James Chastek on the teaching of logic -- part 1 and part 2.

I must have reed St Thomas a thousand times before it hit me that he defined logic in relation to the rational faculty. Logic, by his definition, is the art that directs reason in its own act. This act is governed by the proper object of reason, the what-sensible-things-are. On this account, logic is subordinate to things by definition. The goal is not to give a universal system of all possible arguments, but to give a general account of how we figure out what things are. On St. Thomas’s account logic is the answer to the question: “generally speaking, how does one use an intellect?” or “how does an intellect work?” On this account, you first give its object, then the order we follow to attain the object (general to particular) then the most general things known that can do logical work (the categories) and then how we can refine these general things into definitions (Topics) then the laws that govern how we combine them to form a proposition (de interpretatione) and an argument (the books of Analytics)

The part on the Topics would be the easiest one to leave out, and the one we contemporary thinkers are most in need of.

Logic. Something all aspiring academics should be studying; it would also be useful for those who are engaged in ecumenical dialogue, particularly the "Latins" and the "Greeks". Most philosophy departments that take a historical approach to teaching philosophy do not have a basic logic course for both majors and non-majors. How much would majors benefit from having just one good logic course. It would help them deal with the sort of 'relativism' that one finds in such departments.

Papal Address to Social Doctrine Group

Papal Address to Social Doctrine Group

"Economic and Financial Paradigms … Must Be Rethought"

VATICAN CITY, JUNE 14, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Benedict XVI gave Saturday upon receiving in audience members of the Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation, which promotes the social doctrine of the Church.

* * *
Venerable brothers in the episcopate and the priesthood,
Illustrious and dear friends!

Thank you for your visit that you are making on the occasion of your annual meeting. I greet all of you with affection and am grateful to you for what you do, with proven generosity, at the service of the Church. I greet and thank Count Lorenzo Rossi di Montelera, your president, who interpreted your sentiments with refined sensibility, expounding the foundation's activities with broad brush strokes. I also thank those who, in different languages, wanted to present me with an attestation of their common devotion. Your gathering today assumes a significance and particular value in light of the situation that all of humanity is experiencing in this moment.

In effect, the financial crisis that has struck the industrialized nations, the emergent nations and those that are developing, shows in a clear way how the economic and financial paradigms that have been dominant in recent years must be rethought. Your foundation has done well, then, to confront, in the international conference that took place yesterday, the theme of the pursuit and identification of the values and guidelines that the economic world must stick to in order to bring into being a new model of development that is more attentive to the demands of solidarity and more respectful of human dignity.

I am happy to see that you have especially examined the interdependency between institutions, society and the market, beginning -- in accord with the encyclical "Centesimus Annus" of my venerable predecessor John Paul II -- from the reflection according to which the market economy, understood as "an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector" (No. 42), can only be recognized as a way of economic and civil progress if it is oriented to the common good (cf. No. 43). Such a vision, however, must also be accompanied by another reflection according to which freedom in the economic sector must situate itself "within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality," a responsible freedom "the core of which is ethical and religious" (No. 42). This encyclical opportunely affirms that: "The person fully realizes himself in the free gift of self, so too ownership morally justifies itself in the creation, at the proper time and in the proper way, of opportunities for work and human growth for all" (No. 43).

I hope the research developed by your work, inspired by the eternal principles of the Gospel, will elaborate a vision of the modern economy that is respectful of the needy and of the rights of the weak. As you know, my encyclical on the vast theme of economics and labor will soon be published: It will highlight what, for us Christians, are the objectives to be pursued and the values to be promoted and tirelessly defended, with the purpose of realizing a truly free and solidary human coexistence.

I also note with pleasure what you are doing on behalf of the Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, to whose aim, an aim which you share, I attribute great value for an increasingly fruitful interreligious dialogue.

Dear friends, thank you once again for your visit; I assure each of you a remembrance in prayer as I bless you all from my heart.

[Translation by Joseph G. Trabbic]

Is this sufficient for Blackstone to be called a voluntarist in his account of law?

This then is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by some superior being: and, in those creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature itself subsists, for it's existence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.

Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is necessary that he should in all points conform to his maker's will.

This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.

Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian^[1] has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be obtained than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wanted some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance it's inseparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to inquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, "that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other-It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

source: Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, Section 2

James Chastek, Cultural value endoxes

A good piece regarding endoxa. When it comes to the discussion of morality in high schools and colleges, traditional values are questioned, but modern ones (especially modern rights) are not -- evidence that liberalism is just another tradition despite its pretense to the contrary? When I was in high school, I found that the students were the ones who were questioning received attitudes, while the teachers would act as "neutral" moderators, doing nothing to defend tradition or to lead the "liberated" students to question their own values. There is one classmate in particular who annoyed me greatly with his smart-ass attitude. To this day I have no inclination to talk to him. (Or friend him on Facebook.)

One can see this liberal bias against endoxa (or their rejection by those who desire license) clearly with respect to morality. It seems to happen less with respect to the speculative sciences. However, a similar critique can be made of professional educators. It may be part of the standard narrative that what was believed in the past has been rendered obsolete or false through new discoveries; but for what cannot be immediately be verified, even these supposed new "truths" are taken as assumptions, rather than proved. No attempt is usually made to show why someone reasonable might hold to those beliefs in the past.

People are critical of what they have rejected, but they do not undertake to examine their own beliefs in the same way. Is that close-mindedness? It is certainly proud ignorance to claim that one is "open-minded" or "critical" when one is not really so.

Website dedicated to Fr. Seraphim Rose.

Fr. Finigan links to the following: On Rupture Theology

Daily Mail: The cloud with no name: Meteorologists campaign to classify unique 'Asperatus' clouds seen across the world

Gallery at the Cloud Appreciation Society.

(via Stephen Hand)

An article by Sandra Miesel on Maria Lactans: Mothering God.

The Fall 2008 issue of Communio is on the subject of Natural Law.

Dawn Patrol: And then God created the olive branch
David Schindler calls time-out in dispute over Christopher West's teachings
A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.


Response to Profs. Smith and Waldstein Regarding Christopher West, by David Schindler

A thought that struck me while I was discussing TOB with its defenders -- has TOB become another tool with which those who have been influenced by feminism beat men (and husbands)? While it may be true that some men act selfishly with respect to sex, how true is this of American (and Catholic) husbands? How many women withhold sex in order to punish or spite their husbands? And how different are male and female sexuality? Does Karol Wojtyla recognize that there is a difference in male and female sexuality (and how men and women perceive sex), like Dr. Laura, or would he reject this as a rationalization for "getting it whenever he wants it."

Let's not even get into women's groups, which sound like an excuse for women to complain to other women about their husbands. Not exactly a good way to strengthen one's marriage, especially if it is used primarily as a means of validating their complaints.

James Chastek, A definition and division of analogy

Fr. Z: Politics and worship

According to Dodar, St. Augustine held that

When good does result from human efforts, it is because they are never without divine assistance. Knowledge and love of God, the proper worship of God, are impeded by the dissonance of this free-floating selfhood. Augustine describes the sin of Adam and Eve as self-worship as opposed to the correct worship of God...

Does Augustine define worship in this way? Aquinas distinguishes between charity and religion (both its internal and external acts). It does seem that for Aquinas, there can be no religion without charity.

The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. (ST II II 81, 5 ad 1)

The body of the article, Aquinas on whether religion is a theological virtue:

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.

Insight Scoop: Benedict XVI on Rabanus Maurus, "an exegete, philosopher, poet, pastor and man of God"

Abstract: Synthesis of activated pyrimidine ribonucleotides in prebiotically plausible conditions
Nature: RNA world easier to make
(via JimmyAkin.org)

The Dawn Patrol: Funeral homily for Francis Canavan S.J. By PATRICK J. RYAN S.J.

L'analogie chez saint Thomas d'Aquin par l'abbé S. Leclère

Salve Regina

Those who defend Christopher West (and others) talk about how he has changed their lives and so on. How does this compare with the talks given by Jason Evert and his wife? What is it about West's teaching that is more effective than the Church's teaching, even if it is understood only in prohibitions? After all, obedience is a necessary addition to Faith, and also a "component" of charity (as well as religion). Why weren't these [infused] virtues enough for people to abstain from acts that are prohibited by Christ? Do people need to be presented with the 'positive' goods associated with a prohibition before they cooperate with grace and fulfill the Law? Society, bishops, and other traditional sources of wisdom concerning marriage and family have been lost, that is true, and people need to be taught about the vocation to marriage. But telling them that certain acts are somehow not consonant with giving one's self, or are a lie, or something else -- is this really an adequate explanation for the prohibition? If certain acts are opposed to love, as a general virtue, it is because they are against reason (and some subordinate good) in some way.

A critique of the phrase "integral good" is found here:

« The entire activity of the Church is an expression of a love that seeks the integral good of man. »

The Abbé de Nantes often contested this expression, inherited from John Paul II, but going back to Paul VI, “expert in humanity”. He claimed to be exercising a global magistracy, infallibly fixing new rights and duties for persons and States, determining the entire ideal and programme for a universal social reform “for the integral development of the whole man and of all men”. In this claim, developed by the encyclical on the progress of peoples (Populorum progressio, Easter 1967), the Abbé de Nantes detected the venom of the errors condemned by Saint Pius X in the Letter on the Sillon of 25 August 1910 (Letter to My Friends no 245, April 1967).

Some thoughts that struck me as I read this part -- is this expression really that problematic? And is it linked in any way to the 'integral humanism' of Jacques Maritain? What of the integral human fulfillment of John Finnis? Answers to come, perhaps...

At the Dawn Patrol: Schindler's list
Sparks fly as JP2 Institute dean raps Christopher West for errors
A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.

bloggingLOURDES takes issue with Dr. Janet Smith and Christopher West over their approval of certain sex acts, in the name of theology of the body.

Two other posts on TOB: Sex, Matrimony, the Garden of Eden and Theology of the Body and 10 Via Crucis on Mount Carmel (a brief comment on the Theology of the Body).

It does not appear to me that Father gives an argument against the act in question, except that it goes against human dignity -- that may seem almost tautological. Still, and this is something that those looking for theological arguments to permit such acts forget, there is something to be said for the connatural knowledge of the virtuous that enables them to know that certain things are wrong, even if they cannot give a scientific (that is, reasoned-out) explanation of why this is so.

Curious, in the comments section there is a lot of cricism of NFP--some may be criticizing just the mentality (or intentions) of those practicing it, some appear to be going further and criticing the practice itself.

Something from Counterpunch, of all places: On Evolution, by James C. Faris
A Critique of Darwinism

Space.com: Close-up Look at Black Hole Reveals Feeding Frenzy

More Theology of the Body resources

I came across the names of Matt Pinto and Greg Popcak while writing this post.


Theology of the Body
John Paul II's Theology of the Body
John Paul II's Theology of the Body

Michael Waldstein
Retranslating the Theology of the Body.rtf
Retranslating the Theology of the Body
The 2nd International Theology of The Body Symposium
The Theology of the Body According to John Paul II
Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body

Carl Anderson and Father José Granados
Called to Love - More on Theology of the Body
Called to Love: Approaching John Paul II's Theology of the Body
What is the Theology of the Body & Why is it Changing so Many Lives?

Greg Popcak
Pastoral Solutions Institute: Homepage
Ave Maria Radio Host - Greg and Lisa Popcak - Heart Mind and Strength
Holy Sex!
Catholic Dads: Holy Sex - by Gregory Popcak - Book Review

Christopher West
Christopher West Home
Theology of the Body Institute

A better approach? Chastity - Pure Love Club and Real Love Incorporated

Catholic Social Thought, Political Liberalism, and the Idea of Human Rights
Zachary R. Calo
(via Mirror of Justice)

Christopher West's Theology of the Body by David L. Schindler

stating that, while “there are some important health and aesthetic considerations that can’t be overlooked,” “there's nothing inherently wrong with anal penetration as foreplay to normal intercourse," (Good News About Sex and Marriage, 1st ed., emphasis in original), though qualifying this in the revised edition and stressing the subjective dangers of lust in such activity

I believe it can be argued that anal sex is intrinsically wrong -- the penis is not meant to be put in the anus, and we can know this precisely from the adverse impact on health that this can have. We can also look at the functionality of the organs involved as well.

Some Ralph McInerny videos

Medieval Philosophy: St. Thomas Aquinas


Introduction to Thomas Aquinas


Medieval Philosophy


Metaphysics


Ralph McInerny
Center for Ethics and Culture bio
icuweb
International Catholic University

Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 1

Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 2
Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 3
Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 4
Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 5

Philosopher Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy • VideoSift

wiki
Gifford Lecture Series - Biography - Anthony Kenny
Anthony Kenny - Aquinas on Being - Reviewed by Robert Pasnau

Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 1

Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 2
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 3
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 4
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 5

I hesitate to add "Aristotle" as a label for this post, as I do not consider Nussbaum to be a reliable disciple.

Interview with Quentin Skinner.

Interview of Professor Quentin Skinner - part 1

Interview of Professor Quentin Skinner - part 2

(You can download this interview here.)

James Chastek brings us a translation of the first part of the first chapter of Msgr. Maurice Dionne’s treatment of analogy: Dionne on analogy.

James Schall, "Rights" and Liberties

Few recognize how dangerous the origin of this word is. Many fine scholars such as Jacques Maritain, John Finnis, and others have worked valiantly to save “rights” terminology from relativism, the context in which it is understood in modern political philosophy. They have not prevailed in baptizing it as was their intent, even though they provide plausible arguments about why it need not be a relativistic concept. These arguments are simply ignored or rejected by most rights advocates, though seldom confronted intellectually.


David Walsh has noted that the word “rights” still retains a vague relation to some stable grounding in being. Today, however, “rights” mean what Hobbes, its original formulator, claimed: namely, the word rights means whatever the de facto political authority says it means. A “right” is what the government defines and enforces as a right, nothing more, nothing less. The current president’s whole anti-life agenda, the most extreme ever designed in any responsible or irresponsible polity, is presented to us under the guise of “human rights.” It is breathtaking.


The idea that such “rights” have “natural law” behind them, a way of looking at them so that we can appeal to a common and agreed rational concept of human nature, is fine. But this understanding is neither what the word nor the actions of the government mean. We like to say that the “right to life is the fundamental right.” Nix that “right” and all else falls. This is true. All else is falling. The “right to life” now means politically what, and only what, the government and courts define it to mean, not some “inalienable” idea of human dignity from God or nature.


The Church has taken up the term “natural right” as if it meant something rooted in human nature. I can count almost on one hand the number of times that, aware of the problem, a pope or theologian will say, almost as an aside, that “natural right,” of course, does not mean what “natural right” does mean in the public order. They then use the very same term as if everyone agreed with a grounded view, rooted in natural law.


In practice, we seem to think that everyone agrees with this Catholic background of “natural rights.” We have a basis for common discourse. Yet we soon find that people polemically inquire: “If you claim a ‘right to life,’ why not grant a ‘right’ to abortion or any such thing?”

It seems that the word right is used to refer to both subjective passive rights and subjective active rights, it is being used equivocally, and not univocally. Given our disregard for natural law and its Author, naturally we would associate our conception of rights with some brand of legal positivitism, would we not? What possible limits could there be? Some may say that the liberal 'no harm' principle is sufficient. But how is harm to be defined? Just the production of physical evils? Or moral evils as well, and everything "in between"?

Edward Feser, Davidson’s anomalous monism

James Chastek, Aristotle's account of substance

Charles De Koninck: Works in philosophy

The website includes the following:

Letter On The Common Good

Charles de Koninck


December 22, 1961




Dear Sister Margaret Ann:

The book you mention was out of print six weeks after publication. A new printing will appear in France some time next year.

I wrote that little work to defend Aristotle and St. Thomas when they say that, within a given genus, the common good is always more divine than the proper or personal good. This proposition had been under attack for some time. The reasoning behind this open attack even by well-known Thomists assumed that "common good" is a univocal expression, i.e. with one single meaning, and that one can therefore pass from one genus to the other. Yet in fact the common good of the family (namely, the offspring) and that of the political community (the well-being of the citizens, which, in the end, consists in virtuous activity) are one only in proportion. When said of the Church, we must distinguish between the intrinsic common good, which is the inherent good of the whole made up of parts; and the extrinsic common good, which is God in his very Deity. The latter is a common good in still another sense, for it refers to what St. Thomas calls a "totum ante partes", not "ex partibus." When we say that the creature participates in God's perfection, we do not mean that it is part of God the way a slice of bread is part of the whole loaf. It means simply that the fulness of God's perfection is such that, no matter how perfect the creature or even the ensemble of all creation, it will never compare to God except in the way in which what is only partial compares to the whole. Hence, had God created only one single person, he would still have the nature of common good in the latter sense; so that this person would have to love God as a good that far exceeds the measure of any created person. And this is the basis of charity towards neighbour, whom we must love qua "capax Dei". This is so true that one cannot love God without love of neighbour. Had God produced but one person, this person would still have to love God in his super-abundant communicability to others. This applies even to the soul of Christ, which, in the beatific vision does not see God comprehensively.

It is one thing to compare the member of a society to the society as a whole. The society is for the sake of the common good of its members who are individual persons. Hence society is for man, not man for society. But it does not follow from this that the common good of society must be broken down into individual goods, the way a loaf of bread is shared at the table. In the Eucharist, however, which St. Thomas calls the spiritual common good of the whole Church, "Sumit unus, sumunt mille, quantum iste, tantum ille."

You say: "If we are part of the whole living Christ, then I conclude that the part exists for the whole, and not the whole for the part." Concerning the Mystical Body, three kinds of good are involved. If you consider the perfection of this complex whole as such, then each member, the humanity of Christ most of all, contributes to the perfection or good of the whole; and, in this respect, the member is for the whole the way feet and eyes are for the good of the whole body. But the perfection of the whole flows back to the members, though to the members as their common good. Finally, if we consider the ultimate purpose of the Mystical Body, it is the Deity itself, the extrinsic common good, achieved, immediately, by the individual persons severally. The point is that in God's designs we are in fact dependent upon one another; he has chosen teachers, ministers of the Sacramenta, etc. Now, all this bespeaks dependence on the part of those who are taught and partake in the Sacraments. But we cannot day that the ultimate good of the Mystical Body is the good that is intrinsic to it as an orderly whole of parts; this itself is for the sake of something else, namely, the extrinsic good which is God in his Deity.

Let me put it this way, by analogy: The proper good of the eye is to see; but its seeing contributes to the good of the whole man; but the whole man is not for the sake of the eye's seeing; yet, without sight, the whole would be maimed. But here is where the comparison breaks down: eyes are for seeing and for nothing else; but the teacher, whom St. Thomas calls an eye of the Mystical Body, is not, in all that he is, for the sake of teaching. The immediate good of the teacher is to enlighten those whom he teaches; It is good for him to do so, and good for those taught. But teaching is not his ultimate end as a person; his teaching serves this end, which is to know God as he is in Himself; and he wants those whom he teaches to attain this same end, and to attain it in their individual persons.

See also: Charles de Koninck Archive and the Charles De Koninck Scribd group.

Charles De Koninck, the Common Good, and the Human Environment (pdf)

I have a copy of Love and Responsibility somewhere. Source of the following.

From Love and Responsibility , written by Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II’s pre-papal name) way back in 1960..

The basic premise of the book is the Personalistic norm:—the person is the kind of good which does not admit of being used and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such the means to an end. In its positive form the norm confirms this: the person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love. (i.e. love your neighbor as yourself)

JP II extends this personalistic principle to the sexual act in the following excerpt pg. 272-275:

“Sexual ethics, the ethics of marriage, must examine closely certain facts on which clinical sexology can provide precise information. We have defined love as an ambition to ensure the true good of another person, and consequently as the antithesis of egoism. Since in marriage a man and a woman are associated sexually as well as in other respects the good must be sought in this area too. From the point of view of another person, from the altruistic standpoint, it is necessary to insist that intercourse must not serve merely as a means of allowing sexual excitement to reach its climax in one of the partners, i.e. the man alone, but that climax must be reached in harmony, not at the expense of one partner, but with both partners fully involved. This is implicit in the principle which we have already so thoroughly analysed, and which excludes exploitation of the person, and insists on love. In the present case love demands that the reactions of the other person, the sexual ‘partner’ be fully taken into account.

Sexologists state that the curve of arousal in woman is different from that in man—it rises more slowly and falls more slowly. Anatomically, arousal occurs in the same way in women and in men (the locus of excitement is in the cerebro-spinal system at S2-S3). The female organism, as was mentioned above, reacts more easily to excitation in various parts of the body, which to some extent compensates for the fact that the woman’s excitement grows more slowly than that of the man. The man must take this difference into account, not for hedonistic, but for altruistic reasons. There exists a rhythm dictated by nature itself which both spouses must discover so that climax may be reached both by the man and by the woman, and as far as possible occur in both simultaneously. The subjective happiness which they then share has the clear characteristic of the enjoyment which we have called ‘frui’, of the joy which flows from harmony between one’s own actions and the objective order of nature. Egoism on the other hand—and in this context it is obviously more likely to be egoism on the part of the man—is inseparable from the ‘uti’ in which one party seeks only his own pleasure at the expense of the other. Evidently, the elementary teachings of sexology cannot be applied without reference to ethics.

Non-observance of these teachings of sexology in the marital relationship is contrary to the good of the other partner to the marriage and the durability and cohesion of the marriage itself. It must be taken into account that it is naturally difficult for the woman to adapt herself to the man in the sexual relationship, that there is a natural unevenness of physical and psychological rhythms, so that there is a need for harmonization, which is impossible without good will, especially on the part of the man, who must carefully observe the reactions of the woman. If a woman does not obtain natural gratification from the sexual act there is a danger that her experience of it will be qualitatively inferior, will not involve her fully as a person. This sort of experience makes nervous reactions only too likely, and may for instance cause secondary sexual frigidity. Frigidity is sometimes the result of an inhibition on the part of the woman herself, or of a lack of involvement which may even at times be her own fault. But it is usually the result of egoism in the man, who failing to recognize the subjective desires of the woman in intercourse, and the objective laws of the sexual process taking place in her, seeks merely his own satisfaction, sometimes quite brutally.

In the woman this produces an aversion to intercourse, and a disgust with sex which is just as difficult or even more difficult to control than the sexual urge. It can also cause neuroses and sometimes organic disorders (which come from the fact that the engorgement of the genital organs at the time of sexual arousal results in inflammation in the region of the so-called little pelvis, if sexual arousal is not terminated by detumescence, which in the woman is closely connected with orgasm). Pyschologically, such a situation causes not just indifference but outright hostility. A woman finds it very difficult to forgive a man if she derives no satisfaction from intercourse. It becomes difficult for her to endure this, and as the years go her resentment may grow out of all proportion to its cause. This may lead to the collapse of the marriage. It can be prevented by sexual education—and by this I mean more than merely instruction in sexual matters. For it must be emphasized yet again that physical disgust does not exist in marriage as a primary phenomenon, but is as a rule, a secondary reaction: in women it is the response to egoism and brutality, in men to frigidity and indifference. But the woman’s frigidity and indifference is often the fault of the man, when he seeks his own satisfaction while leaving the woman unsatisfied, something which masculine pride should in any case forbid. But in some particularly difficult situations natural pride may not be enough in the long run—everyone knows that egoism may either blind a man and rob him of his pride or, on the contrary, result in a morbid hypertrophy of pride, which causes him to lose sight of the other human being. Similarly, the natural kindness of a woman, who (so the sexologists tell us) sometimes ‘shams orgasm’ to satisfy a man’s pride, may also be unhelpful in the long run. These are mere palliatives, and cannot in the end give satisfactory solutions to the difficulties experienced in intercourse. There is here a real need for sexual education, and it must be a continuous process. The main objective of this education is to create the conviction that ‘the other person is more important than I’. Such conviction will not arise suddenly and from nothing, merely on the basis of physical intercourse. It can only be, must be, the result of an integral education in love. Sexual intercourse itself does not teach love, but love, if it is a genuine virtue, will show itself to be so in sexual relations between married people as elsewhere. Only then can ‘sexual instruction’ bestow its full benefits: without education in our sense it may even do harm.

This is where the ‘culture of marital relations’ comes in and what it means. Not the ‘technique’ but the ‘culture’. Sexologists often put the main emphasis on technique, whereas this should rather be thought of as something secondary, and often perhaps even inimical to the purpose which it is supposed to serve. The urge is so strong that it creates in the normal man and woman a sort of instinctive knowledge ‘how to make love’ whereas artificial analysis (and the concept of ‘technique’ implies this) is more likely to spoil the whole thing, for what is wanted here is a certain spontaneity and naturalness (subordinated of course to morality). This instinctive knowledge must subsequently mature into a ‘culture of marital relations’. I must refer here to the analysis of ‘tenderness’ to be found in section 3 of Chapter II. This ability to enter readily into another person’s emotions and experiences can play a big part in harmonization of marital intercourse. It has its origin in ‘sentiment’, which is directed primarily towards the ‘human being’ and so can temper and tone down the violent reactions of sensuality, which is so oriented only towards the ‘body’ and the uninhibited impulses of concupiscence. Precisely because a slower and more gradual rise in the curve of sexual arousal is characteristic of the female organism the need for tenderness during physical intercourse, and also before it begins and after its conclusion, is explicable in purely biological terms. If we take into account the shorter and more violent curve of arousal in the man, an act of tenderness on his part in the context of marital intercourse acquires the significance of an act of virtue—specifically, the virtue of continence, and so indirectly the virtue of love (see the analysis in Section 3 of Chapter III). Marriage cannot be reduced to the physical relationship, it needs an emotional climate without which the virtues—whether that of love or that of chastity—become difficult to realize in practice."
(Emphasis mine)

Christopher West even states in his book Theology of the Body for Beginners which explains Pope John Paul II’s Theology of the Body and incorporates the teaching of his book Love and Responsibility that “behind virtually every abortion is a man of lust.” But if one operates by the personalistic norm and values sex as it should be valued--in the context of marriage, then this won't happen.

Based on the above foundation, you might see why I have no need to stimulate arousal by reading posts in this forum. Nor would my wife for that matter.

A Summary of Karol Wojtyla's Love and Responsibility by William E. May
Naked without Shame
Love & Responsibility Foundation
Holy Spirit Interactive: Edward P. Sri - Love and Responsibility

Christopher West's blind spot
TOB has to be seen through Church's historical teachings
A guest post by FR. ANGELO GEIGER F.I. at Dawn Eden's blog

American Papist: "Christopher West’s ideas on sexuality ignore ‘tremendous dangers,’ Alice von Hildebrand says," which refers to this CNA article

Books by Fr. Louis Bouyer

Recently, Editions du Cerf has been republishing books by Fr. Bouyer, including Dom Lambert Beauduin: Un homme d'Église, Newman: Sa vie – Sa spiritualité, Architecture et Liturgie, La Bible et l'Évangile Le sens de l'Écriture : du Dieu qui parle au Dieu fait homme, Le Mystère pascal: Paschale sacramentum — Méditation sur la liturgie des trois derniers jours de la Semaine Sainte, Le Rite et l'homme: Sacralité naturelle et liturgie, Introduction à la vie spirituelle: Précis de théologie ascétique et mystique, Le Sens de la vie monastique, and Le Sens de la vie sacerdotale.

There is also this study of his theology:
Connaissance et mystère: L'itinéraire théologique de Louis Bouyer by Davide Zordan.

Google Books: The invisible Father: approaches to the mystery of the divinity

Louis Bouyer: Author's Page at Ignatius Insight
Musings of a Pertinacious Papist: Fr. Louis Bouyer, rest in peace
Fr. Neuhaus

Original source of the following (apparently the blog no longer exists):

Obituary for
Louis Bouyer
1913-2004
by Jean-Robert Armogathe*

Gruff, and sometimes hot-tempered, Louis Bouyer was a hard man to get to know. He was more comfortable talking about his numerous books th an about his life. And yet, it is impossible to understand his theological work without knowing some of the unusual features of his life.

Bouyer was born in 1913 into a pious Protestant family. He very early displayed the theological curiosity that would accompany him throughout his life. After studies in the Protestant faculty of theology in Paris, he became a pastor in the French Reformed Church. In 1938, Pastor Bouyer--then twenty-five years old--published a dazzling commentary, Introduction to John's Gospel. His intellecual personality and his deep knowledge of the Bible found their rood in the liberal Protestantism that he vigorously (and somewhat unfairly) denounced in a pseudonymous pamphlet that he published in 1941.

Bouyer then converted to Catholicism in 1939. He then redid his studies at Paris' Institut Catholique. He was a remarkable student: during his time at the Institut, he complete a thesis on Athanasius ... that he published in 1943 and a five-hundred page account of ... The Pascal Mystery, which was to become a classic reference of the Jewish origins of the Eucharistic liturgy. A few years later, in 1954, Bouyer published a book-length reflection on Protestantism. His conclusion: the best Protestant doctrines were either incomplete or poorly understood Catholic ones.

After his ordination as a preist of the French Oratory, Bouyer taught humanities at Juilly... He was then offered a positionin the history of dogma and of spirituality at the Institut Catholique. The novelty of his positions, together with his sometimes rude manner, earned him the opposition of his Jesuit colleagues, especially of Father--later Cardinal--[Jean] Danielou. Violent intellectual polemics prompted him to leave the "Catho" and France.

Bouyer nonetheless continued to teach, and was active for many years in the United States, first at Notre Dame, and then at the University of San Francisco in California. English speaking readers proved more open to him than their French counterparts, just at the time that the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar was making him known to a German-speaking publish. Bouyer was a tireless writer. Alongside his theological works, he registered his disapointment with post-conciliar trends in popular writings like ... Catholicism Falls Apart. He also pursued his literary bent, penning works of fiction (which he enjoyed dedicating to neighbors) under various pseudonyms.

The Paschal Mystery had earned Bouyer the reputation of being a modernist, but the liturgical reforms begun by Pius XII and continued by the Council proved him right. He became a respected expert on the liturgy, who was equally opposed to the "neomedieval" restorations of the nineteenth century and the often harebrained creations oif the present. Eucharistie (1966), one of his best books, insists on the Jewish origins of the Mass and shows the full richness of the new Eucharistic prayers. For many years, Bouyer was a member of the International Theological Commission founded by Paul VI.

During the 60's, Maxime Charles, the rector of the Sacre-Coeur in Montemartre, asked Bouyer to form a group of young graduate students from the Ecole Normale Superieure during his stays in France. Among these young men were Jean-Luc Marion, Remi Barque, and Jean Duchesne. The sessions Bouyer held with them at the Normal monastery of La Lucerne were decisive for the group that called itself ["Resurrection"], which was the nucleus of what would become the French edition of Communio. Basing himself on material developed during his cources and sessions, Bouyer published his great triple trilogy, the last systematic theology to appear in France.

Bouyer's attention to Scripture, his preference for the Fathers over the Scholastics, and his knowledge of contemporary authors enabled him to construct astonishingly modern work. It is novel, not in the sense of being fashionable, but in the sense of refusing ready-made positions and looking with fresh eyes on Jewish and Christian tradition.

Alongside the Dominican Yves Congar and the Jesuits Jean Danielou and Henri de Lubac, the Oratorian Louis Bouyer was one of the four great post-war French theologians. Unlike the other three, though, Bouyer was never named a Cardinal. John Paul II honored him with a letter of tribute on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. Like Newman, he liked to remined people that converts are often a nuisance in the Church.--Translated by Adrian Walker

*Jean-Robert Armogathe is an editor of the French edition of Communio. This obituary comes from the Winter, 2004 edition of Communio (pg. 688-689). The next issue (summer), which is yet to be released, will contian Jean-Marie Lustiger's Homily for the Funeral Mass for Father Louis Bouyer and Jean Duschesne's Who Is Still Afraid of Louis Bouyer? Also, for those interested in Communion and Liberation, the Winter 2004 edition had Ratzinger's funeral homily for CL founder, Luigi Giussani.

-- Justin Nickelsen

James Chastek's take on scholastic theology: The first principle of scholasticism

The first principle scholastic thought was that all the authors of Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, and (to a lesser extent) Aristotle formed a unified body of thought, so much so that all apparent contradictions were, as a rule, merely apparent and ultimately even beneficial. For a scholastic, when John said that no one had ever seen God (Jn. 1) and Paul said that God is clearly seen by all since the foundation of the world (Rm. 1) both were speaking of the same truth (the knowability of God) in different ways. It would be contrary to the very nature of Scholasticism to look at the difference between John and Paul and to take it as a principle for utterly distinct- or even different- Johannine and Pauline theologies.A fortiori, the scholastic thinker would have never seen his own theology as a differnt sort of theology from Paul, Augustine, John, Gregory of Nyssa, St. Basil, Dionysius an Aristotle etc…

Scholasticism died when it was no longer taken for granted that there was a single unifying reality that held together the authors of Scripture and the Fathers of the Church. Aristotle, for his own part, was isolated from the other infuences he was once mixed with to make him so much more powerful and effective.

Also of interest: The double reality of dignity and Why the soul is a particular thing but not a substance

Robert Gay, OP: Spiritual notes from a small island...... The Cloud of Unknowing

Pope's Address Upon Visiting Mosque

Pope's Address Upon Visiting Mosque

"Ideological Manipulation of Religion ... Is the Real Catalyst for Tension and Division"


AMMAN, Jordan, MAY 9, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is the text of the discourse Benedict XVI gave today after he visited the King Hussein bin Talal Mosque and the adjacent Hashemite Museum and subsequently met with Muslim religious leaders.

* * *



Your Royal Highness,

Your Excellencies,

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a source of great joy for me to meet with you this morning in this magnificent setting. I wish to thank Prince Ghazi Bin Muhammed Bin Talal for his kind words of welcome. Your Royal Highness's numerous initiatives to promote inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue and exchanges are appreciated by the people of the Hashemite Kingdom and they are widely respected by the international community. I know that these efforts receive the active support of other members of the Royal Family as well as the nation's government, and find ample resonance in the many initiatives of collaboration among Jordanians. For all this, I wish to express my own heartfelt admiration.

Places of worship, like this splendid Al-Hussein Bin Talal mosque named after the revered late King, stand out like jewels across the earth's surface. From the ancient to the modern, the magnificent to the humble, they all point to the divine, to the Transcendent One, to the Almighty. And through the centuries these sanctuaries have drawn men and women into their sacred space to pause, to pray, to acknowledge the presence of the Almighty, and to recognize that we are all his creatures.

For this reason we cannot fail to be concerned that today, with increasing insistency, some maintain that religion fails in its claim to be, by nature, a builder of unity and harmony, an expression of communion between persons and with God. Indeed some assert that religion is necessarily a cause of division in our world; and so they argue that the less attention given to religion in the public sphere the better. Certainly, the contradiction of tensions and divisions between the followers of different religious traditions, sadly, cannot be denied. However, is it not also the case that often it is the ideological manipulation of religion, sometimes for political ends, that is the real catalyst for tension and division, and at times even violence in society? In the face of this situation, where the opponents of religion seek not simply to silence its voice but to replace it with their own, the need for believers to be true to their principles and beliefs is felt all the more keenly. Muslims and Christians, precisely because of the burden of our common history so often marked by misunderstanding, must today strive to be known and recognized as worshippers of God faithful to prayer, eager to uphold and live by the Almighty's decrees, merciful and compassionate, consistent in bearing witness to all that is true and good, and ever mindful of the common origin and dignity of all human persons, who remain at the apex of God's creative design for the world and for history.

The resolve of Jordanian educators and religious and civic leaders to ensure that the public face of religion reflects its true nature is praiseworthy. The example of individuals and communities, together with the provision of courses and programmes, manifest the constructive contribution of religion to the educational, cultural, social and other charitable sectors of your civic society. Some of this spirit I have been able to sample at first hand. Yesterday, I experienced the renowned educational and rehabilitation work of the Our Lady of Peace Centre where Christians and Muslims are transforming the lives of entire families, by assisting them to ensure that their disabled children take up their rightful place in society. Earlier this morning, I blessed the foundation stone of Madaba University where young Muslim and Christian adults will side by side receive the benefits of a tertiary education, enabling them to contribute justly to the social and economic development of their nation. Of great merit too are the numerous initiatives of inter-religious dialogue supported by the Royal Family and the diplomatic community and sometimes undertaken in conjunction with the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue. These include the ongoing work of the Royal Institutes for Inter-faith studies and for Islamic Thought, theAmman Message of 2004, the Amman Interfaith Message of 2005, and the more recent Common Word letter which echoed a theme consonant with my first encyclical: the unbreakable bond between love of God and love of neighbour, and the fundamental contradiction of resorting to violence or exclusion in the name of God (cf. Deus Caritas Est, 16).

Such initiatives clearly lead to greater reciprocal knowledge, and they foster a growing respect both for what we hold in common and for what we understand differently. Thus, they should prompt Christians and Muslims to probe even more deeply the essential relationship between God and his world so that together we may strive to ensure that society resonates in harmony with the divine order. In this regard, the co-operation found here in Jordan sets an encouraging and persuasive example for the region, and indeed the world, of the positive, creative contribution which religion can and must make to civic society.

Distinguished friends, today I wish to refer to a task which I have addressed on a number of occasions and which I firmly believe Christians and Muslims can embrace, particularly through our respective contributions to learning and scholarship, and public service. That task is the challenge to cultivate for the good, in the context of faith and truth, the vast potential of human reason. Christians in fact describe God, among other ways, as creative Reason, which orders and guides the world. And God endows us with the capacity to participate in his reason and thus to act in accordance with what is good. Muslims worship God, the Creator of Heaven and Earth, who has spoken to humanity. And as believers in the one God we know that human reason is itself God's gift and that it soars to its highest plane when suffused with the light of God's truth. In fact, when human reason humbly allows itself to be purified by faith, it is far from weakened; rather, it is strengthened to resist presumption and to reach beyond its own limitations. In this way, human reason is emboldened to pursue its noble purpose of serving mankind, giving expression to our deepest common aspirations and extending, rather than manipulating or confining, public debate. Thus, genuine adherence to religion - far from narrowing our minds - widens the horizon of human understanding. It protects civil society from the excesses of the unbridled ego which tend to absolutize the finite and eclipse the infinite; it ensures that freedom is exercised hand in hand with truth, and it adorns culture with insights concerning all that is true, good and beautiful.

This understanding of reason, which continually draws the human mind beyond itself in the quest for the Absolute, poses a challenge; it contains a sense of both hope and caution. Together, Christians and Muslims are impelled to seek all that is just and right. We are bound to step beyond our particular interests and to encourage others, civil servants and leaders in particular, to do likewise in order to embrace the profound satisfaction of serving the common good, even at personal cost. And we are reminded that because it is our common human dignity which gives rise to universal human rights, they hold equally for every man and woman, irrespective of his or her religious, social or ethnic group. In this regard, we must note that the right of religious freedom extends beyond the question of worship and includes the right - especially of minorities - to fair access to the employment market and other spheres of civic life.

Before I leave you this morning I would like to acknowledge in a special way the presence among us of His Beatitude Emmanuel III Delly, Patriarch of Baghdad, whom I greet most warmly. His presence brings to mind the people of neighbouring Iraq many of whom have found welcome refuge here in Jordan. The international community's efforts to promote peace and reconciliation, together with those of the local leaders, must continue in order to bear fruit in the lives of Iraqis. I wish to express my appreciation for all those who are assisting in the endeavors to deepen trust and to rebuild the institutions and infrastructure essential to the well-being of that society. And once again, I urge diplomats and the international community they represent together with local political and religious leaders to do everything possible to ensure the ancient Christian community of that noble land its fundamental right to peaceful coexistence with their fellow citizens.

Distinguished friends, I trust that the sentiments I have expressed today will leave us with renewed hope for the future. Our love and duty before the Almighty is expressed not only in our worship but also in our love and concern for children and young people - your families - and for all Jordanians. It is for them that you labor and it is they who motivate you to place the good of every human person at the heart of institutions, laws and the workings of society. May reason, ennobled and humbled by the grandeur of God's truth, continue to shape the life and institutions of this nation, in order that families may flourish and that all may live in peace, contributing to and drawing upon the culture that unifies this great Kingdom!

Edward Feser, Act and potency and James Chastek, Descartes' greatest revolution

Edit. Mr. Chastek responds:

Logic is one of the hardest arts/sciences to learn. What logic has been reduced to (formalism and validity, and intellectualism- remember that St. Thomas includes dialectics, rhetoric, and poetry in the modes of argument) is relatively easy to learn, but it is of dubious value and, as far as I can tell, is a tool of thought that excludes the possibilty of metaphysics from the beginning. Trying to make any statement about being or existence is either silly or impossible in all the formal systems I look at. The difference between the per se and the per accidens- which was the dividing line between philosophy and sophistry- is impossible to make or to take seriously where the fundamental unit of logic is the proposition, or where “classes” are seen as terms, or where the copula “is” is taken as having a single meaning.

A real logic course, studying all modes of argument and inference and the basis for them, etc. would probably take eight years. A basic program would probably take two years, and be followed by real life argumentative drills, like the medieval disputation (St. Thomas’s format of writing was developed by a real life public argument his “disputed questions” are developments of “transcipts” of public disputations) Given the rate of maturity of modern people, the needs we require our university system to meet, and the carpetbombing destruction that we commit upon our cognitive powers which makes contemplation very difficult (advertisements, pop music, movies, etc.) I’m not sure that the old modes of knowing logic could come back. The Medievals could never have had our medical or technological skill, and we can’t have their skill at metaphysics, logic, or disputation.

8 years! Did it take the medievals so long?

Is everything issued by the Vatican protected from error? One would think not. Is it a good attitude to have, to test everything against Tradition? Perhaps not. But they must be read in the light of Tradition, and if they seem to contradict Tradition, then one may (should?) raise questions for the sake of clarification. If it is true that not everything spoken or written by the pope is protected from error -- how much more so, if something is issued by the Roman Curia, without him scrutinizing it carefully? (Is it correct to say that the other bishops participate in the ordinary magisterium of the Church?)

MAGISTERIAL DOCUMENTS AND PUBLIC DISSENT

The introduction from Johannes Althusius's Politica. Very Aristotelian. I need to read the rest of the work, especially his brand of "Federalism."

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF POLITICS

Politics is the art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called 'symbiotics'. The subject matter of politics is therefore association (consociatio), in which the symbiotes[1] pledge themselves each to the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life.

The end of political 'symbiotic' man is holy, just, comfortable, and happy symbiosis,[2] a life lacking nothing either necessary or useful. Truly, in living this life no man is self-sufficient (autarkhV), or adequately endowed by nature. For when he is born, destitute of all help, naked and defenceless, as if having lost all his goods in a shipwreck, he is cast forth into the hardships of this life, not able by his own efforts to reach a maternal breast, nor to endure the harshness of his condition, nor to move himself from the place where he was cast forth. By his weeping and tears, he can initiate nothing except the most miserable life, a very certain sign of pressing and immediate misfortune.[3] Bereft of all counsel and aid, for which nevertheless he is then in greatest need, he is unable to help himself without the intervention and assistance of another. Even if he is well-nourished in body, he cannot show forth the light of reason. Nor in his adulthood is he able to obtain in and by himself those outward goods he needs for a comfortable and holy life, or to provide by his own energies all the requirements of life. The energies and industry of many men are expended to procure and supply these things. Therefore, as long as he remains isolated and does not mingle in the society of men, he cannot live at all comfortably and well while lacking so many necessary and useful things. As an aid and remedy for this state of affairs is offered him in symbiotic life, he is led, and almost impelled, to embrace it if he wants to live comfortably and well, even if he merely wants to live. Therein he is called upon to exercise and perform those virtues that are necessarily inactive except in this symbiosis. And so he begins to think by what means such symbiosis, from which he expects so many useful and enjoyable things, can be instituted, cultivated, and conserved. Concerning these matters we shall, by God's grace, speak in the following pages.

The word 'polity' has three principal connotations, as noted by Plutarch.[4] First it indicates the communication of right (jus)[5] in the commonwealth, which the Apostle calls citizenship.[6] Then, it signifies the manner of administering and regulating the commonwealth. Finally, it notes the form and constitution of the commonwealth by which all actions of the citizens are guided. Aristotle understands by polity this last meaning.[7]

The symbiotes are co-workers who, by the bond of an associating and uniting agreement, communicate among themselves whatever is appropriate for a comfortable life of soul and body. In other words, they are participants or partners in a common life.

This mutual communication,[8] or common enterprise, involves (1) things, (2) services, and (3) common rights (jura) by which the numerous and various needs of each and every symbiote are supplied, the self-sufficiency and mutuality of life and human society are achieved, and social life is established and conserved. Whence Cicero said, 'a political community is a gathering of men associated by a consensus as to the right and a sharing of what is useful.'[9] By this communication, advantages and responsibilities are assumed and maintained according to the nature of each particular association. (1) The communication of things (rei) is the bringing of useful and necessary goods to the social life by the symbiotes for the common advantage of the symbiotes individually and collectively. (2) The community of services (operae) is the contributing by the symbiotes of their labours and occupations for the sake of social life. (3) The communion of right (jus) is the process by which the symbiotes live and are ruled by just laws in a common life among themselves.

This communion of right is called the law of association and symbiosis (lex consociationis et symbiosis), or the symbiotic right (jus symbioticum)[10], and consists especially of self-sufficiency (autarkeia), good order (eunomia), and proper discipline (eutaxia). It includes two aspects, one functioning to direct and govern social life, the other prescribing a plan and manner for communicating things and services among the symbiotes.

The law of association in its first aspect is, in turn, either common or proper. Common law (lex communis), which is unchanging, indicates that in every association and type of symbiosis some persons are rulers (heads, overseers, prefects) or superiors, others are subjects or inferiors.

For all government is held together by imperium and subjection; in fact, the human race started straightway from the beginning with imperium and subjection. God made Adam master and monarch of his wife, and of all creatures born or descendant from her.[11] Therefore all power and government is said to be from God.[12] And nothing, as Cicero affirms, 'is as suited to the natural law (jus naturae)[13] and its requirements as imperium, without which neither household nor city nor nation nor the entire race of men can endure, nor the whole nature of things nor the world itself.'[14] If the consensus and will of rulers and subjects is the same, how happy and blessed is their life! 'Be subject to one another in fear of the Lord.'[15]

The ruler, prefect, or chief directs and governs the functions of the social life for the utility of the subjects individually and collectively. He exercises his authority by administering, planning, appointing, teaching, forbidding, requiring, and diverting. Whence the ruler is called rector, director, governor, curator, and administrator. Peter Gregory says that just as the soul presides over the other members in the human body, directs and governs them according to the proper functions assigned to each member, and foresees and procures whatever useful and necessary things are due each member — some useful privately and at the same time to all or to the entire body, others useful publicly for the conservation of social life — so also it is necessary in civil society that one person rule the rest for the welfare and utility of both individuals and the whole group.[16] Therefore, as Augustine says, to rule, to govern, to preside is nothing other than to serve and care for the utility of others, as parents rule their children, and a man his wife.[17] Or, as Thomas Aquinas says, 'to govern is to lead what is governed to its appropriate end'.[18] And so it pertains to the office of a governor not only to preserve something unharmed, but also to lead it to its end.[19] The rector and moderator so endeavours and proceeds that he leads the people by method, order, and discipline to that end in which all things are properly considered.

Government by superiors considers both the soul and the body of inferiors: the soul that it may be formed and imbued with doctrine and knowledge of things useful and necessary in human life, the body that it may be provided with nourishment and whatever else it needs. The first responsibility pertains to education, the second to sustentation and protection. Education centres on the instruction of inferiors in the true knowledge and worship of God, and in prescribed duties that ought to be performed towards one's neighbour; education also pertains to the correction of evil customs and errors. By the former, inferiors are imbued with a healthy knowledge of holy, just, and useful things; by the latter, they are held firm in duty. The responsibility for sustentation of the body is the process by which inferiors are carefully and diligently guided by superiors in matters pertaining to this life, and by which advantages for them are sought and disadvantages to them are avoided.[20] Protection is the legitimate defence against injuries and violence, the process by which the security of inferiors is maintained by superiors against any misfortune, violence, or injury directed against persons, reputations, or properties, and if already sustained, then avenged and compensated by lawful means.

The inferior, or subject, is one who carries on the business of the social life according to the will of his chief, or prefect, and arranges his life and actions submissively, provided his chief does not rule impiously or unjustly.

Proper laws (leges propriae)[21] are those enactments by which particular associations are ruled. They differ in each specie of association according as the nature of each requires.

The laws by which the communication of things, occupations, services, and actions is accomplished[22] are those that distribute and assign advantages and responsibilities among the symbiotes according to the nature and necessities of each association. At times the communication regulated by these laws is more extensive, at other times more restricted, according as the nature of each association is seen to require, or as may be agreed upon and established among the members.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, I agree with Plutarch that a commonwealth is best and happiest when magistrates and citizens bring everything together for its welfare and advantage, and neither neglect nor despise anyone who can be helpful to the commonwealth.[23] The Apostle indeed advises us to seek and promote advantages for our neighbour, even to the point that we willingly give up our own right, by which we guard against misfortune, to obtain a great advantage for the other person.[24] For 'we have not been born to ourselves, inasmuch as our country claims a share in our birth, and our friends a share'.[25] The entire second table of the Decalogue pertains to this: 'you shall love your neighbour as yourself; 'whatever you wish to be done to you do also to others', and conversely, 'whatever you do not wish to be done to you do not do to others'; 'live honourably, injure no one, and render to each his due'.[26] Of what use to anyone is a hidden treasure, or a wise man who denies his services to the commonwealth?

In light of these several truths, the question of which life is to be preferred can be answered. Is it the contemplative or the active? Is it the theoretical and philosophical life or the practical and political life? Clearly, man by nature is a gregarious animal born for cultivating society with other men, not by nature living alone as wild beasts do, nor wandering about as birds. And so misanthropic and stateless hermits, living without fixed hearth or home, are useful neither to themselves nor to others, and separated from others are surely miserable. For how can they promote the advantage of their neighbour unless they find their way into human society?[27] How can they perform works of love when they live outside human fellowship? How can the church be built and the remaining duties of the first table of the Decalogue be performed? Whence Keckerman rightly says that politics leads the final end of all other disciplines to the highest point, and thus builds public from private happiness.[28]

For this reason God willed to train and teach men not by angels, but by men.[29] For the same reason God distributed his gifts unevenly among men. He did not give all things to one person, but some to one and some to others, so that you have need for my gifts, and I for yours. And so was born, as it were, the need for communicating necessary and useful things, which communication was not possible except in social and political life. God therefore willed that each need the service and aid of others in order that friendship would bind all together, and no one would consider another to be valueless. For if each did not need the aid of others, what would society be? What would reverence and order be? What would reason and humanity be? Everyone therefore needs the experience and contributions of others, and no one lives to himself alone.

Thus the needs of body and soul, and the seeds of virtue implanted in our souls, drew dispersed men together into one place. These causes have built villages, established cities, founded academic institutions, and united by civil unity and society a diversity of farmers, craftsmen, labourers, builders, soldiers, merchants, learned and unlearned men as so many members of the same body. Consequently, while some persons provided for others, and some received from others what they themselves lacked, all came together into a certain public body that we call the commonwealth, and by mutual aid devoted themselves to the general good and welfare of this body. And that this was the true origin first of villages, and then of larger commonwealths embracing wide areas, is taught by the most ancient records of history and confirmed by daily experience.[30]

From what has been said, we further conclude that the efficient cause of political association is consent and agreement among the communicating citizens. The formal cause is indeed the association brought about by contributing and communicating one with the other, in which political men institute, cultivate, maintain, and conserve the fellowship of human life through decisions about those things useful and necessary to this social life. The final cause of politics is the enjoyment of a comfortable, useful, and happy life, and of the common welfare — that we may live with piety and honour a peaceful and quiet life, that while true piety toward God and justice among the citizens may prevail at home, defence against the enemy from abroad may be maintained, and that concord and peace may always and everywhere thrive. The final cause is also the conservation of a human society that aims at a life in which you can worship God quietly and without error. The material of politics is the aggregate of precepts for communicating those things, services, and right that we bring together, each fairly and properly according to his ability, for symbiosis and the common advantage of the social life.

Moreover, Aristotle teaches that man by his nature is brought to this social life and mutual sharing.[30] For man is a more political animal than the bee or any other gregarious creature, and therefore by nature far more of a social animal than bees, ants, cranes, and such kind as feed and defend themselves in flocks. Since God himself endowed each being with a natural capacity to maintain itself and to resist whatever is contrary to it, so far as necessary to its welfare, and since dispersed men are not able to exercise this capacity, the instinct for living together and establishing civil society was given to them. Thus brought together and united, some men could aid others, many together could provide the necessities of life more easily than each alone, and all could live more safely from attack by wild beasts and enemies. It follows that no man is able to live well and happily to himself. Necessity therefore induces association; and the want of things necessary for life, which are acquired and communicated by the help and aid of one's associates, conserves it. For this reason it is evident that the commonwealth, or civil society, exists by nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal who strives eagerly for association. If, however, anyone wishes not to live in society, or needs nothing because of his own abundance, he is not considered a part of the commonwealth. He is therefore either a beast or a god, as Aristotle asserts.[31]

Furthermore the continuous governing and obedience in social life mentioned earlier are also agreeable to nature. For, as Peter Gregory adds, 'to rule, to direct, to be subjected, to be ruled, to be governed' are natural actions proceeding from the law of nations (jus gentium). 'Anything else would be considered no less monstrous than a body without a head, or a head without members of the body lawfully and suitably arranged, or even lacking them altogether. For it is especially useful to the individual member who cannot meet his own needs to be aided and upheld by another. The better member is said to be the one who meets his own needs, and is also able to help others. The greater the good he communicates with others, the better and more outstanding the member is. Then, this world has so great and so admirable a diversity [...][32] that unless it be held together by some order of subordination, and regulated by fixed laws of subjection and order, it would be destroyed in a short time by its own confusion. Nor can the diverse parts of it endure if each part seeks to perform its own function indifferently and heedlessly by itself. Power set over against equal power would bring all things to an end by continuous and irreconcilable discord, and would involve in its ruin things that do not belong to it, and that it does not know how to govern.'[33] As long as each part decides to live according to its own will, it may disregard the rule of discipline.[34] Finally, the conservation and duration of all things consist in this concord of order and subjection. 'Just as from lyres of diverse tones, if properly tuned, a sweet sound and pleasant harmony arise when low, medium, and high notes are united, so also the social unity of rulers and subjects in the state produces a sweet and pleasant harmony out of the rich, the poor, the workers, the farmers, and other kinds of persons. If agreement is thus achieved in society, a praiseworthy, happy, most durable, and almost divine concord is produced. [...] But if all were truly equal, and each wished to rule Others according to his own will, discord would easily arise, and by discord the dissolution of society. There would be no standard of virtue or merit, and it follows that equality itself would be the greatest inequality', as Peter Gregory rightly asserts.[35] Hence, when this harmony of rulers and subjects ceases, and there are no longer servants and leaders, such a situation is considered to be among the signs of divine wrath.

I add to this that it is inborn to the more powerful and prudent to dominate and rule weaker men, just as it is also considered inborn for inferiors to submit. So in man the soul dominates the body, and the mind the appetites. So the male, because the more outstanding, rules the female, who as the weaker obeys. Thus, the pride and high spirits of man should be restrained by sure reins of reason, law, and imperium less he throw himself precipitously into ruin.