Concilium v. Communio

CWR Dispatch: Joseph Ratzinger, Theological Reformer by George Weigel
(Also published at First Things.)

As I wrote in The Irony of Modern Catholic History, a fissure in the ranks of the reformist theologians at Vatican II began to open up during the Council’s third session, held in the fall of 1964. A new theological journal, Concilium, was being planned by some of the Council’s influential theological advisers (many of whom had been heavily censored in the pre-Vatican II years). A towering figure among them, the French Jesuit Henri de Lubac, began to worry that Concilium would take the reformist project in a deconstructive direction: one that would do serious damage to what John XXIII, in his opening address to the Council, called “the sacred deposit of Christian doctrine,” which Pope John urged “be more effectively defended and presented.”
  
The first several issues of the new journal intensified de Lubac’s concerns. So in May 1965 the most venerable member of its editorial committee quietly withdrew from the Concilium project while continuing his work at the Council itself. As Vatican II drew to a close, others would join him in expressing serious reservations about the tack being taken by their onetime theological allies. And those concerns did not lessen over time.  

The result was what I call in my book “The War of the Conciliar Succession”: the war to define what Vatican II was and what Vatican II intended for the Catholic future. This war was not a struggle between “traditionalists” and “progressives.” It was a bitterly fought contest within the camp of Vatican II theological reformers. It continues to this day. And the question that so concerned Henri de Lubac remains entirely pertinent, 56 years later: Would an interpretation of the Council that effectively set the Catholic Church against “the sacred deposit of Christian doctrine” end up betraying the gospel and emptying it of its power?  

Joseph Ratzinger joined de Lubac and other dissident conciliar reformers in launching another theological journal, Communio, which he and his colleagues hoped would advance an interpretation of Vatican II that was in continuity with the Church’s settled doctrine even as it developed the Church’s understanding of that doctrine. Communio, now published in 14 language editions, has been a creative force in Catholic intellectual life for decades. Like Ratzinger, Communio is not against Vatican II; it has challenged what its authors contend is a wrongheaded interpretation of Vatican II.

Only one group was engaged in true reform, though in a wrong-headed way by employing the council to do it. Would  it be accurate to say the progressives were leaning towards heresy or had embraced it? Or were they guilty of an archaeologistic thinking that reflected a historical reality that existed only in their imagination? (Simplicity, the Eucharist as Last Supper, and all that?)

Agrapha

Pope Francis on Tradition

The pope who is "not a theologian" and apparently it shows.

CWR: The Idea of Tradition in Querida Amazonia by Eduardo Echeverria

Pope Francis leaves unspoken the relation of Tradition to the normative Scriptures, the Sacraments and Liturgy, creeds and confessions, councils, the theological exposition of the Church’s dogmas and doctrine, and the magisterium of the Church.

More on the Development of Doctrine

CWR: The Spirit versus the letter: Responding to a false view of doctrinal development by Eduardo Echeverria

Sergio Centofanti’s recent essay for Vatican News claims that the Church teaches, “It is necessary to follow the Spirit, rather than the strict letter.” This opposition could not be further from the truth.

I am not of course suggesting that there is not development. But there is development without change even when there is reversal in Church teaching. Centofanti completely overlooks the distinctions between development, continuity, change, and reversal. He focuses on examples of reversals (unbaptized babies, the exegesis of 1 Timothy 11-12 regarding the place of woman in the Church, and religious liberty) but never refers to the theological notes that qualify certain teachings as infallible such that they possess the highest degree of certainty. This means that he fails to account for development, clarifications, reformulations, while nevertheless maintaining the stable continuity of fundamental meaning and truth of authoritative dogmas/doctrines. I will return to this point below.

But does Echeverria make enough distinctions between theological opinion (even if it is of the bishop of Rome) and dogma? Let us look at the two examples of reversals: religious liberty and ecumenism. Was religious liberty (or anything pertaining to the political community and the laws that it may or may not issue) part of Divine Revelation? No -- religious liberty, like contemporary Roman Catholic Social Teaching, pertains to moral theology, and so papal theological opinion on this point isn't "reversed" as if it were dogmatic (even if some Latins think it is) but contradicted.

As for ecumenism -- precepts concerning whom to admit to worship, or with whom one can pray is more a human determination that is (ecclesiastical) positive law than a precept of Divine Law, something taking into consideration goods secondary to God Himself. And so in so far as we are dealing with ecclesiastical positive law, that can be changed. As for human judgments as to who is a heretic or schismatic, those judgments can be erroneous and are not protected by an Latin notion of infallibility.

In order for theories of doctrinal development to be taken seriously, we must talk about doctrine, what constitutes doctrines, whether there are levels of doctrine, and if historically what has been understood to be doctrine was mistaken.

When Papal Positivism Replaces Tradition

Is it linked to the Jesuits, and what St. Ignatius of Loyola recommended in his Spiritual Exercises? "We should always be prepared so as never to err to believe that what I see as white is black, if the hierarchical Church defines it thus."

Robert Fastiggi:

7. Feser’s rejection of the new teaching of the Church on the death penalty is in direct violation of what Lumen Gentium, 25 teaches about the need to adhere to teachings of the ordinary papal Magisterium “with religious submission of mind and will.” His rejection also violates canon 752 of the 1983 CIC and no. 892 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Feser and his followers do not seem to understand the “argument from authority” that applies to teachings of the ordinary papal magisterium and judgments of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Catholics who support the new formulation of CCC 2267 are being faithful Catholics. Prof. Feser’s attempt to put such faithful Catholics and the Pope on the defensive suggests that he believes he has more authority than the Roman Pontiff. If he has difficulty accepting the Church’s new teaching on the death penalty he should, in a spirit of humility, make every effort to understand the teaching “with an evangelical spirit and with a profound desire to resolve his difficulties” (CDF, Donum, Vertiatis, 30). I have no difficulty with the new teaching. I hope and pray that Prof. Feser and his followers will overcome their difficulties.

Again, Fastiggi does not realize that he undermines his own case if his claim that capital punishment is a defined [Roman Catholic] dogma is true. If it isn't, then it isn't part of Tradition and any claim pertaining to its moral goodness or evil or permissibility must be a conclusion of moral theology and evaluated in accordance with the logic of sound reasoning. Justifying a claim based on an appeal to the person who said it or his authority (in this case, Pope Francis) would be an appeal to authority, as his authority does not extend to competence with respect to matters of moral theology per se. Perhaps Fastiggi is too attached to his own Latin opinions regarding the role of the pope to realize this.

Regardless of where they stand on various issues, Latins, traditionalists, "conservatives," or "progressives" will not let go of their belief in the [exaggerated] authority of the pope.

Three Questions for Feser's Critics on the Question of Capital Punishment

CWR: Three questions for Catholic opponents of capital punishment by Dr. Edward Feser

When one reads Pope Francis’s statements about the death penalty carefully, it turns out to be difficult to interpret them in a way that would make assent to them binding on Catholics.

Is There an Ur Tradition?

Had time to look up something that I had been considering but had put aside.

Latin polemics against Orthodox tradition on divorce and remarriage generally focus exclusively on the Byzantines, arguing that the tradition was a human innovation arising from capitulation to human weakness and state pressure or accomodation. Those polemicists do not look at divorce and remarriage within the Oriental Orthodox and Assyrian Churches.

So I took a quick look -- it appears that there is ecclesiastical divorce (and remarriage) in at least the Assyrian, Armenian, Syro-Malankara/Syriac Orthodox, and Coptic Churches. So how would the Latins respond to that? Most likely: "Only Rome has maintained the purity of the Apostolic Tradition, because the pope is the sucessor of St. Peter!"

Is the origin of the Latin tradition on divorce and remarriage linked to the origin of the Latin tradition on clerical continence/celibacy? Latin polemicists, again: "Apostolic Tradition!"


Related: NEW BOOK – Divorce and Remarriage in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition
Oikonomia, Divorce and Remarriage in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition by Rev. Dr. Kevin Schembri (an article published in Melita Theologica)

Related: Divorce and Remarriage of Orthodox Copts in Egypt: The 2008 State Council Ruling and the Amendment of the 1938 Personal Status Regulations by Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron

Questions on Authority in Liturgy

From "Reflections on authority in liturgy today" by Dom Alcuin Reid:

Earlier I asserted that there was a disturbing issue in respect of Pope Pius XII’s exegesis of the premise lex orandi, lex credendi in Mediator Dei whereby he asserts that it is the rule of belief which determines the rule of prayer, and not the other way around. When this was published in 1947 the dangers inherent in this reversal may not have been all that apparent. Sadly, they have become all to clear in the ensuing decades.

For if the Sacred Liturgy (its rites, prayers, chants, and associated arts, etc.) are a “a constitutive element of the holy and living Tradition,” this organism, as handed on in tradition, is itself an essential source for experiencing the Faith and for knowing and reflecting upon what we believe: the Sacred Liturgy is itself theologia prima.5 However, if what we believe determines the rule of prayer, the liturgy can (or ought to) be refashioned according to changes in theology so as to reflect the latter. It is no longer a primary source of theology, but its mirror.

Again, this may not have seemed so dangerous a thing to say in 1947, but by 1967 when what Catholics believed seemed at best to be in flux and at worst in utter turmoil, its potential to underpin a concomitant liturgical revolution was clear. Indeed by 1977 this principle’s potential had been exploited at the official level with a new set of liturgical books reflecting a new theology. At a local level, with very little exercise of liturgical discipline by competent authority, there were extremes: Catholic liturgy was widely regarded as a subjective matter for the local community to “plan,” using even the modern liturgical books with all their options as mere resources rather than receiving them as containing the liturgy given by the Church to be celebrated faithfully. What was believed determined how we prayed: the divergent paucity of the former informed the radical diversity of the latter. There were notable exceptions, of course, but this problem was widespread in both parishes, seminaries and religious communities and, as we know, it manifested itself no more clearly than in the realm of liturgical music.

1. What if a tradition is not being prayed, as was the case for those faithful who did not understand Latin? Monastics and clerics might understand it, but should the normative value of the liturgy rest solely on their participation? How can the sensus fidei/fidelium be exercised properly if the lay people do not understand it? How can there be legitimate development of the liturgy in such an ecclesial environment?

2. What is the source of legitimate development and how is it recognized? (Who has the authority to create or authorize new texts, but the bishops?) Is episcopal approval sufficient, or do the new texts need to be properly received by the Christian faithful as well?

For monastic communities in which all members understand Latin the reception of new liturgical texts composed by members within those communities may not be problematic. Is it enough that they are then adopted by secular priests or bishops for them to be legitimated?

3. Theologia prima - in light of (1) and (2) do we need to re-evaluate the usefulness of the axiom "Lex orandi, lex credendi" or whether it is correct or how it should be understood? How can one pray without not first believing? How can the liturgical texts be put on the same level as Sacred Scripture or oral Tradition? This might be true of the primitive Christian liturgical texts, but is it also true of those texts that replaced them or were added to them?

I am aware that Latin traditionalists are critical even of Mediator Dei but at the moment I cannot see how their concerns are justified because of the above.

4. For me there is also the recurring question of what "sacrifice" means, and how this word has been employed within texts of the Roman rite. Has it been used properly?

Prof Jens Zimmerman on 'The Hermeneutical Significance of Tradition'

Fr. Andrew Stephen Damick on the Bible

The New Heresy

via Byz TX

Which tradition?

I AM A TRADITIONALIST; THEREFORE, I AM by Aristotle Papanikolaou

Papanikolaou makes use of MacIntyre regarding traditions; but shouldn't he distinguish between different ecclesial traditions? There is Sacred Tradition (or the Orthodox equivalent) and then there are theological traditions. There may also be theological opinions about moral teaching but that doesn't mean that those opinions do not reflect the Natural Law. Does Papanikolaou accept that there is a Natural Law? What is his take on the moral law as revealed in the Old Testament?

For those who seek to innovate, they must meet the burden of proof.

And there is also the question of what in the Byzantine tradition reflects Sacred tradition and what does not (female deacons, as opposed to
deaconesses).

Much Needs to Be Revisited

None of the autocephalous Orthodox churches have recognized the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, except for Constantinople.

By what authority does an ecumenical council have to establish patriarchates as having a juridical status, if bishops are equal? Was this locus of authority something handed upon by the apostles, or was it established instead by human/ecclesial positive law? And if the latter, was it just? Can it be abrogated or declared null or invalid? On what basis should autocephaly be granted to a grouping of local Churches? (Or a patriarchate be established?) On the basis of nation? Or of political entities?

Watching the Outlaw King I am reminded of the disputes over authority and contests for power. How can the church be free from such struggles without humility and penance?

Not Sola Scriptura

Pravmir: Why Do Orthodox Christians Need Holy Fathers? Isn't the Bible Enough?

Pope Francis and Capital Punishment

CNA: Vatican Changes Catechism's Teaching on Death Penalty, Calls It Inadmissible

The word "inadmissible" is sure to generate discussion about why that particular word was used -- Bergoglio's sidestepping the question of whether he is contradicting previous Roman teaching on the liceity of capital punishment, and turning it into an absolute prudential judgment with which "reasonable" people should not disagree? Or is it really a synonym for intrinsically immoral?


What do the other apostolic churches teach about capital punishment?

Feser Responds to Fastiggi, Again

Yes, traditional Church teaching on capital punishment is definitive

Robert Fastiggi Responds to Ed Feser

CWR

Feser Responds to Fastiggi

Catholic theologians must set an example of intellectual honesty: A reply to Prof. Robert Fastiggi

A Response to Fastiggi

Link to the article here.

The implication of Fastiggi's defense is that the Church's teaching on capital punishment is neither of the deposit of faith nor is it an obvious precept (or permission) of the Natural Law. In which case, then no mere affirmation or denial of the liceity of capital punishment as being of the Gospel (or of Sacred Tradition) now suffices, as it must be given a justification through moral theology and evaluated accordingly.

I have no real difficulty with the claim that the teaching on the liceity of capital punishment is not a revealed datum. But that it is not of the Natural Law, I need to see an actual argument for that.

Tradition Without Fundamentalism