The introduction from Johannes Althusius's Politica. Very Aristotelian. I need to read the rest of the work, especially his brand of "Federalism."

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF POLITICS

Politics is the art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called 'symbiotics'. The subject matter of politics is therefore association (consociatio), in which the symbiotes[1] pledge themselves each to the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life.

The end of political 'symbiotic' man is holy, just, comfortable, and happy symbiosis,[2] a life lacking nothing either necessary or useful. Truly, in living this life no man is self-sufficient (autarkhV), or adequately endowed by nature. For when he is born, destitute of all help, naked and defenceless, as if having lost all his goods in a shipwreck, he is cast forth into the hardships of this life, not able by his own efforts to reach a maternal breast, nor to endure the harshness of his condition, nor to move himself from the place where he was cast forth. By his weeping and tears, he can initiate nothing except the most miserable life, a very certain sign of pressing and immediate misfortune.[3] Bereft of all counsel and aid, for which nevertheless he is then in greatest need, he is unable to help himself without the intervention and assistance of another. Even if he is well-nourished in body, he cannot show forth the light of reason. Nor in his adulthood is he able to obtain in and by himself those outward goods he needs for a comfortable and holy life, or to provide by his own energies all the requirements of life. The energies and industry of many men are expended to procure and supply these things. Therefore, as long as he remains isolated and does not mingle in the society of men, he cannot live at all comfortably and well while lacking so many necessary and useful things. As an aid and remedy for this state of affairs is offered him in symbiotic life, he is led, and almost impelled, to embrace it if he wants to live comfortably and well, even if he merely wants to live. Therein he is called upon to exercise and perform those virtues that are necessarily inactive except in this symbiosis. And so he begins to think by what means such symbiosis, from which he expects so many useful and enjoyable things, can be instituted, cultivated, and conserved. Concerning these matters we shall, by God's grace, speak in the following pages.

The word 'polity' has three principal connotations, as noted by Plutarch.[4] First it indicates the communication of right (jus)[5] in the commonwealth, which the Apostle calls citizenship.[6] Then, it signifies the manner of administering and regulating the commonwealth. Finally, it notes the form and constitution of the commonwealth by which all actions of the citizens are guided. Aristotle understands by polity this last meaning.[7]

The symbiotes are co-workers who, by the bond of an associating and uniting agreement, communicate among themselves whatever is appropriate for a comfortable life of soul and body. In other words, they are participants or partners in a common life.

This mutual communication,[8] or common enterprise, involves (1) things, (2) services, and (3) common rights (jura) by which the numerous and various needs of each and every symbiote are supplied, the self-sufficiency and mutuality of life and human society are achieved, and social life is established and conserved. Whence Cicero said, 'a political community is a gathering of men associated by a consensus as to the right and a sharing of what is useful.'[9] By this communication, advantages and responsibilities are assumed and maintained according to the nature of each particular association. (1) The communication of things (rei) is the bringing of useful and necessary goods to the social life by the symbiotes for the common advantage of the symbiotes individually and collectively. (2) The community of services (operae) is the contributing by the symbiotes of their labours and occupations for the sake of social life. (3) The communion of right (jus) is the process by which the symbiotes live and are ruled by just laws in a common life among themselves.

This communion of right is called the law of association and symbiosis (lex consociationis et symbiosis), or the symbiotic right (jus symbioticum)[10], and consists especially of self-sufficiency (autarkeia), good order (eunomia), and proper discipline (eutaxia). It includes two aspects, one functioning to direct and govern social life, the other prescribing a plan and manner for communicating things and services among the symbiotes.

The law of association in its first aspect is, in turn, either common or proper. Common law (lex communis), which is unchanging, indicates that in every association and type of symbiosis some persons are rulers (heads, overseers, prefects) or superiors, others are subjects or inferiors.

For all government is held together by imperium and subjection; in fact, the human race started straightway from the beginning with imperium and subjection. God made Adam master and monarch of his wife, and of all creatures born or descendant from her.[11] Therefore all power and government is said to be from God.[12] And nothing, as Cicero affirms, 'is as suited to the natural law (jus naturae)[13] and its requirements as imperium, without which neither household nor city nor nation nor the entire race of men can endure, nor the whole nature of things nor the world itself.'[14] If the consensus and will of rulers and subjects is the same, how happy and blessed is their life! 'Be subject to one another in fear of the Lord.'[15]

The ruler, prefect, or chief directs and governs the functions of the social life for the utility of the subjects individually and collectively. He exercises his authority by administering, planning, appointing, teaching, forbidding, requiring, and diverting. Whence the ruler is called rector, director, governor, curator, and administrator. Peter Gregory says that just as the soul presides over the other members in the human body, directs and governs them according to the proper functions assigned to each member, and foresees and procures whatever useful and necessary things are due each member — some useful privately and at the same time to all or to the entire body, others useful publicly for the conservation of social life — so also it is necessary in civil society that one person rule the rest for the welfare and utility of both individuals and the whole group.[16] Therefore, as Augustine says, to rule, to govern, to preside is nothing other than to serve and care for the utility of others, as parents rule their children, and a man his wife.[17] Or, as Thomas Aquinas says, 'to govern is to lead what is governed to its appropriate end'.[18] And so it pertains to the office of a governor not only to preserve something unharmed, but also to lead it to its end.[19] The rector and moderator so endeavours and proceeds that he leads the people by method, order, and discipline to that end in which all things are properly considered.

Government by superiors considers both the soul and the body of inferiors: the soul that it may be formed and imbued with doctrine and knowledge of things useful and necessary in human life, the body that it may be provided with nourishment and whatever else it needs. The first responsibility pertains to education, the second to sustentation and protection. Education centres on the instruction of inferiors in the true knowledge and worship of God, and in prescribed duties that ought to be performed towards one's neighbour; education also pertains to the correction of evil customs and errors. By the former, inferiors are imbued with a healthy knowledge of holy, just, and useful things; by the latter, they are held firm in duty. The responsibility for sustentation of the body is the process by which inferiors are carefully and diligently guided by superiors in matters pertaining to this life, and by which advantages for them are sought and disadvantages to them are avoided.[20] Protection is the legitimate defence against injuries and violence, the process by which the security of inferiors is maintained by superiors against any misfortune, violence, or injury directed against persons, reputations, or properties, and if already sustained, then avenged and compensated by lawful means.

The inferior, or subject, is one who carries on the business of the social life according to the will of his chief, or prefect, and arranges his life and actions submissively, provided his chief does not rule impiously or unjustly.

Proper laws (leges propriae)[21] are those enactments by which particular associations are ruled. They differ in each specie of association according as the nature of each requires.

The laws by which the communication of things, occupations, services, and actions is accomplished[22] are those that distribute and assign advantages and responsibilities among the symbiotes according to the nature and necessities of each association. At times the communication regulated by these laws is more extensive, at other times more restricted, according as the nature of each association is seen to require, or as may be agreed upon and established among the members.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I agree with Plutarch that a commonwealth is best and happiest when magistrates and citizens bring everything together for its welfare and advantage, and neither neglect nor despise anyone who can be helpful to the commonwealth.[23] The Apostle indeed advises us to seek and promote advantages for our neighbour, even to the point that we willingly give up our own right, by which we guard against misfortune, to obtain a great advantage for the other person.[24] For 'we have not been born to ourselves, inasmuch as our country claims a share in our birth, and our friends a share'.[25] The entire second table of the Decalogue pertains to this: 'you shall love your neighbour as yourself; 'whatever you wish to be done to you do also to others', and conversely, 'whatever you do not wish to be done to you do not do to others'; 'live honourably, injure no one, and render to each his due'.[26] Of what use to anyone is a hidden treasure, or a wise man who denies his services to the commonwealth?

In light of these several truths, the question of which life is to be preferred can be answered. Is it the contemplative or the active? Is it the theoretical and philosophical life or the practical and political life? Clearly, man by nature is a gregarious animal born for cultivating society with other men, not by nature living alone as wild beasts do, nor wandering about as birds. And so misanthropic and stateless hermits, living without fixed hearth or home, are useful neither to themselves nor to others, and separated from others are surely miserable. For how can they promote the advantage of their neighbour unless they find their way into human society?[27] How can they perform works of love when they live outside human fellowship? How can the church be built and the remaining duties of the first table of the Decalogue be performed? Whence Keckerman rightly says that politics leads the final end of all other disciplines to the highest point, and thus builds public from private happiness.[28]

For this reason God willed to train and teach men not by angels, but by men.[29] For the same reason God distributed his gifts unevenly among men. He did not give all things to one person, but some to one and some to others, so that you have need for my gifts, and I for yours. And so was born, as it were, the need for communicating necessary and useful things, which communication was not possible except in social and political life. God therefore willed that each need the service and aid of others in order that friendship would bind all together, and no one would consider another to be valueless. For if each did not need the aid of others, what would society be? What would reverence and order be? What would reason and humanity be? Everyone therefore needs the experience and contributions of others, and no one lives to himself alone.

Thus the needs of body and soul, and the seeds of virtue implanted in our souls, drew dispersed men together into one place. These causes have built villages, established cities, founded academic institutions, and united by civil unity and society a diversity of farmers, craftsmen, labourers, builders, soldiers, merchants, learned and unlearned men as so many members of the same body. Consequently, while some persons provided for others, and some received from others what they themselves lacked, all came together into a certain public body that we call the commonwealth, and by mutual aid devoted themselves to the general good and welfare of this body. And that this was the true origin first of villages, and then of larger commonwealths embracing wide areas, is taught by the most ancient records of history and confirmed by daily experience.[30]

From what has been said, we further conclude that the efficient cause of political association is consent and agreement among the communicating citizens. The formal cause is indeed the association brought about by contributing and communicating one with the other, in which political men institute, cultivate, maintain, and conserve the fellowship of human life through decisions about those things useful and necessary to this social life. The final cause of politics is the enjoyment of a comfortable, useful, and happy life, and of the common welfare — that we may live with piety and honour a peaceful and quiet life, that while true piety toward God and justice among the citizens may prevail at home, defence against the enemy from abroad may be maintained, and that concord and peace may always and everywhere thrive. The final cause is also the conservation of a human society that aims at a life in which you can worship God quietly and without error. The material of politics is the aggregate of precepts for communicating those things, services, and right that we bring together, each fairly and properly according to his ability, for symbiosis and the common advantage of the social life.

Moreover, Aristotle teaches that man by his nature is brought to this social life and mutual sharing.[30] For man is a more political animal than the bee or any other gregarious creature, and therefore by nature far more of a social animal than bees, ants, cranes, and such kind as feed and defend themselves in flocks. Since God himself endowed each being with a natural capacity to maintain itself and to resist whatever is contrary to it, so far as necessary to its welfare, and since dispersed men are not able to exercise this capacity, the instinct for living together and establishing civil society was given to them. Thus brought together and united, some men could aid others, many together could provide the necessities of life more easily than each alone, and all could live more safely from attack by wild beasts and enemies. It follows that no man is able to live well and happily to himself. Necessity therefore induces association; and the want of things necessary for life, which are acquired and communicated by the help and aid of one's associates, conserves it. For this reason it is evident that the commonwealth, or civil society, exists by nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal who strives eagerly for association. If, however, anyone wishes not to live in society, or needs nothing because of his own abundance, he is not considered a part of the commonwealth. He is therefore either a beast or a god, as Aristotle asserts.[31]

Furthermore the continuous governing and obedience in social life mentioned earlier are also agreeable to nature. For, as Peter Gregory adds, 'to rule, to direct, to be subjected, to be ruled, to be governed' are natural actions proceeding from the law of nations (jus gentium). 'Anything else would be considered no less monstrous than a body without a head, or a head without members of the body lawfully and suitably arranged, or even lacking them altogether. For it is especially useful to the individual member who cannot meet his own needs to be aided and upheld by another. The better member is said to be the one who meets his own needs, and is also able to help others. The greater the good he communicates with others, the better and more outstanding the member is. Then, this world has so great and so admirable a diversity [...][32] that unless it be held together by some order of subordination, and regulated by fixed laws of subjection and order, it would be destroyed in a short time by its own confusion. Nor can the diverse parts of it endure if each part seeks to perform its own function indifferently and heedlessly by itself. Power set over against equal power would bring all things to an end by continuous and irreconcilable discord, and would involve in its ruin things that do not belong to it, and that it does not know how to govern.'[33] As long as each part decides to live according to its own will, it may disregard the rule of discipline.[34] Finally, the conservation and duration of all things consist in this concord of order and subjection. 'Just as from lyres of diverse tones, if properly tuned, a sweet sound and pleasant harmony arise when low, medium, and high notes are united, so also the social unity of rulers and subjects in the state produces a sweet and pleasant harmony out of the rich, the poor, the workers, the farmers, and other kinds of persons. If agreement is thus achieved in society, a praiseworthy, happy, most durable, and almost divine concord is produced. [...] But if all were truly equal, and each wished to rule Others according to his own will, discord would easily arise, and by discord the dissolution of society. There would be no standard of virtue or merit, and it follows that equality itself would be the greatest inequality', as Peter Gregory rightly asserts.[35] Hence, when this harmony of rulers and subjects ceases, and there are no longer servants and leaders, such a situation is considered to be among the signs of divine wrath.

I add to this that it is inborn to the more powerful and prudent to dominate and rule weaker men, just as it is also considered inborn for inferiors to submit. So in man the soul dominates the body, and the mind the appetites. So the male, because the more outstanding, rules the female, who as the weaker obeys. Thus, the pride and high spirits of man should be restrained by sure reins of reason, law, and imperium less he throw himself precipitously into ruin.

Pope's Address to Biblical Commission

Pope's Address to Biblical Commission

"God Really Speaks to Men and Women in a Human Way"

VATICAN CITY, MAY 6, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Benedict XVI gave April 23 to the members of the Pontifical Biblical Commission gathered in plenary assembly.

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Your Eminence,
Your Excellency,
Dear Members of the Pontifical Biblical Commission,
I am pleased to welcome you once again at the end of your annual Plenary Assembly. I thank Cardinal William Levada for his greeting and for his concise presentation of the theme that has been the object of attentive reflection at your meeting.

You have gathered once again to study a very important topic: Inspiration and Truth of the Bible. This subject not only concerns theology, but the Church herself, because the life and mission of the Church are necessarily based on the word of God, which is the soul of theology and at the same time the inspiration of all Christian life. The topic you have addressed furthermore responds to a concern that I have very much at heart, because the interpretation of Sacred Scripture is of capital importance for the Christian faith and for the life of the Church.

As you have mentioned, Cardinal President, in his Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus," Pope Leo XIII offered Catholic exegetes new encouragement and new directives on the subject of inspiration, truth and biblical hermeneutics. Later, Pius XII in his Encyclical "Divino Afflante Spiritu," gathered and completed the preceding teaching and urged Catholic exegetes to find solutions in full agreement with the Church's doctrine, duly taking into account the positive contributions of the new methods of interpretation which had developed in the meantime.

The vigorous impetus that these two Pontiffs gave to biblical studies, as you also said, was fully confirmed and developed in the Second Vatican Council, so that the entire Church has benefited and is benefitting from it. In particular, the Conciliar Constitution "Dei Verbum" still illumines the work of Catholic exegetes today and invites Pastors and faithful to be more regularly nourished at the table of the word of God.

In this regard the Council recalls first of all that God is the Author of Sacred Scripture: "The divinely revealed realities, which are contained and presented in the text of Sacred Scripture, have been written down under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. For Holy Mother Church relying on the faith of the apostolic age, accepts as sacred and canonical the Books of the Old and the New Testaments, whole and entire, with all their parts, on the grounds that, written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit they have God as their author, and have been handed on as such to the Church herself" (Dei Verbum, n. 11).

Therefore since all that the inspired authors or hagiographers state is to be considered as said by the Holy Spirit, the invisible and transcendent Author, it must consequently be acknowledged that "the books of Scripture, firmly, faithfully and without error, teach that truth which God, for the sake of our salvation, wished to see confided to the sacred Scriptures" (ibid., n. 11).

From the correct presentation of the divine inspiration and truth of Sacred Scripture certain norms derive that directly concern its interpretation. The Constitution "Dei Verbum" itself, after stating that God is the author of the Bible, reminds us that in Sacred Scripture God speaks to man in a human fashion and this divine-human synergy is very important: God really speaks to men and women in a human way. For a correct interpretation of Sacred Scripture it is therefore necessary to seek attentively what the hagiographers have truly wished to state and what it has pleased God to express in human words.

"The words of God, expressed in the words of men, are in every way like human language, just as the Word of the eternal Father, when he took on himself the flesh of human weakness, became like men" (Dei Verbum, n. 13).

Moreover, these indications, very necessary for a correct historical and literary interpretation as the primary dimension of all exegesis, require a connection with the premises of the teaching on the inspiration and truth of Sacred Scripture. In fact, since Scripture is inspired, there is a supreme principal for its correct interpretation without which the sacred writings would remain a dead letter of the past alone: Sacred Scripture "must be read and interpreted with its divine authorship in mind" (ibid., n. 12).

In this regard, the Second Vatican Council points out three criteria that always apply for an interpretation of Sacred Scripture in conformity with the Spirit that inspired it.

First of all it is essential to pay great attention to the content and unity of the whole of Scripture: only in its unity is it Scripture. Indeed, however different the books of which it is composed may be, Sacred Scripture is one by virtue of the unity of God's plan whose centre and heart is Jesus Christ (cf. Lk 24: 25-27; Lk 24: 44-46).

Secondly, Scripture must be interpreted in the context of the living tradition of the whole Church. According to a statement of Origen: "Sacra Scriptura principalius est in corde Ecclesiae quam in materialibus instrumentis scripta", that is, "Sacred Scripture is written in the heart of the Church before being written on material instruments".

Indeed, in her Tradition the Church bears the living memory of the Word of God and it is the Holy Spirit who gives her its interpretation according to the spiritual meaning (cf. Origin, Homilae in Leviticum, 5,5).

As a third criterion, it is necessary to pay attention to the analogy of the faith, that is to the consistence of the individual truths of faith with one another and with the overall plan of the Revelation and the fullness of the divine economy contained in it.

The task of researchers who study Sacred Scripture with different methods is to contribute in accordance with the above-mentioned principles to the deepest possible knowledge and explanation of the meaning of Sacred Scripture. The scientific study of the sacred texts is important but is not sufficient in itself because it would respect only the human dimension. To respect the coherence of the Church's faith, the Catholic exegete must be attentive to perceiving the Word of God in these texts, within the faith of the Church herself.

If this indispensable reference point is missing, the exegetical research would be incomplete, losing sight of its principal goal, and risk being reduced to a purely literary interpretation in which the true Author God no longer appears.

Furthermore, the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures cannot only be an individual scientific effort but must always be compared with, inserted in and authenticated by the living Tradition of the Church. This rule is decisive to explain the correct relationship between exegesis and the Magisterium of the Church. The Catholic exegete does not only feel that he or she belongs to the scientific community, but also and above all to the community of believers of all times. In reality these texts were not given to individual researchers or to the scientific community, "to satisfy their curiosity or to provide them with material for study and research" (Divino Afflante Spiritu, eb 566).

The texts inspired by God were entrusted in the first place to the community of believers, to Christ's Church, to nourish the life of faith and to guide the life of charity. Respect for this purpose conditions the validity and efficacy of biblical hermeneutics. The Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus" recalled this fundamental truth and noted that, far from hindering biblical research, respect for this norm encourages authentic progress. I would say, a rationalistic hermeneutic of faith corresponds more closely with the reality of this text than a rationalistic hermeneutic that does not know God.

Being faithful to the Church means, in fact, fitting into the current of the great Tradition. Under the guidance of the Magisterium, Tradition has recognized the canonical writings as a word addressed by God to his People, and it has never ceased to meditate upon them and to discover their inexhaustible riches.

The Second Vatican Council reasserted this very clearly: "all that has been said about the manner of interpreting Scripture is ultimately subject to the judgment of the Church which exercises the divinely conferred commisssion and ministry of watching over and interpreting the Word of God" (Dei Verbum, n. 12).

As the above-mentioned Dogmatic Constitution reminds us, an inseparable unity exists between Sacred Scripture and Tradition, because both come from the same source:

"Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture, then, are bound closely together, and communicate one with the other. For both of them, flowing out from the same divine well-spring, come together in some fashion to form one thing, and move towards the same goal. Sacred Scripture is the speech of God as it is put down in writing under the breath of the Holy Spirit. And Tradition transmits in its entirety the Word of God which has been entrusted to the Apostles by Christ the Lord and the Holy Spirit. He transmits it to the successors of the Apostles so that, enlightened by the Spirit of truth, they may faithfully preserve, expound and spread it abroad by their preaching. Thus it comes about that the Church does not draw her certainty about all revealed truths from the Holy Scriptures alone. Hence, both Scripture and Tradition must be accepted and honoured with equal feelings of devotion and reverence" (Dei Verbum, n. 9).

As we know, this word "pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia" was created by St Basil and then absorbed into Gratian's Decree, through which it entered the Council of Trent and then the Second Vatican Council. It expresses precisely this inter-penetration between Scripture and Tradition.

The ecclesial context alone enables Sacred Scripture to be understood as an authentic Word of God which makes itself the guide, norm and rule for the life of the Church and the spiritual growth of believers.

As I have said, this is in no way an obstacle to a serious and scientific interpretation but furthermore gives access to the additional dimensions of Christ that are inaccessible to a merely literary analysis, which remains incapable of grasping by itself the overall meaning that has guided the Tradition of the entire People of God down the centuries.

Dear Members of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, I would like to end my talk by expressing to you all my personal gratitude and encouragement. I thank you warmly for the demanding work you do at the service of the Word of God and of the Church through research, teaching and the publication of your studies. To this I add my encouragement for the ground that has yet to be covered.

In a world in which scientific research is assuming ever greater importance in numerous fields, it is indispensable that exegetical science attain a good level. It is one of the aspects of the inculturation of the faith that is part of the Church's mission, in harmony with acceptance of the mystery of the Incarnation.

Dear brothers and sisters, may the Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God incarnate and the divine Teacher who opened the minds of his disciples to an understanding of the Scriptures (cf. Luke 24: 45), guide and sustain you in your reflection.

May the Virgin Mary, model of docility and obedience to the Word of God, teach you to accept ever better the inexhaustible riches of Sacred Scripture, not only through intellectual research but also in your lives as believers, so that your work and your action may contribute to making the light of Sacred Scripture shine ever brighter before the faithful.

As I assure you of my prayerful support in your efforts, I cordially impart my Apostolic Blessing to you, as a pledge of divine favours.

The paper Michael Augros delivered for ISN's Insurgent Science Series (2009) can be found online:

The online text of Mike Augros's lecture is here (HTML), or you can download it in printable form (PDF).

Unfortunately the 2009 Conference has been cancelled:

The Conference has been called off, but the ISN's 2009 Summer Seminar on "Reduction, Emergence, and Essence" will take place June 15-19 at MIT as planned. Contact us if you need more information.

I haven't heard what the reasons are; I had been thinking of attending.

James Chastek, The Predicable Universal as Mental Word

Have I changed my mind about torture? Originally I thought it was unjust. But now it seems that there are arguments for inflicting pain to punish disobedience and to force compliance. So I haven't changed my mind about acts that inflict pain or directly attack the health of his body and are not meant as punishment--these are always unjust and therefore intrinsically evil. But acts that are intended as punishment? These seem to be morally good, at least with respect to the object. Other considerations, like the circumstances of the act, may make them imprudent or even evil.

The formal object can be tricky to understand...

Some things for me to work out:
If I hold a lit match up to the fuse of a stick of dynamite in order to light the fuse, lighting the fuse is part of the formality of my action, even though I do not bring this about except by means of the lit match. I cannot say that it is the match which is responsible for the lighting of the fuse.

Similarly, if I torture someone in order to get information, I do it precisely to induce them to act in a certain way, even though they are free to refuse, unlike the fuse of the stick of dynamite, which will always light, provided that nothing interferes with the action of the fire. Getting them to talk seems to be part of the formal object, since it is an intended result or consequence of my action.

One may ask how it is possible to separate consequences in one's intent -- for example, how does the principle of double-effect work? How is it possible that I can use deadly force, even lethal means, to defend myself, without intending the death of the assailant? Can I intend to stop the assailant with something that could possibly kill him, without wanting him to die?

Papal Address to Social Sciences Academy

Papal Address to Social Sciences Academy

"Natural Law Is a Universal Guide Recognizable to Everyone"

VATICAN CITY, MAY 4, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is the text of the English-language address Benedict XVI gave today to the members of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. The members of the academy are gathered in the Vatican through Tuesday for their plenary session, which is focused on Catholic social doctrine and human rights.

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Dear Brothers in the Episcopate and the Priesthood,

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

As you gather for the fifteenth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, I am pleased to have this occasion to meet with you and to express my encouragement for your mission of expounding and furthering the Church's social doctrine in the areas of law, economy, politics and the various other social sciences. Thanking Professor Mary Ann Glendon for her cordial words of greeting, I assure you of my prayers that the fruit of your deliberations will continue to attest to the enduring pertinence of Catholic social teaching in a rapidly changing world.

After studying work, democracy, globalisation, solidarity and subsidiarity in relation to the social teaching of the Church, your Academy has chosen to return to the central question of the dignity of the human person and human rights, a point of encounter between the doctrine of the Church and contemporary society.

The world's great religions and philosophies have illuminated some aspects of these human rights, which are concisely expressed in "the golden rule" found in the Gospel: "Do to others as you would have them do to you" (Lk 6:31; cf. Mt 7:12). The Church has always affirmed that fundamental rights, above and beyond the different ways in which they are formulated and the different degrees of importance they may have in various cultural contexts, are to be upheld and accorded universal recognition because they are inherent in the very nature of man, who is created in the image and likeness of God. If all human beings are created in the image and likeness of God, then they share a common nature that binds them together and calls for universal respect. The Church, assimilating the teaching of Christ, considers the person as "the worthiest of nature" (St. Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, 9, 3) and has taught that the ethical and political order that governs relationships between persons finds its origin in the very structure of man's being. The discovery of America and the ensuing anthropological debate in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe led to a heightened awareness of human rights as such and of their universality (ius gentium). The modern period helped shape the idea that the message of Christ - because it proclaims that God loves every man and woman and that every human being is called to love God freely - demonstrates that everyone, independently of his or her social and cultural condition, by nature deserves freedom. At the same time, we must always remember that "freedom itself needs to be set free. It is Christ who sets it free" (Veritatis Splendor, 86).

In the middle of the last century, after the vast suffering caused by two terrible world wars and the unspeakable crimes perpetrated by totalitarian ideologies, the international community acquired a new system of international law based on human rights. In this, it appears to have acted in conformity with the message that my predecessor Benedict XV proclaimed when he called on the belligerents of the First World War to "transform the material force of arms into the moral force of law" ("Note to the Heads of the Belligerent Peoples", 1 August 1917).

Human rights became the reference point of a shared universal ethos - at least at the level of aspiration - for most of humankind. These rights have been ratified by almost every State in the world. The Second Vatican Council, in the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae, as well as my predecessors Paul VI and John Paul II, forcefully referred to the right to life and the right to freedom of conscience and religion as being at the centre of those rights that spring from human nature itself.

Strictly speaking, these human rights are not truths of faith, even though they are discoverable - and indeed come to full light - in the message of Christ who "reveals man to man himself" (Gaudium et Spes, 22). They receive further confirmation from faith. Yet it stands to reason that, living and acting in the physical world as spiritual beings, men and women ascertain the pervading presence of a logos which enables them to distinguish not only between true and false, but also good and evil, better and worse, and justice and injustice. This ability to discern - this radical agency - renders every person capable of grasping the "natural law", which is nothing other than a participation in the eternal law: "unde...lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura" (St. Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II, 91, 2). The natural law is a universal guide recognizable to everyone, on the basis of which all people can reciprocally understand and love each other. Human rights, therefore, are ultimately rooted in a participation of God, who has created each human person with intelligence and freedom. If this solid ethical and political basis is ignored, human rights remain fragile since they are deprived of their sound foundation.

The Church's action in promoting human rights is therefore supported by rational reflection, in such a way that these rights can be presented to all people of good will, independently of any religious affiliation they may have. Nevertheless, as I have observed in my Encyclicals, on the one hand, human reason must undergo constant purification by faith, insofar as it is always in danger of a certain ethical blindness caused by disordered passions and sin; and, on the other hand, insofar as human rights need to be re-appropriated by every generation and by each individual, and insofar as human freedom - which proceeds by a succession of free choices - is always fragile, the human person needs the unconditional hope and love that can only be found in God and that lead to participation in the justice and generosity of God towards others (cf. Deus Caritas Est, 18, and Spe Salvi, 24).

This perspective draws attention to some of the most critical social problems of recent decades, such as the growing awareness - which has in part arisen with globalisation and the present economic crisis - of a flagrant contrast between the equal attribution of rights and the unequal access to the means of attaining those rights. For Christians who regularly ask God to "give us this day our daily bread", it is a shameful tragedy that one-fifth of humanity still goes hungry. Assuring an adequate food supply, like the protection of vital resources such as water and energy, requires all international leaders to collaborate in showing a readiness to work in good faith, respecting the natural law and promoting solidarity and subsidiarity with the weakest regions and peoples of the planet as the most effective strategy for eliminating social inequalities between countries and societies and for increasing global security.

Dear friends, dear Academicians, in exhorting you in your research and deliberations to be credible and consistent witnesses to the defence and promotion of these non-negotiable human rights which are founded in divine law, I most willingly impart to you my Apostolic Blessing.

Mary Ann Glendon's Address to Benedict XVI
"Our Central Focus Has Always Been on the Dignity of the Human Person"

Jordan J. Ballor, Punishment and Restoration

Edward Feser, “It’s just so obvious!”: The case of torture

With respect to the use of torture in judicial proceedings -- the confession that would be extracted is not the same as self-incrimination, since it is not being used for to then indict or prosecute the suspect, but is part of the judicial proceeding itself, as a final step.

In the past, the use of torture was permitted by secular and Church authorities to extract a confession, but only within certain guidelines. Can the accused be compelled to speak the truth about his doing of evil? But how can his statement or confession be verified, unless there is corroborating evidence? A confession is for the sake of thoroughness, after sufficient evidence has been gathered to render judgment -- but if that is the case, why is confession necessary? If not enough evidence has been produced for a conviction, by what right can a judge attempt to extract a confession? In this case, the confession is necessary in order to secure a conviction.

Torture is used if someone is denying his guilt, but there is circumstantial evidence implicating him? What is the justification for this? It is not in the case of using torture on someone who is refusing to reveal the truth about an impending attack. In that case, torture may be understood as a punishment for each act of refusal, which is then followed by an opportunity to obey. (But one must have sufficient evidence that he is lying or concealing this information.)

In the case of confession, he is not disobeying, he is only suspected of lying. So torture is not being used as punishment, but as a way of compelling someone to tell the truth. Is the use of force, infliction of pain or bodily harm, justifiable in order to coerce testimony? But he is already giving testimony. What one wants is some sort of certain that he is telling the truth.

But perhaps the two instances in which torture is used are more similar than I think. After all, in both cases the one being tortured is suspected of lying when he denies, or refusing to tell the truth that he knows.

St. Thomas does not speak about the use of torture, as far as I know. He does say that the accused may not lie to protect himself from being convicted and punished (but he is not bound to satisfy the judge's request if it is no in accordance with the order of justice): Is it a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation?

[I just remembered that during hearings and trials those who do not answer the court's questions, can be held in contempt of court, and put in jail. If the information is vital to the common good, could more severe punishments not be given?]

More thoughts on torture

Can the state compel someone to reveal information that it suspects he has? If it can establish that this person has this information, and he refuses to provide it, could he not be punished for disobedience? And could continued non-compliance be answered with continued punishment? If torture is not just a means of compelling someone to reveal information, but a form of punishment, could it not then be justified?

But how would the state establish (beyond reasonable doubt?) that this person had the information? Would it not have to try him first, and then find him to be disobedient? Can someone be ordered to tell something that he knows, if this is for the safety of the public, or the "common good"?

The use of torture to establish that someone has information would not be justified since it is not punishment--this must be established by other means (witnesses and other evidence).

Already police officers can use pain and force to make someone who is resisting (actively or passively) comply with their orders, or at the very least to get them to stop resisting. Is this torture? Even though they do not have the authority to pass legal judgment upon them, it would seem that they can use force and inflict pain. Is this to be considered punishment? Or justified coercion?

There is also this point to be remembered: it is easier to verify that one is moving one's limbs (or not moving them) than it is to verify that someone is telling the truth, if he is the only one who knows whether what he is saying is true or not.

The Church’s Bible By R.R. Reno (includes a reference to The Church's Bible, edited by Robert Louis Wilken)

NLM: Confessing the Messiah: The Church's Confession of Christ in Jewish-Christian Dialogue - Bishop Müller's Statement Pt. III by Gregor Kollmorgen

Sandro Magister, What the Bible Never Said
A major exhibition dedicated to the apocryphal books – the stories and characters not included in the canonical Scriptures. Not to invalidate the Gospels and the Church, but to bring them closer to us

NLM: Confessing the Messiah: The Church's Confession of Christ in Jewish-Christian Dialogue - Bishop Müller's Statement Pt. II by Gregor Kollmorgen

Hence those people can be saved and attain final communion with God who through no fault of their own lack belief in Jesus Christ, indeed under certain circumstances even lack belief in the existence of a personal God as creator and consummator, but not – and this is decisive – without the grace of Christ working invisibly within them.

This seems possible, but how likely is it to happen in reality? I believe there was a theological opinion that while an explicit belief in Christ was not necessary, sort sort of belief in God was required. If one is thinking about being in the state of grace alone, and without mortal sin, it seems as it is possible to be saved and yet not have belief, so long as one did not deliberately reject the gift of faith. And yet, how can that person's life be rightly ordered, if it is not ordered to God, and how can it be ordered to God, if that person does not believe in the existence of God? Perhaps if one does the good out of duty alone, and this is not ordered to self-fulfillment, but to some good outside of himself.

Pope's Letter for St. Anselm Celebration

Pope's Letter for St. Anselm Celebration

"One of the Brightest Figures in the Tradition of the Church"

AOSTA, Italy, APRIL 28, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is the text of the letter Benedict XVI sent to Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, retired archbishop of Bologna, on the occasion of the ninth centenary of the death of St. Anselm. The message was read April 21, the saint's feast day, at a solemn Mass in the Aosta cathedral in honor of the philosopher and theologian.



* * *

In view of the celebrations in which you, venerable brother, will take part as my legate in the illustrious city of Aosta in honor of the ninth centenary of the death of St. Anselm, which took place in Canterbury on 21 April 1109, I would like to give you a special message in which I wish recall the main features of this great monk, theologian and pastor of souls, whose work has left a deep mark on the history of the Church.

The anniversary is indeed an opportunity not to be missed to renew the memory of one of the brightest figures in the tradition of the Church and in the history of Western European thought. The exemplary monastic experience of Anselm, his original method of rethinking the Christian mystery, his subtle philosophical and theological doctrine, his teaching on the inviolable value of conscience and on freedom as the responsible adherence to truth and goodness, his passionate work as a shepherd of souls, dedicated with all his strength to the promotion of "freedom of the Church," have never ceased to arouse in the past the deepest interest, which the memory of his death is happily reigniting and encouraging in many ways and in different places.

In this memorial of the "Magnificent Doctor" -- as St. Anselm is called -- the Church of Aosta cannot but be recognized, the Church in which he was born and which is rightly pleased to consider Anselm as her most illustrious son. Even when he left Aosta in the time of his youth, he continued to carry in his memory and in his heart the bundle of memories that was never far from his thoughts in the most important moments of life. Among those memories, a particular place was certainly reserved for the sweet image of his mother and the majestic mountains of his valley with their high peaks, and perennial snow, in which he saw represented, as if in a fascinating and suggestive symbol, the sublimity of God. To Anselm - "a child raised in the mountains," as Admero his biographer calls him, ("Vita Sancti Anselmi," i, 2) - God appears to be that of which you cannot think of something bigger: perhaps his intuition was not unrelated to the childhood view of those inaccessible peaks. Already as a child he thought that in order to find God it was necessary to "climb to the summit of the mountain" (ibid.). In fact, he will realize more and more that God remains at an inaccessible height, located beyond the horizons which man is able to reach, since God is beyond the thinkable. Because of this, the journey in search of God, at least on this earth, will never end, but will always be thought and desire, the rigorous process of the intellect and the imploring inquiry of the heart.

The intense desire to know and the innate propensity for clarity and logical rigor will push Anselm towards the "scholeae" [schools] of his time. He will therefore join the monastery of Le Bec, where his inclination for dialectic reflection will be satisfied and above all, where his cloistered vocation will enkindle. To dwell on the years of the monastic life of Anselm is to encounter a faithful religious, "constantly occupied in God alone and in the disciplines of heaven" -- as his biographer writes -- in order to achieve "such a summit of divine speculation that would enable him by a path opened by God to penetrate, and, once penetrated, to explain the most obscure and previously unresolved questions concerning the divinity of God and our faith and to prove with clear reasons that what he stated belonged to sure Catholic doctrine" ("Vita Sancti Anselmi," i, 7). With these words, his biographer describes the theological method of St. Anselm, whose thought was ignited and illuminated in prayer. It is he himself that confesses, in his famous work, that the understanding of faith is an approach toward a vision, which we all yearn for and which we all hope to enjoy at the end of our earthly pilgrimage, "Quoniam inter fidem et speciem intellectum quem in hac vita capimus esse medium intelligo: quanto aliquis ad illum proficit, tanto eum propinquare speciei, ad quam omnes anhelamus, existimo (Cur Deus homo, Commendatio).

The saint desired to achieve the vision of the logical relationships inherent to the mystery, to perceive the "clarity of truth," and thus to grasp the evidence of the "necessary reasons," intimately bound to the mystery. A bold plan certainly, and it is one whose success still occupies the reflections of the students of Anselm today. In fact, his search of the "intellectus" [intellect] positioned between "fides" [faith] and "species" [vision] comes out of the source of the same faith and is sustained by confidence in reason, through which faith in a certain way is illuminated. The intent of Anselm is clear: "to raise the mind to contemplation of God" (Proslogion, Proemium). There remain, in any event, for every theological research, his programmatic words: "I do not try, Lord, to penetrate your depth, because I cannot, even from a distance, compare it with my intellect, but I want to understand, at least up to a certain point, your truth, which my heart believes and loves. I do not seek, in fact, to try to understand it in order to believe it, but I believe in order to understand it."[Non quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam] (Proslogion, 1).

In Anselm, prior and abbot of Le Bec, we underline some characteristics that further define his personal profile. What strikes us, first of all, is his charism as an expert teacher of spiritual life, one who knows and wisely illustrates the ways of monastic perfection. At the same time, one is fascinated by his instructive geniality, which is expressed in that discernment method -- which he names, the "via discretionis" (Ep. 61) -- which is a small image of his whole life, an image composed of both mercy and firmness. The peculiar ability which he demonstrates in initiating disciples to the experience of authentic prayer is very peculiar: in particular, his "Orationes sive Meditationes," eagerly requested and widely used, which have contributed to making many people of his time " anime oranti" [praying souls], as with his other works, have proved themselves a valuable catalyst in making the Middle Ages a "thinking" and, we might add, "conscientious" period. One would say that the most authentic Anselm can be found at Le Bec, where he remained thirty three years, and where he was much loved. Thanks to the maturity that he acquired in a similar environment of reflection and prayer, he will be able, as well in the midst of the subsequent trials as bishop, to declare: "I will not retain in my heart any resentment for any one" (Ep. 321).

The nostalgia of the monastery will accompany him for the rest of his life. He confessed it himself when he was constrained, to his deepest sorrow and that of his monks, to leave the monastery to assume the Episcopal ministry to which did not feel well disposed: "It is well known to many," he wrote to Pope Urban II, "the violence which was done to me, and how much I was reluctant and contrary, when I was brought as a bishop to England and how I explained the reasons of nature, age, weakness and ignorance, which were opposed to this office and that absolutely detest and shun scholastic duties, which I cannot dedicate myself to at all without endangering the salvation of my soul" (Ep. 206). He confides later with his monks in these terms: "I have lived for 33 years a monk -- three years without responsibility, 15 as prior, and as many as abbot -- in such a way that all the good people that knew me loved me, certainly not by my own merits but for the grace of God, and the ones that loved me most were those that knew me most intimately and with greatest familiarity" (Ep. 156). And he added: "You have been many to come to Le Bec ... Many of you I surrounded with a love so tender and sweet that each one had the impression that I did not love anyone else in the same way" (ibid.).

Appointed Archbishop of Canterbury and beginning, in this way, his most troubled journey, his "love of truth" (Ep. 327), his uprightness, his strict loyalty to conscience, his "Episcopal freedom" (Ep. 206), his " Episcopal honesty" (Ep. 314), his tireless work for the liberation of the Church from the temporal conditionings and from the servitude of calculations that are incompatible with his spiritual nature will appear in their full light. His words to King Henry remain exemplary in this respect, "I reply that in neither baptism nor in any other ordination that I have received, did I promised to observe the law or the custom of your father or of the Archbishop Lanfranco, but the law of God and of all the orders received" (Ep. 319). For Anselm, the primate of the Church of England, one principle applies: "I am a Christian, I am a monk, I am a Bishop: I desire to be faithful to all, according to the debt I have with each" (Ep. 314). In this vein he does not hesitate to say: "I prefer to be in disagreement with men than, agreeing with them, to be in disagreement with God" (Ep. 314). Precisely for this reason he feels ready even for the supreme sacrifice: "I am not afraid to shed my blood, I fear no wound in my body nor the loss of any material good" (Ep. 311).

It is understandable that, for all these reasons, Anselm still retains a great actuality and a strong appeal, in as much as it is fruitful to revisit and republish his writings, and together meditate continuously on his life. For this reason I have rejoiced that Aosta, on the occasion of the ninth centenary of the death of the saint, has distinguished itself with a set of appropriate and intelligent initiatives -- especially with the careful edition of his works -- with the intention to make known and loved the teachings and examples of this, its illustrious son. I entrust to you, Venerable Brother, the task of bringing to the faithful of the ancient and beloved city of Aosta the exhortation to remember with admiration and affection this great fellow citizen of theirs, whose light continues to shine throughout the Church, especially where the love for the truths of faith and the desire for their study by the light of reason are cultivated. And, in fact, faith and reason -- "fides et ratio" -- are united admirably in Anselm. I send, with these heartfelt sentiments through you, venerable brother, to the Bishop, Monsignor Giuseppe Anfossi, the clergy, the religious and the faithful of Aosta and to all those who take part in the celebrations in honor of the "Magnificent Doctor," a special apostolic blessing, propitiatory of an abundant outpouring of heavenly favors.

[Translation by Matthew Pollock]

NLM: Confessing the Messiah: The Church's Confession of Christ in Jewish-Christian Dialogue - Bishop Müller's Statement Pt. I by Gregor Kollmorgen

Fr. Georges Florovsky

A favorite of my GOARCH friend, noted for his neo-patristic synthesis. My friend would have liked access to this: Georges Florovsky Papers, 1916-1979 (bulk 1950s-1960s).

Some photos.

the collected works of fr georges florovsky
Georges Florovsky - OrthodoxWiki
Archpriest Georges Florovsky (pdf)
St Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary - Archpriest Georges Florovsky
Protopresybter Georges Florovsky
Father George Florovsky and the Patristic Mindset
THE PROBLEM OF. DIACONATE IN THE ORTHODOX CHURCH.

Related:
Protopresbyter Alexander Schmemann

NLM: Confessing the Messiah: The Church's Confession of Christ in Jewish-Christian Dialogue - Introduction Pt. II by Gregor Kollmorgen

Torture: What it is, and Why it is Wrong by Christopher O. Tollefsen (via The American Papist)

An offense against personal dignity (or charity) rather than an offense against justice?

I begin with the following normative claim: human life and health is an intrinsic, and indeed, a basic, human good. That is to say, life and health constitute a fundamental aspect of human well-being; the possibility of the promotion of either provides not just a possibility but an opportunity, an offer of benefit. And the possibility of damage or destruction of either provides not just a possibility, but an evil to be avoided and, insofar as such damage or destruction is willed, a wrong not to be done. The normative principle that can be drawn from this practical truth is that in willing, one should never intend the damage or destruction of the life or health of another human being.

This principle is compatible with acts that will, in fact, damage or destroy human life: the use of force in self-defense, the decay of the body brought about by intense study, or the possibility of ill health consequent upon incarceration as punishment for one’s crimes. For none of these forms of damage need be intended; they are, if willed appropriately, willed only as side effects of some other reasonable activity. By contrast, the destruction of human life in, for example, mercy killing or capital punishment, is intended—willed in each case as a means to some further end: cessation of suffering or justice.

How does he get around the exceptions? They are effects which are praeter intentionem, or if intended directly, it is subsumed under a higher end, that of justice. (I don't think he is supporting mercy killing, but is using it as an example to show how harm to the body is directly intended through a 'higher' end.) It seems to me that the NNL Theorists would more than likely offer a similar account of why torture is wrong.

Do we say that justice is a separate end, which justifies the inflicting of pain or bodily harm? (It might seem like a form of consequentialism.) Or do we say it is a part of the formality of the act itself?

NLM: Confessing the Messiah - Introduction Pt. I by Gregor Kollmorgen

Asia News: Pope: the Bible must be interpreted within the magisterium of the Church (via The Western Confucian)

Benedict XVI recalled that Leo XIII, Pius XII, and Vatican II reiterated in a variety of ways that "Holy mother Church, relying on the belief of the Apostles, holds that the books of both the Old and New Testaments in their entirety, with all their parts, are sacred and canonical because written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God as their author and have been handed on as such to the Church herself" (Dei Verbum, 11).

This correct approach to the concept of the divine inspiration and truth of Holy Scripture leads to norms that directly concern its interpretation. "In this regard," the pope recalled, "Vatican Council II indicates three criteria that are always valid for an interpretation of Sacred Scripture in keeping with the Spirit who inspired it. First of all, one must pay great attention to the content and unity of all the Scripture. In fact, as different as the books making it up may be, Sacred Scripture is one by virtue of the unity of God's plan, of which Jesus Christ is the center and heart (cf. Lk. 24:25-27; Lk. 24:44-46). In the second place, one must read Scripture in the context of the living tradition of the whole Church. According to a saying of the Fathers, "Sacra Scriptura principalius est in corde Ecclesiae quam in materialibus instrumentis scripta," "Sacred Scripture is written in the heart of the Church before it is written on material instruments." In fact, the Church carries within its Tradition the living memory of the Word of God, and it is the Holy Spirit who gives it the interpretation of this, according to its spiritual meaning (cf. Origen, Homiliae in Leviticum, 5,5). As the third criterion, it is necessary to pay attention to the analogy of faith, or to the cohesion of the individual truths of faith among one another and with the overall plan of Revelation and the fullness of the divine economy contained within it."

The task of researchers studying the Sacred Scripture by various means, then,"is that of contributing according to the aforementioned principles to a deeper understanding and exposition of the meaning of Sacred Scripture. Scientific study of the sacred texts is not sufficient by itself. In order to respect the coherence of the faith of the Church, the Catholic exegete must be attentive to viewing the Word of God in these texts from the perspective of the Church's faith. In the absence of this indispensable point of reference, exegetical research remains incomplete, losing sight of its main purpose, with the danger of becoming a sort of mere intellectual exercise. The interpretation of the sacred Scriptures cannot be only an individual scientific effort, but must always be situated, inserted, and authenticated by the living tradition of the Church. This norm is decisive for clarifying the correct and reciprocal relationship between exegesis and the Magisterium of the Church.

"The texts inspired by God have been entrusted to the community of believers, to the Church of Christ, in order to nourish faith and guide the life of charity. Respect for this purpose influences the validity and efficacy of Biblical hermeneutics. The encyclical Providentissimus Deus recalled this fundamental truth, and observed that, far from obstructing Biblical research, respect for this fact fosters its authentic progress."

In conclusion, "only the ecclesial context permits sacred Scripture to be understood as the authentic Word of God, the guide, norm, and rule for the life of the Church and the spiritual growth of believers. This involves the rejection of any interpretation that is subjective for simply limited to analysis alone, which is incapable of containing the overall meaning that over the course of the centuries has guided the Tradition of the entire people of God."

Holy See on Racism
"Without a Change of Heart, Laws Are Not Effective"

In all its manifestations, racism makes the false claim that some human beings have less dignity and value than others; it thus infringes upon their fundamental equality as God's children and it leads to the violation of the human rights of individuals and of entire groups of persons.

This equality is proper to the ratio of charity, not to that of justice--and yet, the prohibition of certain actions falls under the virtue of justice, and not just charity. Where does the evil with regard to racism arise? In the intellect or the will? Is it possible to be a good-willed racist? Can the intellectual error of racism be separated from the moral error? Can someone believe sincerely that some people should be treated differently from others because they are somehow inferior? Or that they should be slaves -- but still be accorded basic protections under justice and the law?

Disputations: Disproportionate infliction of pain

The question is, are we naming by the 'word' torture the external act (which has for its object the infliction of bodily harm or pain) or the composite of the external act and the internal act (the end of which intention is to induce someone else to cooperate, give information, etc.). It seems the latter, because the internal act gives the formality which defines or puts the external act within a particular moral species.

I argue that torture is unjust here. If it (or the external act) is unjust, how can it possibly be proportionate under any circumstances?

My thinking on this needs to be clarified further.

The Guardian Profile: Roger Scruton
Anthony Barnett (wiki)
Town and Country: Anthony Barnett, Roger Scruton

Anthony Barnett on What’s Changed

James Chastek, Proofs for God's Existence

What the theistic proofs have in in common with the other kinds of proofs for existence is they are all necessary because of some weakness of our intellect. No one needs to prove the existence of trees since they’re just there. For the same reason, no on needed to prove the existence of black swans to Australians; and no one would need to prove the existence of black holes to a civilization which (somehow) could just look up and see one in the sky (like the passengers on the Disney movie The Black Hole). The difference is that the standards of what counts as proof are different in the case of natural science and in metaphysics.

And "The difference between scholastic and modern theology":

The main transition from scholastic to modern theology (which took a few centuries) was the shift from speculative philosophy to history as the field in which one encounters God. The scholastic did not need elaborate, critical, and highly advanced systems of historical analysis in order to do what he understood as theology; just as a modern theologian does not need elaborate logical and disputative systems to do what he understands as theology.

What, then, of monastic theology? Was monastic theology primarily a commentary on Sacred Scripture? Or was there more to it? And what about the theology of the Church Fathers? So much more to read and discover...

Gloria Ruth Frost, Thomas Aquinas on Necessary Truths about Contingent Beings

Edward Feser. Spinoza on final causes

James Chastek, Notes on the ontological proof

RIP, Marjorie Grene

She passed away on March 16. Announcement at Virginia Tech. LA Times obituary. NY Times.

Links:
wiki
The philosophy of Marjorie Grene
The Believer - Interview with Marjorie Grene
Vintage Marjorie Grene: A Review Essay on A Philosophical Testament
Open Court: The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene
The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene (Volume XXIX, 2002)
Amazon.com: The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene
Marjorie Grene, David Depew - The Philosophy of Biology
Virginia Tech professor Marjorie Grene is the first woman in The Library of Living Philosophers


Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog: In Memoriam: Marjorie Grene

James Chastek, Ways to consider natural theology

MacIntyre at 80: Alasdair MacIntyre Conference University College Dublin, 6-8 March 2009

International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry

"Keeping Philosophy Relevant: the Achievements and Challenges of Alasdair MacIntyre" by Professor John Haldane (alas, the text is not available)

Revisionist History: beyond the gatekeepers (via Stephen Hand)

???

Sandro Magister, The Event of Easter on which the Church Stands or Falls
It is the resurrection of Jesus. "We will hear you on this matter some other time," the intellectuals of Athens said to Paul, leaving him by himself. But Benedict XVI is determined, and is reissuing the proclamation "urbi et orbi." He has done so twice in four days. And he has explained why

From the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture:

10th Annual Fall Conference - Call for Papers
The Center is pleased to announce its call for papers for the 10th annual fall conference, The Summons of Freedom: Virtue, Sacrifice and the Common Good. The conference will take place on the campus of the University of Notre Dame November 12-14, 2009. View the call for papers here.

Rorate Caeli, Declaration on the Anaphora of Addai and Mari Not an act of the Supreme Magisterium (from 2008). The post includes a translation of "Historical and Theological Argumentation in Favour Of Anaphoras without Institution Narrative:A Critical Appraisal,"
by Ansgar Santogrossi OSB.

James Chastek, Fourth Way, III

Msgr. Paul McPartlan

A GOARCH friend suggested checking him out (CV). He also seemed to think that the Statement of Joint Catholic-Orthodox Commission (given at Ravenna) would present a challenge to the dogmatic teaching of Vatican I on the nature of papal primacy. I guess I'll have to read that one carefully.

Msgr. McPartlan is also the author of Sacrament of Salvation: An Introduction to Eucharistic Ecclesiology (Google Books & Amazon) and The Eucharist Makes the Church.

"The Eucharist and the Church"; EWTN archived copy of original Zenit article
Draftsman Discusses Ecumenical Document
Radical Preaching: A Week with Paul McPartlan
An interview after the International Theological Commission gave its report on limbo.
"Gaudium et Spes" in The Deacon Reader.
Dr. Paul McPartlan Discusses “The Promise and Challenge of Catholic-Orthodox Dialogue”at Annual SS. Cyril and Methodius Lecture

Related links:
Models of the Eucharist
Pro Unione Web Site - Dialogues O-RC
Eastern Christian Publications
The Deacon Reader - A Review

For the Salvation of Souls: A Preacher's Contribution

James Chastek, Fourth Way, II

ST, I, 2, a. 3:
Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi.

Is Aquinas then saying that goods are commensurable? How would he respond to the incommensurability thesis of the New Natural Law Theory? Does "good" need to be used univocally in order for such comparisons to be made? Or does it suffice that it is used analogically? (Dennis McInerny gives an answer in The Difficult Good.)

Death of Rev. Stanley Jaki - News & Events - Seton Hall University

Seton Hall U. page

source

Other links:
wdtprs
The hermeneutic of continuity: Fr Stanley Jaki RIP
First Things » Blog Archive » Fr. Stanley Jaki, R.I.P.
Philosophy of Science Portal: Deceased--Stanley L. Jaki
William Cinfici: Father Stanley Jaki, Rest in Peace

Rev. Stanley L. Jaki
STANLEY JAKI ON GENESIS ONE
SOCRATES OR THE BABY AND THE BATHWATER
Death?
The Origin of Science
'Science can't explain Creation of the Universe'

Living Tradition: Some Rationalist Presuppositions of the Historical-Critical Method Part III. The Influence Of Kantian Philosophy Upon Historical Criticism by John McCarthy

Fr. Al Kimel, The Sacramentality of Sacraments. See also Is Transubstantiation Bodily Enough?

Is there only one true philosophy, Christianity? Or is true philosophy something separate from what has been revealed? We can find authorities for both opinions, and not a few Church Fathers who seem to endorse the former. And yet what have the popes said and recommended on this question? To learn we must submit to a teacher, and trust that the teacher is in possession of the truth.

Zenit: Message to Buddhists on Vesak
"Witnessing to a Spirit of Poverty"

John Médaille, Compulsory Mis-education

Something worth pondering after this post.

Suzan Mazur, Is Neo-Darwinism Dead?
An Interview with Lynn Margulis

Edward Feser, Fodor and Aquinas on the Extended Mind Thesis (via WWWTW)

Edward Feser takes on Brian Leiter, once again: Pants on fire

Aristotle on why the education of the young should be common

A continuation of this post.

Aristotle explains why education of citizens must be common:

Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that everyone must also have one and the same education and that taking care of this education must be a common matter. It must not be private in the way it is now, when everyone takes care of their own children privately and teaches them whatever private learning they think best. Of common things, the training too must be common.

At the same time, no citizen should even think that he belongs to himself but instead that each belongs to the city, for each is part of the city. The care of each part, however, naturally looks to the care of the whole, and to this extent praise might be due to the Spartans, for they devote the most serious attention to their children and do so in common. (Politics, 8.1 1337a21-32; trans. Peter Simpson.)

At the same time, Aristotle acknowledges that most cities neglect legislation regarding the education of the young, and do not have any sort of common regimen:

In most cities these matters are neglected , and each lives as he wishes, giving sacred law, in Cyclops' fashion, to his wife and children. So while it would be best if the care became a common one and were correctly managed and if doing this were a possibility, yet, in the absence of common care, it would seem proper for each individually to promtoe the virtue of his children and friends, or at least to make that his choice. But from what has been said, it would seem that one would be better able to do this if one became a legislator. For while common cares clearly become common through the laws, they become decent through serious laws. (NE 10.9, 1180a25-34; trans. Peter Simpson.)

And so the virtuous are left to themselves, and must become legislators within the household, setting down laws for the training of their children.

What if there is a common education, but it is not rightly ordered? Perhaps it is in accordance with the constitution of the polity, but the constitution is not a good one, or produces bad people? One should avoid that education as much as one can, and if that is not possible, consider separating and entering a different community. What choice does one have, if one is concerned with virtue and raising one's children in virtue?

The Tyranny of Liberalism

James Kalb on the Ideology's Totalitarian Impulses


By Annamarie Adkins

NEW YORK, MARCH 27, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Liberals -- on both the Right and Left -- may posit that they favor freedom, reason and the well-being of ordinary people. But some critics believe that liberalism itself erodes the very institutions -- family, religion, local associations -- necessary to restrain its excesses.

One such liberal skeptic is attorney and writer James Kalb, who recently wrote a book entitled, "The Tyranny of Liberalism: Understanding and Overcoming Administered Freedom, Inquisitorial Tolerance, and Equality by Command" (ISI).

Kalb explained to ZENIT why he believes liberalism inevitably evolves into a form of soft totalitarianism, or a “dictatorship of relativism,” and why the Church is well positioned to be its preeminent foe.

Q: What is liberalism?

Kalb: We're so much in the middle of it that it's difficult to see it as a whole. You can look at it, though, as an expression of modern skepticism.

Skeptical doubts have led to a demand for knowledge based on impersonal observation and devoted to practical goals. Applied to the physical world, that demand has given us modern natural science.

Applied to life in society, it has led to a technological understanding of human affairs. If we limit ourselves to impersonal observations, we don't observe the good; we observe preferences and how to satisfy them. The result is a belief that the point of life is satisfying preferences.

On that view, the basic social issue is whose preferences get satisfied.

Liberalism answers that question by saying that all preferences are equal, so they all have an equal claim to satisfaction. Maximum equal satisfaction therefore becomes the rational ordering principle for life in society -- give everyone what he wants, as much and as equally as possible. In other words, give everybody maximum equal freedom.

Q: How can an ideology of freedom become tyrannical?

Kalb: Equal freedom is an open-ended standard that makes unlimited demands when taken seriously.

For example, it views non-liberal standards as oppressive, because they limit equal freedom. Liberal government wants to protect us from oppression, so it tries to eradicate those standards from more and more areas of life.

The attempt puts liberal government at odds with natural human tendencies. If the way someone acts seems odd to me, and I look at him strangely, that helps construct the social world he's forced to live in. He will find that oppressive. Liberal government can't accept that, so it eventually feels compelled to supervise all my attitudes about how people live and how I express them.

The end result is a comprehensive system of control over all human relations run by an expert elite responsible only to itself. That, of course, is tyranny.

Q: You argue that liberalism, especially its "advanced" form, corrupts and suppresses the traditional aspects of life that defined and kept Western society together for centuries such as religion, marriage, family and local community. How does it do that?

Kalb: Equal freedom isn't the highest standard in those areas of life. They have to do with love and loyalty toward something outside ourselves that defines who we are. That love and loyalty involve particular connections to particular people and their ways of life.

Such things cannot be the same for everyone. They create divisions and inequalities. They tell people they can't have things they want.

So equal freedom tells us traditional institutions have to be done away with as material factors in people's lives. They have to be debunked and their effects suppressed.

At bottom, liberalism says people have to be neutered to fit into a managed system of equal freedom. They have to be encouraged to devote themselves to satisfactions that don't interfere with the satisfactions of others.

In the end, the only permissible goals are career, consumption and various private pursuits and indulgences.

That doesn't leave much room for religion or for family or communal values. The only permissible public value is liberalism itself.

Q: How does mass media advance the cause of liberalism?

Kalb: The relationship is almost mechanical. It's one of the great strengths of liberalism.

Television and the Internet give us a world chopped up into interchangeable fragments.

To make that world comprehensible to journalists and viewers it has to be put in order in a simple way that can be understood quickly without regard to particularities.

That's impossible if complex distinctions and local habits are allowed to matter.

For that reason the mass media naturally favor a top-down managerial approach to social life with a bias toward sameness and equality -- in other words, something very much like contemporary liberalism.

To put it differently, the mass media prefer things to be discussed publicly and decided centrally based on a simple principle like equality. If that's done they can understand what's going on and what it all means.

Also, they themselves will serve an important function because they provide the forum for discussion and the information for decision. That situation naturally seems appropriate to them.

Q: What about the distinction between Anglo-American liberalism and continental liberalism, and their different models of secularism? Is it inaccurate to lump everything together under the heading of "liberalism"?

Kalb: The fundamental principle is the same, so the distinction can't be relied on.

In the English-speaking world the social order was traditionally less illiberal than on the continent.

King and state were less absolute, the Church had less independent authority, standing armies were out of favor, the aristocracy was less a separate caste, and the general outlook was more commercial and utilitarian.

Classical liberalism could be moderate and still get what it wanted.

Liberalism is progressive, though, so its demands keep growing. It eventually rejects all traditional ways as illiberal and becomes more and more radical.

For that reason state imposition of liberal norms has become at least as aggressive in Britain and Canada as on the continent.

The United States is still somewhat of an exception, but even among us aggressive forms of liberalism are gaining ground. They captured the academy, the elite bar and the media years ago, and they're steadily gaining ground among the people.

The international dizziness about President Obama and the violent reaction to the narrow victory of Proposition 8 concerning same-sex marriage in California show the direction things are going.

Q: Does rejecting "liberalism" mean rejecting freedom of conscience, political equality, free markets and other supposed benefits of "liberalism"?

Kalb: No. A society can still have those things to the extent they make sense. They just need to be subordinated, at least in principle, to a larger order defined by considerations like the good life.

The Church has noted, for example, that free markets are an excellent thing in many ways. They just aren't the highest thing. The same principle applies to other liberal ideals.

Q: Both Popes Pius IX and Leo XIII condemned liberalism, but it seems the Church has embraced it since the Second Vatican Council in its defense of democracy and human rights. The tone of Church social teaching has also focused more on influencing liberal institutions, and less on shaping individuals, families, and local communities. How does one account for this shift in the Church's attitude?

Kalb: The Church apparently decided modernity was here to stay. Liberal modernity looked better than fascist modernity or Bolshevik modernity.

It claimed to be a modest and tolerant approach to government that let culture and civil society develop in their own way. So the Church decided to accept and work within it.

Also, the development of the mass media and consumer society, and the growth of state education and industrial social organization generally, meant Catholics were more and more drawn into liberal ways of thinking. Hostility to liberalism became difficult to maintain within the Church.

The problem, though, is that liberal modernity is extremely critical and therefore intolerant. In order to cooperate with it you have to do things its way.

The recent, virulent attacks on Pope Benedict for many different reasons by the liberal elite illustrate that phenomenon perfectly.

For that reason, if there's going to be joint social action today, it inevitably focuses on extending liberal institutions rather than promoting local and traditional institutions like the family, which are intrinsically non-liberal. Many people in the Church have come to accept that.

Q: You argue that religion can be the unifying force that offers resistance to advanced liberalism, and that the Catholic Church is the spiritual organization most suited to that task. Why do you think so?

Kalb: To resist advanced liberalism you have to propose a definite social outlook based on goods beyond equal freedom and satisfaction.

A conception of transcendent goods won't stand up without a definite conception of the transcendent, which requires religion. And a religious view won't stand up in public life unless there's a definite way to resolve disputes about what it is.

You need the Pope.

Catholics have the Pope, and they also have other advantages like an emphasis on reason and natural law. As a Catholic, I'd add that they have the advantage of truth.

Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture videos

Moral and political philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, honoured at UCD -- the page has an embedded video of his lecture, “On having survived the academic moral philosophy of the twentieth century.” (via The Hermeneutic of Continuity)

A Thomist: St. Thomas, Law and Grace

It reminds me of the question of whether there can be a Christian ethics (i.e. moral philosophy/science, as opposed to moral theology). Ralph McInerny has given an answer, written as a response to Jacques Maritain on the same point. One day I'll write a response to both--each is right on certain points, but...

John 3: 19-21

Part of the Gospel reading for Laetare Sunday.

It would seem to harmonize very well with the epistles of John, that one who loves God will keep His commandments, and that one who sins knowingly but claims to love God lies. If God draws us to Himself, does He not help us know that we sin? Would He really let us remain ignorant, if He wants us to be perfect? And if we know that we are sinning against God, but prefer sin to God, do we not reject His grace of conversion in order to continue to sin "comfortably"?