence of the Roman claim, as distinct from any other claims. [33-35]

Pope Retires Title "Patriarch of West" as Obsolete
Communique
Catholic Culture

Aristotelian logic by William Thomas Parry, Edward A. Hacker (GB)

Something to keep track of... It's out of print but maybe a cheap used copy can be had...

Poetic knowledge and classical education

What sort of mind is proportioned to an education in philosophy? Dialectic and contact with the real world are necessary for the student of philosophy, but what else is required for the student to be able to accept the definitions given to him by his teachers and books? I have thought that the best way to stimulate inquiry is through socratic questioning, but what other means are there for the teacher of philosophy? Is it proper to proceed in a "logical" fashion, with definitions/axioms and reasoning from them? This question about how to teach philosophy got me thinking about pedagogy and other modes of knowing... I again recall the complaints lodged by critics of the manuals. Was the seminary and Catholic university education of the early 20th century intellectually deadening because the requisite preparation that is necessary for scientific learning is missing?

John Senior and Poetic Knowledge:

A tribute to John Senior
Our Schoolmaster Remembered
An interview with James S. Taylor (His Poetic Knowledge: The Recovery of Education.)
"The End of Education": John Senior and the Idea of the University

Teaching Classical Literature Classically by Andrew Kern (CiRCE)
THE “GOOD BOOKS” LITERATURE PROGRAM by Elisabeth Carmack, Ph.D., N.D., DiH.
CIRCE Institute

Related:
Inside Classical Education
Institute for Classical Schools
Memoria Press
The Classical Scholar
Classical Academic Press

Institute for Catholic Liberal Education

A critique of certain programs (including Well-Trained Mind) by a Randian.

A piece on peak oil

Entropy, peak oil, and Stoic philosophy by Ugo Bardi

Any other proponents of neo-stoicism out there?

Zenit: Papal Address to Marriage and Family Institute
"In Love Man Is 'Re-created'"

CUA: Catholic University to Host 2012 Conference on 50th Anniversary of Vatican II

Enough talking, time for action? Or maybe the problem is that the talking was mostly for naught, because the authors of the documents didn't really address the problem of "modernity" because they failed to understand it?

If we could ignore the documents of Vatican II for a moment, what is there of pastoral and dogmatic value that could not be presented through what came before the council? American lay people are familiar with what is taught in the name of the council, but what would a summary of the council documents be like?

Metropolitan Kallistos Ware, St. John Climacus and Prayer (mp3)

Sandro Magister, Benedict XVI the "Reformist." The Prosecution Rests

Introvigne replies to de Mattei, a leader of the anti-conciliarists. And Professor Rhonheimer returns to explain how and why Vatican II must be understood and accepted. In the way indicated by the pope

Christian Philosophy

homistica: New book on Christian Philosophy debates

A collection of the original sources; it won't have later and non-French contributors like John Wippel and Ralph McInerny.

I wrote a paper on this once -- I'd have to revise part of it at least. The first question that needs to be answered is: "How are we to define philosophy?" Do we accept the scholastic definition, or do we define philosophy as something less exact, so that the lyrical expressions of wannabe poets can be considered philosophy? Is philosophy about the mode in which it is expressed or the reasoning? Are there universal rules for good reasoning (including how to define well), which are studied in logic? How much logic did moderns like Blondel study? I think the debate is illustrative of what happens when people have lost the art of definition and name without guidance.

Some could interpret those who affirmed that there is such a thing as Christian philosophy as making an apologetical argument - Gilson and Maritain, for example. A last gasp of Christian triumphalism, unwittingly put forth by "existential" Thomists? Or another attempt to discredit scholasticism, with its philosophical compnent as the target.

If we accept that philosophy is reasoned-out knowledge, then there is no such thing as "Christian" philosophy. Some may be referring instead to how faith and reason interact or how grace affects reason, and naming this nexus as "Christian" philosophy; while it is true that the supernatural life does have benefits for those who seek reasoned-out knowledge, to say that this is "Christian" philosophy is potentially misleading, as our starting points or logic are not affected.


(And if it is claimed that the life of grace enables reason to reflect upon truths "natural" reason cannot come to know, then this would not be philosophy at all.)

Humans 'predisposed' to believe in gods and the afterlife

I believe apologists have made use of this "universal" fact in favor of theism.

So what are atheists to do but try to explain this away with evolutionary psychology or some other form of reductionism? Could it be that the simple and the uneducated have some sort of understanding that the operations of the mind transcend the limits of matter?

Cardinal Burke on the liturgy

Cardinal Raymond Leo Burke from Province of Saint Joseph on Vimeo.

Courses by Michel Labourdette op

On the virtues of Hope and Charity. (In French)

Volume 1 of his course is in commercial print! Cours de théologie morale fondamentale

Parole et Silence
Revue thomiste

How much effort should lay people put into discerning God's will?

Everyone should use prudence, and everyone should ask to be better confirmed God's will. Everyone should learn how to abandon themselves to Divine Providence. But does everyone equally need to know God's will? Lay people can discern what they should do, but much of their action is constrained by their duties and the rules and mores of their community. This is true of secular priests to an extent.

But at present it seems to me that those who need to discern God's will the most are those (religious) who no longer participate in the human economy, but wholly serve the Divine Economy. As a result, they need to be enlightened by Him directly as to how they are to serve Him and what they should do. Much of what the laity needs to do in order to fulfill God's will is given to them through the Natural Law, in conjunction with positive laws. The laity need to exercise prudence, as do those in religious life, but I think religious need to check that they are not presuming to be doing God's will, but must in humility ask to know whether this is actually the case.

The young do need to ask the question of whether they have a vocation to the priesthood or the religious life, but after that... maybe only with respect to great or extraordinary things or difficult cass? A parent does not need to question whether God wants him to do what is right for his children?

An old article in the Marquette Law Review, written by Anton Hermann Chroust: The Problem of Private Property According to St. Thomas Aquinas

Lumen Christi Institute: April 27: "The Dignity of Being a Substance" by Gilles Emery, OP

Vimeo

“The Dignity of Being a Substance” from The Lumen Christi Institute on Vimeo.

How great the burden of proof?

Re: torturing people for the sake of getting information

What needs to be be established so that the court (or lawful authority) can find someone guilty of contempt in refusing to answer some question he has been commanded to answer? Beyond a "reasonable doubt"? It seems to me that it would be difficult to show beyond a reasonable doubt that someone knows (or plans) x - I can't imagine there being sufficient incriminating evidence that someone knows x without the needed information being present as well.

I think the burden should be rather great. If it cannot be established without a reasonable doubt that someone knows x, then he cannot be punished for refusing to divulge that information, even if those in authority have reasons for suspecting that he has that information.

Don Paco on St. Thomas's philosophy

Quaeritur: Aren't You Unfairly Criticizing Gilson?

Additional notes on the definition of torture

Begun on March 19.

Some thoughts on the use of "compel" or "coerce" in the definition of torture.

Compel, coerce, force may be synonyms, but their usage may indicate slight (or not-so-sleight) differences in their meanings?

"Compel" may be somewhat ambiguous, as ambiguous as the definition of "torture" can be. After all, torture can be defined as the use of pain or bodily harm to compel obedience, the yielding of information, etc. -- to make someone do what they do not want to do. If a police officer uses pain to make someone resisting arrest comply with his legitimate commands, is he torturing that person? (Or if a child is spanked because he is not obeying his parents' instructions, is that torture?) Pain is used to bring someone to do something the one applying the pain wants. The same is true of force. On the surface, this does not seem like punishment for disobedience, but the use of pain or force is usually a response (and hence justified in the eyes of the law) to prior non-compliance/disobedience of an instruction or order.


"Coerce" may be less ambiguous than the other two words because in the literature the word coercion is often associated with law and government. Law coerces as well as commands. It doesn't necessarily imply a voluntaristic understanding of law; it is how the effects of law are perceived by its subjects, who may have only an imperfect understanding of the purpose of law.Does coercion involve an understanding that the consequences of not following are punishments? Punishments for disobeying a (legitimate) command? In so far as it is tied to law, I think it does. One is given the opportunity to comply, and if one refuses to do so, he is punished.

(The wiki entry on coercion. SEP. IEP on Free Will.)

How do we distinguish morally licit forms of coercion  (if there are any), getting obedience, cooperation, compliance through the application of pain and so on, from illicit forms? One could make an argument from human dignity that no one should be made a tool of another's will, but taken to an extreme, this argument (proper to liberalism) would lead to the sanctioning of disobedience and the outlawing of all consequences for that act. So is compulsion (as in the example of the police officer) to be identified with (legal) coercion and hence punishment?

In coercing the will of another, one is doing so with respect to an external act, and in particular acts of the body, whether it be to say something or to submit to an arrest.One cannot coerce the will to truly choose some opinion or belief, to assent or deny something, because we cannot confirm that this is actually the case. We can only obtain the physical representation of that belief through a verbal or written profession. Nor can we coerce the will's internal acts (desiring or loving some end). "Mental states" are hidden from us. That sort of mind control is impossible for us, and hence a non-believer cannot be effectively compelled from without to embrace the Christian faith. It also goes against the nature of the act of faith because the "grounds for belief" is not relief of pain or one's physical safety or health, but God's revealing of Himself and the acceptance of this. To say that the act of faith is or must be a free act does not go far enough, in my opinion, in explaining why it cannot be coerced. How is it free, that epistemic encounter with God?

Again, even if torture could be morally justified,  it is ineffective (according to various "experts) at procuring truth (confessions of guilt) or information.

*Compulsion presupposes that the original command was lawful - the one giving the command hand the authority to do so, the one being commanded is under his authority, and so on.

Catholic Online: Verbum Domini: Pope Calls the Faithful to Fall in Love with the Living Word of God