Guess What Church Laws James Martin Would Like to Be Loosened

Gospel: Today Jesus's disciples are critiqued for picking grain on the Sabbath (Mk 2). He responds: "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." Jesus was a devout Jew, grounded in Jewish tradition. But he knew when to set aside some laws in favor of greater need. pic.twitter.com/oc0SSz4PxJ

— James Martin, SJ (@JamesMartinSJ) January 19, 2021

Theological Casuistry

Re: Ott (and similar manuals) weighing or attempting to weigh the certainty or probability of theological opinions -- upon what crtieria is one opinion deemed to be merely probable versus being of common consensus? (It's been a while since I've picked Ott up so I probably have the exact terms wrong.) Does the author look not just across space but across time? Is there any evaluation of the strength of the opinions themselves other than authority or number of adherents?

What does the pope mean by casuistry?

CWR: The Pope’s misuse of “calumny” distracts from deeper, more troubling questions by Christopher R. Altieri

The problem with Pope Francis’ defense of Bishop Juan Barros is not just that Francis has a poor grasp of technical legal terminology or that he misuses certain words, but that he thinks he knows better and refuses to listen to the people who do.

This would not be the first time Pope Francis’ lexical idiosyncrasies were cause for confusion. I still have not met anyone trained in the sacred sciences who can tell me what Francis means when he speaks of “casuistry” – or “abstract casuistry” – though it is clear he does not mean what is generally meant by the term, i.e. the resolution of moral problems by investigation into the specifics of the case and careful application of the general principles of moral science to the specific case, from within the specifics of the case, themselves.

Eastern Christian Books: Jesuits and Casuists: A Note on Understanding Amoris Laetitia

Eastern Christian Books: Jesuits and Casuists: A Note on Understanding Amoris Laetitia

CWR: “Amoris Laetitia” and the chasm in modern moral theology by Fr. D. Vincent Twomey, SVD

Can the apostolic exhortation help bridge the chasm that, since 1968, has divided moral theologians in matters of sexual morality?

The story about the cardinals' letter to the pope is trickling through Catholic news media and EWTN. Will anything else happen before the end of the year? As the cardinals would not be correcting a heretical pope, we don't have to deal with the question of whether that is canonically possible. But they would be correcting a pope who has been ambiguous in his defense of Latin discipline concerning the sacrament of Holy Communion.

Pope Francis, chastisement to the Latin churches and a step towards improving our understanding of the limited authority of the pope?


Does Amoris Laetitia Resolve Genuine Moral Dilemmas? by John Meinert

More Notes on Voting

One may vote for an unworthy candidate only when this is necessary to prevent a still less worthy candidate from obtaining office; but in such a case one should explain the reason for his action if this is possible. In an exceptional case one may vote for some unworthy candidate; viz., if he can thereby avert some unusually great personal disadvantage. (Fr Jone, Moral Theology, n. 295)

Has the formality or the ratio of the object of voting been changed?

The formality of the object of the act is not necessitated. Whether someone is "worthy" of the office is separable in reason from what one judges to be the consequences of his being in office.

I used to lean towards thinking that it was consequentialism and in so far as one ignores what should be the intrinsic morality of the act of voting it does appear to be such. It is one thing to choose someone who ones knows is unworthy and to deliberately do so. It is another to change the ratio of the act of voting from being an act of distributive justice to one of choosing the better option in a rigged system in view of possible consequences.

The object of the act itself can be changed by reason or differ in reason. Am I cutting off an arm to injure another? Or am I cutting off an arm to save his life? The physical act is the same -- the formal object of the act differs.

One could argue that because political office is linked to the common good that choosing someone for political office is therefore an act of distributive justice. I would contend the problem here is that political office, especially in the United States, is not tied to the common good by virtue of the inappropriate size of the political organization and its history. For a similar argument regarding the modern nation-state based on its history, see William Cavanaugh. Because political office, by the very structure of the nation-state, is not tied to the common good it is already an illegitimate use of power to command others. By the fact that it is a tyranny, there is no way to exercise distributive justice to begin with.

Re: the example of casuistry in the OP then,

So taking the ideal example of a true polity which respects the common good --

1. if all of those worthy for office for some reason refused to accept an office or to be considered for office and this is something that could not be changed

2. and one was left with two unworthy candidates, one being less unworthy than the other

3. It seems that in such a case distributive justice cannot be exercised, and the voter is not culpable for this being so (though the culpability of those refusing to take office may differ) -- and one is justified in choosing the less worthy candidate because of the common good.

In the example of a system that is rigged by those who actually hold power so that one is presented with candidates one would not choose otherwise and there are no remedies for this tyranny (peaceful or violent), then the culpability of the injustice falls on those responsible for preserving the system, and not on the voter.

A Note on Voting

Voting seems to be a materially unjust act, not a formally unjust one for most voters -- they have no control over who can be a candidate. In that respect, the parties and the "system" is at fault. Still, if they do not write in a candidate who they think is most qualified for the office, are they complicit in injustice? Who is an acceptable write-in candidates is determined by the state government, and I don't know if all states share the same rules. I am guessing that they don't. One can ask whether those rules or just or not, or if they place an undue burden on those seeking to exercise their vote in good conscience.

More on Amoris Laetitia

From Casuistry to Mercy, Towards a New Art of Pleasing? — An Essay on the Malaise in the Church by Msgr. Michel Schooyans
by Edward Pentin (via Pertinacious Papist)

The Modernist Ruse Behind the Bergoglian Pontificate by Christopher A. Ferrara (via Pertinacious Papist) - Gloria.tv

A response to Thomas Rausch, "Doctrine at the service of the pastoral mission of the Church"

One American prelate seems to approve of Rausch's essay:

Feat. in @CathNewWorld @civcatt essay by Thomas Rausch SJ: Doctrine at the service of pastoral mission of the Church https://t.co/iyPp3X22q9

— Archbishop Cupich (@ArchbishopBlase) May 10, 2016

Related:
From Churches to Church by Thomas P. Rausch
Assessing the movement toward Christian unity

Amoris Laetitia

Pope Francis’ post-Synodal Exhortation, Amoris Laetitia, on “The Joy of Love”, was officially released to the public at...

Posted by Vatican Radio - English Section on Friday, April 8, 2016

Pope’s Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation ReleasedCardinal Schönborn, Cardinal Baldisseri, and Married Couple Present Widely Anticipated ‘Amoris Laetitia’ on Love in the Family

Posted by ZENIT - News Agency on Friday, April 8, 2016

Edward Feser, Hey kids! Free casuistry!

Fr. Cessario on casuistry

The appendix to Introduction to Moral Theology.

Rather than putting all of the blame for the laity developing a distorted understanding of obedience on the Jesuits (as Geoffrey Hull does in A Banished Heart, iirc), should we attribute it instead to the general intellectual and cultural trends following Trent? Was this development in Christian moral theology mirrored by secular trends in understanding ethics in the 18th and 19th centuries? I can see how it would be in the interest of those in power to create docile citizens, but this is always the case, as we see in Aristotle's differentiation of the good citizen from the good man.

Regarding the appraisal of pre-conciliar treatments of sexual morality,  we should keep these comments by Fr. Cessario in mind:

The liberty of indifference favors a dualist anthropology insofar as the theory envisions the will as set over and against the rest of the powers of the human person. This may explain why casuist moral theology took a disproportionate interest in regulating sexual morality. No greater threat to the liberty of indifference could be imagined than the sudden upsurge of bad lust. So every precaution had to be taken to maintain the serene "indifference" of the will in the face of some de facto, especially unexpected, compelling good. Recall that, according to the casuist theorists, no factor outside of the will itself could set human willing effectively upon a particular course of action (238).

The "Jansenistic" attitude towards sex may not have been due to formal or even cultural Jansenism, but a "practical" Jansenism arising from the dominance of casuistry?

An Interview with Fr. Hugh Barbour

I need to find his short article on probabilism. Edit. Looks like that article is no longer available.

From his review of Morality of Everyday Life:

Another error that is more to the point regards the characterization of Saint Alphonsus’ moral teaching as “probabilism.” Quite precisely, his theory is called “aequiprobabilism.” This school of casuistry holds that the opinion favoring liberty over law may be followed if it is intrinsically probable, all things being equal. This last condition means that, in cases where there is question of the cessation of a law that has already been in force, the opinion favors the law even if the other opinion has probability, but, when there is question of the law having yet come into force, the opinion favors liberty. The simple probabilist holds that any truly probable opinion may be followed, even if an opposing opinion may be more probable. An aequiprobabilist holds the same view but gives greater weight to laws already presumably in force. In casuistic practice, however, these views are merely useful for persuading the penitent, because the confessor may not impose his theory’s resolution of the moral case in question on the penitent, if there exists another view not condemned by authority. In reality, the only two systems of moral evaluation condemned have been rigorism (as in the case of the Jansenists) and laxism (as in the case of some Jesuits), so all the others are practically probable and certainly licit. The Q.E.D. is that the probabilist view wins out, if the penitent wants it to and the confessor keeps within the bounds of his authority. The Thomist Dominic Pruemmer explains in his classic Vademecum:

If one prescinds from rigorism and laxism, each of the systems described is tolerated by the Church, and so the confessor has no right to impose his system on the penitent, or strictly require anything of the penitent which he is not bound to do according to the approach of another legitimate system. Thus the confessor may prudently counsel safer or more probable opinions, but he cannot strictly impose them (that is, in preference to merely probable ones). In practice let him choose those opinions which, considering all the circumstances, he foresees will produce the best fruit for the spiritual health of the penitent.

Thus, Dr. Fleming’s intuition is fundamentally sound: Probabilism, which favors liberty because of a respect for circumstances, is the default system of classical Roman Catholic casuistry. Even so, it is not Roman Catholic casuistry he is promoting but rather a return to any casuistic system at all (including Talmudic or Caroline) within the traditions that have made up our society, for such systems by their very nature harmonize with life as it is actually lived and use morality to preserve and strengthen rather than to break down and overturn ties of blood and soil and common endeavor. Apart from those few things one may never do under any circumstances—such as blaspheme, murder the innocent, commit unnatural acts, or steal from a man poorer than oneself—it is almost impossible to indicate specific acts that must always be done regardless of circumstances. For this reason, then, there must be casuistry, since the possibilities for doing good are literally infinite.

For every manual of casuistry, there needs to be a speculative presentation of general principles. Otherwise, the ethics inculcated may be merely a kind of positivistic integralism, a “this is the way its always been, so don’t ask questions” attitude, unable to defend itself from the critical and revolutionary spirit. This companion volume to The Morality of Everyday Life has yet to be written, but here the reviewer dares to present a suggestion as to what its overarching, unifying insight should be. The exposition of nominalism in the sixth chapter points in the direction of the deepest level of moral reasoning. Whereas Dr. Fleming’s interpretation and application of the genesis of the notion of individualism is not one to which I would subscribe, this is the one place in the book where he brushes up against the larger philosophical issue underlying any account of the morality of human acts and transcending any given instance of moral reasoning.

But is the speculative presentation of general principles by St. Alphonsus the same as that of St. Thomas Aquinas? Apparently not, according to Fr. Pinckaers...

Fr. Pinckaers on St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus Liguori

"Dominican Moral Theology in the 20th Century," The Pinckaers Reader, 77-8.

Father Deman, who succeeded Father Ramirez from 1945 to 1954, is of special interest to us because of his lengthy and excellent article on probabilism, which appeared in 1936.(1) There he makes a penetrating critical and systematic study of moral casuistry. He describes the controversy which had centered on probabilism since the seventeenth century in response to the problem of a doubtful conscience in the application of the law, and which ended in the recommendation of the teachings of St. Alphonsus Liguori. The latter became the patron saint of moral theologians because of his balance, which avoids the laxity of the casuists and the rigor of the Jansenists. However, Father Deman concludes his study on St. Alphonsus and on the concept of moral theology, of which he is the eminent representative, in these words:

Between St. Alphonsus and St. Thomas there remains the lack of harmony of two irreconcilable systems. Every attempt at reconciliation is doomed to concordism, that is to say, to artifice, that is to say, to failure. The historical reality of their misunderstanding cannot be denied.(2)

This judgement seems to me entirely justified. Between St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus and the authors of the manuals, even when they follow the Thomistic school, it is certainly possible to find some partial agreements, but there is always a fundamental lack of harmony at the level of systematization, all the more difficult to resolve when it is not perceived. In St. Thomas we are dealing with a morality of beatitude and the virtues, centering around charity and prudence, and with our modern moralists, with commandments and legal obligations, focusing on conscience and sins.

1. "Probabilisme," Dictionnaire de la theologie catholique, vol. 13 (1936), col. 417-619.
2. Ibid., col. 590.

Can the two systems of moral theology be harmonized? Not fully, according to Fr. Pinckaers. The precepts of the modern moralists, the casuistry and development of conscience, might be able to be integrated into a more "classical" system of moral theology, but its foundations or presuppositions about the Christian moral life cannot be.

Conscience, as it is understood by moderns, is not the same as prudence, and it cannot replace prudence, but is it a "part" of prudence? Does the development of conscience in accordance with the modern manuals truncate the development of prudence, and by extension, the Christian spiritual life? It seems to me that Fr. Pinckaers would agree with this conclusion, though I have to read what he writes about "modern" conscience.

Is everything really ok between a married couple?

Warning: this post is somewhat explicit.

Many Catholic theologians and apologists claim that so long as the placement of the sperm within the vagina is not thwarted or replaced by something else, then anything goes--anal sex, oral sex, etc.

For examples, this seems to be a typical response over at the EWTN Q&A section:

The rationale for the Church's stance that deliberate sexual stimulation (of any type, not just oral sex) outside of completed marital intercourse is wrong is, in part, because it is inherently selfish. Rather than giving completely of themselves to the other, the couple is using each other for sexual satisfaction while avoiding the responsibilities involved (e.g., complete unity, openness to new life).

The implication is that deliberate sexual stimulation within completed marital intercourse is ok, when used as a means to an end. Similarly:

Hi,

To make it absolutely clear:a couple can never have oral sex as a replacement for normal sex.

Oral sex is only allowed as a prelude to normal sex. I suggest you get Christopher West's book, "Good News About Sex and Marriage." It's available through shopcatholicl.com. It would be good for both of you to read it.

Fr. Vincent Serpa, O.P.

I need to read Love and Responsibility, but I doubt that John Paul II directly addressed the question of oral sex and anal sex. Some, however, have used what he has written to justify oral sex. From a blog, Catholic Writings:

Before he was elected Pope John Paul II, Karol Wojtyla wrote in his book “Love and Responsibility” that in an act of sexual intercourse, the couple should strive to attain climax at the same time. This highest point of the sexual union between husband and wife should be shared by both.

This ideal certainly is hard to achieve, given that, as said above, men reach orgasm much quicker than women. It is therefore the husband’s responsibility to slow down and “read” his wife’s body language, which will tell him when she is about to climax.

This is one area when oral sex is allowed between husband and wife - to help the woman to climax at the same time as the husband.

However, in the event that the man does climax first, it is also his responsibility to ensure that his wife also climaxes during this act of sexual intercourse by physical stimulation.

If the husband is engaged in coitus with his wife, how is he going to give oral sex at the same time? Manual stimulation, perhaps, but oral sex seems to be physically impossible, even for a contortionist.

Again, over at EWTN:

Dear Fr.:

In a recent post, you answered that oral sex deviates from the unitive and procreative aspects of the marriage act. However, I think some detail must be made clear to arrive at the fullest picture of truth, otherwise incorrect conclusions might be drawn and sometimes those incorrect conclusions can bring great sorrow to the marriage bed and that's not what the church intends.

Although oral sex may not be licitly performed to completion, as that inhibits the procreative aspect of married sex, it should be noted that 1) oral sex as a prelude to intercourse is licit and 2) the statement is only fully true when discussing oral sex from wife to husband; oral sex to fulfill sexual pleasure for a husband TO his wife actually aids in the unitive aspect of married sex. As long as the completed sex act end with sperm ejaculated into the vagina, other techniques for aiding the wife's sexual pleasure are actually encouraged, be it oral or manual. John Paul II wrote as much when he spoke of the obligation of a husband to give his wife sexual pleasure in Love and Responsibility. It is no secret to know that very many women simply cannot achieve orgasm with direct intercourse alone. For a wife to be left without this unitive aspect of lovemaking is actually against the teachings of the church. If you think about it, it's basic biology as God created us and human body parts are part of His design (a theology of the body, so to speak): God created a man with one sexual organ, a penis, and it allows the man to assist in procreation and it gives the man (and woman, to a lesser extent) sexual pleasure. God created a woman with a vagina for procreation and a clitoris that does nothing else but give the woman pleasure. For all parts of the body to be used as God planned it surely is good.

However, having said that, it is quite clear that oral or manual sex in place of completed intercourse is always sinful. In this day and age, when we are bombarded with deviant sexual behavior in and out of marriage, it is imperitive that clear teaching of Catholic sexualtiy not be shyed away from, as that is what will keep marriages strong. (By they way, I got much of this information from the previous priest who did the Q&A for the EWTN NFP forum; it's legit, I promise!)

Pleasure is the unitive aspect of lovemaking? Unitive in an equivocal sense, or common in praedicando. What is actually unitive is coitus itself, when a man and woman join as one flesh.
Is pleasure the purpose of coitus? Or is it, as Aristotle teaches, the completion of the act? I think the reason we have problems understanding traditional sexual morality is because we are so engrossed with pleasure, and don't understand its place within natural teleology.

This is almost as bad as the position which says anything is ok between two consenting adults.
Where does this confusion arise? Perhaps it is an attempt to reconcile proportionalism (or a system that focuses exclusively on the intention) with the Church's teachings about contraception and sex (in so far as they remain 'physicalist'? or so the critics would say), leaving as much freedom as possible for the moral agent. (The "new" casuistry.) Or perhaps it arises from some form of "personalism" (though it is not clear to me that personalism has different historical sources and causes as proportionalism).

The Church's teachings against artificial contraception are on solid ground; but it seems to me that many of the explanations offered to defend her teachings do not pay sufficient attention to the morality of the external act, and its object. Is it commensurate for the penis to be put anywhere other than the vagina? It seems to me that the answer is no.

Certainly, there are health risks associated with anal sex? Frequent anal sex can lead to incontinence after the loss of muscle tone and the diminished ability of the sphincter muscle to contract, etc. But it seems that arguing anal sex is wrong based on future consequences is a consequentialist argument. It is not the same as pointing out that there is an affinity between the penis and the vagina, in so far as there is natural lubrication provided by secretions, and protection against friction given type of cells constituting the vaginal wall, and so on? There are all sort of physiological details that reveal it is proper for the penis to be in the vagina, in contrast to the anus, where there is no lubrication and the muscle wall is rather thin and susceptible to tearing, and so on.

What about the use of the hands for manual stimulation? It seems that between a married couple, the use of the hands to caress, excite and please is ok, so long as the marital embrace is not frustrated or replaced. What of the mouth? There seems to me to be a difference between kissing as a sign of reverence, and using it as a tool for stimulation. And then of course there is the women using her mouth as a substitute vagina. As for men "giving oral sex," one notes that the [chauvinistic] Greeks thought that this practice was unmanly.

While the use of the hands to stimulate the genitalia seems ok, it does not seem to me that the same can be said of using the mouth and tongue. It may be difficult to formulate an argument why, beyond 'modest repugnance,' but as evidence I would point to the fact that the sense of taste has for its organ the tongue, and the sense of smell often works in conjunction with the tongue (and its organ, too, is located in the head, on the face). Given the proximity of the components of the reproductive system to those of the urinary system, without an adequate cleaning of the genital area, one suspects that through the two senses just mentioned there would be sufficient reason to be repulsed from following through on the act.

Of course some may point to homosexual behavior among animals--but it is neither that common nor that dominant within a species; the strength of the desire for pleasure (or in the case of males to ejaculate?) -- can lead to certain acts, but this does not mean that they are "in accordance with nature" except in so far as they proceed from the sense appetite.

Small wonder that the missionary position is the favorite among women -- it fosters intimacy, parity between man and woman. Many of the other positions seem to play to a focused on the self, especially when the male is at advantage -- pleasing him or his ego, or lording his supposed sexual prowess over the female. One comment heard in the past is that certain positions are rather animalistic, since they are those used by brute beasts (and missionary is physically impossible for them); while between human beings, the missionary position does seem optiumum, especially since it fosters communication between two spouses in a way that respects both the complementarity of male and female and the equality based on their nature. Other positions that foster face-to-face orientation seem to be better for that reason--communion, relating to the other at all levels, and promoting what is proper between rational animals, rather than to brute beasts.

This too might be an argument against oral sex; when one is performing oral sex, there is no longer face-to-face parity between the two spouses. How would I otherwise respond to the argument that the man giving oral sex is being "generous" in trying to please his wife? Perhaps
the key is, again, this possibly narrow focus on pleasure. Of course, we tread a minefield when dealing with the statistics behind vaginal versus clitoral orgasms; there is plenty of polemics one both sides, though many argue that only a clitoral orgasms is possible for most women. One wonders if men were more considerate and attentive to the rhythms of their wives that the occurence of vaginal orgasms would be more frequent. Would it not be better to recommend that the husband spends more time preparing himself and his wife for the conjugal act, and spends a little time afterwards embracing her and communicating with her to show his love and affection? If women do not derive much satisfaction from sex and instead look forward to the cuddling, would it not be a sign that sex should be more like cuddling?

(Can a Catholic couple read the Kama Sutra?)

I wonder about the credibility of women who claim they like other positions -- have they been degraded either through abuse or voluntary acts? Or is their response due to a lack of self-respect; they see themselves as nothing more than sex machines and give the response they think males want to hear?

(Dr. Laura unfortunately also believes that anything goes between a married couple, and I believe she is in error on this point.)

Some websites where the answer no is given:
Christdot forum
Presentation Ministries:

Does the Church say that oral sex as foreplay in marital relations is OK?

No, the Church has never said anything officially on this. So the Church has not said oral sex followed by vaginal sex is OK, nor has the Church said it is not OK. In this case we must apply basic moral principles without the help of the Church's specific guidance. In all marital relations, each spouse should have a profound respect for the other. All marital relations should ex-press the total self-giving of the spouses to each other. Therefore, lust, which by definition focuses on self-gratification, is contradictory to love. Also, the natural functions of our bodies should be respected; so unnatural acts are wrong. Applying these principles, I believe that oral sex in marriage is wrong and sows seeds of destruction which will eventually undermine a marriage. Because of this, pastors and caring people should bring up this subject rather than let spouses sow the seeds of destruction in their marriages.

Misc:
On the Impossibility of Same-Sex Marriage

A rehash of casuist controversies?

Conscience as a Stern Monitor, by Alexander Pruss

If either Newman or Socrates is right, then the voice of conscience does not speak of what is permissible but of what is forbidden or obligatory. Someone who says "My conscience permits me to do A" is at worst confused, and at best reporting that her conscience does not speak against doing A. But that is an argument from silence, and hence weak.

Thus, if two people argue about whether something is morally permitted, and both invoke the testimony of their conscience, all other things being equal, the one who claims it is forbidden is more likely to be right. For the same reason, moral progress tends to move primarily in the direction of more being seen as forbidden or, equivalently, more being seen required.

This can be seen as one view opposing probabilism. "For the same reason, moral progress tends to move primarily in the direction of more being seen as forbidden or, equivalently, more being seen required." Moral progress of an individual? I'm not sure if I would agree with this characterization--it certain seems to play upon the voluntarist's fears of losing freedom and being constricted (see Fr. Pinckaer's treatment of the development of moral theology in The Sources of Christian Ethics). If there is sufficient law-imposing during one's youth, then moral progress will be a greater understanding of the reasons why freedom is ordered in the ways that it is, not more imposition of laws. Complains about legalism can be understood in this way then--those who only see the coercive nature of law and an external source of law, and have not really formed in the "spirit" of the law and therefore able to understand its rationale.

And in any case, conscience, or at least our judgment about what conscience says, is only a fallible guide. So the claim that moral progress tends to be from the less restrictive to the more restrictive may have other exceptions. But there is a presumption that those claiming duty or prohibition are right than that those claiming permission are.

But anything can be restricted--such as intercourse with one's spouse because one does not wish to become impure, or because one wishes to observe abstinence the night before Divine Liturgy. There must be a reason given for the restriction that makes the restriction seem compelling to us during moral deliberation.

Pruss admits of two exceptions to this:
(1) "There are exceptions, of course, to the idea that claims about moral prohibition (or obligation) are more likely correct than ones about moral permission. A general class of exceptions is when we realize that an earlier prohibition was based on the conjunction of a true claim of conscience with a false empirical claim. Thus, a prohibition against women taking various roles in society might well have been based at least in part on false empirical claims about women's intellectual abilities."

(Or similarly, a misapplication of a rule or the use of the wrong premise(s) in moral reasoning. The example I am thinking of is the forbidding of women to sing in choir during the liturgy by Pius X--iirc, it was thought that singing was an office proper to the clergy. Later, when it became clear that singing is an office proper to all who participate in the liturgy (without blurring the distinction between liturgicalparts), the ban was lifted. Of course, this is not an example involving conscience, but it is an example of how a conclusion can be wrong because of the premises, and something similar could illustrate how conscience can be mistaken.)

(2) "Another major class of exceptions is when a claim of obligation logically depends on a prior claim of permissibility. These tend to be cases of positive duty. For instance, the claim that embryonic stem cell research is morally obligatory out of duty for the suffering depends on the prior claim that embryonic stem cell research is morally permissible (opponents of such research should also grant the conditional that if it were permissible, it would be obligatory). A prohibition on discrimination against exhibitionists would presumably be based on a presupposition of the permissibility of exhibitionism. In such cases, conscience's sternness cannot be invoked to defend the claim of duty, because what is really at issue is the logically prior permissibility claim."

What Pruss is addressing is a possible is a conflict between two opinions on what can be done/should be avoided--it doesn't matter if the source of both opinions is one's own moral training, or if they originate with others held to be authorities, etc. If one authority permits and another authority forbids, which is to be followed?

I wrote over at Right Reason:

It seems to me that you are advancing one possible response to the casuist controveries, but it is not clear to me what the practical import of your claim is. Doesn't one need to be able to distinguish between a prohibition that contains an authentic moral insight from scrupulosity? If you admit that the scrupulous are not reliable guides for telling us what is permissible and what is not, then are we not already on the path to elaborating norms and rendering them intelligible? 

No response yet, though I'm not sure if one would be needed. I just think the inquiry should be taken into a different direction, as the current discussion is rather pointless. (And I find talk of the voice of conscience and such, rather than the judgment of conscience, rather distracting. If one wishes to use certain terms because one is using the endoxa of accepted authorities, one better have a good reason for adopting those authorities as authorities in the first place. Otherwise, why talk about consicence without at least a nominal or popular definition in place? This was the same question Fr. Madigan brought up in response to Dr. Garcia, since Dr. Garcia did not give a definition of virtue in his talk about virtue based moral theories. Let us first call conscience the act of judging whether an act is forbidden or obligatory or permissible, and then by extension, the power ordered to this act. Of course this power may be identical with another power, say, the intellect.)

CE on probabilism
Fr. Hugh Barbour, O. Praem, Law or Liberty

In defense of casuistry

I recall reading an article by a traditionalist (not sure where--was it online? I can't find anything through yahoo and google, and I'm not sure if I've saved it somewhere...). It was a defense of the 19th century moral theology manuals and of casuistry. I think it would be uncontroversial to claim that there is a place for moral casuistry today, whether it be by the confessor or by someone whose advice is being sought. What else is the dealing of difficult (or not-so-difficult) particular cases than casuistry? Is the problem primarily the reduction of moral theology to casuistry? Can the art be integrated into the larger schema of a virtues-based moral theology?

Dr. Thomas Fleming has studied the ethics of St. Alphonsus Liguori and recommends it for those wishing to learn Catholic moral theology.

Edit. Ite ad Thomam
Edit. (9/1/11) The Ite ad Thomam post is no longer available, but has been copied elsewhere. And, more recently, St. Alphonsus's Theologia Moralis: The Magisterially-Guaranteed Manual of Casuistry.

Raphael Gallagher, CSsR.(Religion and in the Social and Cultural Development of Ireland)

Casuistry--A Summary by Jeramy Townsley
The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning

Misc Links:
Servais Pinckaers, "The Place of Philosophy in Moral Theology"
Livio Melina. Christ and the Dynamism of Action. Communio Spring, 2001
Philokalia Republic
Peter Kwasniewski CV ("William of Ockham and the Metaphysical Roots of Natural Law")
Michael Waldstein CV ("The Common Good in St. Thomas and John Paul II," "Dietrich von Hildebrand and St. Thomas Aquinas on Goodness and Happiness," interview)
Stephen Long, "Charity and Justice: Christian Economy and the Just Ordering of the Commandments" (alt)
Cardinal Ratzinger, "Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today"
Alfred J. Freddoso's site
Christopher Kaczor's review of Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal
Anthony Kelly, CssR, A Trinitarian Moral Theology
Augustine DiNoia, O.P., "Imago Dei-Imago Christi"
Michael Hull, "Schools of Thought in Contemporary Moral Theology"
Notes, Analysis of the Moral Act, A Proposal

Eutopia

Note to self:
Ralph McInerny, "On natural law and natural rights"
(see also McInerny, Ralph. "Natural Law and Human Rights." American Journal of Jurisprudence 36 (1991): 1–14)
His review of What We Can't Know
(Found through search results at Claremont.org for natural law morality)


Pinckaers, "The Recovery of the New Law in Moral Theology," Irish Theological Quarterly 64.1 (Spring 1999).