Monday, February 21, 2011

A New Wrinkle

Or just something I had forgotten...

For the discussion on torture over at WWWTW, I went back and reread what the CCC says about torture:

Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity. Except when performed for strictly therapeutic medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations performed on innocent persons are against the moral law.[90]
2298 In times past, cruel practices were commonly used by legitimate governments to maintain law and order, often without protest from the Pastors of the Church, who themselves adopted in their own tribunals the prescriptions of Roman law concerning torture. Regrettable as these facts are, the Church always taught the duty of clemency and mercy. She forbade clerics to shed blood. In recent times it has become evident that these cruel practices were neither necessary for public order, nor in conformity with the legitimate rights of the human person. On the contrary, these practices led to ones even more degrading. It is necessary to work for their abolition. We must pray for the victims and their tormentors.

So torture as defined in the CCC includes its use for punishment.

Is Christian personalism just a variant of liberal moral theory? I wrote that this is a novelty and the appeal to human dignity and respect for the person is not reducible to what has been written by Thomists about the virtues of charity and justice. So how much weight should the CCC carry? I do not hold it to be an infallible document, and while it should be respected, I think there is a break with the past with regards to punishment. Now it might be that Sacred Tradition does not explicitly maintain the infliction of pain as punishment is licit. But it would seem that various moral theologians (and bishops?) have taught it.

Again, how is torture as it is broadly defined here different from corporal punishment by parents or lawful authorities?

Fr. Brian Harrison has an article from 2006 for This Rock, but I would think it has been superceded by his addendum.

Edit. I vaguely recall an attempt to harmonize the CCC with "traditional" teaching on the infliction of pain as a punishment, but I can find no record of having written about it on this blog. I may have written it somewhere else, or just done it mentally. One could interpret the CCC as prohibiting the torture of those who have already been sentenced and punished for an offense -- torture (or any sort of maltreatment) would in their case be going beyond what has already been determined to be a proper punishment for their offense. (Maltreatment might be justified on the grounds that they have lost human dignity, etc., but I do not think that this would be in accord with a traditional understanding of justice.)

Still, I think the more obvious sense of the sentence in the CCC is that it prohibits torture as a form of punishment. But this would only be a problem if the CCC were represent the highest teaching authority of the Church and protected by infallibility.

Friday, February 18, 2011

Aquinas-Barth Conference

At Princeton in June.

Google Books: 2 by Edward Grant

The Nature of Natural Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages
A history of natural philosophy: from the ancient world to the nineteenth century

The Art of Definition

Working with elementary school students, I noticed that when asked to give definitions, students usually just give synonyms. But this is true of teachers as well. Is it also a weakness of children's dictionaries? Does this instill a bad habit that gets in the way of acquiring the intellectual virtues later on in life?

Aristotle's theory of the syllogism By Günther Patzig

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Zenit: ON ST. JOHN OF THE CROSS
"If a Man Has a Great Love Within … He Endures Life’s Problems More Easily"

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

While I was driving home and thinking of my recent hospital experience, I asked if part of the problem was not an inordinate desire for health, and if the amount of money being spent on research was not an indication of our wrong priorities. If we found that a majority (if not most or all) diseases of civilization were due to diet, would our society continue to spend so much money on research? I say "so much" since the amount of funding and grant money required to pay scientists and their staff and keep medical, pharmaceutical, or biological research laboratories running must be great. Even if we eliminated 70 or 80% of the diseases that plague us as we age, would we nevertheless demand 100% eradication? Would we not be satisfied with our lot in life?
This is assuming that everyone doing research is doing so with pure intentions, and not because they seek to make money from it. We could once again ask how the surplus wealth that is necessary for research is being obtained--if our research is a form of prodigality and the means by which the money is being obtained involves great injustice, then wouldn't the whole enterprise be doubly compromised?

Still, collective sin as it is used in contemporary discourse can seem like it is poorly-defined. How much responsibility do those who benefit from the system bear, as compared to those who are in control of the system?

It's been a long day...

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council: A Counterpoint for the History of the Council Now Available

Fr. Z: Archbp. Marchetto’s book about “School of Bologna” and interpretations of Vatican II now in English

NLM

Happiness Surveys and the Good of Ethics

We have often received reports through the MSM of the results of surveys trying to find the world's happiest country, and so on.

The most recent item I've seen that makes use of such surveys is Jim Bannon's "The Pursuit of Happiness" (EB), which uses the results of astudy comparing the 50 states, which attempted to link objective criteria with respondents' subjective life-satisfaction scores.

How does one determine unhappiness, or dissatisfaction? The failure to attain the goods that one wants or expects? How is this quantified in a survey? Some surveys may find a correlation with simplicity in lifestyle--others may not, especially when the top 5 happiest countries are industrialized. The definition of happiness is left up to the individual -- though external markers are sought to justify their impression. As far as I have seen, these surveys do not rely upon a notion of happiness universally applicable to all, a standard by which societies (and their ways of life) everywhere can be judged.

But on to my main point: it seems natural to us to think of goods as things that we possess. If we have the good or goods, then we are happy. Is this a problem of language? Does the word "good" lend itself to thinking in terms of abstractions and habits, things that we have? That is, because the word "good" is an [abstract] noun, are we inclined to seek a res that is a substance, rather than an accident. Do we find this problematic conception in other languages, or is it limited only to English? (Merriam-Webster, etymology)
Or is it more the psychology of fallen nature -- we spend much time thinking about what we wish to acquire in order to satisfy inordinate desires? Then, when we come across the word in a writings dealing with ethics, we first think of things before anything else. (Did utilitarianism/consequentialism play any role in promoting this understanding?)

Which of the Greek or Latin Fathers talked about goods as being things that are possessed? I can't remember St. Augustine's treatment. I do remember Boethius talking about the goods that are constitutive of happiness. He seems to share that conception of  the relationship of "good" to happiness with many moderns. From The Consolation of Philosophy: Aristotle does enumerate "goods" (things to be possessed) which are identified by various people as being happiness in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, but this is a dialectical discussion(?) aimed at showing that these opinions are incorrect.

What needs to be recovered is an understanding of good(s) of happiness primarily as an activity, and not as something that we have/possess, either "internal" to us (e.g. virtue or office/power/ability) or external to us (e.g. family). These latter goods are instruments or occasions for activity or the exercise of virtue.

If they are to be really meaningful, these surveys should not be a "sociological" study of what people want and desire and are missing, but a study of how people live. But that would probably require too much of an academic survey.

*Boethius's account, or any traditional Catholic theology for that matter, does seem to be right with respect to  naming God as our first ("highest") good. But this requires a nuanced explanation.

Monday, February 14, 2011

The Dominican Spiritual Life

op-stjoseph: The Dominican Spiritual Life
A talk by Fr. Thomas Joseph White, O.P

Fr. Brian Mullady, OP on EWTN



(via op-stjoseph)
Zenit: On Christ and the "Fullness" of the Law
"What Is This Superior Justice That He Demands?"

Fr. Michael Himes

Someone in the OLOP Young Adult Group posted this video on FB:


I was a bit curious, since I had heard one of Fr. Himes's homilies and was not impressed, despite the presence of what I considered a personality cult at his Mass. He didn't strike me as someone orthodox, but the typical American theologian who thinks he is a better authority than the bishop of Rome. I suppose I should listen to the video and read some of his stuff to have a better judgment of him as a theologian, teacher, and priest.

The talk he gave as part of BC's Last Lecture series--Boston College Front Row:

(fora.tv)

Food for Thought
Foundations of Christianity: Faith and Hope

He offers some guidance on discernment.

Heights article
Something on him and his brother.

2008: Dominican University Presents Michael Himes in Mazzuchelli Lecture

Sunday, February 13, 2011

Robert Araujo, Law as a Moral Idea -- a short note about Nigel Simmond’s Law as Moral Idea.

Related: Natural Law “Externalism” v. Law as a Moral Idea
Juriprudence Discussion Group
Positivism and Separation of Laws and Morals, Fifty Years On

James Chastek on Nature as a Principle of Motion

An interview with an old friar

Loving God More than Yourself

Aquinas argues that we should love God more than ourselves, for example in the Summa Theologiae here (with reference to the angels and the natural love of God) and here (with reference to us and charity). Now, it seems that if you were to ask a simple Catholic the reason why we love God more than ourselves he would not talk about God being the common good of all creation or as the cause of happiness.

Loving God more than ourselves seems to be part of Sacred Tradition; is it explicit in Sacred Scripture? One could interpret "greatest commandment" (Matthew 22:36-40) as implying this order. It is only implicit in Luke 10:27 -- it must be read into it, from Tradition and perhaps from Matthew 22:37?

It seems that through the theological virtue of Faith we believe that God is more lovable than us or more worthy of love. If pressed for a reason we might talk about His goodness and His relationship to us as Creator to creature. He is the cause, we are the effects, we are subordinate to Him. He is also "greater" in perfection, "better" than us. It seems to me that Aquinas's argument with God as the universal good is a more sophisticated version of this line of reasoning. If asked to give an explanation of the order of charity as it pertains to God, I think many of the faithful could manage an explanation with the sort of amateur theology I've outlined above.

Saturday, February 12, 2011

h2onews.org: The Theologian of the Pontifical Household and Communication

from 2008

Ensemble Organum

Polygenism

Nathan O'Halloran, SJ, Moving forward with polygenism?

I note that the author writes "proved" with scare quotes? The modern scientific method does not provide demonstrations; at best it gives probable arguments, if that. The "epistemological status" is even worse when it's not just a scientific claim (concerning causes and effects) but a historical one as well.

Something from Mark Shea in 2009.
Ite ad Thomam: Garrigou-Lagrange: The Error of Conceiving Mysticism as "Extraordinary"

Center for Thomistic Studies Aquinas Lectures

Thomistica.net: Online Aquinas Lecture from the Center for Thomistic Studies

Thomistica.net includes links to Germain Grisez, “The Restless Heart Blunder” and Msgr. John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Controversy Concerning Unity of Substantial Form in Human Beings”

the archive

Friday, February 11, 2011

Thursday, February 10, 2011

Zenit: PAPAL ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF EDUCATION CONGREGATION
"To Educate Is an Act of Love"

An act of love? To educate is ordered to love, since the act is directed to the perfection of another, but it is not necessarily an act of love. There are plenty of educators who do so not from charity, but from self-love, or love of their own glory, with no consideration for the well-being of his students. Or the raging egomaniac who believes himself to be a prophet, bringing enligthenment to the ignorant masses. He may desire their good, but it is on his terms. There's something wrong about his love, if indeed he has rejected the Holy Spirit.

The office of the teacher bears with it a great burden, as truth is the foundation for right desire.
The educational endeavor seems to have become ever more arduous because, in a culture which too often makes relativism its creed, the light of truth is lacking, more than that, it is considered dangerous to speak of truth, thus instilling doubt on the basic values of personal and community life. Important, because of this, is the service carried out in the world by the numerous formative institutions that are inspired in the Christian vision of man and of reality: to educate is an act of love, exercise of "intellectual charity," which requires responsibility, dedication, consistency of life. The work of your Congregation and the choices you will make in these days of reflection and study will certainly contribute to respond to the present "educational emergency."
Charity is the central virtue for Christian educators, but also for all Christians!

Pope Benedict XVI links theology to the life of prayer:
However, the theologian must not forget that he is also the one who speaks to God. Hence, it is indispensable to have theology closely united with personal and community prayer, especially liturgical prayer. Theology is sciencia fidei and prayer nourishes faith. In the union with God, mystery is, in some way, savored, it comes close, and this proximity is light for the intelligence. I would also like to stress the connection between theology and the other disciplines, considering that it is taught in Catholic Universities and, in many cases, in civil ones. Blessed John Henry Newman spoke of the "circle of knowledge," to indicate that an interdependence exists between the different branches of knowledge; but God is He who has a relationship only with the totality of the real; consequently, to eliminate God means to break the circle of knowledge.
In this perspective, the Catholic universities, with their very precise identity and their openness to the "totality" of the human being, can carry out a valuable work of promoting the unity of knowledge, orienting students and teachers to the Light of the world, "the true light that enlightens every man" (John 1:9). These are considerations that are valid also for Catholic schools. First of all, there must be the courage to proclaim the "great" value of education, to form solid persons able to collaborate with others and to give meaning to their life. Today there is talk of inter-cultural education, object of study also in your Plenary Assembly.

He touches upon what is necessary for those involved with Catholic universities:
Required in this realm is a courageous and innovative fidelity, which is able to combine the clear awareness of one's identity with openness to others, because of the exigencies of living together in multi-cultural societies. Emerging also for this end is the educational role of the teaching of the Catholic religion as scholastic discipline in inter-disciplinary dialogue with others. In fact, this contributes widely not only to the integral development of the student, but also to knowledge of the other, to mutual understanding and respect. To attain such objectives particular attention must be given to the care of the formation of leaders and formators, not only from a professional point of view, but also religious and spiritual, so that, with the consistency of one's life and with personal involvement, the presence of the Christian educator will be expression of the love and witness of the truth.

Tuesday, February 08, 2011

Monday, February 07, 2011

Proportionality in Warfare by Keith Pavlischek

Israel’s efforts to protect itself against Hamas and Hezbollah have been widely criticized in the press for being “disproportionate,” going beyond an eye for an eye. This is a grave misunderstanding of the term, Keith Pavlischek explains, drawing out its true meaning in the tradition of just war theory as a strategy for avoiding harm to noncombatants — an area in which Israel is far more conscientious than its enemies.

Which led me to ask the question, is it morally permissible for an entity to wage 4GW if it is the only way to achieve victory? Or are certain tactics proscribed, e.g. deliberately endangering civilians by blending in with them?

Free?

The New Atlantis: How Can I Possibly Be Free? by Raymond Tallis

Do brain scans prove that free will is an illusion? Are we unfree if we are not entirely self-created? Raymond Tallis exposes the vacuity of these arguments and describes how freedom truly emerges in the development of the human being and through the development of human community.

Saturday, February 05, 2011

Rowman Littlefield

Thomas Cromwell: Machiavellian Statecraft and the English Reformation by J. Patrick Coby

Niccolo Machiavelli: The Laughing Lion and the Strutting Fox by Raymond Angelo Belliotti

How did James Keenan, S.J. land a contract with the company?
Revaluing ethics: Aristotle's dialectical pedagogy By Thomas W. Smith (Google Books)

A review.

James Chastek on Matter

Matter (1) and Matter (2)

From the second part:
Within the context of universal nature, any particular individual is matter. Universal nature moves by cycles, and these cycles are made by the arising of things, and the necessary corruption that is entailed by this. Matter taken in this sense causes time – though not “time” in the sense of an international agreement that a second will be 9 billion or so periods of caesium-133 but in the sense of mode of existence that arises from any particular thing being ordered by an interior impulse of universal nature to be other or something else. Aristotle thought that the last sphere of the heavens was the sole ultimate cause of this “order of any particular nature to being other or something else”, and so he concluded that the one motion of this sphere was the cause of one time. The theory fell through in its particulars, but the general structure of the argument remains: if the activity of one thing is the reason for why all particular natures are matter, then one time would arise from it; and if one activity of one thing is not responsible for this, then there would be as many times as there are actions of universal nature.

William T. Cavanaugh on the Modern Nation-State

Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State is not the Keeper of the Common Good (pdf)

I agree with his conclusions regarding the modern nation-state. He seems to believe that its power should be limited, and I would agree with that. I disagree with him on what he says about the origin of the state (government) and the nature of politics as a science:

In Christian social ethics the assumption is often made, with a minimum of examination, that the responsibility for promoting and protecting the common good falls to the state. In this essay I want to examine that assumption. All too often Christian social ethics begins from ahistorical and idealized assumptions about the state as protector and benefactor. They are ahistorical because they assume that the state has been with us since biblical times. The state, as Charles Curran says, is “natural and necessary” and “based on creation”.2 It takes different forms—polis for Aristotle, regimen principum for Aquinas—but these different terms refer to the same essential reality; all historical forms of political community are conflated into the term “state”.3 These accounts are also idealized because they assume that society is prior to the state and broader than the state. Human society is represented as a pyramid: the family is at the base, other groups and associations are in the middle, and the state is at the top to coordinate and protect. The base has “ontological priority” to the state and calls forth the state to be at its service. Furthermore, “Society is broader than the state and includes much more.”4 The state is just one limited part of society, but is established in nature with an important role to play: “the end or purpose of the state or government [is] the pursuit of the common good”.5

What I find unhelpful about such accounts is the way that they float free from any empirical testing of their theses. Christian ethicists will commonly recognize that, in a sinful world, particular states always fall short of the ideal. Nevertheless, the ideal is presented not merely as a standard for Christian political practice but as a statement of fact: the state in its essential form simply is that agency of society whose purpose it is to protect and promote

the common good, even if particular states do not always live up to that responsibility. This conclusion is based on a series of assumptions of fact: that the state is natural and primordial, that society gives rise to the state and not vice-versa, and that the state is one limited part of society. These assumptions of fact, however, are often made without any attempt to present historical evidence on their behalf.

Certainly the study of history will aid those who wish to criticize the modern nation-state. While what Aristotle or others say about the genesis of political communities may be without sufficient evidence, an account such as Aristotle's does not consist of historical claims alone. The claims that are made regarding governing of a political community may make use of assertions about history as illustrations, but they are not dependent upon them? It only needs to be shown that people desire to live in society with others for the sake of friendship, and society also serves to bring about other goods.

Does some version of the naturalistic fallacy apply to attempts to bridge normative and descriptive "sciences" or "disciplines"? And is this what someone like Aristotle is trying to do, borrowing premises from a descriptive discipline (whether it be history or anthropology) to argue for certain norms? I think rather, it is the use of the historical imagination to show how certain norms have been instantiated in the past. There may be variation in the forms of government and in the goods that are being sought, but certain aspects of political [goal-oriented] reasoning are universal? I think the claim that he takes to be of fact (the purpose of the state, i.e. the government) is really a normative claim. I do not believe that Aristotle or Aquinas link the claim about the nature and purpose of government with "other assumptions of fact," even if it is the case that this is what Charles Curran does.


Started on July 31, 2010 at 5:38 PM.

What a straw man fallacy is not.

Fallacy: Straw Man
Logical Fallacy: Straw Man
Straw man - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Fallacies [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

The fallacy is imputing an argument to someone that isn't his, and then refuting it.

One needs to be wary of reading too much into someone's remarks; opponents may even deliberately misinterpret those remarks for the sake of rhetorical effectiveness with the audience.

The fallacy is not the same as debating an imaginary opponent to illustrate a point, so long as one is not falsely attributing the argument to anyone participating in the debate. It is also not the same as drawing out an implication from the premises that are accepted by the other side--but one should demonstrate that this is what logically obtains, if the other side does not realize it.

One must take care in identifying fallacies. As in all arguments, one should support one's point; in this case by showing how the argument is a fallacy, rather than resorting to mere assertion based on one's own authority.

When I was at Christendom one of the professors told us to avoid talking of "isms." I might elaborate on that advice some time in connection with the transformation of academic philosophy into genealogy. (I haven't tired of that critique yet.)

Temporal Happiness

Returning to an old post, I ask once again: What is temporal happiness? Is it identical to what might be called imperfect participation in happiness by Aquinas? Or is it the imperfect happiness that we can attain by our natural powers alone?* I suppose "temporal happiness" could be used to refer to either, depending on the speaker.

However, some authors, such as Henri Grenier (see the comments to that post), use "temporal happiness" to name the end of civil society. Was the use of temporal happiness in this way begun by neo-Thomists? Or can it be found in earlier Thomistic commentators? I need a Dominican Thomist to be my personal reference librarian.

For the neo-Thomists, does one's temporal good consist of the necessities of life, as well as health/life? Or are these understood as instruments for the sake of activity? I would suspect the latter --these instruments would then be necessary conditions for virtuous activity, but not sufficient conditions, obviously. I think the listing of  habits  (e.g. knowledge) and quasi-habits (e.g. family) as a good constitutive of happiness is a recent "development" (perhaps most prominent among New Natural Law theorists?) and involves a certain confusion about the meanings of the word "good" and how the analogous use of good is related to desire and practical reason. Are the NNL theorists just following the example of Aquinas? If happiness is convertible with both ends and goods, and it is defined as an activity by those who follow Aristotle, then can a habit or quasi-habit said to be an end or good in the same way an activity can? Is what Aquinas writes about how the precepts of the Natural Law are derived incorrect or in need of clarification? More on that later.

If temporal happiness is identified in this way, it can then be distinguished from the supernatural end or good (spiritual good?) of man. I suppose calling the supernatural good a "spiritual" good is misleading, as virtue and the temporal good are primarily goods of the soul. A related question then: Why shouldn't the Church have care of the temporal good as well as the "supernatural good"?


*I cannot say that this imperfect happiness is identical to the natural end/good of the neo-thomists. I don't understand the controversy over nature/supernature, the natural desire of man to see God, etc. well enough to say anything at this point. I do plan on getting a copy of Feingold's The Natural Desire to see God According to St. Thomas and His Interpreters. (Sapientia Press has also published that collection of essays, Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of the Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought.)

I still have to finish reading Dennis Bradley's Aquinas on the Two-Fold Human Good (a review; Google Books).

Related:

entelechy, energeia, eudaimonia


Begun on July 15, 2010 at 12:41 AM.

CYA

"This website and its content, unless otherwise stated or given with an acknowledgement of its source, is copyright of T. Chan. All rights reserved."

This blog is intended to help those who are in pursuit of knowledge. However, I would ask that if you seek to use the material presented here in a published form other than the Internet that you contact me either by leaving a comment on the relevant post or by e-mail. Thank you!

*This statement has now been revised.*

10 Big Myths about copyright explained

John Kyparissiotes's Decades

Don't miss Peter Gilbert's translation of John Kyparissiotes's Decades.

Being a Disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Pursuit of Wisdom

Being a Disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Pursuit of Wisdom

The lecture by Fr. Dewan at Christendom has now been uploaded, so you can listen to it here if you don't have access to iTunes or don't want to take the trouble to download it through iTunes.

Friday, February 04, 2011

The Dominican Province of St. Joseph: Consumed by the Holy Mysteries of this Great Sacrament
A Homily by Archbishop Augustine Di Noia, O.P.

Thursday, February 03, 2011

Certitude and Evidence

ML asked a question on FB about defining fact and opinion, and after posting a brief response there I see this post by James Chastek: The evident.

I wrote on FB that I'd look at self-evidence as being one criterion for distinguishing the two, along with the notion of certitude. I also added that the modern distinction between fact and opinion does not correspond to the distinction between knowledge and opinion in "realist" epistemology. I also asked whether to accept the distinction between fact and opinion is not too much of a concession to modern empiricists.

I should have added that the main problem between the distinction between fact and opinion is that it is commonly presented as a dichotomy, which is not true. Some facts (i.e. that which is observable) can be known by those who are present to observe it, but others who believe such facts to be true do not have knowledge of it, only opinion or belief (and if they rely on the testimony of someone whom they trust, it is faith).

Solidarity vs. Identity

Solidarity, if it is identical to social justice or perhaps benevolence, pertains to the will, while identity pertains to the intellect. The exercise of solidarity is dependent upon how one's identity, which is admittedly "subjective," in that people can identify themselves in various ways and think that each way of determining their identity is correct relative to the moral agent. But in answer to the question of "Who am I?" in relation to moral reasoning, we should look not at what is relatively insignificant (what are our pastimes or "interests" are), but firstly the role we play in creation [our function, narrowly conceived]. This role is tied to our understanding of our family (including lineage), relations with friends and associates, community, and people.

I remember someone else in the PhD program writing her dissertation on role-centered morality, but from more of an "analytic" perspective--I don't know if she is trying to turn her dissertation into a book (or if she's still in academics). If roles are so important, why didn't the medievals talk about them? Because their moral theology  already presupposes an understanding of roles and related precepts (see Aquinas's discussion of the virtues related to justice and the order of charity)--there wasn't a need to write an explicit account of roles and duties. (As Fr. Cessario once said in class, "The medievals didn't have to talk about community; they lived it.")  This understanding of roles is covered, implicity if not explicitly (at least not as far as I remember) in Dr. Fleming's The Morality of Everyday Life (a review here).

For us Americans, the acquisition of a "role-centered" morality is necessary for a deepening of our understanding of the lay vocation.
Zenit: ON THE BEATITUDES AS A PROGRAM OF LIFE
"Teaching That Comes From Above and Touches the Human Condition"

Tuesday, February 01, 2011

The St. Croix Review -- I received a solicitation from them last year, but I didn't subscribe due to lack of funds and sufficient interest. I gather it is a conservative publication, but how conservative?

Monday, January 31, 2011

Christendom: World-Renowned Thomist Dewan Delivers Lecture

The lecture can be downloaded from the Christendom itunes account.

New Theories Reveal the Nature of Numbers

(via ML)

Sunday, January 30, 2011

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Fr. Michael Sherwin, O.P., Annual Aquinas Lecture - Blackfriars, Oxford

Blackfriars

If Love it is ... from Blackfriars Hall on Vimeo.

(via GodzDogz)
Zenit: Papal Greeting to Orthodox-Catholic Commission
"Christians Need to Work Together in Mutual Acceptance and Trust" [2011-01-28]
Jeffrey Polet reviews Alasdair MacIntyre's God, Philosophy, Universities.

Thursday, January 27, 2011

Zenit: Cardinal Piacenza's Address to Priestly Celibacy Congress
"The Teaching of the Pontiffs From Pius XI to Benedict XVI"

Wednesday, January 26, 2011

Monday, January 24, 2011

A Form of the Ad Hom?

The psychological analysis fallacy? The psychoanalysis fallacy? The pop psychology fallacy?

1. Opponent A is x (some trait, e.g. callous, or does not feel some emotion).
2. Being x is bad. Or it is an indicator of the lack of mental health. Hence, opponent A is not rational.
3. Therefore his arguments are false.

It seems to be a form of the ad hominem fallacy, but could also be considered to be a form of "poisoning the well" too?

Sunday, January 23, 2011

Christopher Thompson, Towards a Green Thomism

Towards a Green Thomism
From Conservation to Consecration: Towards a Green Thomism
by Dr. Christopher J. Thompson

(Originally published in Homiletic & Pastoral Review. Via Insight Scoop)

Saturday, January 22, 2011

Aquinas Lecture at St. Vincent Ferrer Church by Fr. Pius Pietrzyk, O.P.

Fr. Thomas Petri, O.P., will offer the annual Aquinas lecture at St. Vincent Ferrer Church in New York City. The lecture is entitled, "The Light of St. Thomas on the Theology of the Body". The lecture will be held at St. Vincent Church (66th & Lexington) on Tuesday, January 25, 2011 at 7:00pm. The lecture is free and open to the public.

(source)
Christendom: World-Renowned Thomistic Philosopher to Deliver Lecture
January 21, 2011

"Lawrence Dewan, O.P., a world-renowned Thomistic philosopher, will be giving a lecture on Friday, January 28 at 4 p.m. The talk, entitled Being a Disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas, will be held in the Chapel Crypt."

Friday, January 21, 2011

William Oddie, The call for a new Syllabus of Errors, this time on Vatican II, should be heeded (via Fr. Z)

The text of the address by Bishop Athanasius Schneider (via Fr. Z and Rorate Caeli)

If such a syllabus were to come out, I do not think it would be issued before negotiations with the SSPX ended?

Now in paperback: Wretched Aristotle

Wretched Aristotle: Using the Past to Rescue the Future by Jude Dougherty

Thursday, January 20, 2011

John Searle lecture at the DSPT

From October last year.

Q&A

His webpage.
Faculty page.
Philosopher John Searle Reflects on Half Century at Berkeley


Leiter Reports, 2010: John Searle (Berkeley) Elected to American Philosophical Society
Philosophy of Mind Podcast

DSPT: Aquinas Lecture 2011

Fr. Bryan Kromholtz, OP "The Dead in Christ Will Rise: Thomas Aquinas and Current Ideas on the Time of the Resurrection"
Wednesday, March 2, 2011, 7:30 pm at the Dominican School of Philosophy & Theology

Previous lectures, including last year's:
DSPT Aquinas Lecture, March 3rd, 2010
"Christ and Israel: An Unresolved Question in Catholic Theology"
- presented by Bruce Marshall, PhD

Tyranny and consent of the governed

Thomistica.net notes that some articles have become available at Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism, including one by Michael Pakaluk (Aristotle, Natural Law, and the Founders) and Christopher Tollefsen (New Natural Law Theory). The last appears to be an abridged version of his essay for Lyceum. There is also this piece by Paul Sigmund, Ockham to Hooker: Late Medieval Transformations of Natural Law.

Ah, the Liberal innovations in natural law... something I still need to study further.

Sigmund writes:

Hooker argues that human reason can discover the existence of God and our moral obligations to others, who are “our equals in nature.” “In those times wherein there were no civil societies,” (when Locke quotes this passage, he adds “i.e, in the state of nature”), men were bound by the natural and divine law “even as they are men.” In order to resolve the conflicts that result from self-interest and partiality, men agree to establish government, and because they are all equal this requires the consent of all. This consent, once given by the community, is binding on subsequent generations, a striking difference from the individual consent to majority rule given by the participants in the social contract in Locke’s Second Treatise. Hooker also argues that, in the English case, consent was given to an established church, an institution that Locke rejects in his Letter on Toleration (1685). Therein he argues that true religion must be based on the individual conscience rather than governmental coercion.
Does it make sense for liberal democrats to talk of consent, rather than acquiescence? If one's forefathers made the decision and one has duties to the community one is born into, as well as affection, then one shouldn't have much of a choice about the community. If a government is tyrannical but cannot be overthrown, then do those who suffer under its rule and reject it consent? Or acquiesce? Is a tyrannical government legitimate? Does it have the "right" to rule (as opposed to having power or coercive force)? Should an illegitimate government be obeyed? (Does the virtue of obedience come into play rather than prudence?)

If someone is unjustly deprived of political power or citizenship, what recourse does he have, should he nonetheless obey the government? Is his aspiration to change the government or constitution wrong in itself (as opposed to being wrong because it is against prudence)? Is respect for custom/law a sufficient reason to prevent a polity from changing from one constitution to another (as might seem justified when more and more members of succeeding generations are virtuous and deigned worthy of citizenship)?

Hooker's theory on the origin of government is echoed later by someone else -- the first name that popped up in my head was Calhoun, but that's not quite right. Of whom am I thinking? It's actually John Finnis, and I'll have to double-check to see if this is common among liberal theorists.

There is so much more to investigate...

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

All is connected



The German physicist Hans-Peter Düerr talks about connectiveness. Interviewed by Helena Norberg-Hodge. Filmed by Constantin Dumba

Parts 2, 3, 4, 5

Reductionism? Or analogy? I'll have to watch the videos.

I am reminded of Empedocles teaching concerning the two basic forces of the universe, love and strife--I think this has been repeated by someone more recent?

OUP is having a 20% off sale

Until February 28, 2011. Promo Code: 28913 for Theology, 28904 for Philosophy, 28911 for Politics & International Relations.

My wish list:
The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy
A. Edward Siecienski

J. M. Hussey, Andrew Louth

Some other books to examine:
Reclaiming Conservatism: How a Great American Political Movement Got Lost--And How It Can Find Its Way Back
Mickey Edwards

There is a paperback edition of The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas by Fr. Gilles Emery, O.P.
James Chastek, De Koninck and Contraception

Monday, January 17, 2011

Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism (via Mirror of Justice)

Christopher Kaczor's tribute to Ralph McInerny

And What's More . . (via Mirror of Justice)
Acting Reasonable: Democracy, Authority, and Natural Rights in the Thought of Jacques Maritain by Brian Jones, M.A.
(via Insight Scoop)

"It seems that the Rowland/Schindler argument against "rights talk" (as well as other aspects of current social and political thought) is rooted in a misunderstanding of St. Thomas's teaching on man's two ends. Maritain actually seems to be more faithful to the Thomistic understanding of man's natural end, along with providing legitimacy to the temporal order, which would have tremendous effects then in the realm of culture and social/political philosophy. Maritain's work is truly Thomistic because he makes distinctions in order to unite."

I think this may be a oversimplification of Rowland and Schindler, but I just gave away the copy of Rowland that was most handy, so I can't support it at this point. But I think it is a mistake to identify man's natural end with the temporal good (or the political common good), if that is what the author is doing here.

As for the use of the word democracy -- I'll have to read Maritain on this point. But using democracy (as opposed to polity) to name any good constitution/form of government seems to strain the word too much, if this is indeed what Maritain does.

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Physics as Metaphysics by Mark Vernon
Is there a quantum spirituality?

"Permanent deacons are deacons."

Pertinacious Papist passes on some links concerning a thesis put forth by Dr. Edward Peters regarding the obligation to celibacy for all deacons. If the thesis is correct and the obligation is restated, that would close the "cheat" for Catholic men who are tempted to seek the "best of both worlds."
History Professor Shannon Awarded 2010 Best Essay Prize

Dr. Shannon's essay, ""From History to Traditions: A New Paradigm of Pluralism in the Study of the Past" was published in Historically Speaking.
Thomas Aquinas & Contemporary Scholarship
Inaugural Philosophy Workshop

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Eighth Day Books sponsoring two symposia

January 29: Imagination & Soul: Harry Potter, Twilight and Spiritual Formation with John Granger
February 12: Patristics Symposium: On the Tree of the Cross, The Patristic Doctrine of the Atonement

More information.
Thomistica.net: Program for an Ave Maria conference in honor of Ralph McInerny (update)

Haldane and Lee (and George) and ensoulment

I'm not posting any really new material here, just summarizing what I have written in other posts.

John Haldane and Patrick Lee are probably correct in their criticism of Pasnau's application of Aquinas to contemporary embryology. (See their followup.) I'm not going to read those parts carefully. They are correct to emphasize that development (not just growth but organization/differentiation of organs) is caused by the conceptum itself, and not by something external to it. Development it is a natural operation of the conceptum.
You'll find the same sort of argumentation in the pieces written collaboratively by Lee and Robert George, and probably in George and Christopher Tollefsen's book Embryo (which I haven't had the chance to read yet).

But I would argue that development occurs in other animals as well and cannot be attributed to the rational soul alone. One cannot claim absolutely that a rational soul is present at conception, when the presence of a sensitive soul could explain what is taking place.

To clarify what I had written previously: I don't think that the medieval understanding that there is a succession of forms--vegetative, sensitive, rational--as the embryo is formed from without can be maintained. I use "sensitive"  here to distinguish the rational soul from the nonrational souls of other animals. Nor do I think one can rule out a priori with good reason that the rational soul is infused at birth. But one cannot establish the presence of the rational soul either, since there is the absence of rational activity (and the organs required for that activity). The conceptum does have the power in itself to generate those organs ("the brain and nervous system"), but this power in itself does not mean that it possess a rational soul, unless one argues additionally that only a rational soul can bring about the development of organs that are proportioned to the intellect, etc. But what does the rational soul as form of the body have in addition to what is possessed by a sensitive soul that could conceivably develop the embryo into a specifically human body? Even if it is the case that the human sense organs are very different from those of any other animal, this does not mean it is impossible for a sensitive a sensitive soul to generate those organs.

Still, a theological argument based on what the Church's teachings on the Incarnation can be made that the soul is infused at conception, but this will not convince non-believers. I tend to think that changing the laws regarding abortion on the Federal level will never happen. (And it seems unlikely to me that the Federal government will ever let this issue devolve back to the states.) With the refusal of traditional morality regarding sexuality and marriage, the culture and its institutions of many areas and states cannot but have abortion as a legitimate act for women. In those places, for a law against abortion to take hold, many other changes must be implemented. These changes are so great and encompassing that one can speak of the necessity of their people to be converted without exaggeration. Some states may be more sympathetic to stricter abortion laws, but their culture may be changing at a rapid places.

Go Bishop Athanasius Schneider, Go!

Sandro Magister, A New Syllabus for the 21st Century
That is, a document condemning mistaken interpretations of Vatican Council II. It's been requested by a bishop of Kazakhstan, at a conference in Rome with other bishops and cardinals. Also prompting reactions is the announcement by Benedict XVI of a new interreligious meeting in Assisi

(via the Western Confucian)

Wednesday, January 12, 2011

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

More on Dignity

Joe Carter offers a response to Robert T. Miller's Two Bases of Morality in Catholic Theology.

Is the concept of dignity convertible with the "good"? Is it an adequate foundation for understanding the virtue of caritas? Mr. Miller notes that the New Natural Law theorists make use of "human dignity" in their argumentation, and I agree with him. I also agree with the substance of his argument, especially on this point:

In particular, the concept of human dignity lacks definite content: It implies that we must treat others with respect, but it does not tell us which kinds of treatment are respectful and which not.26 The formula that we must treat human beings always as ends and never merely as means is similarly empty. It does not justify any particular set of moral norms because it tells us nothing about what kind of treatment is consistent with treating a person as an end and not a mere means.27 For that matter, it does not provide a clear account of what it means to say that we are treating a person as an end or a means. If I hire a prostitute to give me sexual pleasure, these moralists will say that I have treated her as a means, but if I hire a masseuse to give me non-sexual physical pleasure, they say that I have treated her as an end, for this latter transaction is morally licit. Whence the difference, since in both cases I have participated in a voluntary transaction in order that I have a pleasant sense experience? As far as I can see, the theologians who rely on the concept of human dignity have no basis to distinguish these cases.

NNL theorists have difficulties explaining the virtue of justice and its associated acts based on human dignity alone. But an extended development of this claim will have to wait until I finish my project.

Aquinas Lecture 2010 by Matthew Levering



Aquinas Institute of Theology

The Sacramental Body of the Eucharist

The Sacramental Body of the Eucharist from Province of Saint Joseph on Vimeo.

No access to this article for me.

There has been some discussion of this post on abortion, the human soul, and the question of ensoulment. While Googling for confirmation by other scholars of what I remembered about Aquinas, I found this article:

"Aquinas's Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations" by Jason T. Eberl

If I were an academic I would check it out (and I'd be able to get access it if the school library were decent; it's probably accessible at BC).

Some thoughts on Haldane and Lee (plus this) on ensoulment to come. I should read De Potentia all the way through, since I haven't done so before.

Monday, January 10, 2011

Forgot this

Also from CUA:
Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life
Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering, eds.

I was reminded of this book by Fr. Pius Pietrzyk, O.P.

Also of interest to me from the Fall/Winter 2010/2011 Catalog:
Bourdin, Bernard / The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State
Benestad, J. Brian / Church, State, and Society (gotta check out what he says about sovereignty)
Hittinger, John P. / The Vocation of the Catholic Philosopher
Leinsle, Ulrich G. / Introduction to Scholastic Theology
Lombardo, Nicholas E. O.P. / The Logic of Desire
Rhonheimer, Martin / The Perspective of Morality

Canty, Aaron / Light and Glory, The Transfiguration of Christ in Early Franciscan and Dominican Theology

Hrm, written in honor of a Jesuit patristic scholar:
Rombs, Ronnie J. / Tradition and the Rule of Faith in the Early Church

Inspired by MacIntyre? Tarpley, Joyce Kerr / Constancy and the Ethics of Jane Austen's Mansfield Park

Something on Maritain's philosophy of beauty: Trapani Jr., John G. / Poetry, Beauty, and Contemplation


The latest collection of essays from the American Maritain Association's annual meeting: Colvert, Gavin / The Renewal of Civilization

The following collection of essays might not be worth full price:
Zaborowski, Holger / Natural Moral Law in Contemporary Society

The River Forest School

One more comment from Mr. Aversa that got caught by Blogger, this time in response to "Stephen Barr on science and metaphysics":

The River Forest school is still active.


From Edward Feser's "The Thomistic Tradition (part 1)" (vide also part 2):


This approach emphasizes the Aristotelian foundations of Aquinas’s philosophy, and in particular the idea that the construction of a sound metaphysics must be preceded by a sound understanding of natural science, as interpreted in light of an Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Accordingly, it is keen to show that modern physical science can and should be given such an interpretation. Charles De Koninck (1906-1965), James A. Weisheipl (1923-1984), William A. Wallace, and Benedict Ashley are among its representatives. It is sometimes called “Laval Thomism” after the University of Laval in Quebec [which produced this brilliant thesis: Thomism and Mathematical Physics], where De Koninck was a professor. The alternative label “River Forest Thomism” derives from a suburb of Chicago, the location of the Albertus Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science, whose members are associated with this approach. It is also sometimes called “Aristotelian Thomism” (to highlight its contrast with Gilson’s brand of existential Thomism) though since Neo-Scholastic Thomism also emphasizes Aquinas’s continuity with Aristotle, this label seems a bit too proprietary. (There are writers, like the contemporary Thomist Ralph McInerny, who exhibit both Neo-Scholastic and Laval/River Forest influences, and the approaches are not necessarily incompatible.)


See also:
River Forest Thomism
Scholasticism in Empiriological Sciences
The Modeling of Nature by William Wallace, O.P.
The Way toward Wisdom by Benedict Ashley, O.P.

Some general notes for the readers:

Fr. Wallace is getting along in years; the same is true of Fr. Ashley. I had heard from one of Fr. Wallace's students that he was writing another book on natural philosophy,but I do not know if this will ever be completed and published.

Science, Philosophy, and Theology in the Thomistic Tradition by William A. Wallace, O.P.
Benedict Ashley on Atheists

It would appear that Fr. Ashley's Theologies of the Body, Humanist and Christian is no longer in print?


"How the University of Chicago Opened My American Mind" from The Lumen Christi Institute on Vimeo.

The successors to the Laval School can be found in various institutions, such as Thomas Aquinas College or the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota. (The latter less so, with the retirement of Richard Berquist and the department's recruitment of faculty not formed in the tradition.) Many TAC alumni who have PhDs can be found all over the country; many end up returning to TAC to become a tutor. The influence of the River Forest school appears to have peaked in the '60s, and the various faculty members were given other assignments after Vatican II. There is a short history written by Fr. Ashley on the River Forest school. During the '50s the River Forest school would hold conferences where philosophers and scientists would discuss various topics pertaining to the philosophy of nature and philosophy of science. I don't think anything comparable has been done since, though the Institute for the Study of Nature has attempted to revive this. (Unfortunately, ISN was unable to have its planned conference in 2010 because of various difficulties.)

I don't know if Fr. Weisheipl was able to form any disciples within the tradition while he was at UoT.

His THE REVIVAL OF THOMISM: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY.
Philosophy and the God of Abraham: essays in memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP By James A. Weisheipl, Raymond James Long

While the pursuit a dialectical inquiry into contemporary science may be a worthwhile (even salvific) endeavor for Dominicans and some others, I think that we will not see its fruits widely disseminated any time soon. And perhaps we do not deserve them, as I will explain in another post.

CUA Press, Spring and Summer 2011

CUA Press is scheduled to publish The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God by Gilles Emery, O.P. and translated by Matthew Levering (no webpage yet). It is not quite clear to me from the description in the catalog how the content of this book differs from other books by Fr. Emery in English translation: Trinity in Aquinas and The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas -- it seems to deal more with the sources of Church doctrine on the Most Holy Trinity before giving a "synthetic exposition of the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in their divine being and mutual relations, and in their action for us," and ending "with a doctrinal exposition of the 'missions' of the Son and the Holy Spirit, that is, the salvific sending of the Son and Holy Spirit that leads humankind to the contemplation of the Father." (And so CUA Press has gone down the path of PCness, at least in their catalogs--I do not know if this has affected the editing of the texts.)

So less Aquinas (though the book is undoubtedly Thomistic)?

Other titles of interest to me:
Christ our Hope: An Introduction to Eschatology, by Paul O'Callaghan
Understanding Language: A Guide for Beginning Students of Greek and Latin, by Douglas Fairbairn
Papal Justice: Subjects and Courts in the Papal State, 1500-1750 by Irene Fosi

Already in publication:
New paperback editions of Medieval Church Law and the Origins of the Western Legal Tradition: A Tribute to Kenneth Pennington, edited by Wolfgang P. Müller and Mary E. Sommar and Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition by Christopher Kaczor, and Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas, edited by Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering

Sunday, January 09, 2011

Mr. Alan Aversa has attempted twice to write a comment for the post "Reductionism in Contemporary Science" but it has not shown up, so I am posting it here:

St. Thomas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics really helps clear this up: Are All the Classes of Causes Studied by One Science or by Many?. Mathematics, e.g., does not treat of final causes, and modern physics (mathematical physics) is a combination of physica and mathematics; it is a scientia media (See Replies to 6 and 7 of his Division and methods of the sciences; also In II Phys. lect. 3, n. 8Summa Theol. 2-2.9.2, ad 3@m (3rd reply); In I Post Anal. lect. 25, n. 2.). Mathematical physics is "formally mathematical and materially physical." 

I suspect that it has been eaten up by Blogger as spam because of the embedded links.

Edit. He also added this comment, which is also not being published for whatever reason, to my second post on Stephen Barr:
Read St. Thomas Aquinas's De Mixtione Elementorum and the Thomist article on it: "Elemental Virtual Presence in St. Thomas" by Christopher Decaen. 
Thanks!