The sameness of organisms, cities, and corporations: Q&A with Geoffrey West
Evidence of natural law and natural limits? I am doubting it.
Geoffrey West: The surprising math of cities and corporations
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
Professor Cua passed away earlier this year. I didn't know that. I wish I had had the opportunity to meet him while I was in the DC area.
Monday, July 25, 2011
Tony M. over at WWWTW has a post on authority: Political Authority and its Legitimacy.
Who is doing the designating? How so (and on what basis and rationale)? And how is this decision made known? How is authority transferred or conferred?
Who is doing the designating? How so (and on what basis and rationale)? And how is this decision made known? How is authority transferred or conferred?
So, I am going to suggest that even within the context of assuming that all authority comes from God, it is a natural, essential feature of political authority in exercise that there be a public act or condition under which it is recognized, before the ruler can rightly and appropriately demand obedience.
Other than the sheerest direct intervention by miraculous sign, this public event or condition is at the hands of men: it is men, for example, who design and regulate the law of succession from one king to the next. In many cases, it is the oldest son, but in some cultures a group of elders select which son it is. Men can change the rule of succession without a revolution against the existing order. So, it seems to me correct to say that whatever we say about whether God puts the authority into the hands of the body politic as a whole for them to pass on, or not, it must be the case that God normally permits the designation of who shall hold authority as a matter for men to determine. (And this does not imply democracy.)
Labels:
authority,
distributive justice,
justice,
politike
Saturday, July 23, 2011
Friday, July 22, 2011
Thomas Tallis (1505-1585) - Honor, virtus et potestas
Taverner Consort, Taverner Choir
Andrew Parrett
(via the Chant Cafe)
Taverner Consort, Taverner Choir
Andrew Parrett
(via the Chant Cafe)
Thursday, July 21, 2011
OpStJoseph: The Worshiping, Sacramental Body
A lecture by Fr. Walter Wagner, O.P.
A lecture by Fr. Walter Wagner, O.P.
The Worshiping, Sacramental Body from Province of Saint Joseph on Vimeo.
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
Church of God to be released in October
Ignatius Press is printing a new edition of Louis Bouyer's Church of God (via Insight Scoop).
Labels:
books,
ecclesiology,
Ignatius Press,
Louis Bouyer
A good complement to The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State? On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State by Joseph R. Strayer (GB)
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
Edward Feser, Does morality depend on God?
Per impossibile... after all we cannot come into existence on our own. The goods of human nature would stay the same, though something would be missing, our ultimate end.
Now that doesn’t mean that God is irrelevant to ethics; far from it. For one thing, only part of the natural law can be known without reference to God. For example, that murder, lying, adultery, dishonoring parents, etc. are contrary to the good for us can be known from an examination of human nature alone. But the fact that God exists naturally has moral implications of its own, and since for A-T the existence of God can also be known through natural reason, there are certain very general religious obligations (such as the obligation to love God) that can be known through reason alone, and thus form part of the natural law. (Indeed, these are our highest obligations under natural law.) Then there is the fact that the natures of things, including human nature, derive ultimately from those ideas in the divine intellect which form the archetypes by reference to which God creates. (In this way morality is for A-T neither independent of God nor grounded in arbitrary divine commands, as I explained in a post on the Euthyphro objection.) Furthermore, for A-T, a complete account of moral obligation requires reference to God as legislator (even if moral obligation can proximately be explained by reference to the natural end of the will). Finally, divine revelation is also needed for a complete account of everyday moral life. For one thing, divine revelation discloses certain details about morality that the human intellect is too feeble reliably to discover on its own. For another, some aspects of the natural law are so demanding that many people are capable realistically of living up to them only given the hope of a reward in the hereafter, of the sort divine revelation promises. (Again, all of these issues are discussed in Aquinas. See chapter 8 of the first volume of Michael Cronin’s The Science of Ethics for a useful treatment of the proximate and ultimate grounds of moral obligation.)
All the same, since to a large extent the grounds and content of morality can be known from a study of human nature alone, it follows that to a large extent morality would be what it is even if human beings existed and God did not. For, again, morality is not based in arbitrary divine commands any more than scientific laws are expressions of some arbitrary divine whim. From the A-T point of view, “divine command theory” (or at least the crude version of divine command theory that takes the grounds and content of morality to rest on sheer divine fiat) is, I would say, comparable to occasionalism, and similarly objectionable. (Cf. my recent post on Ockham.)
Per impossibile... after all we cannot come into existence on our own. The goods of human nature would stay the same, though something would be missing, our ultimate end.
Monday, July 18, 2011
No, It Was Just Plain Old Equivocal by David Werling
A Response to Fr. Cavalcoli’s letter in the on-going debate over the Second Vatican Council and the traditionalist critique
A Response to Fr. Cavalcoli’s letter in the on-going debate over the Second Vatican Council and the traditionalist critique
I was reading the comments for Edward Feser's latest. Who has the time and money to be a FT apologist? Because that is what is needed for a proper response to be given to those who are objecting to the proofs for the existence of God, claiming that they understand Aquinas's metaphysics.
But have they been convinced by the argument from motion? Is there a problem with jumping to the metaphysical proofs when the physical proof has been neglected or is not understood? After all, Aquinas believes that it is not possible to prove Creation ex nihilo, and that one cannot argue against an eternal Creation. And yet, the proof from motion would nonetheless be sound. Is this true of the third way (possibility/necessity) as well? I would think so... An eternal Creation does not exist necessarily? But can we know this from reason alone? If we can't, we must show that even if it exists necessarily, it is nonetheless caused by another. Or, one has to show that the ultimate necessary being is not material.
So does this show, once again, that there is a need to study physics before metaphysics?
But have they been convinced by the argument from motion? Is there a problem with jumping to the metaphysical proofs when the physical proof has been neglected or is not understood? After all, Aquinas believes that it is not possible to prove Creation ex nihilo, and that one cannot argue against an eternal Creation. And yet, the proof from motion would nonetheless be sound. Is this true of the third way (possibility/necessity) as well? I would think so... An eternal Creation does not exist necessarily? But can we know this from reason alone? If we can't, we must show that even if it exists necessarily, it is nonetheless caused by another. Or, one has to show that the ultimate necessary being is not material.
So does this show, once again, that there is a need to study physics before metaphysics?
Sunday, July 17, 2011
A return to the Divine authority?
Aquinas' moral theology is not a version of divine command theory in so far as that involves [Divine] voluntarism. But while the intelligibility of moral precepts is tied to "eudaimonism," the intelligibility of the precepts does not mitigate their obligatory character. Do discussions of Thomistic virtue ethics ignore this aspect of the moral precepts, and how their observance is tied to the virtues of obedience and religion (and not just charity, even if that is the highest virtue)? (Similarly, even if we rightly call God "Abba" should we not temper out understanding of Him with an acknowledgment of His Sovereignty and His Superiority?)
In an earlier post I talked about Aristotle's discussion of education for the young and how it should be common, or "public." What happens when the society is corrupt and the mores it seeks to impart contradict the natural law? Liberal tolerance may seem nice and neutral, but it involves a rejection of traditional morality and usually directs its adherents to suppressing those who would uphold it. What are families to do when their community has become hostile to tradition and to God? Does this mitigate the obligation to have one's children participate in the common paideia (and I am not equating this with our public school system, even if proponents of public mass education believe they are identical)? I would think so, precisely the authority of God is greater than that of the polis, and what the polis is doing is wrong in the sight of God.
In an earlier post I talked about Aristotle's discussion of education for the young and how it should be common, or "public." What happens when the society is corrupt and the mores it seeks to impart contradict the natural law? Liberal tolerance may seem nice and neutral, but it involves a rejection of traditional morality and usually directs its adherents to suppressing those who would uphold it. What are families to do when their community has become hostile to tradition and to God? Does this mitigate the obligation to have one's children participate in the common paideia (and I am not equating this with our public school system, even if proponents of public mass education believe they are identical)? I would think so, precisely the authority of God is greater than that of the polis, and what the polis is doing is wrong in the sight of God.
Labels:
Aristotle,
law,
moral theology,
politike,
St. Thomas Aquinas,
virtues
Saturday, July 16, 2011
Quare?
Theologian Jean Porter Honored for Book on Natural Law (which has plenty of links, including one for her faculty page)
Nature as reason: a Thomistic theory of the natural law wasn't that good, according to the reviews written by trusted people that I've read. She is being honored for a different book, Ministers of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal Authority by the Catholic Press Association. I should take that organization's opinion into consideration because?
Nature as reason: a Thomistic theory of the natural law wasn't that good, according to the reviews written by trusted people that I've read. She is being honored for a different book, Ministers of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal Authority by the Catholic Press Association. I should take that organization's opinion into consideration because?
Friday, July 15, 2011
Sandro Magister, The Theologian and the Cardinal. An American Story
The censure of a book about God provokes not rupture, but dialogue. The progressive magazine "America" holds out the olive branch. A lesson by Pope Benedict on what "true" theology is
What gives?
The censure of a book about God provokes not rupture, but dialogue. The progressive magazine "America" holds out the olive branch. A lesson by Pope Benedict on what "true" theology is
What gives?
Oh really?
NYT: Internet Use Affects Memory, Study Finds
"The subjects were significantly more likely to remember information if they thought they would not be able to find it later. “Participants did not make the effort to remember when they thought they could later look up the trivia statement they had read,” the authors write."
How much money was spent on exploring what should be obvious? After all, memory does involve some volition, it's not "automatic."
"The subjects were significantly more likely to remember information if they thought they would not be able to find it later. “Participants did not make the effort to remember when they thought they could later look up the trivia statement they had read,” the authors write."
How much money was spent on exploring what should be obvious? After all, memory does involve some volition, it's not "automatic."
Thursday, July 14, 2011
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
James Chastek: "The physical sciences are based not just on measurement, but measurement of a rationalized continuum, which means that there is no possible measurement without a definite numerical value."
His discussion of facts.
His discussion of facts.
The latest issue of Nova et Vetera has an article by Angela McKay Knobel on Aquinas's treatment of the infused and acquired virtues. It does pose a good puzzle about the exact relationship between the two.
Labels:
CUA,
future research,
St. Thomas Aquinas,
virtues
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Monday, July 11, 2011
Radical Orthodoxy: An Interview with John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock
More finger-pointing at Duns Scotus for what ails Western culture.
mp3
More finger-pointing at Duns Scotus for what ails Western culture.
mp3
Labels:
Duns Scotus,
John Milbank,
Radical Orthodoxy,
univocity
Sunday, July 10, 2011
The theology of creation and the theology of the Resurrection (which includes and ratifies Incarnation) demand that prayer should be expressed in a bodily form, involving all the dimensions of bodily expression. The spiritualization of the body calls for the embodiment of the Spirit, and vice versa. Only in this way can man and the world be 'humanized', which means that matter is brought to its spiritual capacity the Spirit is expressed in the wealth of creation. (The Feast of Faith, 71)
St. Thomas doesn't explicitly discuss the use of bodily gestures in prayer? But his teachings could be accommodated to it.
Labels:
human nature,
Joseph Ratzinger,
liturgy,
St. Thomas Aquinas
Saturday, July 09, 2011
Friday, July 08, 2011
Thursday, July 07, 2011
I can understand why some might think the center of the soul is in the head or brain, given the position of the eyes and the importance of sight in our encounter with reality. Even the blind who rely on the developed senses might think of the head as being the important part. What are the reasons for believing that the soul is centered elsewhere, like the gut or the heart?
A reminder that we should thank God for good health.
Simon Lewis: Don't take consciousness for granted
Wednesday, July 06, 2011
Papal Address to Ratzinger Prize Winners
Zenit
Papal Address to Ratzinger Prize Winners
"The Real Question": "Is What We Believe True or Not?"
VATICAN CITY, JULY 1, 2011 (Zenit.org).- Here is a translation of the address Beneedict XVI gave Thursday when he conferred the Ratzinger Prize on its first three winners. The prize recognizes work in theology.
NCR: East-West Catholic Dialogue in D.C.
Orientale Lumen conference tussles over the role of the papacy. Greek Orthodox bishop suggests a Ratzingerian solution.
Orientale Lumen conference tussles over the role of the papacy. Greek Orthodox bishop suggests a Ratzingerian solution.
Tuesday, July 05, 2011
MB posts a link to this: Nut and gristle, a response to a lecture by Dr. Christos Yannaras.
Related:
Dr. Yannaras Receives Honorary Doctor of Divinity
Citation: Bestowal of Honorary Doctorate upon Dr. Christos Yannaras
Address: Dr. Christos Yannaras 14 September 2010
Towards a New Ecumenism
ΠΑΝΤΕΙΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ
Related:
Dr. Yannaras Receives Honorary Doctor of Divinity
Citation: Bestowal of Honorary Doctorate upon Dr. Christos Yannaras
Address: Dr. Christos Yannaras 14 September 2010
Towards a New Ecumenism
ΠΑΝΤΕΙΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ
Monday, July 04, 2011
In reference to Jude Doughtery's synthesis of Aquinas with modern rights theories:
As much as I respect Dr. Dougherty as a senior, I think he is incorrect in his attempt to harmonize a modern rights theory with Aquinas. I don't think he's modified his views since he wrote that piece (which was in the 80s), but then again, I haven't read through his entire corpus. The tendency of modern Thomists to talk about "metaphysical" bases can be rather confusing, though I can see what he is trying to do, to exact a metaphysical argument from Aquinas's theology, just as someone might try to extract an account of ethics or natural law from it. But nonetheless, I think equality of nature is mostly irrelevant to Aquinas's treatment of justice -- it is important in his explanation of charity, the love of neighbor, and that part of the Great Commandment, so it's foundational in that sense to his moral theology. But it doesn't explain what the virtue of justice is, except in so far justice is directed towards other human beings.
My interlocutor writes:
But I did read below the Aquinas citation, and was roughly familiar with Aquinas terms for justice and what they mean before. I'm well aware of what you say about not being able to ground modern conceptions of rights and justice in Aquinas. I agree. But it isn't clear to me it does any good to say he "doesn't talk about justice being founded upon the fact that people are equal because they have the same nature," because it seems to me this just begs the question of what relevant thing it is that people share, in part because the statement "people are equal" is pretty vacuous. I'm not interested in defending modern conceptions of rights and justice. Aquinas is famously inexplicit about moral first principles, still what reasons does he give for his supreme one, neighbor-love? What is the rational basis for the golden rule, or is there one?
The New Natural Law theorists have complained that Aquinas doesn't clearly derive the precepts of the Natural Law from human goods and the like. His discussion of the precepts of the Natural Law in I II 94, 2 is admittedly brief. But Aquinas just doesn't have the same project as the NNL theorists, who wish to focus on the precepts in their model of practical reason. Rather, the precepts are associated with the virtues, and subordinate to them. So when he writes,
Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. (I II 94, 2)
We need to know what is good for man but we also have to understand this in the context of his discussion of the virtues. He doesn't reason out the precepts for the reader, but perhaps it should be fairly obvious.
As for charity, charity extends to neighbor on account of God, who desires to share Himself with rational creatures. So those who have the same nature and end, other human beings, are loved with charity. But so are those that do not have the same nature but are higher, the angels.
As much as I respect Dr. Dougherty as a senior, I think he is incorrect in his attempt to harmonize a modern rights theory with Aquinas. I don't think he's modified his views since he wrote that piece (which was in the 80s), but then again, I haven't read through his entire corpus. The tendency of modern Thomists to talk about "metaphysical" bases can be rather confusing, though I can see what he is trying to do, to exact a metaphysical argument from Aquinas's theology, just as someone might try to extract an account of ethics or natural law from it. But nonetheless, I think equality of nature is mostly irrelevant to Aquinas's treatment of justice -- it is important in his explanation of charity, the love of neighbor, and that part of the Great Commandment, so it's foundational in that sense to his moral theology. But it doesn't explain what the virtue of justice is, except in so far justice is directed towards other human beings.
My interlocutor writes:
But I did read below the Aquinas citation, and was roughly familiar with Aquinas terms for justice and what they mean before. I'm well aware of what you say about not being able to ground modern conceptions of rights and justice in Aquinas. I agree. But it isn't clear to me it does any good to say he "doesn't talk about justice being founded upon the fact that people are equal because they have the same nature," because it seems to me this just begs the question of what relevant thing it is that people share, in part because the statement "people are equal" is pretty vacuous. I'm not interested in defending modern conceptions of rights and justice. Aquinas is famously inexplicit about moral first principles, still what reasons does he give for his supreme one, neighbor-love? What is the rational basis for the golden rule, or is there one?
The New Natural Law theorists have complained that Aquinas doesn't clearly derive the precepts of the Natural Law from human goods and the like. His discussion of the precepts of the Natural Law in I II 94, 2 is admittedly brief. But Aquinas just doesn't have the same project as the NNL theorists, who wish to focus on the precepts in their model of practical reason. Rather, the precepts are associated with the virtues, and subordinate to them. So when he writes,
Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. (I II 94, 2)
We need to know what is good for man but we also have to understand this in the context of his discussion of the virtues. He doesn't reason out the precepts for the reader, but perhaps it should be fairly obvious.
As for charity, charity extends to neighbor on account of God, who desires to share Himself with rational creatures. So those who have the same nature and end, other human beings, are loved with charity. But so are those that do not have the same nature but are higher, the angels.
Labels:
charity,
New Natural Law Theory,
practical reason,
rights
Yes! Magazine: Sarah Van Gelder, Rehabilitation, Not Punishment: A Better Solution to Crime
This is not exactly voluntary, prisoners aren't free to come and go as they please -- there is still a penal aspect to it.
This is not exactly voluntary, prisoners aren't free to come and go as they please -- there is still a penal aspect to it.
Sunday, July 03, 2011
This comment over at WWWTW forced me to return to the diss. to check my notes. (I confess that I was motivated by the desire to give someone a written smackdown.) It was at the very least a good exercise in thinking about ius, and as a result of my new notes I may revise the first chapter or even start from scratch. I was thinking about committing myself to its writing during Mass - maybe a bad distraction. Whether it will happen, we'll see. It is time to check the last revision of the outline.
Saturday, July 02, 2011
LY Faber criticizes remarks made by Francis Cardinal George regarding Duns Scotus.* These days I cringe whenever a bishop or theologian does intellectual history -- the narrative they provide usually seems facile and poorly informed? Who has the time to do history and become an expert on more than one thinker? Very few specialists. A bishop should study good theology instead and not worry about who said what, but too many Catholic intellectuals seek to explain "modernity" and its problems through intellectual currents of the past. Too much of an academic exercise, and not sufficiently "pastoral" -- what do the Christian faithful really need, an egghead or a pastor who will teach them about God?
Unfortunately the tendency to do bad intellectual history seems to be a fault of Joseph Ratzinger as well.
*They are in an unpublished manuscript, “Catholic Christianity and the Millennium: Frontiers of the Mind in the 21st Century.”
Unfortunately the tendency to do bad intellectual history seems to be a fault of Joseph Ratzinger as well.
*They are in an unpublished manuscript, “Catholic Christianity and the Millennium: Frontiers of the Mind in the 21st Century.”
Friday, July 01, 2011
A critique of a recent essay by R. R. Reno giving suggestions as to how we would best help the poor: R. R. Reno's "Preferential Option for the Poor" (from a link posted at FPR)
I can understand why those with families would wish to avoid living in poor areas. A universal precept that aone should move to such areas seems inappropriate. But we should do what we can to build up community and to live in solidarity with the poor, giving up luxuries that are not necessary (and may even interfere with progress in charity) and working for a more just political economy.
What can be done to improve the moral condition of poor areas, if they are beset by moral problems in addition to material poverty? The lack of fathers has had an impact, and government intervention and welfare has not done much.
I can understand why those with families would wish to avoid living in poor areas. A universal precept that aone should move to such areas seems inappropriate. But we should do what we can to build up community and to live in solidarity with the poor, giving up luxuries that are not necessary (and may even interfere with progress in charity) and working for a more just political economy.
What can be done to improve the moral condition of poor areas, if they are beset by moral problems in addition to material poverty? The lack of fathers has had an impact, and government intervention and welfare has not done much.
Rome Reports: Spanish youth tackling controversial issues in Church for WYD 2011 in Madrid
WYD 2011 Madrid (FB)
Pilgrimage Office?
WYD 2011 Madrid (FB)
Pilgrimage Office?
Thursday, June 30, 2011
Stray thoughts
There is a piece still in the works...
An evolutionist holds the assumption that because of DNA, there are a host of "forms" available to a particular organism. But has this been shown to be the case for any one organism/species? What if development is not due DNA alone, but also to epigenetic factors (and processes)? If matter is proportionate to form, then how can the matter that is proper to one form1 (or one set of forms1) be transformed to the matter proper for a different form1 (or different set of forms2) by changes in the DNA alone? One would have to show that the DNA is a cause for those epigenetic factors as well, rather than being one tool among many...
Form1 - substantial form (At the moment I think organization, a la Goodwin, is inadequate, as substantial form encompasses organization but more than that.)
Form2 - the structure(s) of the organism, which constitute its appearance
An evolutionist holds the assumption that because of DNA, there are a host of "forms" available to a particular organism. But has this been shown to be the case for any one organism/species? What if development is not due DNA alone, but also to epigenetic factors (and processes)? If matter is proportionate to form, then how can the matter that is proper to one form1 (or one set of forms1) be transformed to the matter proper for a different form1 (or different set of forms2) by changes in the DNA alone? One would have to show that the DNA is a cause for those epigenetic factors as well, rather than being one tool among many...
Form1 - substantial form (At the moment I think organization, a la Goodwin, is inadequate, as substantial form encompasses organization but more than that.)
Form2 - the structure(s) of the organism, which constitute its appearance
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Kathryn Jean Lopez interviews Robert P. George: Sex and the Empire State
Losing marriage to sexual liberalism.
Losing marriage to sexual liberalism.
Monday, June 27, 2011
The Pursuit of Happiness: Can We Have an Economy of Well-Being? by Carol Graham
Eudaimonia would be the answer but we already have disputes about what constitutes the good life and the its relation to the moral law...
Eudaimonia would be the answer but we already have disputes about what constitutes the good life and the its relation to the moral law...
Sunday, June 26, 2011
OpStJoseph: The Spirituality of Blessed John Henry Newman (Part I)
Part 2:
Oratorian? How did it diverge from that of St. Philip Neri?
Part 2:
Oratorian? How did it diverge from that of St. Philip Neri?
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Friday, June 24, 2011
James Chastek, Notions of the Soul
How does "arrangement" differ from the contemporary concept of "organization"?
The first real account we get of what the soul is – which is still firmly materialistic – is that the soul is some arrangement of parts which, of themselves, are not living. The Greeks called this the theory that the soul was a harmony, and it is still the simplest theory of the soul (though we would probably dump “harmony” in favor of something more scienecy- sounding). The theory is continually abandoned for various reasons, the simplest being that arrangement is a feature of position or place, but if all one does is change the position or place of something, it doesn’t cease to be what it is. If all there was to being alive was arrangement, then death wouldn’t change what a thing was – which would mean that a cow doesn’t cease to be a cow when it dies.
How does "arrangement" differ from the contemporary concept of "organization"?
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Pertinacious Papist: The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism. PP republishes a review, originally published in Latin Mass Magazine, by Christopher Oleson of Thaddeus Kozinski's The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism. (archive for the review)
Related:
A review at NDPR
Related:
A review at NDPR
Byzantine, Texas: A favorite Orientale Lumen Conference podcast - Sr. Dr. Vassa Larin.
Labels:
liturgy,
Orientale Lumen,
Orthodox,
Sister Vassa Larin
Zenit: That I May See You
A Look at Benedict XVI's Catecheses on Christian Prayer
By Kevin M. Clarke
A Look at Benedict XVI's Catecheses on Christian Prayer
By Kevin M. Clarke
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
John Finnis on the Good of Marriage
Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good (via Mirror of Justice)
I have something in the works on the difference between "traditional" Thomistic moral theology/philosophy and the New Natural Theology regarding human goods. I maintain that in the former, the good to which we aim or which we intend is understood [primarily or exclusively] as an activity (or action), while it is understood within the NNLT as some sort of state or quasi-habit. This has an impact on the question of whether there is a single good which constitutes human happiness (and how various goods are integrated).
One could ask whether a model of practical reason is descriptive or normative. Some features of human practical reasoning are universal -- means-ends, the relationship of human desire to a (perceived) good (even if this is denied in a particular moral theory), the nature of practical reason as being focused on human action. Some aspects are present only to those educated (or raised) within a specific tradition.
I have something in the works on the difference between "traditional" Thomistic moral theology/philosophy and the New Natural Theology regarding human goods. I maintain that in the former, the good to which we aim or which we intend is understood [primarily or exclusively] as an activity (or action), while it is understood within the NNLT as some sort of state or quasi-habit. This has an impact on the question of whether there is a single good which constitutes human happiness (and how various goods are integrated).
One could ask whether a model of practical reason is descriptive or normative. Some features of human practical reasoning are universal -- means-ends, the relationship of human desire to a (perceived) good (even if this is denied in a particular moral theory), the nature of practical reason as being focused on human action. Some aspects are present only to those educated (or raised) within a specific tradition.
Labels:
ethics,
good,
John Finnis,
New Natural Law Theory,
practical reason
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Emmaus Patch: Local Priest and Author Explores Orthodoxy in new Book
He says theology is not just theory and doctrine matters.
Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy
He says theology is not just theory and doctrine matters.
Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy
Monday, June 20, 2011
The FB page for CUA press announces that Fr. Emery's book, The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God has been released.
If bread is not a substance in itself, but a union of [substances] that constitute the bread, flour, salt, etc., then what happens when the bread is transformed into the Body of Christ? Is an accidental union replaced by a substantial union, with each part of bread a potential substance only when it is separated from the rest? Or is each part a substance unto itself?
Sunday, June 19, 2011
Saturday, June 18, 2011
Thomistica.net: Reflections on Ralph McInerny
Which reminds me, I should contact St. Augustine Press.
Which reminds me, I should contact St. Augustine Press.
Friday, June 17, 2011
Was looking at the program for this year's New Wine, New Wineskins Conference and this caught my eye: Michael J. Martocchio, “The Ethics of Sustainability”
I assume this is he, listed as a member of the adjunct faculty at Duquesne.
Related:
Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church
Richard Heinberg, Five Axioms of Sustainability
Kirkpatrick Sale, The Four Pillars of Sustainability
Thriving Beyond Sustainability: Pathways to a Resilient Society by Andrés R. Edwards
I assume this is he, listed as a member of the adjunct faculty at Duquesne.
Related:
Catholic Theological Ethics in the World Church
Richard Heinberg, Five Axioms of Sustainability
Kirkpatrick Sale, The Four Pillars of Sustainability
Thriving Beyond Sustainability: Pathways to a Resilient Society by Andrés R. Edwards
Labels:
conferences,
ethics,
moral theology,
sustainability
Idealism, subjectivity, and Divine Revelation
Kyle R. Cupp: Patriarchy, Theology and Doctrine, More on Power, Patriarchy and Truth, and Am I a Dissenter?
In combating controversy, the Church has refrained from declaring certain philosophical systems or statements or positions as erroneous, except when they manifestly contradict her teachings. Is there a new form of Modernism afoot, which is an attack not on supernatural knowledge directly, but indirectly through questioning of natural human knowledge (and communication, which is dependent upon language). How can a false understanding of human knowledge not lead to some form of neo-Modernism? The Church may need to declare certain propositions concerning human knowledge to be errors in order to safeguard Revelation, the authority of the Church, and Apostolic Succession, if such errors ever gain prominence, instead of being the speculation of academics lacking a solid preparation in philosophy. If the object of the intellect is not the thing but an idea or concept, then how is the idea connected to the thing? How can one possibly know that the idea represents reality?
Epistemology, knowledge, truth: what is the relationship between what one believes about human knowledge and Divine revelation here? Communication or teaching is meditated through human language, which is grounded upon human knowledge. But language is also grounded upon custom; hence part of education lies in untangling the two. Belief or faith doesn't require that the proposition is evident for one to assent to it; in fact, belief or faith is only possible when the proposition is not evident. Nonetheless, that the mind can have opinions is an indication that the mind transcends the material (and sensation)? So how does the modern distinguish between nous, episteme and doxa?
Not all are careful enough to define their terms in their arguments, and so "interpretation" comes into play, especially if there is no acceptable tradition providing definitions for those terms. But with respect to human knowledge (philosophy or science), one does not learn from words alone, but by checking those propositions against reality and what one already knows.
Regardig "realism" -- Aristotelian-Thomism is sometimes said to be "moderate" realism, while Platonism is "radical" or "extreme" realism. Plato does not deny that we have true knowledge, but the things that are the object of our knowledge are the Forms, not the material world. But the realism to which I refer is not with regards to universals, but to our knowledge; the contrast between realism and idealism. Can there be such a melding of realism and idealism so that it is still realism, a la "phenomenological realism"? If we have knowledge of ideas and things, then what makes the connection, and how do we know that such relation is true?
Are some mistaking the way we transition from confusion to knowledge through refining of definitions for something else? Our understanding of things can grow, but our starting point must be the thing, and not an idea of that thing. A "philosophy of hermeneutics" might be plausible if one was dealing with just opinions, and not reality. No wonder scientists scorn philosophers.
SEP: hermeneutics, phenomenology, epistemology
Modernism
In combating controversy, the Church has refrained from declaring certain philosophical systems or statements or positions as erroneous, except when they manifestly contradict her teachings. Is there a new form of Modernism afoot, which is an attack not on supernatural knowledge directly, but indirectly through questioning of natural human knowledge (and communication, which is dependent upon language). How can a false understanding of human knowledge not lead to some form of neo-Modernism? The Church may need to declare certain propositions concerning human knowledge to be errors in order to safeguard Revelation, the authority of the Church, and Apostolic Succession, if such errors ever gain prominence, instead of being the speculation of academics lacking a solid preparation in philosophy. If the object of the intellect is not the thing but an idea or concept, then how is the idea connected to the thing? How can one possibly know that the idea represents reality?
Epistemology, knowledge, truth: what is the relationship between what one believes about human knowledge and Divine revelation here? Communication or teaching is meditated through human language, which is grounded upon human knowledge. But language is also grounded upon custom; hence part of education lies in untangling the two. Belief or faith doesn't require that the proposition is evident for one to assent to it; in fact, belief or faith is only possible when the proposition is not evident. Nonetheless, that the mind can have opinions is an indication that the mind transcends the material (and sensation)? So how does the modern distinguish between nous, episteme and doxa?
Not all are careful enough to define their terms in their arguments, and so "interpretation" comes into play, especially if there is no acceptable tradition providing definitions for those terms. But with respect to human knowledge (philosophy or science), one does not learn from words alone, but by checking those propositions against reality and what one already knows.
Regardig "realism" -- Aristotelian-Thomism is sometimes said to be "moderate" realism, while Platonism is "radical" or "extreme" realism. Plato does not deny that we have true knowledge, but the things that are the object of our knowledge are the Forms, not the material world. But the realism to which I refer is not with regards to universals, but to our knowledge; the contrast between realism and idealism. Can there be such a melding of realism and idealism so that it is still realism, a la "phenomenological realism"? If we have knowledge of ideas and things, then what makes the connection, and how do we know that such relation is true?
Are some mistaking the way we transition from confusion to knowledge through refining of definitions for something else? Our understanding of things can grow, but our starting point must be the thing, and not an idea of that thing. A "philosophy of hermeneutics" might be plausible if one was dealing with just opinions, and not reality. No wonder scientists scorn philosophers.
SEP: hermeneutics, phenomenology, epistemology
Modernism
Labels:
Divine Revelation,
Magisterium,
Modernism,
philosophy
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