Clergy Congregation's Letter to Permanent Deacons

"We Must Love the Poor In a Preferential Way"

VATICAN CITY, AUG. 18, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is the letter Cardinal Cláudio Hummes, the prefect of the Congregation for Clergy, sent Aug. 10 to permanent deacons on the feast of St. Lawrence, deacon and martyr.

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My Dear Permanent Deacons:

The Church discovers more and more the richness of the permanent diaconate. Whenever Bishops come to the Congregation for the Clergy, on the occasion of their ad limina visits, the theme of the diaconate, among others, is often commented upon and the prelates are generally very much pleased and full of hope in regard to you, Permanent Deacons. This fills all of us with joy. The Church thanks you and recognizes your dedication to your qualified ministerial work. At the same time, the Church would like to encourage you on the way of personal sanctification, in your prayer lives and in the spirituality of the diaconate. To you one can equally apply what the Pope has said to priests, for the Year for Priests, that is that it is necessary “to work in favor of this pull of priests toward spiritual perfection, upon which, above all, depends the efficacy of their ministry.” (discourse of March 16, 2009).

Today, on this feast of St. Lawrence, Deacon and Martyr, I would like to invite you to reflect upon two areas, your ministry of the Word, and your ministry of Charity.

We recall with gratitude the Synod on the Word of God, celebrated in October of last year. We, ordained ministers, have received from the Lord, through the mediation of the Church, the task of preaching the Word of God to the ends of the earth, announcing the person of Jesus Christ, who has died and risen, His Word and His Kingdom, to every creature. This Word, as the final Message of the Synod affirms, has one voice which is His, Revelation, has one will which is His, Jesus Christ, and one Way which is His, Missionary Activity. To know Revelation, to adhere unconditionally to Jesus Christ as a fascinated and enamored disciple, to base oneself always upon Jesus Christ and to be with Him in our Mission, this is then what awaits a permanent deacon, decisively and without any reservation. From a good disciple a good missionary is born.

The ministry of the Word which, in a special way for Deacons, has as its great model St. Stephen, Deacon and Martyr, requires of ordained ministers a constant struggle to study it and carry it out, at the same time as one proclaims it to others. Meditation, following the style of lectio divina, that is, prayerful reading, is one well traveled and much counseled way to understand and live the Word of God, and make it ones own. At the same time, intellectual, theological and pastoral formation is a challenge which endures throughout life. A qualified and up to date ministry of the Word very much depends upon this in depth formation.

We are awaiting, in the proximate future, a document of the Holy Father regarding the Synod which we have referred to. This must be welcomed with an openness of heart and with profound commitment to study it.

The second reflection regards the ministry of Charity, taking as a great model St. Lawrence, Deacon and Martyr. The diaconate has its roots in the early Church’s efforts to organize charitable works. At Rome, in the third century, during a period of great persecution of Christians, the extraordinary figure of St. Lawrence appears. He was archdeacon of Pope Sixtus II, and his trustee for the administration of the goods of the community. Our well beloved Pope Benedict XVI says regarding St. Lawrence: “His solicitude for the poor, his generous service which he rendered to the Church of Rome in the area of relief and of charity, his fidelity to the Pope, from him he was thrust forward to the point of wanting to undergo the supreme test of martyrdom and the heroic witness of his blood, rendered only a few days later. These are universally recognized facts.” (Homily Basilica of St. Lawrence, November 30, 2008).

From St. Lawrence we also take note of the affirmation “the riches of the Church are the poor.” He assisted the poor with great generosity. He is thus an ever more present example to permanent deacons. We must love the poor in a preferential way, as did Jesus Christ; to be united with them, to work towards constructing a just, fraternal and peaceful society. The recent encyclical letter of Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate (Charity in Truth), should be our updated guide. In this encyclical the Holy Father affirms as a fundamental principle “Charity is the royal road of the social doctrine of the Church” (n. 2). Deacons must identify themselves in a very special way with charity. The poor are part of your daily ambiance, and the object of your untiring concern. One could not understand a Deacon who did not personally involve himself in charity and solidarity toward the poor, who again today are multiplying in number.

My dear Permanent Deacons, may God bless you with all his love and make you happy in your vocation and mission! With respect and admiration, I greet the wives and children of those of you who are married. The Church thanks you for the support and multifaceted collaboration which you give to your respective spouses and fathers in their diaconal ministry. In addition, the Year for Priests invites us to manifest our appreciation for our dear priests, and to pray for them and with them.

Vatican City, Feast of St. Lawrence, Deacon and Martyr, August 10, 2009

Cláudio Cardinal Hummes
Archbishop Emeritus of Sao Paulo
Prefect of the Congregation for the Clergy

Stephen Meyer on Coast to Coast AM. Alas, you have to be a member to download clips.

He is a fellow at the Discovery Institute. During the show he maid references to Pete Ward's Rare Earth. He also mentioned his colleagues Jay Richards and Guillermo Conzalez, who wrote Privileged Planet.

Stephen Meyer's new book

Signature in the Cell

He is being interviewed on Coast to Coast AM tonight. If an audio file becomes available, I will put up the link.

A review by A. C. Grayling of Alison Gopnik's The Philosophical Baby: What Children's Minds Tell Us About Truth, Love and the Meaning of Life.

(via First Things)

Zenit: Cardinal Tauran at World Religion Congress
"We Have To Do Good and To Avoid Evil"

Often a question is asked: "Do objective moral values exist capable of uniting men and of procuring for them peace and happiness?". How do believers answer such a question?

Believers are convinced that ethics cannot only produce norms of behaviour, but must shape the human conscience and help to discover the demands of natural law: we have to do good and to avoid evil. [The First Principle of Practical Reason.] This is a fundamental principle which imposes itself on everybody and which allows dialogue with persons of different religions and cultures.

So as believers, we must be able to indicate to our fellow men and women that our values are fundamental for our fellow men and women in order to foster mutual comprehension, recognition and cooperation among all the members of the human family. [We may share the same ends or goods... but does that necessitate that the means always be the same, in every society?]

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 constitutes one of the highest expressions of the conscience of modern history. No doubt it has contributed to make men and women of our time aware of the patrimony of values inherent to the human person and to its dignity.

Believers nevertheless are in a position of giving a new light by teaching that man has been created in the image of God. They have been created equal. They have received from the Creator inalienable rights among which are the right to live, to be free and to look for happiness. [Is he taking this explicitly from the Declaration of Independence?]

So consequently we have to measure the progress of science and of technology not only according to their results, but also according to their capacity to defend the specificity of the human person and to check if the spiritual fundamental values are prevailing over our instinctive reactions.

It is why so often Pope Benedict recalls the nobility of reason which manifests itself through authentic human behaviour of the person and of the society. It is therefore always urgent to check if in our life the truth prevails over ambiguity. A trend to separate human rights from the ethical and rational dimensions should be resisted.

The legislator should behave in a manner which is ethically responsible because politics cannot make abstraction of ethics nor civil law and legal order can make abstraction of a superior moral law.

The great religious wisdoms and philosophies have to witness to the existence of a moral patrimony widely shared, which forms the basis of every dialogue on moral questions; this patrimony expresses a universal ethical message that man can decipher. The form and the extension of these traditions can considerably differ according to cultures and situations, but nevertheless they remind us of the existence of a patrimony of moral values common to all human beings. For example, the "golden rule": "do not do to anyone what you do not want to be done to you" is found, under one form or another, in the majority of the traditions of wisdom. [And what of the love of God?]

Individuals and communities are able, in the light of reason, to recognize the fundamental orientations of an ethical behaviour consistent with the nature of the human subject himself.

What is a Vocation? According to St. Thomas Aquinas By Joseph Bolin

Whether sinners love God more than themselves with a natural love?

Mr. Kevin F. Keiser writes in response to my use of Garrigou-Lagrange to argue that we cannot love God more than ourselves without grace:

I am well aware of these texts of Garrigou-Lagrange, as well as other similar ones in the Christian Perfection and Contemplation, The Three Ways, and in his commentary on the Summa. I had to undertake the study of them for my doctoral thesis. 

Nevertheless, I still maintain what I said, that in St. Thomas’ mind, the deliberative love of the will is perverted through sin, but not even sin can remove the natural love of God as principle of nature and as extrinsic common good. See for example De Veritate 22, a. 2, ad 3: 

“To the third it must be said that God can be considered in two ways: either in himself, or in his effects. In himself indeed, since he is the essence of goodness, he cannot be not loved. Wherefore, by all those seeing him through his essence, he is loved, and there as much as someone knows him, so much does he love him. But in some of his effects, insofar as they are contrary to the will, such as punishments inflicted, or commandments which seem heavy, God himself is refused, and in a certain way is hated. And nevertheless, it is necessary that they who hate him as so some effects, love him in other effects; just as the Demons themselves, according to Dionysius in the 4th book of the Divine Names, they desire to be and to live naturally, and in this, they desire and love God himself.” 

It is perhaps better explained in the Commentary on the Sentences, lib. 4 d. 50 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 1: “I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will is in them always evil” 

The upshot of this is that… (qc. 5): “Now God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His effects.”

Even better is II-II, q. 34, a. 1: “I answer that, As shown above (I-II, 29, 1), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, “the invisible things” of God . . . “are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Romans 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate–for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him. 

Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary to the human will, since “to be, to live, to understand,” which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such like effects. Some of God’s effects, however, are contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.” 

I realize that these texts are speaking about hatred of God, and not about the inability to love him. Nevertheless, they are quite pertinent, since they all speak of a natural love of God that cannot be subverted or displaced by sin, not even by the obstinacy in actual mortal sin found in the demons and the damned.
It is not sufficient, then, simply to assert that my previous post “goes against the plain meaning of I II 109, 3.” Does St. Thomas go against the plain meaning of I II 109, 3. I should say not, unless by plain you mean not requiring any understanding of the terms used, But I think the plain meaning is, well, what St. Thomas says there, namely, “in statu naturae corruptae homo ab hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis.” It is quite plainly consistent with St. Thomas’ other thought elsewhere. 

As for Garrigou-LaGrange, my adherence to him is quite strong, but my adherence to St. Thomas is stronger, And I have found that Garrigou-LaGrange is a sure guide to Thomas’ thought, with few exceptions. This is one of those exceptions, where, with the Carmelites of Salamanca and many others, he placed an already existing aversio to God in the will of man in Original Sin, an aversio with which he is born, present even before a child’s first motion of will (as the texts you supplied so clearly point out). St. Thomas, on the other hand, does not think so; he says that in original sin, there is “something corresponding to the aversion [i.e. of actual sin], namely, the destitution of Original Justice” (De malo, q. 5 a. 2). For St. Thomas, the essence of Original Sin is not an inordinate love of self that we are born with, but the loss of the gratuitous integrity of our Original State (which makes it so that our first rational act will certainly be one of inordiinate love of self unless we are helped by grace, I-II, q. 89, a. 6), plus the real culpa that accrues to our nature, since the loss of Original Justice was perpetrated by the human will in the active principle of our nature, i.e. Adam. Even the wound of malice for St. Thomas is by way of privation of a previous order, not by way of position of a perverting self-love (I-II, q. 85, a. 3). 

As for religion in sinners, we agree. As for whether the State can compel acts of religion, I’m not sure, but you might want to look at De Regimine Principum, Bk. 1, ch. 15. My first interpretation would be that before Christ, the State could command acts of religion, but afterwards, it must leave that to the Church,

Mr. Keiser (apologies for misspelling your last name earlier):

I concede that according to these texts, the demons and sinners love God in the way spelled out in those texts. But, we need to keep in my the distinction between an inclination and the will act or volition. Commentary on the Sentences, lib. 4 d. 50 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 1 identifies the natural will with an inclination. Just because the will is inclined to certain acts, does not mean that it is reduced to those acts necessarily. None of the texts show that sinners or the demons actually love God more than themselves. So, the damned may be inclined by nature to love God more than themselves, but they do not actually do so.

The inclination to the love of God (and to love God more than one's self), being natural, is present in children before the age of reason. I believe St. Thomas stipulates that once a child reaches the age of reason he must make a true choice between God and sin. For those who reject God sinfully, they have turned themselves away from God, and they cannot love God more than themselves even with a natural love. The inclination to love God remains but it is not actualized.

Regarding your last comments: here and here -
Also the texts do not directly speak of loving God more than one's self - I think it is correct to say that the love of God more than one's self is possible when we understand that God is greater than our selves, is the final end of all creation, and so on. Is it possible for someone to love God naturally and yet not love Him more than himself [once he has this understanding]? I think it is possible for a disordered or sinning will to do so - the love of God in such a manner is nonetheless made subordinate to the love of one's self (and the rejection of God as the [supernatural] last end). Is it possible for those who are damned to have multiple or successive acts of the intellect and will? It seems that this is the case for the demons and the blessed in heaven while we have not reached the Last Day - but afterwards?

Look up Russell Hittinger on corporate personhood.

The irony won't be clear to those unfamiliar with Russell's recent writing on the topic of "society". His thesis is that societies have a real unity that exists beyond mere aggregation. Societies are real social forms that are much different than a simple cobbling-together of disparate individuals who share superficial interests or even legal recognition. Hittinger has even used "a college faculty" as an example of a kind of societal social form - a collection of individuals who share a true unity, not because they are mandated by an authority to have a pseudo-unity, and not because they are simply using each other as means to individual ends, but because there is a transcending substance that unites them, akin to family.

Societies may have a real unity, but that does not mean that they are named persons, except analogously. Should corporations or societies have rights given to them as a whole?

His CV can be found here.

The Decreasing Ontological Density of the State in Catholic Social Doctrine by Patrick McKinley Brennan (pdf)

CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE LARGE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION by GERALD J. RUSSELLO (pdf)

Russell Hittinger, Two Thomisms, Two Modernities

Fr. Alexander Men, The Six Days of Creation

Insight Scoop: Fr. Aidan Nichols: The Pope "gives social teaching an injection of theology"

Benedict gives social teaching an injection of theology
Fr Aidan Nichols says there is more genuine Christian doctrine in the Pope's new encyclical than in Paul VI's 1967 letter Populorum Progressio

Zenit: Cardinal Cordes on "Caritas in Veritate"

Zenit: Cardinal Cordes on "Caritas in Veritate"
"The Heart of Social Doctrine Remains the Human Person"

Edward Feser, Scholastic’s Bookshelf, Part I

AICN: Another BRIDGET JONES Movie, + Blanchett's In Another Historical Epic!!

Sandro Magister, Grand Returns. "Iota unum" and "Stat veritas" by Romano Amerio (via Fr. Z)

Regarding the act of religion

After thinking about this topic for the past few days, I've reached some tentative conclusions:

Looking through ST II II question 81 again, I see that when Aquinas speaks of the subjection of our mind to God with respect to the virtue of religion, he is referring to religion’s direction of our actions to God as our last end. So in this case, subjection is just giving what is due to God as First Principle and Lord of all things; it is subjection in a rather limited sense. Hence it is possible to be subject to God in this way, by rendering to Him what is due (honor and worship), and yet be in rebellion against him (i.e. being in the state of sin).

So at this point I am inclined to think that acts of religion are possible for those who are in the state of sin, but the possibility of acquiring the virtue to some degree is even less than that of the other moral virtues, given the proximity of religion to God. With that being the case, one could still argue that the state should not compel acts of religion.

I'll have to look at the earlier paper I wrote about acts of religion; I think I argued that acts of religion should not be commanded by the state, but the justification for this was that the state did not have the competency to compel one to do what required grace. While an act of religion may not require grace, to expect someone in the state of sin to develop that virtue, while persisting in sin, seems to be unreasonable.

Alasdair MacIntyre has a new book out: God, philosophy, universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition. Can intellectual history be well-written? Only if one takes advantage of the latest scholarship, and even that may not be sufficient as one tries to recreate the intellectual milieu of an age.

How difficult is it to determine a theologian's influence at a university or within a religious order? Tracing a school of thought to its founder(s) may be simple enough; but to show that this school had an impact on those who were not members? Can this be done, especially if they are not contemporaneous?

Some discussion of the primary end of marriage here. Compare with the United States Catechism for Adults.

From an article by Robert T. Miller criticizing Msgr. Alberto Bonandi:

More specifically, Bonandi argues that there are two ends of marriage—the unitive and the procreative—and if the Church permits the divorced and remarried to pursue one of these ends (the unitive), "consistency would require" that the Church also permit such persons to pursue the other (the procreative), and so to have sexual intercourse. But these "ends" are not the ends of "marriage," no matter what theologians or popes may have carelessly said; they are the ends, rather, of marriage acts, that is, of sexual acts. In contemporary Catholic moral doctrine, a sexual act is licit if, among other things, it is appropriately ordered to these two ends; that is, it is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of the moral liceity of a sexual act that it be of a kind that is (a) fit to produce a certain kind of emotional intimacy between the spouses, and (b) fit to be procreative. Thus sexual acts incompatible with either the unitive end (some people mention in vitro fertilization) or the procreative end (e.g., masturbation) are morally wrong. The reason, incidentally, that adulterous sexual acts are wrong is that, while they may be ordered to the unitive end, they are incompatible with the procreative end because an adulterous relationship is not a reasonable one in which to rear the children that the act may produce.

Bonandi takes these ends, which govern the moral quality of sexual acts, and converts them into norms governing human relationships generally: For Bonandi, if a relationship is fostering the unitive end, then that relationship may (perhaps ought to) foster the procreative end as well. The implications of this are rather shocking. For if, as Bonandi says, a man and a woman sharing a life together and rearing children are pursuing the unitive end and so may pursue the procreative end as well, then a widower who invites his own mother into his home to assist in the rearing of his children will be pursuing the unitive end with her and so may have sexual intercourse with her as well, which is worse than absurd. In truth, we pursue the unitive end with different people in different ways all the time. This does not license us to pursue the procreative end as well.

A discussion of the act (and virtue) of religion at Just Thomism.

Google Books: Dominican Gallery, by Aidan Nichols, O.P.

In this book Fr. Nichols discusses the lives and influence of seven English Dominicans of the 20th century.

Mark Johnson, Got 24 theses?

RTForum: Regarding the Literal Meaning of the Six Days of Creation by John F. McCarthy

Apparently Matthew Levering is now at the University of Dayton, according to this post at Ordo Praedicatorum. Does this have to do with the current situation at Ave Maria? (Dr. Levering still has a faculty page at the university.) What's going to happen to the Aquinas Center for Theological Renewal?

According to his CV(?), he will be starting at UD this Fall.

(source)

A personalist notion of the common good in Caritas in Veritate?

From the encyclical:

7. Another important consideration is the common good. To love someone is to desire that person's good and to take effective steps to secure it. Besides the good of the individual, there is a good that is linked to living in society: the common good. It is the good of "all of us", made up of individuals, families and intermediate groups who together constitute society[4]. It is a good that is sought not for its own sake, but for the people who belong to the social community and who can only really and effectively pursue their good within it. To desire the common good and strive towards it is a requirement of justice and charity. To take a stand for the common good is on the one hand to be solicitous for, and on the other hand to avail oneself of, that complex of institutions that give structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically and culturally, making it the pólis, or "city". The more we strive to secure a common good corresponding to the real needs of our neighbours, the more effectively we love them.

What is marked in red seems to be in accord with the traditional understanding of the common good--one which is found in the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example. But what follows right after seems to be a more personalistic understanding of the common good, in which the common good is subordinate to the good of each individual. I don't think the Latin translation is available yet, but I do not think it will say anything really different from what is being expressed here in English. This understanding of the common good can be found in John XXIII, the documents of Vatican II, and subsequent documents concerning Catholic social teaching. But is that enough of a pedigree to grant it validity? The two notions of the common good can be reconciled, if it is admitted that the supposed good of the individual, to which the "common good" is subordinate, is itself a common good, and not a private good.

Did Pope Pius XII write much on the common good?

I am surprised that more Catholic philosophers and theologians have not picked up on this. But if my understanding of this current notion of the common good is wrong, please explain to me how so.

Living with others

Living with others is a "basic" good; and yet is there a precept of Natural Law that commands us to do so? We may speak of a natural inclination to do so, or a natural imperative, but a precept? We may have an inclination to procreate, but this is not a precept for everyone -- the precepts of Natural Law tell us how to choose this reasonably, if we choose it. Some may renounce it for the sake of the Kingdom. But some may be called to renounce human company for the sake of God's company -- to become a hermit. They are not cut off from the supernatural communion that is the Church, but they are removed from participating in human relationships "in this world." (Physically? I think you see what I am getting at.)

It would seem from his treatment of the lawfulness of virginity that St. Thomas would affirm that there is, indeed, a precept to live with others. If someone is not needed for the earthly civitas for its perfection, but set aside by God for something greater, are they dispensed from the precept? I don't see how the duty to live with others can be anything but a duty of the individual. The duty of the multitude, as described by St. Thomas, does not seem to fit in this case: "The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multitude."

Perhaps the response is that one is not really living apart from others--that the supernatural communion the hermit shares with other members of the Church is the fulfillment of the precept. The precept is not be fulfilled at one level, but is at a higher level.

Something to think about: The Genesis Flood--Why the Bible Says It Must be Local by Rich Deem

Fr. Pinckaers on St. Alphonsus Liguori

After all the shifts and variations of ethicists through two centuries--and they were at times extreme--St. Alphonsus' system established a certain balance by its return to considered reason. There followed a measure of calm in regard to the probabilist dispute, and in 1831 the Church confirmed this by declaring that the moral theology of Blessed Alphonsus might be safely taught and used in the confessional. Withotu going so far as to assert explicitly that his 'theory of equal probability' was the best system for moral theology, the Church declared him a Doctor in 1871. Thus Alphonsus became the patron of moralists.

The patronage of St. Alphonsus, which merits our respect and esteem for his achievements, still leaves ethicists free in regard to following his reasoning. They retain this freedom as long as no definite law constrains them. This freedom is all the more necessary as the limitations of casuist morality, of which St. Alphonsus was teh most highly authorized representative, have become more apparent in our day. We can now better perceive the fundamental differences in organization and structure as well as in problematics that separate it from the moral theology of St. Thomas and the Fathers of the Church. Incontestably, post-Tridentine moral theology, in concentrating on cases of conscience and the dispute over probabilism, narrowed its horizon. We see now how it contrasts with the breadth fo the views on human action and on God that we find in the Fathers and the great scholastics. The link has not been broken, but there has been a shrinkage and a slight distortion.

The Sources of Christian Ethics, 277

Moral Choices: The Moral Theology of St. Alphonsus Liguori, by Theodule Rey-Mermet

Worth getting? It seems that St. Alphonsus' Theologia Moralis is not easy to come by. I should review what Fr. Pinckaers says about St. Alphonsus and the debates over probabilism. Dr. Fleming esteems St. Alphonsus highly.

CE
Doctors of the Church
A Short History of Moral Theology
Redemptorists USA

Defending Probabilism: The Moral Theology of Juan Caramuel by Julia Fleming (Google Books)

American Papist: Text: Caritas in Veritate on 'urgent need of a true world political authority'

Pope Benedict's third encyclical is a mammoth work which will take some time to digest, but here is a third important paragraph I'd like to highlight, one that is sure to generate some vigorous debate back-and-forth:

67. In the face of the unrelenting growth of global interdependence, there is a strongly felt need, even in the midst of a global recession, for a reform of the United Nations Organization, and likewise of economic institutions and international finance, so that the concept of the family of nations can acquire real teeth. One also senses the urgent need to find innovative ways of implementing the principle of the responsibility to protect and of giving poorer nations an effective voice in shared decision-making. This seems necessary in order to arrive at a political, juridical and economic order which can increase and give direction to international cooperation for the development of all peoples in solidarity. To manage the global economy; to revive economies hit by the crisis; to avoid any deterioration of the present crisis and the greater imbalances that would result; to bring about integral and timely disarmament, food security and peace; to guarantee the protection of the environment and to regulate migration: for all this, there is urgent need of a true world political authority, as my predecessor Blessed John XXIII indicated some years ago. Such an authority would need to be regulated by law, to observe consistently the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, to seek to establish the common good, and to make a commitment to securing authentic integral human development inspired by the values of charity in truth. Furthermore, such an authority would need to be universally recognized and to be vested with the effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice, and respect for rights. Obviously it would have to have the authority to ensure compliance with its decisions from all parties, and also with the coordinated measures adopted in various international forums. Without this, despite the great progress accomplished in various sectors, international law would risk being conditioned by the balance of power among the strongest nations. The integral development of peoples and international cooperation require the establishment of a greater degree of international ordering, marked by subsidiarity, for the management of globalization. They also require the construction of a social order that at last conforms to the moral order, to the interconnection between moral and social spheres, and to the link between politics and the economic and civil spheres, as envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations.

... globalization and development are dependent upon... cheap energy...

Substance, Accident, and Transubstantiation
by
Peter A. Kwasniewski

(the rest of the article)

R. R. Reno on Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.

Defending Truth

07.07.2009

R.R. Reno

CNA: Renowned moral theologian weighs-in on Theology of the Body debate
(via The Hermeneutic of Continuity)

Zenit: Holy See on Economic Crisis and Development
"We Reiterate Our Plea That the Poorest Countries Be Given Priority" [2009-07-02]

Recommendations:

Consequently, for the Holy See, there is, first and foremost, a compelling moral obligation to address these worsening social and economic disparities which undermine the basic dignity of so many of the world's inhabitants. At the same time Church institutions all over the world have seized the momentum to foment new structures of solidarity and to call for and encourage the redirection of the national and global financial and economic systems towards the principles of justice, solidarity and subsidiarity.

Given the vulnerability of so many of the world's poor, we endorse the proposed approach to protect them with short-term stabilization measures while using longer term measures to help ensure sustainable financial flows and reduce the likelihood of this crisis reoccurring. We also urge that the future agenda be not overly ambitious. Short-term actions must focus on means that are capable of bringing tangible relief within a reasonable time period to individuals most in need. Longer term measures -- which often may require developing a stronger political consensus to realize them -- should focus on actions that support sustainability. We therefore support the proposed practical balance between short-term needs for effective action and the longer term proposals to review the framework of the global economic system.

In terms of specific action, we welcome the commitments made at the G20 London Summit last April to make available more than $1 trillion in additional assistance. Unfortunately, however, only a small part of this assistance was targeted for the poorest developing countries. Hence, it is essential that adequate financial assistance still be directed to these countries, whose financing needs must be closely monitored. It is also important that such assistance be extended with minimal conditionality from the IFIs.

We are conscious of the human and social dimensions of this global crisis. In light of that, we support measures aimed at strengthening food security, the protection of social expenditures, and, more generally, a people centered focus of public expenditure. In this regard, we welcome particularly the proposals for the necessary additional resources to be made to the World Bank's Vulnerability Financing Framework.

New World Bank Group Vulnerability Financing Facility

And then there is this...

As the UN community assumes this collective responsibility to support the poorest developing countries at this time of financial crisis, we believe it is appropriate to recall the reflections of Pope Benedict XVI at the beginning of this year in celebrating World Day of Peace. He placed special emphasis on the essential need for a 'strong sense of global solidarity' between rich and poor countries to address effectively the fight against poverty. His appeal was essentially a moral one, based on the common good for all human beings.

Does the common good of the human race require that the UN undertake the responsibility to support developing countries? How would it enforce the rule of law and bring about justice, both of which are necessary for the common good? Relying on the current system to provide the necessary funds does not seem to be an acceptable solution, if the system is itself a form of exploitation and unjust. I can see why many are wary of redistributionist schemes, and those critics may have a point regarding the taking away of people's income unjustly--but I think the source of the funding and wealth must be examined too. Is Robin Hood just, if he is a representative of the government?

Sandro Magister, New Discoveries. Why St. Paul Was Given a Philosopher's Face

GoogleBooks: First the Bow is Bent in Study

James Chastek, Aristotle, essentialism, and evolution

When we simply plow through Aristotle’s text changing every “what is” to “essence” we will be prone to fall into exactly the sort of error that is thoroughly discredited by the insights of evolution. In Aristotle’s system, the “what”, when said of a natural thing, refers to a compositeof matter and form; when said of a being without matter thing, it refers to form alone. The first “what” is inseparable from a change and flux so far as it is defined with matter, and so if we say that “the what” means “essence” than the essence of natural things is changeable. Changeability is not the whole of its essence (for form is essential to its essence too) but it is inseparable from it. In this sense of essence, the essences of the things the natural scientist studies are changeable. The difficulty is that “essence”, because of its absolute character, cannot mix with the idea of being changeable. The mind recoils from the idea of “changeable essence” as a contradiction, or at least an extremely poor choice of words. This is why when we find various good reasons to say that essences (or what we thought were essences) are not fixed, it is better to junk the idea of essence altogether. This is fine, but even after we junk the word “essence” we are still left with Aristotle’s “the what”, which, when applied to natural things, includes matter and is therefore capable of change.

But Aristotle also says that nature is more form than matter, does he not, even though it is made up of both? And matter is proportioned to form -- so how much change can a thing tolerate before its potencies are affected, and it no longer has the same potencies as before?

Continuum/T&T Clark has an edition of Fr. Bouyer's The Christian Mystery that is currently in print.

Zenit: Holy Father's Address to French Seminary
"The Task of Forming Priests Is a Delicate Mission"

James Chastek:

It would be interesting to develop St. Thomas’s notion of logic as a manual like “the proper use of a human intellect”.

int.) Human powers can function well or poorly. Digestion can happen either effortlessly, or with difficulty and pain; vision can be either 20/20 or obscured by glaucoma, nerve damage, etc; the endocrine system can work or be impaired by diabetes; our ability to make a jump shot can be trained and coached, etc.

1.) Intellect: a power which knows what things are. We pass over any consideration of the nature of this power, unless we need to know it in order to use the intellect properly.

2.) We come to know by learning. So intellect learns what things are. Like other human powers, sometimes this development is automatic, other times it must be trained or coached. We are only interested here in the part that can be trained or coached (that is, educated).

3.) Learning involves getting a more perfect knowledge of something, and so begins with what is more imperfect. Learning simply speaking therefore begins with a concept that is most imperfect, simply speaking.

4.) The learning in question is of what something is. The most imperfect grasps of what something is, is our awareness that it is at all in some way. One the one hand, this is a real awareness of what something is; on the other hand it is so imperfect and indeterminate that it tells us almost nothing, and is always taken for granted in our thought.

(more examples)

The logic from names to definition(s)
The Death of an Interesting Theory

Edward Feser, Hume, science, and religion and James Chastek, Hume's critique of causality as applying to exterior things

Are the unitive and procreative ends of marriage really "co-equal"? Can we explain the traditional precept of the Church to marry a Catholic if they are? Or is this precept better understood of the procreative end is the primary end, and the unitive secondary to it? That is to say, we should marry someone Catholic for the sake of the children and their proper upbringing as Catholics and so on. After all, Catholics have an obligation to raise their children as Catholics, even if their spouse is not Catholic.

Aidan Nichols, O.P., Redeeming Beauty: Soundings in Sacral Aesthetics

Edward Feser, Empiricism versus Aristotelianism

As I read through The Underground History of American Education, I am reminded of the criticism of bureaucratic management by Alasdair MacIntyre and others. Perhaps it is time for me to re-read and re-evaluate After Virtue. The question: can the causal links between the rise of certain political and social forms and the development of new theories of morality be maintained?

DETERMINING THE CONTENT AND DEGREE OF AUTHORITY OF CHURCH TEACHINGS
John R. T. Lamont

B) Problems with the Neo-Scholastic Approach to Doctrine, and Their Remedy

The ideas about the interpretation of Church teachings that have been criticized so far emerge from "progressive" theological currents that have become widely accepted only since the 1950s. Immediately before this period, the predominant approach to the interpretation of Church teachings was that of neo-Scholastic theologians, itself a development of the views of baroque Scholastics. Although this approach is still the one generally used by theologians who reject the heterodoxy of the progressive notions, resorting to the neo-Scholastic approach is not a satisfactory method for evaluating certain conciliar teachings, such as that on religious liberty. While this approach is not heterodox, it nonetheless has serious shortcomings. Remedying them requires some constructive work on the issue of the interpretation of Church teachings.

One class of shortcomings arises from its dependence on a mistaken theory of revelation, which I have dubbed the "magis-terial" theory of revelation, and criticized elsewhere.(41) This theory underlies the neo-Scholastic system of theological notes, which divides teachings into the categories of de fide divina, de fide divina et catholica, de fide catholica, de fide in genere, theologice certa, doctrina catholica, and proxima fidei. The falsity of the magisterial theory and of the theories of the development of doctrine that are associated with it means that these classifications are mistaken or inadequate.(42) However, since most of these notes are intended to be applied to teachings that are infallibly taught, we need not go into their shortcomings in detail. The feature of the neo-Scholastic system that does concern us closely is its general approach to Church teachings, which conceives of assent to these teachings as primarily obedience to a command.

Christopher West gives an interview for OSV, but does not really address Dr. Schindler, as far as I can tell. (I gave it a quick glance.)

Intervista con Prof. P. Bruno Esposito


Arautos do Evangelho: Il Prof. P. Bruno Esposito, O.P. Vicerettore Accademico della Pontificia Università san Tommaso d'Aquino a Roma - "Angelicum" ci parla della sua visita in Brasile, sulla fede dei brasiliani e commenta la spiritualità degli Araldi del Vangelo. - visite: www.tv.arautos.org.br - Arautos do Evangelho.

The Dawn Patrol: Virgo redacta
Christopher West and the dangers of overanalogizing Mary

A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.

Mark Shiffman, Descartes, Algebra, and Alienation

James Chastek, The lack of proper formation and its effects

Aristotle argues that a defining trait of a first principle is being indemonstrable, and that to think otherwise shows lack of paideia- that is, lack of a proper formation (lack of proper upbringing, culture, liberal education, etc)

Mr. Chastek expands on this by looking at what St. Thomas says in his commentary on the Metaphysics. I don't think I can think of a better critique of modern education than what is presented here. Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of miseducation or deformation than education. Students cannot distinguish between knowledge and opinion, nor do they know what is apparent and what is not.

Yahoo: Transparent frog discovered
Scientists find a "crystal" frog whose organs appear through its clear skin.

For the sake of precision

When people claim the Blessed Mother of God was the first Christian theologian, they need to realize that they are using "theology" and "theologian" equivocally, in a similar way to when Orthodox polemicists claim that Latins do not have a proper understanding of what "theology" is. Was the Blessed Mother a great Christian contemplative? Undoubtedly. Did she have the gift of wisdom in abundance? The supernatural virtue of faith? And so on? Yes. But did she have the acquired habit of theological science? I question that, and even if she didn't, she had far greater gifts to employ in her spiritual life, and the lack of theologia does very little to diminish her perfection.

James Chastek on the teaching of logic -- part 1 and part 2.

I must have reed St Thomas a thousand times before it hit me that he defined logic in relation to the rational faculty. Logic, by his definition, is the art that directs reason in its own act. This act is governed by the proper object of reason, the what-sensible-things-are. On this account, logic is subordinate to things by definition. The goal is not to give a universal system of all possible arguments, but to give a general account of how we figure out what things are. On St. Thomas’s account logic is the answer to the question: “generally speaking, how does one use an intellect?” or “how does an intellect work?” On this account, you first give its object, then the order we follow to attain the object (general to particular) then the most general things known that can do logical work (the categories) and then how we can refine these general things into definitions (Topics) then the laws that govern how we combine them to form a proposition (de interpretatione) and an argument (the books of Analytics)

The part on the Topics would be the easiest one to leave out, and the one we contemporary thinkers are most in need of.

Logic. Something all aspiring academics should be studying; it would also be useful for those who are engaged in ecumenical dialogue, particularly the "Latins" and the "Greeks". Most philosophy departments that take a historical approach to teaching philosophy do not have a basic logic course for both majors and non-majors. How much would majors benefit from having just one good logic course. It would help them deal with the sort of 'relativism' that one finds in such departments.

Papal Address to Social Doctrine Group

Papal Address to Social Doctrine Group

"Economic and Financial Paradigms … Must Be Rethought"

VATICAN CITY, JUNE 14, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Benedict XVI gave Saturday upon receiving in audience members of the Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation, which promotes the social doctrine of the Church.

* * *
Venerable brothers in the episcopate and the priesthood,
Illustrious and dear friends!

Thank you for your visit that you are making on the occasion of your annual meeting. I greet all of you with affection and am grateful to you for what you do, with proven generosity, at the service of the Church. I greet and thank Count Lorenzo Rossi di Montelera, your president, who interpreted your sentiments with refined sensibility, expounding the foundation's activities with broad brush strokes. I also thank those who, in different languages, wanted to present me with an attestation of their common devotion. Your gathering today assumes a significance and particular value in light of the situation that all of humanity is experiencing in this moment.

In effect, the financial crisis that has struck the industrialized nations, the emergent nations and those that are developing, shows in a clear way how the economic and financial paradigms that have been dominant in recent years must be rethought. Your foundation has done well, then, to confront, in the international conference that took place yesterday, the theme of the pursuit and identification of the values and guidelines that the economic world must stick to in order to bring into being a new model of development that is more attentive to the demands of solidarity and more respectful of human dignity.

I am happy to see that you have especially examined the interdependency between institutions, society and the market, beginning -- in accord with the encyclical "Centesimus Annus" of my venerable predecessor John Paul II -- from the reflection according to which the market economy, understood as "an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector" (No. 42), can only be recognized as a way of economic and civil progress if it is oriented to the common good (cf. No. 43). Such a vision, however, must also be accompanied by another reflection according to which freedom in the economic sector must situate itself "within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality," a responsible freedom "the core of which is ethical and religious" (No. 42). This encyclical opportunely affirms that: "The person fully realizes himself in the free gift of self, so too ownership morally justifies itself in the creation, at the proper time and in the proper way, of opportunities for work and human growth for all" (No. 43).

I hope the research developed by your work, inspired by the eternal principles of the Gospel, will elaborate a vision of the modern economy that is respectful of the needy and of the rights of the weak. As you know, my encyclical on the vast theme of economics and labor will soon be published: It will highlight what, for us Christians, are the objectives to be pursued and the values to be promoted and tirelessly defended, with the purpose of realizing a truly free and solidary human coexistence.

I also note with pleasure what you are doing on behalf of the Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, to whose aim, an aim which you share, I attribute great value for an increasingly fruitful interreligious dialogue.

Dear friends, thank you once again for your visit; I assure each of you a remembrance in prayer as I bless you all from my heart.

[Translation by Joseph G. Trabbic]

Is this sufficient for Blackstone to be called a voluntarist in his account of law?

This then is the general signification of law, a rule of action dictated by some superior being: and, in those creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature itself subsists, for it's existence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.

Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is necessary that he should in all points conform to his maker's will.

This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.

Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian^[1] has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

But if the discovery of these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reason, and could not otherwise be obtained than by a chain of metaphysical disquisitions, mankind would have wanted some inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have rested content in mental indolence, and ignorance it's inseparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, he has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to inquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, "that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other-It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

source: Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, Section 2

James Chastek, Cultural value endoxes

A good piece regarding endoxa. When it comes to the discussion of morality in high schools and colleges, traditional values are questioned, but modern ones (especially modern rights) are not -- evidence that liberalism is just another tradition despite its pretense to the contrary? When I was in high school, I found that the students were the ones who were questioning received attitudes, while the teachers would act as "neutral" moderators, doing nothing to defend tradition or to lead the "liberated" students to question their own values. There is one classmate in particular who annoyed me greatly with his smart-ass attitude. To this day I have no inclination to talk to him. (Or friend him on Facebook.)

One can see this liberal bias against endoxa (or their rejection by those who desire license) clearly with respect to morality. It seems to happen less with respect to the speculative sciences. However, a similar critique can be made of professional educators. It may be part of the standard narrative that what was believed in the past has been rendered obsolete or false through new discoveries; but for what cannot be immediately be verified, even these supposed new "truths" are taken as assumptions, rather than proved. No attempt is usually made to show why someone reasonable might hold to those beliefs in the past.

People are critical of what they have rejected, but they do not undertake to examine their own beliefs in the same way. Is that close-mindedness? It is certainly proud ignorance to claim that one is "open-minded" or "critical" when one is not really so.

Website dedicated to Fr. Seraphim Rose.

Fr. Finigan links to the following: On Rupture Theology

Daily Mail: The cloud with no name: Meteorologists campaign to classify unique 'Asperatus' clouds seen across the world

Gallery at the Cloud Appreciation Society.

(via Stephen Hand)

An article by Sandra Miesel on Maria Lactans: Mothering God.

The Fall 2008 issue of Communio is on the subject of Natural Law.

Dawn Patrol: And then God created the olive branch
David Schindler calls time-out in dispute over Christopher West's teachings
A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.


Response to Profs. Smith and Waldstein Regarding Christopher West, by David Schindler

A thought that struck me while I was discussing TOB with its defenders -- has TOB become another tool with which those who have been influenced by feminism beat men (and husbands)? While it may be true that some men act selfishly with respect to sex, how true is this of American (and Catholic) husbands? How many women withhold sex in order to punish or spite their husbands? And how different are male and female sexuality? Does Karol Wojtyla recognize that there is a difference in male and female sexuality (and how men and women perceive sex), like Dr. Laura, or would he reject this as a rationalization for "getting it whenever he wants it."

Let's not even get into women's groups, which sound like an excuse for women to complain to other women about their husbands. Not exactly a good way to strengthen one's marriage, especially if it is used primarily as a means of validating their complaints.

James Chastek, A definition and division of analogy

Fr. Z: Politics and worship

According to Dodar, St. Augustine held that

When good does result from human efforts, it is because they are never without divine assistance. Knowledge and love of God, the proper worship of God, are impeded by the dissonance of this free-floating selfhood. Augustine describes the sin of Adam and Eve as self-worship as opposed to the correct worship of God...

Does Augustine define worship in this way? Aquinas distinguishes between charity and religion (both its internal and external acts). It does seem that for Aquinas, there can be no religion without charity.

The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity. (ST II II 81, 5 ad 1)

The body of the article, Aquinas on whether religion is a theological virtue:

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.

Insight Scoop: Benedict XVI on Rabanus Maurus, "an exegete, philosopher, poet, pastor and man of God"

Abstract: Synthesis of activated pyrimidine ribonucleotides in prebiotically plausible conditions
Nature: RNA world easier to make
(via JimmyAkin.org)

The Dawn Patrol: Funeral homily for Francis Canavan S.J. By PATRICK J. RYAN S.J.

L'analogie chez saint Thomas d'Aquin par l'abbé S. Leclère

Salve Regina

Those who defend Christopher West (and others) talk about how he has changed their lives and so on. How does this compare with the talks given by Jason Evert and his wife? What is it about West's teaching that is more effective than the Church's teaching, even if it is understood only in prohibitions? After all, obedience is a necessary addition to Faith, and also a "component" of charity (as well as religion). Why weren't these [infused] virtues enough for people to abstain from acts that are prohibited by Christ? Do people need to be presented with the 'positive' goods associated with a prohibition before they cooperate with grace and fulfill the Law? Society, bishops, and other traditional sources of wisdom concerning marriage and family have been lost, that is true, and people need to be taught about the vocation to marriage. But telling them that certain acts are somehow not consonant with giving one's self, or are a lie, or something else -- is this really an adequate explanation for the prohibition? If certain acts are opposed to love, as a general virtue, it is because they are against reason (and some subordinate good) in some way.

A critique of the phrase "integral good" is found here:

« The entire activity of the Church is an expression of a love that seeks the integral good of man. »

The Abbé de Nantes often contested this expression, inherited from John Paul II, but going back to Paul VI, “expert in humanity”. He claimed to be exercising a global magistracy, infallibly fixing new rights and duties for persons and States, determining the entire ideal and programme for a universal social reform “for the integral development of the whole man and of all men”. In this claim, developed by the encyclical on the progress of peoples (Populorum progressio, Easter 1967), the Abbé de Nantes detected the venom of the errors condemned by Saint Pius X in the Letter on the Sillon of 25 August 1910 (Letter to My Friends no 245, April 1967).

Some thoughts that struck me as I read this part -- is this expression really that problematic? And is it linked in any way to the 'integral humanism' of Jacques Maritain? What of the integral human fulfillment of John Finnis? Answers to come, perhaps...

At the Dawn Patrol: Schindler's list
Sparks fly as JP2 Institute dean raps Christopher West for errors
A guest post by FR. ANGELO MARY GEIGER F.I.

bloggingLOURDES takes issue with Dr. Janet Smith and Christopher West over their approval of certain sex acts, in the name of theology of the body.

Two other posts on TOB: Sex, Matrimony, the Garden of Eden and Theology of the Body and 10 Via Crucis on Mount Carmel (a brief comment on the Theology of the Body).

It does not appear to me that Father gives an argument against the act in question, except that it goes against human dignity -- that may seem almost tautological. Still, and this is something that those looking for theological arguments to permit such acts forget, there is something to be said for the connatural knowledge of the virtuous that enables them to know that certain things are wrong, even if they cannot give a scientific (that is, reasoned-out) explanation of why this is so.

Curious, in the comments section there is a lot of cricism of NFP--some may be criticizing just the mentality (or intentions) of those practicing it, some appear to be going further and criticing the practice itself.

Something from Counterpunch, of all places: On Evolution, by James C. Faris
A Critique of Darwinism

Space.com: Close-up Look at Black Hole Reveals Feeding Frenzy

More Theology of the Body resources

I came across the names of Matt Pinto and Greg Popcak while writing this post.


Theology of the Body
John Paul II's Theology of the Body
John Paul II's Theology of the Body

Michael Waldstein
Retranslating the Theology of the Body.rtf
Retranslating the Theology of the Body
The 2nd International Theology of The Body Symposium
The Theology of the Body According to John Paul II
Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body

Carl Anderson and Father José Granados
Called to Love - More on Theology of the Body
Called to Love: Approaching John Paul II's Theology of the Body
What is the Theology of the Body & Why is it Changing so Many Lives?

Greg Popcak
Pastoral Solutions Institute: Homepage
Ave Maria Radio Host - Greg and Lisa Popcak - Heart Mind and Strength
Holy Sex!
Catholic Dads: Holy Sex - by Gregory Popcak - Book Review

Christopher West
Christopher West Home
Theology of the Body Institute

A better approach? Chastity - Pure Love Club and Real Love Incorporated

Catholic Social Thought, Political Liberalism, and the Idea of Human Rights
Zachary R. Calo
(via Mirror of Justice)

Christopher West's Theology of the Body by David L. Schindler

stating that, while “there are some important health and aesthetic considerations that can’t be overlooked,” “there's nothing inherently wrong with anal penetration as foreplay to normal intercourse," (Good News About Sex and Marriage, 1st ed., emphasis in original), though qualifying this in the revised edition and stressing the subjective dangers of lust in such activity

I believe it can be argued that anal sex is intrinsically wrong -- the penis is not meant to be put in the anus, and we can know this precisely from the adverse impact on health that this can have. We can also look at the functionality of the organs involved as well.

Some Ralph McInerny videos

Medieval Philosophy: St. Thomas Aquinas


Introduction to Thomas Aquinas


Medieval Philosophy


Metaphysics


Ralph McInerny
Center for Ethics and Culture bio
icuweb
International Catholic University

Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 1

Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 2
Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 3
Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 4
Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy: Section 5

Philosopher Anthony Kenny on Medieval Philosophy • VideoSift

wiki
Gifford Lecture Series - Biography - Anthony Kenny
Anthony Kenny - Aquinas on Being - Reviewed by Robert Pasnau

Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 1

Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 2
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 3
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 4
Martha Nussbaum on Aristotle: Section 5

I hesitate to add "Aristotle" as a label for this post, as I do not consider Nussbaum to be a reliable disciple.

Interview with Quentin Skinner.

Interview of Professor Quentin Skinner - part 1

Interview of Professor Quentin Skinner - part 2

(You can download this interview here.)

James Chastek brings us a translation of the first part of the first chapter of Msgr. Maurice Dionne’s treatment of analogy: Dionne on analogy.

James Schall, "Rights" and Liberties

Few recognize how dangerous the origin of this word is. Many fine scholars such as Jacques Maritain, John Finnis, and others have worked valiantly to save “rights” terminology from relativism, the context in which it is understood in modern political philosophy. They have not prevailed in baptizing it as was their intent, even though they provide plausible arguments about why it need not be a relativistic concept. These arguments are simply ignored or rejected by most rights advocates, though seldom confronted intellectually.


David Walsh has noted that the word “rights” still retains a vague relation to some stable grounding in being. Today, however, “rights” mean what Hobbes, its original formulator, claimed: namely, the word rights means whatever the de facto political authority says it means. A “right” is what the government defines and enforces as a right, nothing more, nothing less. The current president’s whole anti-life agenda, the most extreme ever designed in any responsible or irresponsible polity, is presented to us under the guise of “human rights.” It is breathtaking.


The idea that such “rights” have “natural law” behind them, a way of looking at them so that we can appeal to a common and agreed rational concept of human nature, is fine. But this understanding is neither what the word nor the actions of the government mean. We like to say that the “right to life is the fundamental right.” Nix that “right” and all else falls. This is true. All else is falling. The “right to life” now means politically what, and only what, the government and courts define it to mean, not some “inalienable” idea of human dignity from God or nature.


The Church has taken up the term “natural right” as if it meant something rooted in human nature. I can count almost on one hand the number of times that, aware of the problem, a pope or theologian will say, almost as an aside, that “natural right,” of course, does not mean what “natural right” does mean in the public order. They then use the very same term as if everyone agreed with a grounded view, rooted in natural law.


In practice, we seem to think that everyone agrees with this Catholic background of “natural rights.” We have a basis for common discourse. Yet we soon find that people polemically inquire: “If you claim a ‘right to life,’ why not grant a ‘right’ to abortion or any such thing?”

It seems that the word right is used to refer to both subjective passive rights and subjective active rights, it is being used equivocally, and not univocally. Given our disregard for natural law and its Author, naturally we would associate our conception of rights with some brand of legal positivitism, would we not? What possible limits could there be? Some may say that the liberal 'no harm' principle is sufficient. But how is harm to be defined? Just the production of physical evils? Or moral evils as well, and everything "in between"?

Edward Feser, Davidson’s anomalous monism

James Chastek, Aristotle's account of substance