Pope's Letter for St. Anselm Celebration

Pope's Letter for St. Anselm Celebration

"One of the Brightest Figures in the Tradition of the Church"

AOSTA, Italy, APRIL 28, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is the text of the letter Benedict XVI sent to Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, retired archbishop of Bologna, on the occasion of the ninth centenary of the death of St. Anselm. The message was read April 21, the saint's feast day, at a solemn Mass in the Aosta cathedral in honor of the philosopher and theologian.



* * *

In view of the celebrations in which you, venerable brother, will take part as my legate in the illustrious city of Aosta in honor of the ninth centenary of the death of St. Anselm, which took place in Canterbury on 21 April 1109, I would like to give you a special message in which I wish recall the main features of this great monk, theologian and pastor of souls, whose work has left a deep mark on the history of the Church.

The anniversary is indeed an opportunity not to be missed to renew the memory of one of the brightest figures in the tradition of the Church and in the history of Western European thought. The exemplary monastic experience of Anselm, his original method of rethinking the Christian mystery, his subtle philosophical and theological doctrine, his teaching on the inviolable value of conscience and on freedom as the responsible adherence to truth and goodness, his passionate work as a shepherd of souls, dedicated with all his strength to the promotion of "freedom of the Church," have never ceased to arouse in the past the deepest interest, which the memory of his death is happily reigniting and encouraging in many ways and in different places.

In this memorial of the "Magnificent Doctor" -- as St. Anselm is called -- the Church of Aosta cannot but be recognized, the Church in which he was born and which is rightly pleased to consider Anselm as her most illustrious son. Even when he left Aosta in the time of his youth, he continued to carry in his memory and in his heart the bundle of memories that was never far from his thoughts in the most important moments of life. Among those memories, a particular place was certainly reserved for the sweet image of his mother and the majestic mountains of his valley with their high peaks, and perennial snow, in which he saw represented, as if in a fascinating and suggestive symbol, the sublimity of God. To Anselm - "a child raised in the mountains," as Admero his biographer calls him, ("Vita Sancti Anselmi," i, 2) - God appears to be that of which you cannot think of something bigger: perhaps his intuition was not unrelated to the childhood view of those inaccessible peaks. Already as a child he thought that in order to find God it was necessary to "climb to the summit of the mountain" (ibid.). In fact, he will realize more and more that God remains at an inaccessible height, located beyond the horizons which man is able to reach, since God is beyond the thinkable. Because of this, the journey in search of God, at least on this earth, will never end, but will always be thought and desire, the rigorous process of the intellect and the imploring inquiry of the heart.

The intense desire to know and the innate propensity for clarity and logical rigor will push Anselm towards the "scholeae" [schools] of his time. He will therefore join the monastery of Le Bec, where his inclination for dialectic reflection will be satisfied and above all, where his cloistered vocation will enkindle. To dwell on the years of the monastic life of Anselm is to encounter a faithful religious, "constantly occupied in God alone and in the disciplines of heaven" -- as his biographer writes -- in order to achieve "such a summit of divine speculation that would enable him by a path opened by God to penetrate, and, once penetrated, to explain the most obscure and previously unresolved questions concerning the divinity of God and our faith and to prove with clear reasons that what he stated belonged to sure Catholic doctrine" ("Vita Sancti Anselmi," i, 7). With these words, his biographer describes the theological method of St. Anselm, whose thought was ignited and illuminated in prayer. It is he himself that confesses, in his famous work, that the understanding of faith is an approach toward a vision, which we all yearn for and which we all hope to enjoy at the end of our earthly pilgrimage, "Quoniam inter fidem et speciem intellectum quem in hac vita capimus esse medium intelligo: quanto aliquis ad illum proficit, tanto eum propinquare speciei, ad quam omnes anhelamus, existimo (Cur Deus homo, Commendatio).

The saint desired to achieve the vision of the logical relationships inherent to the mystery, to perceive the "clarity of truth," and thus to grasp the evidence of the "necessary reasons," intimately bound to the mystery. A bold plan certainly, and it is one whose success still occupies the reflections of the students of Anselm today. In fact, his search of the "intellectus" [intellect] positioned between "fides" [faith] and "species" [vision] comes out of the source of the same faith and is sustained by confidence in reason, through which faith in a certain way is illuminated. The intent of Anselm is clear: "to raise the mind to contemplation of God" (Proslogion, Proemium). There remain, in any event, for every theological research, his programmatic words: "I do not try, Lord, to penetrate your depth, because I cannot, even from a distance, compare it with my intellect, but I want to understand, at least up to a certain point, your truth, which my heart believes and loves. I do not seek, in fact, to try to understand it in order to believe it, but I believe in order to understand it."[Non quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam] (Proslogion, 1).

In Anselm, prior and abbot of Le Bec, we underline some characteristics that further define his personal profile. What strikes us, first of all, is his charism as an expert teacher of spiritual life, one who knows and wisely illustrates the ways of monastic perfection. At the same time, one is fascinated by his instructive geniality, which is expressed in that discernment method -- which he names, the "via discretionis" (Ep. 61) -- which is a small image of his whole life, an image composed of both mercy and firmness. The peculiar ability which he demonstrates in initiating disciples to the experience of authentic prayer is very peculiar: in particular, his "Orationes sive Meditationes," eagerly requested and widely used, which have contributed to making many people of his time " anime oranti" [praying souls], as with his other works, have proved themselves a valuable catalyst in making the Middle Ages a "thinking" and, we might add, "conscientious" period. One would say that the most authentic Anselm can be found at Le Bec, where he remained thirty three years, and where he was much loved. Thanks to the maturity that he acquired in a similar environment of reflection and prayer, he will be able, as well in the midst of the subsequent trials as bishop, to declare: "I will not retain in my heart any resentment for any one" (Ep. 321).

The nostalgia of the monastery will accompany him for the rest of his life. He confessed it himself when he was constrained, to his deepest sorrow and that of his monks, to leave the monastery to assume the Episcopal ministry to which did not feel well disposed: "It is well known to many," he wrote to Pope Urban II, "the violence which was done to me, and how much I was reluctant and contrary, when I was brought as a bishop to England and how I explained the reasons of nature, age, weakness and ignorance, which were opposed to this office and that absolutely detest and shun scholastic duties, which I cannot dedicate myself to at all without endangering the salvation of my soul" (Ep. 206). He confides later with his monks in these terms: "I have lived for 33 years a monk -- three years without responsibility, 15 as prior, and as many as abbot -- in such a way that all the good people that knew me loved me, certainly not by my own merits but for the grace of God, and the ones that loved me most were those that knew me most intimately and with greatest familiarity" (Ep. 156). And he added: "You have been many to come to Le Bec ... Many of you I surrounded with a love so tender and sweet that each one had the impression that I did not love anyone else in the same way" (ibid.).

Appointed Archbishop of Canterbury and beginning, in this way, his most troubled journey, his "love of truth" (Ep. 327), his uprightness, his strict loyalty to conscience, his "Episcopal freedom" (Ep. 206), his " Episcopal honesty" (Ep. 314), his tireless work for the liberation of the Church from the temporal conditionings and from the servitude of calculations that are incompatible with his spiritual nature will appear in their full light. His words to King Henry remain exemplary in this respect, "I reply that in neither baptism nor in any other ordination that I have received, did I promised to observe the law or the custom of your father or of the Archbishop Lanfranco, but the law of God and of all the orders received" (Ep. 319). For Anselm, the primate of the Church of England, one principle applies: "I am a Christian, I am a monk, I am a Bishop: I desire to be faithful to all, according to the debt I have with each" (Ep. 314). In this vein he does not hesitate to say: "I prefer to be in disagreement with men than, agreeing with them, to be in disagreement with God" (Ep. 314). Precisely for this reason he feels ready even for the supreme sacrifice: "I am not afraid to shed my blood, I fear no wound in my body nor the loss of any material good" (Ep. 311).

It is understandable that, for all these reasons, Anselm still retains a great actuality and a strong appeal, in as much as it is fruitful to revisit and republish his writings, and together meditate continuously on his life. For this reason I have rejoiced that Aosta, on the occasion of the ninth centenary of the death of the saint, has distinguished itself with a set of appropriate and intelligent initiatives -- especially with the careful edition of his works -- with the intention to make known and loved the teachings and examples of this, its illustrious son. I entrust to you, Venerable Brother, the task of bringing to the faithful of the ancient and beloved city of Aosta the exhortation to remember with admiration and affection this great fellow citizen of theirs, whose light continues to shine throughout the Church, especially where the love for the truths of faith and the desire for their study by the light of reason are cultivated. And, in fact, faith and reason -- "fides et ratio" -- are united admirably in Anselm. I send, with these heartfelt sentiments through you, venerable brother, to the Bishop, Monsignor Giuseppe Anfossi, the clergy, the religious and the faithful of Aosta and to all those who take part in the celebrations in honor of the "Magnificent Doctor," a special apostolic blessing, propitiatory of an abundant outpouring of heavenly favors.

[Translation by Matthew Pollock]

NLM: Confessing the Messiah: The Church's Confession of Christ in Jewish-Christian Dialogue - Bishop Müller's Statement Pt. I by Gregor Kollmorgen

Fr. Georges Florovsky

A favorite of my GOARCH friend, noted for his neo-patristic synthesis. My friend would have liked access to this: Georges Florovsky Papers, 1916-1979 (bulk 1950s-1960s).

Some photos.

the collected works of fr georges florovsky
Georges Florovsky - OrthodoxWiki
Archpriest Georges Florovsky (pdf)
St Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary - Archpriest Georges Florovsky
Protopresybter Georges Florovsky
Father George Florovsky and the Patristic Mindset
THE PROBLEM OF. DIACONATE IN THE ORTHODOX CHURCH.

Related:
Protopresbyter Alexander Schmemann

NLM: Confessing the Messiah: The Church's Confession of Christ in Jewish-Christian Dialogue - Introduction Pt. II by Gregor Kollmorgen

Torture: What it is, and Why it is Wrong by Christopher O. Tollefsen (via The American Papist)

An offense against personal dignity (or charity) rather than an offense against justice?

I begin with the following normative claim: human life and health is an intrinsic, and indeed, a basic, human good. That is to say, life and health constitute a fundamental aspect of human well-being; the possibility of the promotion of either provides not just a possibility but an opportunity, an offer of benefit. And the possibility of damage or destruction of either provides not just a possibility, but an evil to be avoided and, insofar as such damage or destruction is willed, a wrong not to be done. The normative principle that can be drawn from this practical truth is that in willing, one should never intend the damage or destruction of the life or health of another human being.

This principle is compatible with acts that will, in fact, damage or destroy human life: the use of force in self-defense, the decay of the body brought about by intense study, or the possibility of ill health consequent upon incarceration as punishment for one’s crimes. For none of these forms of damage need be intended; they are, if willed appropriately, willed only as side effects of some other reasonable activity. By contrast, the destruction of human life in, for example, mercy killing or capital punishment, is intended—willed in each case as a means to some further end: cessation of suffering or justice.

How does he get around the exceptions? They are effects which are praeter intentionem, or if intended directly, it is subsumed under a higher end, that of justice. (I don't think he is supporting mercy killing, but is using it as an example to show how harm to the body is directly intended through a 'higher' end.) It seems to me that the NNL Theorists would more than likely offer a similar account of why torture is wrong.

Do we say that justice is a separate end, which justifies the inflicting of pain or bodily harm? (It might seem like a form of consequentialism.) Or do we say it is a part of the formality of the act itself?

NLM: Confessing the Messiah - Introduction Pt. I by Gregor Kollmorgen

Asia News: Pope: the Bible must be interpreted within the magisterium of the Church (via The Western Confucian)

Benedict XVI recalled that Leo XIII, Pius XII, and Vatican II reiterated in a variety of ways that "Holy mother Church, relying on the belief of the Apostles, holds that the books of both the Old and New Testaments in their entirety, with all their parts, are sacred and canonical because written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God as their author and have been handed on as such to the Church herself" (Dei Verbum, 11).

This correct approach to the concept of the divine inspiration and truth of Holy Scripture leads to norms that directly concern its interpretation. "In this regard," the pope recalled, "Vatican Council II indicates three criteria that are always valid for an interpretation of Sacred Scripture in keeping with the Spirit who inspired it. First of all, one must pay great attention to the content and unity of all the Scripture. In fact, as different as the books making it up may be, Sacred Scripture is one by virtue of the unity of God's plan, of which Jesus Christ is the center and heart (cf. Lk. 24:25-27; Lk. 24:44-46). In the second place, one must read Scripture in the context of the living tradition of the whole Church. According to a saying of the Fathers, "Sacra Scriptura principalius est in corde Ecclesiae quam in materialibus instrumentis scripta," "Sacred Scripture is written in the heart of the Church before it is written on material instruments." In fact, the Church carries within its Tradition the living memory of the Word of God, and it is the Holy Spirit who gives it the interpretation of this, according to its spiritual meaning (cf. Origen, Homiliae in Leviticum, 5,5). As the third criterion, it is necessary to pay attention to the analogy of faith, or to the cohesion of the individual truths of faith among one another and with the overall plan of Revelation and the fullness of the divine economy contained within it."

The task of researchers studying the Sacred Scripture by various means, then,"is that of contributing according to the aforementioned principles to a deeper understanding and exposition of the meaning of Sacred Scripture. Scientific study of the sacred texts is not sufficient by itself. In order to respect the coherence of the faith of the Church, the Catholic exegete must be attentive to viewing the Word of God in these texts from the perspective of the Church's faith. In the absence of this indispensable point of reference, exegetical research remains incomplete, losing sight of its main purpose, with the danger of becoming a sort of mere intellectual exercise. The interpretation of the sacred Scriptures cannot be only an individual scientific effort, but must always be situated, inserted, and authenticated by the living tradition of the Church. This norm is decisive for clarifying the correct and reciprocal relationship between exegesis and the Magisterium of the Church.

"The texts inspired by God have been entrusted to the community of believers, to the Church of Christ, in order to nourish faith and guide the life of charity. Respect for this purpose influences the validity and efficacy of Biblical hermeneutics. The encyclical Providentissimus Deus recalled this fundamental truth, and observed that, far from obstructing Biblical research, respect for this fact fosters its authentic progress."

In conclusion, "only the ecclesial context permits sacred Scripture to be understood as the authentic Word of God, the guide, norm, and rule for the life of the Church and the spiritual growth of believers. This involves the rejection of any interpretation that is subjective for simply limited to analysis alone, which is incapable of containing the overall meaning that over the course of the centuries has guided the Tradition of the entire people of God."

Holy See on Racism
"Without a Change of Heart, Laws Are Not Effective"

In all its manifestations, racism makes the false claim that some human beings have less dignity and value than others; it thus infringes upon their fundamental equality as God's children and it leads to the violation of the human rights of individuals and of entire groups of persons.

This equality is proper to the ratio of charity, not to that of justice--and yet, the prohibition of certain actions falls under the virtue of justice, and not just charity. Where does the evil with regard to racism arise? In the intellect or the will? Is it possible to be a good-willed racist? Can the intellectual error of racism be separated from the moral error? Can someone believe sincerely that some people should be treated differently from others because they are somehow inferior? Or that they should be slaves -- but still be accorded basic protections under justice and the law?

Disputations: Disproportionate infliction of pain

The question is, are we naming by the 'word' torture the external act (which has for its object the infliction of bodily harm or pain) or the composite of the external act and the internal act (the end of which intention is to induce someone else to cooperate, give information, etc.). It seems the latter, because the internal act gives the formality which defines or puts the external act within a particular moral species.

I argue that torture is unjust here. If it (or the external act) is unjust, how can it possibly be proportionate under any circumstances?

My thinking on this needs to be clarified further.

The Guardian Profile: Roger Scruton
Anthony Barnett (wiki)
Town and Country: Anthony Barnett, Roger Scruton

Anthony Barnett on What’s Changed

James Chastek, Proofs for God's Existence

What the theistic proofs have in in common with the other kinds of proofs for existence is they are all necessary because of some weakness of our intellect. No one needs to prove the existence of trees since they’re just there. For the same reason, no on needed to prove the existence of black swans to Australians; and no one would need to prove the existence of black holes to a civilization which (somehow) could just look up and see one in the sky (like the passengers on the Disney movie The Black Hole). The difference is that the standards of what counts as proof are different in the case of natural science and in metaphysics.

And "The difference between scholastic and modern theology":

The main transition from scholastic to modern theology (which took a few centuries) was the shift from speculative philosophy to history as the field in which one encounters God. The scholastic did not need elaborate, critical, and highly advanced systems of historical analysis in order to do what he understood as theology; just as a modern theologian does not need elaborate logical and disputative systems to do what he understands as theology.

What, then, of monastic theology? Was monastic theology primarily a commentary on Sacred Scripture? Or was there more to it? And what about the theology of the Church Fathers? So much more to read and discover...

Gloria Ruth Frost, Thomas Aquinas on Necessary Truths about Contingent Beings

Edward Feser. Spinoza on final causes

James Chastek, Notes on the ontological proof

RIP, Marjorie Grene

She passed away on March 16. Announcement at Virginia Tech. LA Times obituary. NY Times.

Links:
wiki
The philosophy of Marjorie Grene
The Believer - Interview with Marjorie Grene
Vintage Marjorie Grene: A Review Essay on A Philosophical Testament
Open Court: The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene
The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene (Volume XXIX, 2002)
Amazon.com: The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene
Marjorie Grene, David Depew - The Philosophy of Biology
Virginia Tech professor Marjorie Grene is the first woman in The Library of Living Philosophers


Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog: In Memoriam: Marjorie Grene

James Chastek, Ways to consider natural theology

MacIntyre at 80: Alasdair MacIntyre Conference University College Dublin, 6-8 March 2009

International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry

"Keeping Philosophy Relevant: the Achievements and Challenges of Alasdair MacIntyre" by Professor John Haldane (alas, the text is not available)

Revisionist History: beyond the gatekeepers (via Stephen Hand)

???

Sandro Magister, The Event of Easter on which the Church Stands or Falls
It is the resurrection of Jesus. "We will hear you on this matter some other time," the intellectuals of Athens said to Paul, leaving him by himself. But Benedict XVI is determined, and is reissuing the proclamation "urbi et orbi." He has done so twice in four days. And he has explained why

From the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture:

10th Annual Fall Conference - Call for Papers
The Center is pleased to announce its call for papers for the 10th annual fall conference, The Summons of Freedom: Virtue, Sacrifice and the Common Good. The conference will take place on the campus of the University of Notre Dame November 12-14, 2009. View the call for papers here.

Rorate Caeli, Declaration on the Anaphora of Addai and Mari Not an act of the Supreme Magisterium (from 2008). The post includes a translation of "Historical and Theological Argumentation in Favour Of Anaphoras without Institution Narrative:A Critical Appraisal,"
by Ansgar Santogrossi OSB.

James Chastek, Fourth Way, III

Msgr. Paul McPartlan

A GOARCH friend suggested checking him out (CV). He also seemed to think that the Statement of Joint Catholic-Orthodox Commission (given at Ravenna) would present a challenge to the dogmatic teaching of Vatican I on the nature of papal primacy. I guess I'll have to read that one carefully.

Msgr. McPartlan is also the author of Sacrament of Salvation: An Introduction to Eucharistic Ecclesiology (Google Books & Amazon) and The Eucharist Makes the Church.

"The Eucharist and the Church"; EWTN archived copy of original Zenit article
Draftsman Discusses Ecumenical Document
Radical Preaching: A Week with Paul McPartlan
An interview after the International Theological Commission gave its report on limbo.
"Gaudium et Spes" in The Deacon Reader.
Dr. Paul McPartlan Discusses “The Promise and Challenge of Catholic-Orthodox Dialogue”at Annual SS. Cyril and Methodius Lecture

Related links:
Models of the Eucharist
Pro Unione Web Site - Dialogues O-RC
Eastern Christian Publications
The Deacon Reader - A Review

For the Salvation of Souls: A Preacher's Contribution

James Chastek, Fourth Way, II

ST, I, 2, a. 3:
Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi.

Is Aquinas then saying that goods are commensurable? How would he respond to the incommensurability thesis of the New Natural Law Theory? Does "good" need to be used univocally in order for such comparisons to be made? Or does it suffice that it is used analogically? (Dennis McInerny gives an answer in The Difficult Good.)

Death of Rev. Stanley Jaki - News & Events - Seton Hall University

Seton Hall U. page

source

Other links:
wdtprs
The hermeneutic of continuity: Fr Stanley Jaki RIP
First Things » Blog Archive » Fr. Stanley Jaki, R.I.P.
Philosophy of Science Portal: Deceased--Stanley L. Jaki
William Cinfici: Father Stanley Jaki, Rest in Peace

Rev. Stanley L. Jaki
STANLEY JAKI ON GENESIS ONE
SOCRATES OR THE BABY AND THE BATHWATER
Death?
The Origin of Science
'Science can't explain Creation of the Universe'

Living Tradition: Some Rationalist Presuppositions of the Historical-Critical Method Part III. The Influence Of Kantian Philosophy Upon Historical Criticism by John McCarthy

Fr. Al Kimel, The Sacramentality of Sacraments. See also Is Transubstantiation Bodily Enough?

Is there only one true philosophy, Christianity? Or is true philosophy something separate from what has been revealed? We can find authorities for both opinions, and not a few Church Fathers who seem to endorse the former. And yet what have the popes said and recommended on this question? To learn we must submit to a teacher, and trust that the teacher is in possession of the truth.

Zenit: Message to Buddhists on Vesak
"Witnessing to a Spirit of Poverty"

John Médaille, Compulsory Mis-education

Something worth pondering after this post.

Suzan Mazur, Is Neo-Darwinism Dead?
An Interview with Lynn Margulis

Edward Feser, Fodor and Aquinas on the Extended Mind Thesis (via WWWTW)

Edward Feser takes on Brian Leiter, once again: Pants on fire

Aristotle on why the education of the young should be common

A continuation of this post.

Aristotle explains why education of citizens must be common:

Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that everyone must also have one and the same education and that taking care of this education must be a common matter. It must not be private in the way it is now, when everyone takes care of their own children privately and teaches them whatever private learning they think best. Of common things, the training too must be common.

At the same time, no citizen should even think that he belongs to himself but instead that each belongs to the city, for each is part of the city. The care of each part, however, naturally looks to the care of the whole, and to this extent praise might be due to the Spartans, for they devote the most serious attention to their children and do so in common. (Politics, 8.1 1337a21-32; trans. Peter Simpson.)

At the same time, Aristotle acknowledges that most cities neglect legislation regarding the education of the young, and do not have any sort of common regimen:

In most cities these matters are neglected , and each lives as he wishes, giving sacred law, in Cyclops' fashion, to his wife and children. So while it would be best if the care became a common one and were correctly managed and if doing this were a possibility, yet, in the absence of common care, it would seem proper for each individually to promtoe the virtue of his children and friends, or at least to make that his choice. But from what has been said, it would seem that one would be better able to do this if one became a legislator. For while common cares clearly become common through the laws, they become decent through serious laws. (NE 10.9, 1180a25-34; trans. Peter Simpson.)

And so the virtuous are left to themselves, and must become legislators within the household, setting down laws for the training of their children.

What if there is a common education, but it is not rightly ordered? Perhaps it is in accordance with the constitution of the polity, but the constitution is not a good one, or produces bad people? One should avoid that education as much as one can, and if that is not possible, consider separating and entering a different community. What choice does one have, if one is concerned with virtue and raising one's children in virtue?

The Tyranny of Liberalism

James Kalb on the Ideology's Totalitarian Impulses


By Annamarie Adkins

NEW YORK, MARCH 27, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Liberals -- on both the Right and Left -- may posit that they favor freedom, reason and the well-being of ordinary people. But some critics believe that liberalism itself erodes the very institutions -- family, religion, local associations -- necessary to restrain its excesses.

One such liberal skeptic is attorney and writer James Kalb, who recently wrote a book entitled, "The Tyranny of Liberalism: Understanding and Overcoming Administered Freedom, Inquisitorial Tolerance, and Equality by Command" (ISI).

Kalb explained to ZENIT why he believes liberalism inevitably evolves into a form of soft totalitarianism, or a “dictatorship of relativism,” and why the Church is well positioned to be its preeminent foe.

Q: What is liberalism?

Kalb: We're so much in the middle of it that it's difficult to see it as a whole. You can look at it, though, as an expression of modern skepticism.

Skeptical doubts have led to a demand for knowledge based on impersonal observation and devoted to practical goals. Applied to the physical world, that demand has given us modern natural science.

Applied to life in society, it has led to a technological understanding of human affairs. If we limit ourselves to impersonal observations, we don't observe the good; we observe preferences and how to satisfy them. The result is a belief that the point of life is satisfying preferences.

On that view, the basic social issue is whose preferences get satisfied.

Liberalism answers that question by saying that all preferences are equal, so they all have an equal claim to satisfaction. Maximum equal satisfaction therefore becomes the rational ordering principle for life in society -- give everyone what he wants, as much and as equally as possible. In other words, give everybody maximum equal freedom.

Q: How can an ideology of freedom become tyrannical?

Kalb: Equal freedom is an open-ended standard that makes unlimited demands when taken seriously.

For example, it views non-liberal standards as oppressive, because they limit equal freedom. Liberal government wants to protect us from oppression, so it tries to eradicate those standards from more and more areas of life.

The attempt puts liberal government at odds with natural human tendencies. If the way someone acts seems odd to me, and I look at him strangely, that helps construct the social world he's forced to live in. He will find that oppressive. Liberal government can't accept that, so it eventually feels compelled to supervise all my attitudes about how people live and how I express them.

The end result is a comprehensive system of control over all human relations run by an expert elite responsible only to itself. That, of course, is tyranny.

Q: You argue that liberalism, especially its "advanced" form, corrupts and suppresses the traditional aspects of life that defined and kept Western society together for centuries such as religion, marriage, family and local community. How does it do that?

Kalb: Equal freedom isn't the highest standard in those areas of life. They have to do with love and loyalty toward something outside ourselves that defines who we are. That love and loyalty involve particular connections to particular people and their ways of life.

Such things cannot be the same for everyone. They create divisions and inequalities. They tell people they can't have things they want.

So equal freedom tells us traditional institutions have to be done away with as material factors in people's lives. They have to be debunked and their effects suppressed.

At bottom, liberalism says people have to be neutered to fit into a managed system of equal freedom. They have to be encouraged to devote themselves to satisfactions that don't interfere with the satisfactions of others.

In the end, the only permissible goals are career, consumption and various private pursuits and indulgences.

That doesn't leave much room for religion or for family or communal values. The only permissible public value is liberalism itself.

Q: How does mass media advance the cause of liberalism?

Kalb: The relationship is almost mechanical. It's one of the great strengths of liberalism.

Television and the Internet give us a world chopped up into interchangeable fragments.

To make that world comprehensible to journalists and viewers it has to be put in order in a simple way that can be understood quickly without regard to particularities.

That's impossible if complex distinctions and local habits are allowed to matter.

For that reason the mass media naturally favor a top-down managerial approach to social life with a bias toward sameness and equality -- in other words, something very much like contemporary liberalism.

To put it differently, the mass media prefer things to be discussed publicly and decided centrally based on a simple principle like equality. If that's done they can understand what's going on and what it all means.

Also, they themselves will serve an important function because they provide the forum for discussion and the information for decision. That situation naturally seems appropriate to them.

Q: What about the distinction between Anglo-American liberalism and continental liberalism, and their different models of secularism? Is it inaccurate to lump everything together under the heading of "liberalism"?

Kalb: The fundamental principle is the same, so the distinction can't be relied on.

In the English-speaking world the social order was traditionally less illiberal than on the continent.

King and state were less absolute, the Church had less independent authority, standing armies were out of favor, the aristocracy was less a separate caste, and the general outlook was more commercial and utilitarian.

Classical liberalism could be moderate and still get what it wanted.

Liberalism is progressive, though, so its demands keep growing. It eventually rejects all traditional ways as illiberal and becomes more and more radical.

For that reason state imposition of liberal norms has become at least as aggressive in Britain and Canada as on the continent.

The United States is still somewhat of an exception, but even among us aggressive forms of liberalism are gaining ground. They captured the academy, the elite bar and the media years ago, and they're steadily gaining ground among the people.

The international dizziness about President Obama and the violent reaction to the narrow victory of Proposition 8 concerning same-sex marriage in California show the direction things are going.

Q: Does rejecting "liberalism" mean rejecting freedom of conscience, political equality, free markets and other supposed benefits of "liberalism"?

Kalb: No. A society can still have those things to the extent they make sense. They just need to be subordinated, at least in principle, to a larger order defined by considerations like the good life.

The Church has noted, for example, that free markets are an excellent thing in many ways. They just aren't the highest thing. The same principle applies to other liberal ideals.

Q: Both Popes Pius IX and Leo XIII condemned liberalism, but it seems the Church has embraced it since the Second Vatican Council in its defense of democracy and human rights. The tone of Church social teaching has also focused more on influencing liberal institutions, and less on shaping individuals, families, and local communities. How does one account for this shift in the Church's attitude?

Kalb: The Church apparently decided modernity was here to stay. Liberal modernity looked better than fascist modernity or Bolshevik modernity.

It claimed to be a modest and tolerant approach to government that let culture and civil society develop in their own way. So the Church decided to accept and work within it.

Also, the development of the mass media and consumer society, and the growth of state education and industrial social organization generally, meant Catholics were more and more drawn into liberal ways of thinking. Hostility to liberalism became difficult to maintain within the Church.

The problem, though, is that liberal modernity is extremely critical and therefore intolerant. In order to cooperate with it you have to do things its way.

The recent, virulent attacks on Pope Benedict for many different reasons by the liberal elite illustrate that phenomenon perfectly.

For that reason, if there's going to be joint social action today, it inevitably focuses on extending liberal institutions rather than promoting local and traditional institutions like the family, which are intrinsically non-liberal. Many people in the Church have come to accept that.

Q: You argue that religion can be the unifying force that offers resistance to advanced liberalism, and that the Catholic Church is the spiritual organization most suited to that task. Why do you think so?

Kalb: To resist advanced liberalism you have to propose a definite social outlook based on goods beyond equal freedom and satisfaction.

A conception of transcendent goods won't stand up without a definite conception of the transcendent, which requires religion. And a religious view won't stand up in public life unless there's a definite way to resolve disputes about what it is.

You need the Pope.

Catholics have the Pope, and they also have other advantages like an emphasis on reason and natural law. As a Catholic, I'd add that they have the advantage of truth.

Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture videos

Moral and political philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, honoured at UCD -- the page has an embedded video of his lecture, “On having survived the academic moral philosophy of the twentieth century.” (via The Hermeneutic of Continuity)

A Thomist: St. Thomas, Law and Grace

It reminds me of the question of whether there can be a Christian ethics (i.e. moral philosophy/science, as opposed to moral theology). Ralph McInerny has given an answer, written as a response to Jacques Maritain on the same point. One day I'll write a response to both--each is right on certain points, but...

John 3: 19-21

Part of the Gospel reading for Laetare Sunday.

It would seem to harmonize very well with the epistles of John, that one who loves God will keep His commandments, and that one who sins knowingly but claims to love God lies. If God draws us to Himself, does He not help us know that we sin? Would He really let us remain ignorant, if He wants us to be perfect? And if we know that we are sinning against God, but prefer sin to God, do we not reject His grace of conversion in order to continue to sin "comfortably"?

Investigate: God is both the object and end of charity.

Orestes Brownson on Catholicism and Republicanism by Jude P. Dougherty (Modern Age 45:4, Fall 2003) - 03/12/09

Orestes Brownson’s presence looms large in Russell Kirk’s celebrated 1953 tome, in large part because, for Kirk, Brownson represents a luminous thinker unjustly neglected by modern scholars. Even further, Brownson seems to be a central figure not only in the nineteenth-century development—or maintenance—of order in American society, but, for Kirk, is someone whose prose remains genuinely instructive for contemporary citizens; he is “one of those dead who give us life. . . .”

Public Discourse: Christopher O. Tollefsen: Liberty, Authority, and the Good of Religion

Has the Church infallibly taught that human life begins at conception?

And does this mean that the soul is infused at conception? If not, then can the conceptum really be called human except equivocally? Can it be said that a teaching that the soul is infused at conception can be found in the Deposit of Faith? It seems not--it appears that in the past, some reason has been given for the prohibition of abortion other than that the conceptum is a individual human being, and therefore abortion is murder and unjust. What, then, do recent papal pronouncements that abortion ends human life mean with regards to the status of the conceptum? To this Thomist, it appears that to hold that the conceptum is human and a rational soul is nonetheless absent (or that the soul may not be infused at conception) is incoherent.

Some contemporary authors such as Robert George have argued that it can be shown from science that the conceptum is human. It seems to me that at best these arguments do show material continuity but do not rule out the possibility that a [brute] animal soul is present and is responsible for development, rather than a rational soul. One could posit some principle of parsimony, and that a transient soul is not necessary, as the rational soul could be responsible for development and much more (and therefore a rational soul is present from the very beginning and hence infused at conception), but it seems very difficult (impossible?) to justify this assumption of parsimony. (Would Ockham's razor actually lead to the conclusion that a brute soul is present and not a rational one?)

If this reasoning concerning the identity of the conceptum is correct, then to claim that one can know from natural reason that the conceptum is a human life at conception is wrong, unless, again 'human' is being used equivocally. And, by extension, the natural law argument for the prohibition cannot definitively be founded upon the injustice of murder.

[It should be noted though that for the materialist, considerations about rational and irrational souls do not matter. As the rational soul is not needed as a formal cause defining something to be human, one could give a (false) argument that the conceptum is human, based on causality and continuity. But this seems to be a dishonest way to persuade someone of the evilness of abortion.]

Pope John Paul II's Theology of the Body
By Brian Thomas Becket Mullady

(via the Western Confucian)

Evolution's new wrinkle: Proteins with cruise control provide new perspective (via VFR)

From Kevin R. C. Gutzman, Did somebody say “Democracy”?:

The idea that a polis should rule itself was called “eleutheria”—“freedom”—by the ancient Greeks, by the way. As the example of Sparta shows, freedom in the Greek sense did not necessarily have anything to do with democracy.

Available for pre-order: The Writings of Charles De Koninck, Volume Two

Insight Scoop: Governmental expansion and the principle of subsidiarity

A letter from Magdi Cristiano Allam to Pope Benedict XVI: « CAN THE CHURCH LEGITIMATE ISLAM AS A RELIGION AND CONSIDER MOHAMMED AS A PROPHET? »

The original(?) in Italian. (His website.)

Zenit: Middle Eastern Priest Explains Islam (Part 2)

Zenit: Middle Eastern Priest Explains Islam (Part 1)

Middle Eastern Priest Explains Islam (Part 1)

Interview With Father Samir Khalil Samir

By Annamarie Adkins

BEIRUT, Lebanon, MARCH 4, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Confusion over Islam -- among Christians and Muslims -- may have peaked after Sept. 11, 2001, but many questions still remain.

That's why Jesuit Father Samir Khalil felt called to offer some answers, as an Islamic scholar, Semitologist, Orientalist and a Catholic theologian born in Egypt and based in the Middle East for more than 20 years.

The Jesuit priest teaches Catholic theology and Islamic studies at St. Joseph University in Beirut, is founder of the CEDRAC research institute and is author of, most recently, "111 Questions on Islam" (Ignatius).

In this interview with ZENIT, Father Samir speaks about his experience and efforts to build a mutual understanding between followers of the two Abrahamic faiths.

Part 2 will appear Thursday.

Q: Why did you agree to produce this book?

Father Samir: Two reasons. It was a year before 9/11 that I started discussing this topic with journalists, having interviews together. I noticed a great ignorance of Islam in the West -- Christians, non-Christians and nonbelievers.

In general, they had very poor knowledge of Islam. I thought I had to clarify. Their ignorance pushed some of them to be aggressive and negative toward Muslims. Some of them were very naïve, believing everything they heard. Some even were using Islam to be aggressive toward Christianity. All of that is a consequence of ignorance.

The second reason was to help Muslims reflect on their own religion and faith. In a previous experience with Muslim youth in a Paris suburb, I noticed they didn't know almost anything about their own religion.

Speaking with different Muslim people I met in Europe -- in Germany during the summer, or in France where I teach, or in Italy where I was living -- it was always the same. Most Christians don't know their religion, either.

I wanted to give good information about Islam to help people not to have any false information or prejudice against it.

Q: How did the interviewers choose the 111 questions from the thousands that could have been asked?

Father Samir: The journalists I worked with had a lot of questions themselves, and questions from what people were asking them: about violence; whether Muslims would accept Western civilization; and about Muslims having problems with equality between men and women.

So, in fact, the questions are more directed to Western society so it could understand Islam better.

Q: Do you think most Muslims would be satisfied by the objectivity of your answers to the 111 questions? Why or why not?

Father Samir: My effort was to be objective; I tried, but you can never truly reach a perfect objectivity.

Certainly, not everybody will be happy. Some think Islam is a violent religion, or a religion against women; they will not be happy because they will say I am not clear enough about the violence and inequality of men and women.

People who think Islam is a religion of peace and equality between men and women, and that Mohammed elevated the status of women, will not be happy either.

Everyone has a position. Few people will be satisfied, if they are against or for Islam.

But those who want to know something serious about Islam will be able to make their own opinion, because they will have the facts in front of them in my book.

Q: The introduction to the book notes that it is an attempt to foster mutual understanding between Christians and Muslims. But many of your answers paint Islam and its origins in a very negative light. How do you think the average Christian's opinion of Islam will change after reading the book?

Father Samir: I don't think it was very negative, or negative at all; my intention is a better understanding. Not a feeling, but an understanding -- something that uses the head first, then the heart.

You have to first give serious information to promote dialogue and mutual understanding. If I don't say the whole truth, the truth will appear anyway, and the situation will be worse.

I am trying to build a mutual understanding, not built on compromises and false information. Dialogue starts with serious, academic, honest information about Christianity and Islam.

The answers are trying to be useful information; some answers are negative because the point is negative.

I don't know what the average Christian thinks. Nowadays, I suppose the majority has a negative opinion of Islam, before reading any book.

We, Arabs and Muslims, are in a crisis. When we Arabs -- Muslims and Christians -- speak together, we recognize we are in a bad situation. We had a glorious time in other centuries, but now we are at the bottom.

I hope that the book will help people understand things that concern them, like terrorism; there are some explanations, but not justifications. I can't justify terrorism, but I can explain why others are led to terrorist acts, I can also show that it has some support in the Koran and the Tradition -- sunnah.

Most Muslims choose peace and nonviolence. The 10% that chooses violence is stronger than the 90% that doesn't. Sometimes the bad part of humanity, though smaller, is stronger.

Q: Is a critical examination of Islam's history and sacred texts -- that is, subjecting the faith to reason -- even possible in the Muslim world? Why or why not?

Father Samir: Usually, in the Muslim tradition, faith is over everything; it is above reason.

If you tell a Muslim the Koran says something, but the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says something contrary, the Muslim will say, "We have to follow God's words and law, and not the human rights laws."

In the Christian tradition, we find more people interpreting the Bible than Muslims interpreting the Koran. They had an interpretive movement in the Islamic world in 9th, 10th and 11th century, but then they went backward.

As for the relationship between reason and faith, today Muslims are in a negative period of their history. Certainly it is possible to unite the two, but they would have to work very hard. There are many reasons for this regression, but fundamentally, there is ignorance on the part of the Muslim clergy.

Thomistica.net: New Latin-English edition of the Summa Theologiae -- the website.

"Fair"

Does it mean the same thing as equal?

Online Etymology Dictionary:

fair (adj.)
O.E. fæger "beautiful, pleasant," from P.Gmc. *fagraz (cf. O.N. fagr, O.H.G. fagar "beautiful," Goth. fagrs "fit"), from PIE *fag-. The meaning in ref. to weather (c.1205) preserves the original sense (opposed to foul). Sense of "light complexioned" (1551) reflects tastes in beauty; sense of "free from bias" (c.1340) evolved from another early meaning, "morally pure, unblemished" (c.1175). The sporting senses (fair ball, fair catch etc.) began in 1856. Fair play is from 1595; fair and square is from 1604. Fair-haired in the fig. sense of "darling, favorite" is from 1909. Fairly in the sense of "somewhat" is from 1805; it earlier meant "totally." Fairway (1584) originally meant "navigational channel of a river;" golfing sense is from 1910. First record of fair-weather friends is from 1736.

Merriam Webster:

6 a: marked by impartiality and honesty : free from self-interest, prejudice, or favoritism b (1): conforming with the established rules : allowed (2): consonant with merit or importance : due c: open to legitimate pursuit, attack, or ridicule

The definition MW gives for "just" (2 a (1): acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good : righteous (2): being what is merited : deserved b: legally correct : lawful) conforms to our understanding of what is legally just.

I ask because some have tried to defined justice in terms of fairness. Level is a kind of equal, but it appears that fair has no link to level.

Insight Scoop: First Millennium Petrine Ministry (the article by Joseph Previtali)

Kenneth L. Grasso, Francis Canavan, S.J. (1917–2009)

What's Wrong with the World: Aquinas on Usury

Albino Barrera, "Exchange-Value Determination: Scholastic Just Price, Economic Theory, and Modern Catholic Social Thought," History of Political Economy.1997; 29: 83-116.

link

$15 to access the article for 2 days? Crazy.

A question about profit

In a society where there is perfect justice (and virtue), would it be possible for producers to make a true profit?

From the California Catholic Daily calendar:

Berkeley: Renowned Univ. of Notre Dame professor and author, Dr. Jean Porter comes to Dominican School of Philosphy and Theology (DSPT) to present a lecture on Christianity and Human Rights. Titled "The Natural Law and the Law of Nations: A Medieval Perspective on a Contemporary Dilemma," the lecture will be held on Mar. 12, at DSPT Classroom 1, 2301 Vine Street, at 7:30 p.m. Dr. Porter's lecture is part of DSPT's Faith in Human Rights Project. The project will run from Jan. 12 through May 12, and will include a variety of components that will be offered to the general public, such as: courses of study, lectures, workshops, a film festival, and art exhibits.

Michael Liccione, Picking your hermeneutical circle

On the "Right of Association"

A continuation of this post. (The examination proceeds with an exclusive focus on justice, rather than charity, because no political state can enforce the precepts of charity. Only God can.)

Can a member of a political community be forced to remain a part of that community, simply because he no longer wishes to live with them? Or if they do not share the same conception of the good life?

It seems to me that one can choose to dissociate or separate from others because they are a bad influence or do not share the same goals. For example, the virtuous man may have to separate himself from bad friends. What then if the political community becomes so degenerate that one cannot live in it, because it is not pursuing the right end? It seems that the virtuous man should leave, and take his family with him. (It might be easier for a man living "on his own" to cope with a degenerate society, but I don't think it would be healthy for him to stay too long. Certainly that community would continue to be a source of temptation.)

This does not mean that society is not natural or that one's happiness does not consist in living with others. What it does mean is that as a result of Adam's fall and men's sins, one may not only separate from others, but it is prudent and even right to do so when his fellow-men do not seek to live virtuously, and are sources of scandal to him. One could even say that in such a case, a minority of the righteous has been rejected by the others; by rejecting the righteous they give up their claims to their aid and support in justice. (The example of the righteous man, Lot.)

Nonetheless, can the government compel a person to remain in the community? We may instantly reject such coercion as being wrong and unjust, but let me put forth an argument in defense of it.

Because of economic interdependence and the division of labor, the virtuous man may be needed for the community to survive. To take an extreme case, what if he is the only farmer, supplying all of the food for the rest of the community? Also, what is to be done about one's obligations in justice--making a return for the past benefits received from that community? While one should fulfill these obligations, it could be that love of self (in charity) may override any of these obligations. But so long as the community is not directly preventing him from worshipping God but only endangering his salvation through vicious living, the farmer may have a duty to remain and continue contributing to the community.

Would it not be better to get the rest of the community self-sufficient with respect to food, and allow him to go his way, instead of forcing him to stay indefinitely so that he provides a needed service for the community? Some might see continued coercion as nothing more than a form of slavery which cannot be justified as punishment, since he has not done anything wrong. How can he be forced by law or the threat of punishment to produce for others? Because the community has a legitimate interest in ensuring he carries out his obligations to the community. Still, if the community is actually vicious, it will probably have no compunction over forcing the farmer to stay and continue supplying food, even though he dislikes the company of the other members.

What then of the racist farmer? Can he be allowed to go his own way because he does not want to live with people of another race? As I stated in that previous post, while the farmer may not be bound by commutative justice to sell his produce to people he does not like, he may be bound out of legal justice to exchange goods with others, so long as they are living in a community together.

But does this mean that there is no "right of association"? Only that if there is such a right, it does not apply to commercial transactions for necessities. (And arguably, if all work is necessary for the sake of the members of the community, then even transactions for non-necessities.) Nor does it apply to the gathering of citizens, as citizens--anything touching upon "public" life. One can still choose one's intimate friends though.

Community is voluntary in so far as one must consent to living with others. (Happiness is voluntary in this way since it, too, must be willed.) In fact, one must do more than this for there to be a true community. On the other hand, the number of intentional communities that can come into existence without a violation of some virtue of justice are few -- most of them are religious, since one's duty to God supercedes one's duties to parents or community of birth patria. Just as one cannot choose the family one is born into, one usually cannot choose the political community one is born into, and once one starts living there, one picks up obligations to other members of that community.

A community is always in danger of decay, and ultimately falling apart or being destroyed because of sin and human weakness.

In the concrete, civic friendship cannot be identified with virtuous friendship, because not everyone is virtuous. But this does not mean that this is not the ideal. Aristotle's definition of friendship is applicable to those who live in a good regime, even if the citizens do not all share the same intimate friendship with one another.

The question of whether egoism or altruism is true of human motivation may be raised by some -- do individuals gather together merely for the sake of self-interest? Should people gather together merely to exchange the necessities of life? If what is meant by self-interest is survival (and reproduction), then no. But what if self-interest is extended to higher goods, such as having the company of others?

We would think it strange to call a group of self-sufficient (with respect to basic necessities) individuals who do not communicate with one another in any way a community.

Because of the associations of the words egoism and altruism, and how they are understood by certain philosophers, it would be better to employ Aristotle's distinction between the various kinds of self-love. It is part of our perfection to live well with others, communing not only in the necessities for the sustaining of life, but also in higher goods.

Related:

Robert Weissberg, Stuff White People Like

Josef Pieper’s Contemplative Assent to the World Thomas Austenfeld (from Modern Age 42:4, Fall 2000) - 02/26/09

Living in community as a good or end in itself.

Liberals tend to think that civic friendship is merely a kind of 'commercial' or 'advantage' friendship--people associate with one another in a political community only because they can secure some sort of private benefit from them, as it happens in commercial exchange. It is mutually advantageous for people to associate in community. If they recognize Aristotle's virtuous friendship, this type of friendship is limited to and perhaps between husband and wife.

For example, Bernard Yack interprets Aristotle as identifying political friendship as a form of shared advantage friendship (The Problems of a Political Animal, 55-6). See page 98 for his brand of personalism/individualism.) How do such liberals reach such conclusions when reading Aristotle? Because they believe the good life of which Aristotle speaks is a private good, determined by the individual alone, and in relation only to himself, not in relation to others, (except, perhaps, in so far as they contribute to his happiness).

Aristotle does concede that virtuous friendships are rare, but this is because virtue is rare. iirc, he also says that it is not possible for us to become close friends with everyone. Nonetheless, this does not mean that civic, or political, friendship cannot be an instance of virtuous friendship. It depends on the constitution of the polity, and what character the citizens have. But more importantly, friendship is defined by the good which is being pursued. The shared good that two people have when engaging in commerce is that commercial relationship they have, which is desired not for its own sake but for the sake of the goods which are being exchanged and the private benefit each derives from the relationship as a result. That is to say, the relationship is mutual beneficial (human mutualism), but it is ordered towards the private good of each participant. In contrast, the virtuous friendship is ordered towards the shared pursuit of virtue, not as individuals, but together. Or, the shared life of virtue. Similarly, the common good of a political community is the shared good life.

The word synergy may help us better understand what is meant by the common good of a community -- it should be obvious living well together cannot be done by the participants alone, it must be done by all. But this apparently is very difficult to grasp. On the other hand, it may be misleading to use this term--the citizens are not working together for some other goal; the goal is precisely to live well with one another.

Hence, among liberals there is a conceptual confusion of what is truly private and what is common. If there wasn't such a confusion, they should be able to see that the friendship that a husband and a wife share is tied to their domestic life. One's happiness is achieved through living this common life well. Domestic happiness is not the pleasure or other goods one is able to secure through one's spouse.

Let us take an extreme case. Is it possible for the virtuous man (and his family) to live among the vicious (Lot in Sodom?). They could refuse to associate with others, except when it is necessary to do so in order to exchange products. Otherwise, one may end up living like them, to one degree or another. (As is the case with Lot, who may not have indulged in the same sins as the Sodomites, but was not fully righteous either?)

Would we say that there is something incomplete about his happiness? Not if he had a right relationship with God. His opportunities to perform charitable external actions for his neighbor might be limited, but he could still pray for them. However, if he did not have a right standing with God, but his ultimate end was his own good, would his happiness not be affected in some way?

If human beings are not ordered to living with others by their very nature, then do not political associations (non-familial or non-commercial) become purely voluntary, unless there is some mutual and necessary advantage to be derived from it? To obtain from others what satisfies the exigences of life? External goods may be necessary for survivial, but they are not sufficient unto themselves for true happiness.

Started on January 17.

Zenit: Pope's "Lectio Divina" on Paul's Letter to Galatians

Pope's "Lectio Divina" on Paul's Letter to Galatians

"Only a Shared Freedom Is Human Freedom"


VATICAN CITY, FEB. 23, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the "lectio divina" Benedict XVI delivered Friday during a visit to Rome's Major Seminary on the eve of the feast of the seminary's patroness, Our Lady of Confidence. The "lectio divina" is a reflection on St. Paul's Letter to the Galatians.

* * *

Lord Cardinal,
Dear Friends,

For me it is always a great joy to be in my seminary, to see the future priests of my diocese, to be with you under the sign of Our Lady of Confidence. We go forward with her, who helps and accompanies us, and who really gives us the certainty of always being helped by divine grace.

Let us now see what St. Paul says to us with this text: "You were called to freedom." At all times, freedom has been humanity's great dream, since the beginning, but particularly in modern times. We know that Luther was inspired by this text of the Letter to the Galatians, and his conclusion was that the monastic Rule, the hierarchy, the magisterium seemed a yoke of slavery from which he had to free himself. Subsequently, the age of the Enlightenment was totally guided, penetrated by this desire for freedom, which it was thought had already been attained. However, Marxism also presented itself as the path to freedom.

Tonight we ask: What is freedom? How can we be free? St. Paul helps us to understand the complicated reality which freedom is by inserting this concept in a context of fundamental anthropological and theological divisions. He says: "Do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love be servants of one another." The rector has already told us that "flesh" is not the body, but, in St. Paul's language, it is the absolutizing of the I, of the I that wants to be all and have everything for itself. In short, the absolute I, which does not depend on anything or anyone, seems really to possess freedom. I am free if I do not depend on anyone, if I can do everything I wish. However, precisely this absolutizing of the I is "flesh," namely, the degradation of man, it is not the victory of freedom: libertinism is not freedom, instead, it is the failure of freedom.

And Paul dares to propose a strong paradox: "Through charity, be of service " (in Greek "douleuete"); in other words, paradoxically, freedom is realized in service: We are free if we become one another's servants. And so Paul puts the whole problem of freedom in the light of the truth of man. To reduce oneself to the flesh, apparently raising oneself to the rank of divinity -- "I, man alone" -- introduces a lie. Because in fact, it is not like this: Man is not an absolute, being able to isolate himself and behave according to his own will. This goes against the truth of our being. Our truth is, above all, that we are creatures, creatures of God and we live in relationship with the Creator. We are rational beings, and only by accepting this relationship do we enter into truth, otherwise we fall into falsehood and, in the end, are destroyed by it.

We are creatures, hence dependents of the Creator. In the age of the Enlightenment, especially for atheism, this dependency seemed like something from which it was necessary to free oneself. In reality, however, it would be a fatal dependency only if this Creator God was a tyrant, not a good Being, only if he was as human tyrants are. If, however, this Creator loves us and our dependence implies being in the realm of his love, in this case, in fact, dependency is freedom. Thus, we are, indeed, in the love of the Creator, we are united to him, to the whole of his reality, to all his power. This, therefore, is the first point: To be a creature means to be loved by the Creator, to be in this relationship of love that he gives us, with which he provides for us. From this derives above all the truth about ourselves, which at the same time is a call to love.

And because of this to see God, to orient oneself to God, to know God, to know the will of God, to insert oneself in his will, that is, in the love of God is to enter increasingly into the realm of truth. And this path of knowledge of God, of the relationship of love with God, is the extraordinary adventure of our Christian life: Because in Christ we know the face of God, the face of God who loves us even to the cross, to the gift of himself.

However, the creaturely relationship also implies a second type of relationship: We are in relationship with God but, at the same time, as human family, we are also in relationship with one another. In other words, human freedom is, on one hand, to be in the joy and great realm of the love of God, but it also implies being only one thing with the other and for the other. There is no freedom in being against the other. If I absolutize myself, I become the other's enemy, we can no longer coexist on earth and the whole of life becomes cruelty and failure. Only a shared freedom is human freedom; in being together we can enter the symphony of freedom.

Hence, this is another point of great importance: Only by accepting the other, by accepting also the apparent limitation that respect for the other implies for my freedom, only by inserting myself in the network of dependencies that makes us, finally, only one human family, will I be on the way to common liberation.

A very important element appears here. What is the measure of this sharing of freedom? We see that man needs order and law, to be able to realize his freedom, which is a freedom lived in common. And how can we find this just order, in which no one is oppressed, but each one can make his own contribution to form this sort of concert of freedom? If there is no common truth of man as it appears in the vision of God, only positivism remains and one has the impression of something imposed even in a violent manner. Hence the rebellion against order and law as if it was a question of slavery.

However, if we can find the order of the Creator in our nature, the order of truth that gives each one his place, order and law can be in fact instruments of freedom against the slavery of egoism. To serve one another becomes an instrument of freedom, and here we can include a whole philosophy of politics according to the social doctrine of the Church, which helps us to find this common order that gives each one his place in the common life of humanity. The first reality that must be respected, therefore, is truth: Freedom against truth is not freedom. To serve one another creates the common realm of freedom.

And then Paul continues, saying: "For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.'" After this affirmation the mystery of the Incarnate God appears, the mystery of Christ appears who in his life, Death and Resurrection becomes the living law.

Immediately, the first words of our reading -- "You were called to freedom" -- point to this mystery. We have been called by the Gospel, we have really been called in baptism, to participate in the death and resurrection of Christ, and in this way we have passed from the "flesh," from egoism, to communion with Christ. And so we are in the fullness of the law.

You probably all know St. Augustine's beautiful words: "Dilige et fac quod vis -- Love and do what you will." What Augustine says is the truth, if we have truly understood the word "love." "Love, and do what you will," but we must really be penetrated by communion with Christ, having identified ourselves with his death and resurrection, being united to him in the communion of his body. By participation in the sacraments, by listening to the Word of God, the Divine Will, the divine law really enters our will, our will identifies with his, they become only one will and thus we are really free, we can really do what we will, because we love with Christ, we love in truth and with truth.

Therefore, let us pray to the Lord that he will help us on this path that began with baptism, a path of identification with Christ that is always realized again in the Eucharist. In the third Eucharistic Prayer we say: "To be one body and one spirit in Christ." It is a moment in which, through the Eucharist and through our true participation in the mystery of the death and resurrection of Christ, we become one spirit with Him, we identify with his will, and thus we truly attain freedom.

After this word -- the law has been fulfilled -- after this unique word that becomes reality in communion with Christ, all the figures of the saints who have entered into this communion with Christ appear behind the Lord, in this unity of being, in this unity with his will. Above all, the Virgin appears, in her humility, her goodness, her love. The Virgin gives us this confidence, she takes us by the hand, guides us and helps us on the path of uniting ourselves with the will of God, as she was from the first moment, expressing this union in her "Fiat."

And, finally, after these beautiful things, the letter points out once more the rather sad situation of the community of the Galatians, when Paul says: "But if you bite and devour one another take heed that you are not consumed by one another ... walk by the Spirit." It seems to me that in this community -- which was no longer on the path of communion with Christ, but in the external law of the "flesh" -- naturally controversies also emerged and Paul says: "You become wild beasts, one bites the other." He refers thus to the controversies that arise when faith degenerates into intellectualism and humility is substituted by the arrogance of being better than the other.

We see clearly that also today there are similar things when, instead of being inserted in communion with Christ, in the Body of Christ which is the Church, each one wants to be better than the other and with intellectual arrogance wants to be regarded as the best. And thus controversies arise which are destructive, born is a caricature of the Church, which should be one soul and one heart.

In St. Paul's warning we should find today a reason to examine our conscience: not to think of being better than the other, but to meet one another in the humility of Christ, in the humility of the Virgin, to enter into the obedience of the faith. Precisely in this way the great realm of truth and freedom in love is really opened also for us.

Finally, we want to thank God because He has shown us his face in Christ, because he has given us the Virgin, the saints, because He has called us to be only one body, one spirit with him. And let us pray that He will help us to insert ourselves ever more in this communion with his will, so as to find love and joy in freedom.

[At the end of the dinner with the community of the Roman Seminary, the Holy Father said]

I am told that yet another word is expected from me. I have already spoken perhaps too much, but I would like to express my gratitude, my joy at being with you. In my conversation now at table I have learned something more about the history of the Lateran, begun by Constantine, Sixtus V, Benedict XIV, Pope Lambertini.

So I have seen all the problems of the history and ever-new rebirth of the Church in Rome. And I have understood that in the discontinuity of external historical events lies the great continuity of the unity of the Church at all times. And also in regard to the composition of the seminary, I have understood that it is an expression of the catholicity of our Church. From all the continents we are one Church and we have the future in common. Let us only hope that vocations will grow because, as the rector said, there is a need for laborers in the Lord's vineyard. Thank you all!

[Translation of Italian original by Inma Alvarez]

© Copyright 2009 -- Libreria Editrice Vaticana

A Thomist brings up an interesting question regarding philosophical sin, conscience, and the knowledge of God's law.

Papal Address to Academy for Life Conference

Papal Address to Academy for Life Conference

"Confidence in Science Cannot Forget the Primacy of Ethics"


VATICAN CITY, FEB. 22, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Benedict XVI delivered Saturday to participants in a conference sponsored by the Pontifical Academy for Life on the theme "New Frontiers of Genetics and the Danger of Eugenics." The conference coincided with the Pontifical Academy for Life's 15th general assembly.

* * *

Lord Cardinals,
Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate and Priesthood,
Illustrious Academicians,
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am especially pleased to receive you on the occasion of the 15th ordinary assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life. In 1994 my venerable predecessor, Pope John Paul II, instituted this body under the presidency of a scientist, Professor Jerôme Lejeune, understanding with foresight the delicate work that it would have to undertake over the course of years. I thank the president, Archbishop Rino Fisichella, for the words with which he wished to introduce this meeting, confirming the Academy's great dedication to the promotion and defense of human life.

From the time that the laws of heredity were discovered in the middle of the 19th century by the Augustinian abbot Gregor Mendel, who has been considered the founder of genetics, this science has truly taken giant steps in understanding the language at the basis of biological information, which determines the development of a living being. It is for this reason that modern genetics occupies a place of special prominence in the biological disciplines, which have contributed to the prodigious development of the knowledge of the invisible architecture of the human body and the cellular and molecular processes that preside over its multiple activities. Today science has arrived at revealing the recondite mechanisms of human physiology as well as the processes that are linked to the appearance of certain defects that are inheritable from parents along with processes that make some persons more susceptible to contract an illness. This knowledge, the fruit of the genius and toil of countless scholars, make it possible to more easily arrive at not only a more effective and early diagnosis of genetic maladies, but also to create therapies to alleviate the contraction of illnesses and, in some cases, to restore, in the end, the hope of regaining health. Moreover, from the time that the whole sequence of the human genome became available, the differences between one person and another and between different human populations have also become the object of genetic investigations, which allowed a glimpse of the possibility of new conquests.

Today the area of research still remains open and every day new horizons, in a large part unexplored, are disclosed. The work of researchers in such enigmatic and precious areas requires a special support; the cooperation between different sciences is a support that can never be lacking if results are to be arrived at that are effective and productive of authentic progress for the whole of humanity. This complementarity makes it possible to avoid the danger of a genetic reductionism that would identify the person exclusively with his genetic information and his interaction with his environment. It is again necessary to emphasize that man is greater than all of that which makes up his body; in fact, he carries with him the power of thought, which is always drawn to the truth about himself and the world. The words of Blaise Pascal, who was a great thinker as well as a gifted scientist, return: "Man is only a reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need for the whole universe to take up arms to crush him: a vapor, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But even if the universe were to crush him, man would still be nobler than his slayer, because he is able to know that he is dying and the advantage the universe has over him. The universe, however, knows nothing of this" ("Pensées," 347).

Every human being, then, is much more than a singular combination of genetic information that is transmitted to him by his parents. The generation of man can never be reduced to the mere reproduction of a new individual of the human species, as is the case with all other animals. Every appearance of a person in the world is always a new creation. The words Psalm 139 recall this with deep wisdom: "You formed my inmost being; you knit me in my mother's womb ... My very self you knew; my bones were not hidden from you, when I was being made in secret" (13, 15). If we want to enter into the mystery of human life, then it is necessary that no science isolate itself, pretending to have the last word. Rather, the common vocation to arrive at the truth -- according to the different methodologies and contents proper to each science -- must be shared.

Your conference, in any case, does not only analyze the great challenges that genetics is held to face; but it also extends to the dangers of eugenics, which is certainly not a new practice and which in the past has been the cause of real forms of discrimination and violence. The disapproval of eugenics used with violence by a regime, as the fruit of the hatred of a race or group, is so rooted in consciences that it found a formal expression in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Despite this, there are appearing in our days troubling manifestations of this hateful practice, which present themselves with different traits. Certainly ideological and racist eugenics, which in the past humiliated man and provoked untold suffering, are not again being proposed. But a new mentality is insinuating itself that tends to justify a different consideration of life and personal dignity based on individual desire and individual rights. There is thus a tendency to privilege the capacities for work, efficiency, perfection and physical beauty to the detriment of other dimensions of existence that are not held to be valuable.

In this way the respect that is due to every human being -- even in the presence of a defect in his development or a genetic illness that could manifest itself in the course of his life -- is weakened, and those children whose life is judged unworthy of being lived are punished from the moment of conception.

It is necessary to reemphasize that every discrimination exercised by any power in regard to persons, peoples or ethnic groups on the basis of differences that stem from real or presumed genetic factors is an act of violence against all of humanity. What must be forcefully reemphasized is the equal dignity of every human being according to the fact itself of having life. Biological, psychological or cultural development or state of health can never become an element of discrimination. It is necessary, on the contrary, to consolidate a culture of hospitality and love that concretely testifies to solidarity with those who suffer, razing the barriers that society often erects, discriminating against those who are disabled and affected by pathologies, or worse - selecting and rejecting in the name of an abstract ideal of health and physical perfection. If man is reduced to an object of experimental manipulation from the first stage of development, that would mean that biotechnologies would surrender to the will of the stronger. Confidence in science cannot forget the primacy of ethics when human life is at stake.

I hope that your research in this sector, dear friends, will continue with due scientific care and the attention that ethical principles require in matters that are so important and decisive for the fitting development of personal existence. This is the wish with which I would like to conclude this meeting. As I invoke copious heavenly light upon your work, I affectionately impart to all of you a special apostolic blessing.

[Translation by Joseph G. Trabbic]

© Copyright 2009 -- Libreria Editrice Vaticana

St. Anthony of Padua Institute

Living Tradition: Some Rationalist Presuppositions of the Historical-Critical Method Part II. The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant In The Background John F. McCarthy

(Part 1)