Thursday, June 04, 2009

Fr. Z: Politics and worship

According to Dodar, St. Augustine held that

When good does result from human efforts, it is because they are never without divine assistance. Knowledge and love of God, the proper worship of God, are impeded by the dissonance of this free-floating selfhood. Augustine describes the sin of Adam and Eve as self-worship as opposed to the correct worship of God...
Does Augustine define worship in this way? Aquinas distinguishes between charity and religion (both its internal and external acts). It does seem that for Aquinas, there can be no religion without charity.

The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. (ST II II 81, 5 ad 1)

The body of the article, Aquinas on whether religion is a theological virtue:

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.

Sunday, May 31, 2009

Saturday, May 30, 2009

Those who defend Christopher West (and others) talk about how he has changed their lives and so on. How does this compare with the talks given by Jason Evert and his wife? What is it about West's teaching that is more effective than the Church's teaching, even if it is understood only in prohibitions? After all, obedience is a necessary addition to Faith, and also a "component" of charity (as well as religion). Why weren't these [infused] virtues enough for people to abstain from acts that are prohibited by Christ? Do people need to be presented with the 'positive' goods associated with a prohibition before they cooperate with grace and fulfill the Law? Society, bishops, and other traditional sources of wisdom concerning marriage and family have been lost, that is true, and people need to be taught about the vocation to marriage. But telling them that certain acts are somehow not consonant with giving one's self, or are a lie, or something else -- is this really an adequate explanation for the prohibition? If certain acts are opposed to love, as a general virtue, it is because they are against reason (and some subordinate good) in some way.
A critique of the phrase "integral good" is found here:
« The entire activity of the Church is an expression of a love that seeks the integral good of man. »

The Abbé de Nantes often contested this expression, inherited from John Paul II, but going back to Paul VI, “expert in humanity”. He claimed to be exercising a global magistracy, infallibly fixing new rights and duties for persons and States, determining the entire ideal and programme for a universal social reform “for the integral development of the whole man and of all men”. In this claim, developed by the encyclical on the progress of peoples (Populorum progressio, Easter 1967), the Abbé de Nantes detected the venom of the errors condemned by Saint Pius X in the Letter on the Sillon of 25 August 1910 (Letter to My Friends no 245, April 1967).


Some thoughts that struck me as I read this part -- is this expression really that problematic? And is it linked in any way to the 'integral humanism' of Jacques Maritain? What of the integral human fulfillment of John Finnis? Answers to come, perhaps...

Friday, May 29, 2009

At the Dawn Patrol: Schindler's list
Sparks fly as JP2 Institute dean raps Christopher West for errors
A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.
bloggingLOURDES takes issue with Dr. Janet Smith and Christopher West over their approval of certain sex acts, in the name of theology of the body.

Two other posts on TOB: Sex, Matrimony, the Garden of Eden and Theology of the Body and 10 Via Crucis on Mount Carmel (a brief comment on the Theology of the Body).

It does not appear to me that Father gives an argument against the act in question, except that it goes against human dignity -- that may seem almost tautological. Still, and this is something that those looking for theological arguments to permit such acts forget, there is something to be said for the connatural knowledge of the virtuous that enables them to know that certain things are wrong, even if they cannot give a scientific (that is, reasoned-out) explanation of why this is so.

Curious, in the comments section there is a lot of cricism of NFP--some may be criticizing just the mentality (or intentions) of those practicing it, some appear to be going further and criticing the practice itself.
Something from Counterpunch, of all places: On Evolution, by James C. Faris
A Critique of Darwinism
Space.com: Close-up Look at Black Hole Reveals Feeding Frenzy

Monday, May 25, 2009

Christopher West's Theology of the Body by David L. Schindler

stating that, while “there are some important health and aesthetic considerations that can’t be overlooked,” “there's nothing inherently wrong with anal penetration as foreplay to normal intercourse," (Good News About Sex and Marriage, 1st ed., emphasis in original), though qualifying this in the revised edition and stressing the subjective dangers of lust in such activity


I believe it can be argued that anal sex is intrinsically wrong -- the penis is not meant to be put in the anus, and we can know this precisely from the adverse impact on health that this can have. We can also look at the functionality of the organs involved as well.

Sunday, May 24, 2009

Some Ralph McInerny videos

Medieval Philosophy: St. Thomas Aquinas


Introduction to Thomas Aquinas


Medieval Philosophy


Metaphysics


Ralph McInerny
Center for Ethics and Culture bio
icuweb
International Catholic University

Friday, May 22, 2009

Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 1

Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 2
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 3
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 4
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 5

I hesitate to add "Aristotle" as a label for this post, as I do not consider Nussbaum to be a reliable disciple.

Thursday, May 21, 2009


Interview of Professor Quentin Skinner - part 1
(You can download this interview here.)
James Chastek brings us a translation of the first part of the first chapter of Msgr. Maurice Dionne’s treatment of analogy: Dionne on analogy.

Monday, May 18, 2009

James Schall, "Rights" and Liberties


Few recognize how dangerous the origin of this word is. Many fine scholars such as Jacques Maritain, John Finnis, and others have worked valiantly to save “rights” terminology from relativism, the context in which it is understood in modern political philosophy. They have not prevailed in baptizing it as was their intent, even though they provide plausible arguments about why it need not be a relativistic concept. These arguments are simply ignored or rejected by most rights advocates, though seldom confronted intellectually.


David Walsh has noted that the word “rights” still retains a vague relation to some stable grounding in being. Today, however, “rights” mean what Hobbes, its original formulator, claimed: namely, the word rights means whatever the de facto political authority says it means. A “right” is what the government defines and enforces as a right, nothing more, nothing less. The current president’s whole anti-life agenda, the most extreme ever designed in any responsible or irresponsible polity, is presented to us under the guise of “human rights.” It is breathtaking.


The idea that such “rights” have “natural law” behind them, a way of looking at them so that we can appeal to a common and agreed rational concept of human nature, is fine. But this understanding is neither what the word nor the actions of the government mean. We like to say that the “right to life is the fundamental right.” Nix that “right” and all else falls. This is true. All else is falling. The “right to life” now means politically what, and only what, the government and courts define it to mean, not some “inalienable” idea of human dignity from God or nature.


The Church has taken up the term “natural right” as if it meant something rooted in human nature. I can count almost on one hand the number of times that, aware of the problem, a pope or theologian will say, almost as an aside, that “natural right,” of course, does not mean what “natural right” does mean in the public order. They then use the very same term as if everyone agreed with a grounded view, rooted in natural law.


In practice, we seem to think that everyone agrees with this Catholic background of “natural rights.” We have a basis for common discourse. Yet we soon find that people polemically inquire: “If you claim a ‘right to life,’ why not grant a ‘right’ to abortion or any such thing?”
It seems that the word right is used to refer to both subjective passive rights and subjective active rights, it is being used equivocally, and not univocally. Given our disregard for natural law and its Author, naturally we would associate our conception of rights with some brand of legal positivitism, would we not? What possible limits could there be? Some may say that the liberal 'no harm' principle is sufficient. But how is harm to be defined? Just the production of physical evils? Or moral evils as well, and everything "in between"?