A Faithful Interpretation of Suarez?

forgetting that Francisco Suarez was such a Marxist pic.twitter.com/msfWIagOsZ

— Jordan L. Perkins, Doctor of Juris (@jordanlperkins) May 7, 2020

How do we get from point A (resources given by God for the benefit of all) to point Z (after being allocated and being the matter of productive labor, what is produced is nevertheless still a "common good" that can be distributed by whoever holds political authority)?

I am doubting that the distinction resulting from the mendicant controversies between ownership and use would be that helpful, though it is the case that later scholastics applied it.

Electing Bishops?

CWR: New ARCIC document issues call for episcopal and ecumenical accountability by Dr. Adam A. J. DeVille

More Notes on Voting

One may vote for an unworthy candidate only when this is necessary to prevent a still less worthy candidate from obtaining office; but in such a case one should explain the reason for his action if this is possible. In an exceptional case one may vote for some unworthy candidate; viz., if he can thereby avert some unusually great personal disadvantage. (Fr Jone, Moral Theology, n. 295)

Has the formality or the ratio of the object of voting been changed?

The formality of the object of the act is not necessitated. Whether someone is "worthy" of the office is separable in reason from what one judges to be the consequences of his being in office.

I used to lean towards thinking that it was consequentialism and in so far as one ignores what should be the intrinsic morality of the act of voting it does appear to be such. It is one thing to choose someone who ones knows is unworthy and to deliberately do so. It is another to change the ratio of the act of voting from being an act of distributive justice to one of choosing the better option in a rigged system in view of possible consequences.

The object of the act itself can be changed by reason or differ in reason. Am I cutting off an arm to injure another? Or am I cutting off an arm to save his life? The physical act is the same -- the formal object of the act differs.

One could argue that because political office is linked to the common good that choosing someone for political office is therefore an act of distributive justice. I would contend the problem here is that political office, especially in the United States, is not tied to the common good by virtue of the inappropriate size of the political organization and its history. For a similar argument regarding the modern nation-state based on its history, see William Cavanaugh. Because political office, by the very structure of the nation-state, is not tied to the common good it is already an illegitimate use of power to command others. By the fact that it is a tyranny, there is no way to exercise distributive justice to begin with.

Re: the example of casuistry in the OP then,

So taking the ideal example of a true polity which respects the common good --

1. if all of those worthy for office for some reason refused to accept an office or to be considered for office and this is something that could not be changed

2. and one was left with two unworthy candidates, one being less unworthy than the other

3. It seems that in such a case distributive justice cannot be exercised, and the voter is not culpable for this being so (though the culpability of those refusing to take office may differ) -- and one is justified in choosing the less worthy candidate because of the common good.

In the example of a system that is rigged by those who actually hold power so that one is presented with candidates one would not choose otherwise and there are no remedies for this tyranny (peaceful or violent), then the culpability of the injustice falls on those responsible for preserving the system, and not on the voter.

A Note on Voting

Voting seems to be a materially unjust act, not a formally unjust one for most voters -- they have no control over who can be a candidate. In that respect, the parties and the "system" is at fault. Still, if they do not write in a candidate who they think is most qualified for the office, are they complicit in injustice? Who is an acceptable write-in candidates is determined by the state government, and I don't know if all states share the same rules. I am guessing that they don't. One can ask whether those rules or just or not, or if they place an undue burden on those seeking to exercise their vote in good conscience.

The Right to Citizenship

A follow-up to this post.

Why is there not a universal, natural right to citizenship?

1. What is required for one to be able to order the community, or legislate, well? [Civic] prudence and the moral virtues.

2. What about being able to judge other people well, according to their character (rather than the platform that they espouse)? This requires experience, familiarity with virtue, and right opinion regarding moral precepts and the good, at least, if not knowledge.

These are not inborn traits; they must be acquired and they are contingent, not necessary. As a result, there can be no natural right since no one is "naturally" qualified to rule or to have some share in it. Some notion of [natural] individual dominion or sovereignty is inadequate to back up the claim that such a right exists. In accordance with distributive justice, then, the work of the whole should be done by all the members of whole only if they are qualified to do it, not simply because they are members.

One might appeal to Aquinas' discussion of law as a counter-argument in favor of all being naturally entitled to citizenship:

Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.

The act of legislating belongs to the community as a whole in directing itself to its good - "since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs." This could be further explained by an appeal to dominion or sovereignty (though Aquinas does not do so in the Summa Theologiae).

But not all participate in the ordering in the right way - some order, some are ordered. And even those who order may not do so equally, for example the members of the family. While the wife (and to a lesser extent their children) may contribute to the deliberation of the household, the husband is the authority. I do not think Aquinas would dispute this point. There appears to be a significant difference between an individual directing himself and an individual being a part of a group. The differences between the members and the consequences of these on their relationships to one another (~social dynamics) are such that the group is not reducible to the totality of the individuals who comprise it. The act of legislation may be attributable to the community as a whole, but it is not necessary that all members of the community are equally the author of that act - there may be justified degrees of participation. While it may be proper that all members of a community be consulted concerning potential legislation (especially regarding its impact on the community), this does not entail that all should be legislators.

While I am sympathetic to the claim that the best constitution (or the one most amenable to Christian fraternity) is that of a republic, it is an ideal and not one that comes about naturally. The paideia that is required must be in place in order to bring a republic into being and to sustain it. Nowadays, it is not as important question  as the problem of size and scale, a more pressing matter, not only because of the lack of ecological sustainability.

If it is not in accord with distributive justice that those who do not have the requisite virtue have a share in rule, and it is not unjust to prevent them from having it, could a valid consequentialist argument be made that if they were to have a share in rule that a worse state of affairs would result (e.g. there would be more disagreement and conflict, or the quality of the legislation would decrease as more compromises would have to be made to satisfy the demands of opposing factions)?

An additional question that needs to be addressed is whether men and women are equally suited to rule. But perhaps a more important consideration is the relationship of a man to his family as the husband and father and to other men as a member of a group.

Natural resources, again

And ownership...

How are natural resources common? (1) Intended for the benefit of all? (And therefore to be shared by all or apportioned to all.) Or (2) common in so far as they are not claimed by anyone? In which case they (a) belong in potency to everyone or anyone, or (b) belong in actuality to everyone until they are apportioned to someone through property claims/rights?

I'm thinking of not just fossil fuels, oil and coal, but other, more basic natural resources -- fresh water, [arable] land, plants and trees -- these do not appear to be uniformly distributed across the planet. Is it the case that how they are to be distributed should be left to the market, and to contracts between individuals or groups, and thus governed only by commutative justice, with property rights being given to those who have first possession? Or should distributive justice also play a role in determining property rights, with only labor for extraction and processing covered by commutative justice?

Or do fossil fuels differ from other natural resources because they are such immense stores of energy and more important/valuable in that respect?

How are claims of ownership to be adjudicated if not "first come, first have," or "finders, keepers"?

I could imagine these considerations being used to defend the need for a world government, in order for there to be an 'equitable' distribution of resources.

Something to reflect upon again: the right to refuse service and the right of association

Tony M. over at WWWTW has a post on authority: Political Authority and its Legitimacy.

Who is doing the designating? How so (and on what basis and rationale)? And how is this decision made known? How is authority transferred or conferred?

So, I am going to suggest that even within the context of assuming that all authority comes from God, it is a natural, essential feature of political authority in exercise that there be a public act or condition under which it is recognized, before the ruler can rightly and appropriately demand obedience.

Other than the sheerest direct intervention by miraculous sign, this public event or condition is at the hands of men: it is men, for example, who design and regulate the law of succession from one king to the next. In many cases, it is the oldest son, but in some cultures a group of elders select which son it is. Men can change the rule of succession without a revolution against the existing order. So, it seems to me correct to say that whatever we say about whether God puts the authority into the hands of the body politic as a whole for them to pass on, or not, it must be the case that God normally permits the designation of who shall hold authority as a matter for men to determine. (And this does not imply democracy.)

David Boyle, Land tax vs. land redistribution

The Stewardship Economy by Julian Pratt

An old article in the Marquette Law Review, written by Anton Hermann Chroust: The Problem of Private Property According to St. Thomas Aquinas

Ryan T. Anderson reviews John D. Mueller's Redeeming Economics: Dismal Science Redeemed: What’s Gone Wrong.

I'm puzzled by this account given by Mueller:

Thus the theory Aquinas outlined—known as “Scholastic” economics—had four key elements: the theory of production, which explains which goods (and how many of them) we produce; the theory of justice in exchange, which accounts for how we are compensated through the sale of goods for our contributing to their production; the theory of final distribution, which determines who will consume our goods; and finally, the theory of consumption (or utility), which explains which goods people prefer to consume.

I think I have the book, but if I do, it's in storage. What he writes here about distributive justice does need to be checked, since distributive justice pertains to common goods. It could be argued that whatever we produce from natural resources, which are clearly "common goods," is also common, but I haven't come across a persuasive argument that this is so.

Hugh Walters on Vincent McNabb, O.P.

The Thomist Inheritance and the Household Economy of Father Vincent McNabb

When St Thomas analyses property in the Commentary on the Sentences, the Summa Contra Gentiles, his lectures on Aristotle and the Summa Theologiae, he is not talking of the early communal apostolic life of the early church which could still be found in religious life. He is talking of ordinary ownership, and borrows his main line of thought from Aristotle’s Politics. The key texts in the Summa Theologiae are contained in 11-11 q.66, where he is discussing theft and robbery. Property is essentially about things (res), not, as later for Locke, ourselves, our life and our liberty as well as our possessions. Property involves ownership or control (dominium). This can be divided up into managing or taking care of them and distributing them (potestas procurandi et dispensandi) on the one hand, but also the use of things. Thomas does not in fact discuss quite how property is acquired—a lacuna leading to much diversion in later thought. The basic reason why this ownership is appropriate is argued from Genesis 1: the dominion given over the creation.

The main problem, though, is that of private property (propriam possidere): with what justification can someone come to appropriate for themselves what is common to all, or at least open to be appropriated by all? Thomas argues that private property is both permitted and necessary. The reasons for this are common sense ones, given human nature as it is: that everyone is more concerned to acquire their own things rather than what is common; common tasks will belong to everyone and no one; that it is simply more efficient and better organised to run one’s own affairs, and finally that there is less to quarrel about. He claims that it is what is jointly owned that is the basis of the most frequent disputes. Here he was running up against the radical tradition of the Church Fathers, who by and large saw private property as the basis of disputes. To incorporate this tradition, Thomas in his next paragraph seems to take back what he said, in discussing the use of things as opposed to their management.’ In this regard things are not held as private property but ut communes—as common, for the common good, the whole community. In need each should readily share with others. He quotes I Timothy, that the rich should give easily and communicate their wealth to others. Private property for Thomas is an extension of the natural law, part of human law, made by agreement, a device of human reason. It has been claimed, not without some justification, that the history of natural law (particularly that to do with property) is ‘an attempt to rearrange the elements of the puzzle left by Aquinas.’ The reason for this is the difficulty of reconciling the very idea of private property (with its concomitant idea of developing the resources of the earth) with the ability of those in need to have prior claim to it. What in fact does private property amount to?

The limits of property rights clarify the rhetorical flourishes of those who wanted to abolish the distinction of mine and thine. Here Thomas relies on the discussion of almsgiving or charity eleemosyna) to declare what became traditional teaching: some resources are essential for the survival of oneself and one’s household; some are necessary to one’s state of life and business affairs, or paying debts. These can be called absolute and relative necessity. Finally there are superflua, or luxuries. What should be done in justice with each of these elements of one’s own belongings?

In times of extreme need, ‘for anyone in that condition, all resources become common resources’. There is no theft morally: people in this condition are simply taking from the common stock. They are entitled to do so. Likewise those who have what is necessary for one’s state in life or superflua under a duty in strict justice to help those whose need they are aware of where there is dire need all around, the individual must judge what is best under the guidance of good sense. When there is no famine the rich ought by natural right to sustain the poor who do not have enough for a decent life out of their superflua: these are also held in common. Quite what is relatively necessary and what is superfluous is left up to individual judgement, a true judgement unswayed by consumerism, as we would say today. Yet, as Finnis says, for the distribution of superflua legislation is appropriate.

Two very important points arise out of this discussion of property. Distributive justice, what is owed to the poor in strict justice, is a matter for every owner, every householder. It is not primarily a matter for the state, contrary to our modern assumptions. Ownership is a good thing, limiting the power of the state and giving the rich the opportunity to give of their abundance both in justice and in charity. The second point is that Thomas says quite clearly that a man cannot have more than enough without another having less than enough (II-II 118 a.1 and 2). Finnis emphasises that even though economics is not a zero sum game, Thomas is still right to say this: ‘For if we set aside the possible world in which everyone everywhere has enough to meet all their needs, superflua truly belong to others; anyone who keeps them is depriving, and indeed stealing from those to whom they should by one means or another have been made available.’ The thoughts of St Thomas are taken up with clarity by McNabb who wrote ‘Study not merely to give God his due by worship but to give man his due by justice. What is superfluous to your poor estate distribute. This is distributive charity; a virtue so sacred that crimes against it are the forerunners of inevitable doom’.

Hrm... Distributive justice is to be executed by the owner, rather than the ruler? Who has charge over common goods has charge over their distribution -- so how is that which is owned by an individual "common"? If it is common, then how is it owned or property? But the point St. Thomas is making is that that which is superfluous reverts to being "common" in times of urgent need. But who should be handling the distribution -- those who have ownership of common goods, or those who had original ownership?


If it is the community as a whole that has ownership over what is common to all, then either it is the community as a whole, or those who are appointed to rule, who have the responsibility for distributing those goods, rather than the original owner?

Hence, an additional solution might be to argue that owners have some share in ruling and therefore this is part of their discharge of their duty as a ruler, but I do not think this is what the author is claiming. This solution may not be sustainable, even if it may be in accord with certain republican sympathies.

Is it more an act of charity than of distributive justice? (And should not one's effort in producing those goods play some role not only in determining ownership/property claims, but also merit?)